Major General Short...

[AW1Steve]

Yet Richardson was fired for doing just that. It interfered with "training". [:(]

[Don Bowen]

US Military thinking did not consider a carrier based attack on Hawaii. They bases were alerted for sabotage and for submarine attacks - and were well prepared for either. The blow was expected on the Philippines, which fared as bad or worse. Not Kimmel or Short, it was MacArthur that was the big failure. Yet he finished the war a "hero".

[bradfordkay]

And yet twice in the interwar years, US carriers "attacked" Pearl Harbor during maneuvers. It seems that some military minds were more "open" to the idea than others. Personally, I can't picture being in command at a major installation on the eve of war and not having some search aircraft out - if for no other reason than to search for submarines.

It is my understanding the Adm. Richardson was fired because of his opposition to basing the fleet in Pearl Harbor at all, not because he ordered air searches that "interfered with training".

[Alfred]

There simply were not sufficient search planes at Pearl Harbor to allow for a 360 degree search out to 700 miles. Secretary Forrestal's 1945 comment that there were sufficient assets tellingly was that there were sufficient assets for a 128 degree search.

So the question comes down to which sector gets searched. When Kimmel's predecessor, Richardson deployed his air search assets in the west to northwest sector, the very sector from which the USN "successfully" attacked Pearl Harbor in 1938. Even so Richardson had only extended the regular exercises from 180 to 300 miles using 6 planes.

Kimmel together with his senior air commander Halsey and his intelligence chief Layton all believed that any attack would come from the Marshalls, ie the southwest. As he lacked the means to mount a meaningful search, Kimmel took the conscious decision to save his assets for when they could be meaningfully employed.

So whether Richardson's search plan or Kimmel's brains trust views been represented in a search plan, the KB would have been missed anyway as it launched from a different quadrant and much further out to sea.

As top naval dog at Pearl Harbor, Kimmel of course has to wear the consequences. Doesn't change the fact that others whose decisions resulted in outcomes at least as bad as Pearl Harbor, were not accorded similar treatment as that suffered by Short and Kimmel. Politics and luck are great determinants of how successful a career ultimately turns out to be.

Alfred

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

You can only imagine what would have happened to them if they were Russian, German, Chinese, or Japanese officers...

Interestingly, Germans were quite forgiving when it came to failures on among generals, at least up until 1944 assasination plot. They would have just sidelined general just like what happened to Short.
Even Japanese were not too keen on executing generals, for example Homma's performance on PI was seen as way sub-par, but he was just sidelined, not executed.

Soviets, on the other hand, were bit more unforgiving...

[crsutton]

I have been reading a biography of Chiang Kai Shek. He was not adverse to shooting a general or two.

[jeffk3510]

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen


US Military thinking did not consider a carrier based attack on Hawaii. They bases were alerted for sabotage and for submarine attacks - and were well prepared for either. The blow was expected on the Philippines, which fared as bad or worse. Not Kimmel or Short, it was MacArthur that was the big failure. Yet he finished the war a "hero".

Glad I am not the only one who thinks this way....

[bradfordkay]

Alfred, yes, I know that there were not enough aircraft for a 360 degree search. This does not mean that the commanders should have given up and said, "oh eff it... we just won't try at all." Since the threat was expected to come from the Japanese Mandated Islands it is likely that the search aircraft would never have found the enemy, but not having them up at all is a serious failure, IMO. Besides, a 128 degree search pattern would have covered the most likely avenues of approach.

And this still doesn't even address the lack of a single CAP section flying that morning.

[TSCofield]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

There simply were not sufficient search planes at Pearl Harbor to allow for a 360 degree search out to 700 miles. Secretary Forrestal's 1945 comment that there were sufficient assets tellingly was that there were sufficient assets for a 128 degree search.

So the question comes down to which sector gets searched. When Kimmel's predecessor, Richardson deployed his air search assets in the west to northwest sector, the very sector from which the USN "successfully" attacked Pearl Harbor in 1938. Even so Richardson had only extended the regular exercises from 180 to 300 miles using 6 planes.

Kimmel together with his senior air commander Halsey and his intelligence chief Layton all believed that any attack would come from the Marshalls, ie the southwest. As he lacked the means to mount a meaningful search, Kimmel took the conscious decision to save his assets for when they could be meaningfully employed.

So whether Richardson's search plan or Kimmel's brains trust views been represented in a search plan, the KB would have been missed anyway as it launched from a different quadrant and much further out to sea.

As top naval dog at Pearl Harbor, Kimmel of course has to wear the consequences. Doesn't change the fact that others whose decisions resulted in outcomes at least as bad as Pearl Harbor, were not accorded similar treatment as that suffered by Short and Kimmel. Politics and luck are great determinants of how successful a career ultimately turns out to be.

Alfred

Maybe but there was no search planes out, even going the wrong direction. In fact, the entire post was on a relaxed, peacetime status even though war warnings had been posted just a week earlier.

Short and Kimmels biggest mistake was that of complacency. In hall honesty neither of them thought the Japanese were either strong enough nor ballsy enough to mount an attack like they did. Even though the history of the Imperial Japanese war philosophy was based on suprise and bold maneuvers dating back to the Russo-Japanese War the commanders at Pearl continued to dismiss the abilities of the Japanese forces.

The only way to really cripple the US was to engage in a bold attack, something similar to the torpedo attack that the Japanese did at Port Arthur in 1904. This suprise attack took the Russian Far East Fleet out of commission early on and created conditions that led to Tsushima. Bold risks were part of the Japanese history but the subtle racism of the Americans and the British of the time simply couldnt' consider the Japanese soldier, airman or sailor could be of the same calibre as their British or American counterparts. The only way the Japanese could hurt the US at Pearl Harbor was by sabotage, a 'sneaky Jap' method of trickery. The concept that the Japanese could actually come all the way from Japan with a fleet and attack Pearl Harbor was simply inconceivable to many US commanders during the time.

And as a result such an attack occured. And they both deserved to lose their commands for it. As others have said a commander's responsibility is to protect the command he is entrusted with against any reasonable condition. The commanders at Pearl Harbor just didn't consider such an attack as possible and that was their biggest failing. If they had, they would have done some things differently. Maybe there wouldn't have been waves of P40s aloft on December 7th but there wouldn't have been the peacetime attitude on the post that was prevelant after multiple warnings that war was both possible and imminent. Short and Kimmel were both guilty of complaceny, assuming that it could never happen to them, here at Pearl. In a way similar to attack on September 11th the leadership ignored warning signs and failed to take into consideration repeated evidence that the Japanese were planning something spectacular to tip the scales in their favor.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

I agree Short was unlucky. What is everyones take on Kimmel?

Gunclub/peacetime admiral. Not what you want in wartime.

[vinnie71]

One issue that no one has mentioned is that almost in every quarter of the American military, they did not believe they would be attacked. Mostly out of a sense of superiority that the Japanese did not have the stomach for war with a great power.

And yet, Japanese actions in the previous 2 generations should have alerted them to who they were dealing with. A surprise attack on the Russians initiated their mutual war. Also their sheer bloody mindedness in accepting casualties in relentless assaults on fortifications and the ability to manoever effectively on the battlefield showed their competence as well.

Besides the Japanese had been flaunting 'international opinion' since the Mukden incident and therefore was well known, having attacked foreign ships and interests in China for over a decade. IN a sense, the allies were essentially trying to bully Japan while lacking both the teeth and the will to bring her in line. This state of affairs had existed for 10 years and the allies were luled in a false sense of security and superiority. Frankly the Japanese profited from their adversaries sense of superiority.

To put it bluntly, I don't believe that the single person (Short or Kimmel) should be blamed. They were no more than representatives of the military system they served.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: jeffk3510
I agree Short was unlucky. What is everyones take on Kimmel?

Kimmel was a brilliant rising star in the Navy. He was smart, dedicated, experienced. Stark liked him, Ernie King liked him. He was one of the few that were 'fleeted up' to positions beyond what they normally would have been entitled to.

What could he have done, given other circumstances? I don't think anyone will ever know. I frankly like him. He was a lot like Nimitz and had a lot of the same background. He was an historical gunclub guy, but he had the ability to recognize changing times and tactical imperitives. Just look at his appreciations vis a vis Richardson's.

I think he got totally screwed. I would hire the man in a heartbeat. And give him a huge administrative area.

[TSCofield]

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

One issue that no one has mentioned is that almost in every quarter of the American military, they did not believe they would be attacked. Mostly out of a sense of superiority that the Japanese did not have the stomach for war with a great power.

Actually I did, first page.

[Blackhorse]

ORIGINAL: SimHq Tom Cofield

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

One issue that no one has mentioned is that almost in every quarter of the American military, they did not believe they would be attacked. Mostly out of a sense of superiority that the Japanese did not have the stomach for war with a great power.

Actually I did, first page.

It is fair to say that the Western powers underestimated Japan's fighting abilities, but not Japan's willingness to wage war. By November, 1941 the conventional wisdom among the military and naval leadership was that Japan was going to attack somewhere, somehow. The surprise was that they attacked as far away as Pearl Harbor.

In early December, British Admiral Philipps was in Manila, discussing with MacArthur what do to when the war started. Philipps was summoned back to Singapore on the 5th, after the Japanese invasion convoys were sited in the Gulf of Siam. In November, Halsey told his ship captains that they should be prepared to attack the Japanese, if their ships were encountered on patrol.

When the Secretary of War received word of the attack on Pearl Harbor, his immediate reaction was, "My God. This must be wrong. This must mean the Philippines."

Costello, in The Pacific War, concludes that the British had probably broken the Japanese naval operational code, and told the U.S. of their findings, including an IJN fleet warning in early November to prepare for war with the British, Dutch and Americans. The Americans did not know if the Japanese would attack only the British and Dutch -- gambling that Roosevelt might not be able to wrangle a declaration of war out of the Congress -- or if they would make a pre-emptive strike on the Philippines as well.