So now you gonna make me go get Morrison and quote him?
How very tiresome.
Capturing Land Air Bases was THE CENTRAL STRATEGY of the Pacific War.
Moderators: Joel Billings, Tankerace, siRkid
Oh my
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Re: Oh my
I am looking at a map of the Coral Sea battle. I used a ruler. The absolute closest Fletcher got to Rabaul was around 550 to 525 nautical miles. Quote whomever you like.Originally posted by Chiteng
So now you gonna make me go get Morrison and quote him?
How very tiresome.
Here is a map for you. This is not the one I have here in my office, but it'll do :
Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. 
another thing to keep in mind where discussing the "control of the sea lanes by LBA", is that it is not attacking the moving task force that is so effective, but attacking those transports while they are loading and unloading. That is the time they are the most vulnerable. being able to fly medium or heavy bombers to attack anchored/docked transports will surely help 'contol the seal lanes.'
ahhh
ahhh that is the problem the date. Dont worry Dhaad I will get you the date.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Re: ahhh
Well, don't forget you are talking about the involvement of US carriers under the command of Fletcher in the Battle of the Coral Sea, which is traditionally given as May 7th - 8th, 1942. The map covers Fletchers movements from May 4th to May 9th.Originally posted by Chiteng
ahhh that is the problem the date. Dont worry Dhaad I will get you the date.
Last time I checked, the forums were messed up.
smoking gun
The capture of bases for use as air platforms to use against naval vessels was an important consideration and motivation during the Pacific war, however it was not the only reason, nor do i see what this has to do with discussions that revolve around both the effectiveness of level bombers flying at low range against shipping (and especially warships) and the apparant lack of consequence for doing so.
To answer the historical perogative and put things into persepective here, lets acknowledge that air/bases were taken to provide a variety of services, of which sea control and sea denial was only one of them.
Bases were important as logistical focal points, way points and safe havens for ships as well as jumping off points for future operations.
Sometimes they were also used strictly to coherce the enemy into battle, such as Midway for example. Yamamotto's ONLY reason for attacking Midway was to draw out the remains of the US fleet and get that "Decisive Battle" he so badly wanted, one that would force the US to the negotiation table and lead to a "short war".....the only war that Japan had a chance of winning with the Industrial Giant in the east.
The fact that Midway was an airbase was important only in what losing it to the enemy would mean to the Americans, hence Yamamotto's train of thought that the USN would "have" to do something about it. Capturing Midway would both impede US efforts to return to the central Pacific and more importantly would provide Japan with an air platform to stage potential airraids on Pearl Harbor itself...rather important a consideration given that PH was the "Normura" of the entire Pacific theatre for them.
Attacking ships at sea was if anything, a low factor and a bonus at best but with so much ocean out there, it would have been easy for the US shipping routes to go south to keep the lifelines to Australia open.
Philippines:
Yes and no regarding the "ship" issue......aircover "was" important.....because in the real world even a single errant bomb hit means one less merchant or warship on the front lines doing it's job as opposed to sitting idle in a harbor. But that was hardly the only factor. More importantly having control of the air makes it the most threatening to merchant shipping, less so warships though that "threat" is there too. Another big threat, and one far far far more important than attempting "Sea control" out on the greater ocean is what can happen when an *unmoving* transport fleet at anchor is trying to unload it's troops and supplies and from there get them off the beaches and into the front lines where they are less vulnerable. By that virtue it is "essential" that the invading force have air superiority. Hitting moving ships is not a factor here.
Having air superiority also is a vital component to assisting the ground pounders themselves once the fighting has started, both in direct ground support as well as logistical interdiction.
Finally....and this was one of the BIGGIES.....Japan had to attack the airfields of Clark and others because of the obvious presence of strategic bomber elements based there which in turn could bomb the bejeevus out of the major Japanese air bases on Formosa, from which much of the Japanese air component would be launched. Losing that component or having it interdicted would have majorly F**** up the entire Japanese invasion time-table for the whole region
In other words, of course the Japanese had to take the airfields....this of itself is not an indication of the effectiveness of level bombers against moving warships (and merchants)
**
12/10/41
An odd example to use in my opinion (no offense to anyone). What killed the Prince of wales and Repulse? one a modern battleship designed to survive in an environment which included modern aircraft?
Not bombs.......and those few that hit did *nothing* of consequence.....those little bombs were incapable of piercing the thick skin of the PoW and didn't make much of an impression on the old Repulse either (Britian's weakest capital ship)
No gents....."Torpedoes" were the killer here, delivered in then "exotic" fashion by twin engined level bombers designed or modified to carry them with crews trained to operate in that fashion. I'm not sure the Allies were even aware that the enemy operated in such a fashion, certainly the general assumption before the war was that the IJN and IJA operated obsolete junk with medicore pilots at best.
wrong.
**
Solomons......UV et all
Dgaad is correct in one thing....the "threat" of LBA is real enough that it must be taken into account, but we must remember that here, as in other areas, is a key difference between one who "wargames" and real life. In a wargame a player can be bold and daring because his job and his life are not at stake, thus he can act more rashly and maybe get away with it, or if not, noones gonna call him on the carpet. Just as with the tactics we are debating here, we must keep that in mind as well
that said......
What was Rabaul's greatest threat to carriers..? Again it was torpedo carrying twin engined bombers if the range was long. If the range was short....single engined types just like those carried by the carriers themselves.......If the US wasn't aware of the long range threat before the Brits got spanked then they had to be aware of it now.
However one thing to remember.....IIRC Rabaul did engage a carrier early in the war, either before or during Coral Sea. Due to the extreme range the attacking Beattys, unescorted, suffered greatly at the hands of the CAP (believe this is the one where one USN pilot became an "ace" in one battle, shooting down 5 beattys)
The point here, is three fold.
1) the enemy was attacking at low level, with torpedoes (a ship's worst enemy. A commander has to take them seriously by default as there's no such thing as a "good underwater hit" One hit.....just one hit would be enough to send a precious carrier back to the States for repairs.....alot can happen in the time it takes....ask the Saratoga which kept getting torpedoed by submarines on the way to the front lines!
2) Such an attack, even thwarted would throw a scare into any but the most insane or bullish carrier commander (so i'm little unsuprised that Jack Fletcher, who was not bullish and prone to excessive caution) gave LBA bases such as Rabaul a wide berth
3) We see the Pro and Con issues missing from UV The potential "threat" and reward of a LBA low level attack on a carrier TF, but coming at a steep price in hacked down level bombers due to flak and CAP ministrations.
As with the Phillipines, airpower played far too broad a role in the sequence of events for it to be IMO portrayed as some kind of vindication of the effectiveness of LBA against moving ships.
First and formost the massive level bomber forces primary influence in this theatre was New Gineau where their presence made IJA ground operations hell on earth. As for anti ship operations......largely ineffective outside of scouting until the development of skip bombing attacks which were mostly effective against ill prepared and/or ill defended merchant convoys...thus creating a hammer and anvil effect
the hammer......pound the enemy troops and bases, making it a combat and logistical hell
the anvil......complete the maneuver by denying and hindering the enemy's troop and supply convoy efforts.
As for the Solomons chain itself......what made Henderson field so deadly to the Japanese?
Answer: dive bombers and fighter bombers.
Dive bombing and even glide bombing (for fighters not suited for the stresses of diving at high angles) is far more effective against warships, especially merchants vs level bombers.
Level bombers were important though for recon, and most importantly for plastering ports and air bases giving them the air superiority to march up the chain with little threat from enemy air assets. they could also be devastating against stationary ships such as during one of Yamamotto's last great reinforce efforts that preceeded the Third battle of the Solomons where after Henderson was all but knocked out, raiding B-17's from Santos caused havoc at the Japanese beachhead (along with the ragtag survivors of Henderson itself)
The threat against ships is there too, but is only one component of this strategy.
More importanly, the American "leap frogging" strategy was born not out of the need for airbases but out of a need of a quicker, less costly solution to trying to assault heavily defended IJA/N bases for at this point one thing the Japanese had aplenty was troops.....unfort they did not have the air and sea assets to go with it.
What were the primary air weapons used here? Fighter-bombers and single engined dive bombers. With a chain of small to medium bases it was enough to control the seas and make life hell for any warships, merchants.....and even barges that tried to slip in.
As for the warships......well lets put it into perspective again....when the IJN massively reinforced Rabaul with over a half dozen heavy cruisers and attendant destroyers shortly before the US assault on Bouginaville, they detected this buildup.....a serious potential threat...particularily given the dearth of USN surface assets at the time (most gearing up for big effort in the Central Pacific)
Did they unleash big clumsy level bombers against this formidable naval force using low level attacks or even "skip bombing"?
nope....they sent in a carrier TF armed with fighters, dive and torp bombers.
back to Japan goes the majority of the IJN assets with interest and the invasion is on.
**
1944 onward.
Back to what i was saying earlier. Yes air superiority is important but by this time anti-ship operations were hardly the major goal.....the USN had it's burgening mobile airbases by then...the carriers, armed with planes designed for anti ship with pilots trained for it.
Saipen was needed first and formost to provide an LBA platform for heavy bombers to attack Japan. (perhaps forcing an early surrender? one could hope at the time)
It also provided a logical way point for the US fleet train so that the USN could continue it's penetration of the IJN inner defence line.
**
return to the Philippines.
An obvious magnet......politically MacArthur vowed to return and he'd campaigned hard for it bending the ear of Roosevelt. He got his wish....there were obvious strategic reasons as well......taking it back would cut off the Empire from it's South seas conquests and make the stranglehold on Japan's sea lanes all the more complete. LBA would also be assisted by having bases close enough to Japan to assist long range fighters
Anti-ship again....a small but pertient component but hardly the overriding factor.
One must also consider the role of aircraft types as well. Even in the earlier logistically strained days, the aircraft that would make LBA's the biggest threat to enemy naval forces are single engined aircraft. Dive and torpedo bombers which can counter-attack carriers and benefit from basing on an "unsinkable" carrier and escorted by fighters can negate the new mobile weapon of the two navies.
Level bombers are a threat too, but one substantially less so, unless, like the IJN you train and equip your twin engined planes to carry torps. One should also ask why they did this in the first place if level bombers are such great ship killers as they were orig designed
**
Let me clarify a point here. I am not, repeat **not** advocating making LBA ineffective against ships....warships or merchants. I've played plenty of past wargames where this was the case. Games such as Carrier Force , or Carrier Strike, or to a lesser degree.....PacWar.
However, those games did not allow you to control altitude settings so a doctornal "default" was set in place. Good in one way as it did well to simulate the lackluster ability of level bombers hitting dedicated warships at sea, bad in a sense as it did at times make a gamer wonder what use at all land based aircraft were (part of this due too, to the tactical scope of the games in question as well, where only carrier battles mattered)
The "problem" here, is that players are exploiting a micro-management feature to put forth a strategy that inflates the effectiveness of level bombers ****without consequence****
and that is wrong.
Alot of good ideas have been put forth on this, including a few by me (well in my opinion anyway ) To bury our heads in the sand on this issue is to do a diservice to the wargaming community.
I'm all for level bombers being used "agressively" which is probably the best overall term to describe things here, but one should also have to pay the piper on it in the form of shot down and shot up bombers and shell shocked (fatiqued) crews, increased down time for said bombers (when said level bombers might be needed to support operations they were better suited for such as recon.....ground support, base interdiction etc)
You might get lucky and score that bomb hit.......especially if you catch a fat and slow merchant convoy with little protection.....but then again you might catch a hornet's nest of warships or a heavily defended convoy that pours flak into the nice exposed big bellies of these clumsy brutes with all their racks of bombs.
Its up to the players to decide their priorities.
Right now its a no brainer....because there's no "con" to the argument. So keep all those twin and four engined bombers attacking at 100 - 1000 feet.
Gotta admit too...i cringed at the Billy Mitchell example......all that farcical publicity stunt proved was that level bombers were capable of sinking unmanned, motionless ships, some at ridiculously low altitudes (to ensure hits for the cameras)
And the "unsinkable" Ostfriesland....."dreaded" (hoo!) German battleship? Mitchell could have sunk her with a carpenter's hammer in the shape she was in (previous flooding unattended too, bringing unprotected glass scuttles below the current waterline.
She would never have been in danger had she been crewed at the time, even if anchored.
Potential was there....but only potential and even in WWII it wasn't nearly as effective as thought. Italian high level attacks were total failure. Taranto was a triumph of carrier based single engined boldness (using torps again)
PH raid used carrier aircraft designed for anti-ship and again , the most devastating weapons were the torps (the one exception the converted 16.1 inch naval shells lugged into the air by the B5N's......KO'ing the USS Arizona, (which wasn't moving at the time or firing back)
Perspective.....its not just for breakfest anymore
To answer the historical perogative and put things into persepective here, lets acknowledge that air/bases were taken to provide a variety of services, of which sea control and sea denial was only one of them.
Bases were important as logistical focal points, way points and safe havens for ships as well as jumping off points for future operations.
Sometimes they were also used strictly to coherce the enemy into battle, such as Midway for example. Yamamotto's ONLY reason for attacking Midway was to draw out the remains of the US fleet and get that "Decisive Battle" he so badly wanted, one that would force the US to the negotiation table and lead to a "short war".....the only war that Japan had a chance of winning with the Industrial Giant in the east.
The fact that Midway was an airbase was important only in what losing it to the enemy would mean to the Americans, hence Yamamotto's train of thought that the USN would "have" to do something about it. Capturing Midway would both impede US efforts to return to the central Pacific and more importantly would provide Japan with an air platform to stage potential airraids on Pearl Harbor itself...rather important a consideration given that PH was the "Normura" of the entire Pacific theatre for them.
Attacking ships at sea was if anything, a low factor and a bonus at best but with so much ocean out there, it would have been easy for the US shipping routes to go south to keep the lifelines to Australia open.
Philippines:
Yes and no regarding the "ship" issue......aircover "was" important.....because in the real world even a single errant bomb hit means one less merchant or warship on the front lines doing it's job as opposed to sitting idle in a harbor. But that was hardly the only factor. More importantly having control of the air makes it the most threatening to merchant shipping, less so warships though that "threat" is there too. Another big threat, and one far far far more important than attempting "Sea control" out on the greater ocean is what can happen when an *unmoving* transport fleet at anchor is trying to unload it's troops and supplies and from there get them off the beaches and into the front lines where they are less vulnerable. By that virtue it is "essential" that the invading force have air superiority. Hitting moving ships is not a factor here.
Having air superiority also is a vital component to assisting the ground pounders themselves once the fighting has started, both in direct ground support as well as logistical interdiction.
Finally....and this was one of the BIGGIES.....Japan had to attack the airfields of Clark and others because of the obvious presence of strategic bomber elements based there which in turn could bomb the bejeevus out of the major Japanese air bases on Formosa, from which much of the Japanese air component would be launched. Losing that component or having it interdicted would have majorly F**** up the entire Japanese invasion time-table for the whole region
In other words, of course the Japanese had to take the airfields....this of itself is not an indication of the effectiveness of level bombers against moving warships (and merchants)
**
12/10/41
An odd example to use in my opinion (no offense to anyone). What killed the Prince of wales and Repulse? one a modern battleship designed to survive in an environment which included modern aircraft?
Not bombs.......and those few that hit did *nothing* of consequence.....those little bombs were incapable of piercing the thick skin of the PoW and didn't make much of an impression on the old Repulse either (Britian's weakest capital ship)
No gents....."Torpedoes" were the killer here, delivered in then "exotic" fashion by twin engined level bombers designed or modified to carry them with crews trained to operate in that fashion. I'm not sure the Allies were even aware that the enemy operated in such a fashion, certainly the general assumption before the war was that the IJN and IJA operated obsolete junk with medicore pilots at best.
wrong.
**
Solomons......UV et all
Dgaad is correct in one thing....the "threat" of LBA is real enough that it must be taken into account, but we must remember that here, as in other areas, is a key difference between one who "wargames" and real life. In a wargame a player can be bold and daring because his job and his life are not at stake, thus he can act more rashly and maybe get away with it, or if not, noones gonna call him on the carpet. Just as with the tactics we are debating here, we must keep that in mind as well
that said......
What was Rabaul's greatest threat to carriers..? Again it was torpedo carrying twin engined bombers if the range was long. If the range was short....single engined types just like those carried by the carriers themselves.......If the US wasn't aware of the long range threat before the Brits got spanked then they had to be aware of it now.
However one thing to remember.....IIRC Rabaul did engage a carrier early in the war, either before or during Coral Sea. Due to the extreme range the attacking Beattys, unescorted, suffered greatly at the hands of the CAP (believe this is the one where one USN pilot became an "ace" in one battle, shooting down 5 beattys)
The point here, is three fold.
1) the enemy was attacking at low level, with torpedoes (a ship's worst enemy. A commander has to take them seriously by default as there's no such thing as a "good underwater hit" One hit.....just one hit would be enough to send a precious carrier back to the States for repairs.....alot can happen in the time it takes....ask the Saratoga which kept getting torpedoed by submarines on the way to the front lines!
2) Such an attack, even thwarted would throw a scare into any but the most insane or bullish carrier commander (so i'm little unsuprised that Jack Fletcher, who was not bullish and prone to excessive caution) gave LBA bases such as Rabaul a wide berth
3) We see the Pro and Con issues missing from UV The potential "threat" and reward of a LBA low level attack on a carrier TF, but coming at a steep price in hacked down level bombers due to flak and CAP ministrations.
As with the Phillipines, airpower played far too broad a role in the sequence of events for it to be IMO portrayed as some kind of vindication of the effectiveness of LBA against moving ships.
First and formost the massive level bomber forces primary influence in this theatre was New Gineau where their presence made IJA ground operations hell on earth. As for anti ship operations......largely ineffective outside of scouting until the development of skip bombing attacks which were mostly effective against ill prepared and/or ill defended merchant convoys...thus creating a hammer and anvil effect
the hammer......pound the enemy troops and bases, making it a combat and logistical hell
the anvil......complete the maneuver by denying and hindering the enemy's troop and supply convoy efforts.
As for the Solomons chain itself......what made Henderson field so deadly to the Japanese?
Answer: dive bombers and fighter bombers.
Dive bombing and even glide bombing (for fighters not suited for the stresses of diving at high angles) is far more effective against warships, especially merchants vs level bombers.
Level bombers were important though for recon, and most importantly for plastering ports and air bases giving them the air superiority to march up the chain with little threat from enemy air assets. they could also be devastating against stationary ships such as during one of Yamamotto's last great reinforce efforts that preceeded the Third battle of the Solomons where after Henderson was all but knocked out, raiding B-17's from Santos caused havoc at the Japanese beachhead (along with the ragtag survivors of Henderson itself)
The threat against ships is there too, but is only one component of this strategy.
More importanly, the American "leap frogging" strategy was born not out of the need for airbases but out of a need of a quicker, less costly solution to trying to assault heavily defended IJA/N bases for at this point one thing the Japanese had aplenty was troops.....unfort they did not have the air and sea assets to go with it.
What were the primary air weapons used here? Fighter-bombers and single engined dive bombers. With a chain of small to medium bases it was enough to control the seas and make life hell for any warships, merchants.....and even barges that tried to slip in.
As for the warships......well lets put it into perspective again....when the IJN massively reinforced Rabaul with over a half dozen heavy cruisers and attendant destroyers shortly before the US assault on Bouginaville, they detected this buildup.....a serious potential threat...particularily given the dearth of USN surface assets at the time (most gearing up for big effort in the Central Pacific)
Did they unleash big clumsy level bombers against this formidable naval force using low level attacks or even "skip bombing"?
nope....they sent in a carrier TF armed with fighters, dive and torp bombers.
back to Japan goes the majority of the IJN assets with interest and the invasion is on.
**
1944 onward.
Back to what i was saying earlier. Yes air superiority is important but by this time anti-ship operations were hardly the major goal.....the USN had it's burgening mobile airbases by then...the carriers, armed with planes designed for anti ship with pilots trained for it.
Saipen was needed first and formost to provide an LBA platform for heavy bombers to attack Japan. (perhaps forcing an early surrender? one could hope at the time)
It also provided a logical way point for the US fleet train so that the USN could continue it's penetration of the IJN inner defence line.
**
return to the Philippines.
An obvious magnet......politically MacArthur vowed to return and he'd campaigned hard for it bending the ear of Roosevelt. He got his wish....there were obvious strategic reasons as well......taking it back would cut off the Empire from it's South seas conquests and make the stranglehold on Japan's sea lanes all the more complete. LBA would also be assisted by having bases close enough to Japan to assist long range fighters
Anti-ship again....a small but pertient component but hardly the overriding factor.
One must also consider the role of aircraft types as well. Even in the earlier logistically strained days, the aircraft that would make LBA's the biggest threat to enemy naval forces are single engined aircraft. Dive and torpedo bombers which can counter-attack carriers and benefit from basing on an "unsinkable" carrier and escorted by fighters can negate the new mobile weapon of the two navies.
Level bombers are a threat too, but one substantially less so, unless, like the IJN you train and equip your twin engined planes to carry torps. One should also ask why they did this in the first place if level bombers are such great ship killers as they were orig designed
**
Let me clarify a point here. I am not, repeat **not** advocating making LBA ineffective against ships....warships or merchants. I've played plenty of past wargames where this was the case. Games such as Carrier Force , or Carrier Strike, or to a lesser degree.....PacWar.
However, those games did not allow you to control altitude settings so a doctornal "default" was set in place. Good in one way as it did well to simulate the lackluster ability of level bombers hitting dedicated warships at sea, bad in a sense as it did at times make a gamer wonder what use at all land based aircraft were (part of this due too, to the tactical scope of the games in question as well, where only carrier battles mattered)
The "problem" here, is that players are exploiting a micro-management feature to put forth a strategy that inflates the effectiveness of level bombers ****without consequence****
and that is wrong.
Alot of good ideas have been put forth on this, including a few by me (well in my opinion anyway
) To bury our heads in the sand on this issue is to do a diservice to the wargaming community.I'm all for level bombers being used "agressively" which is probably the best overall term to describe things here, but one should also have to pay the piper on it in the form of shot down and shot up bombers and shell shocked (fatiqued) crews, increased down time for said bombers (when said level bombers might be needed to support operations they were better suited for such as recon.....ground support, base interdiction etc)
You might get lucky and score that bomb hit.......especially if you catch a fat and slow merchant convoy with little protection.....but then again you might catch a hornet's nest of warships or a heavily defended convoy that pours flak into the nice exposed big bellies of these clumsy brutes with all their racks of bombs.
Its up to the players to decide their priorities.
Right now its a no brainer....because there's no "con" to the argument. So keep all those twin and four engined bombers attacking at 100 - 1000 feet.
Gotta admit too...i cringed at the Billy Mitchell example......all that farcical publicity stunt proved was that level bombers were capable of sinking unmanned, motionless ships, some at ridiculously low altitudes (to ensure hits for the cameras)
And the "unsinkable" Ostfriesland....."dreaded" (hoo!) German battleship? Mitchell could have sunk her with a carpenter's hammer in the shape she was in (previous flooding unattended too, bringing unprotected glass scuttles below the current waterline.
She would never have been in danger had she been crewed at the time, even if anchored.
Potential was there....but only potential and even in WWII it wasn't nearly as effective as thought. Italian high level attacks were total failure. Taranto was a triumph of carrier based single engined boldness (using torps again)
PH raid used carrier aircraft designed for anti-ship and again , the most devastating weapons were the torps (the one exception the converted 16.1 inch naval shells lugged into the air by the B5N's......KO'ing the USS Arizona, (which wasn't moving at the time or firing back)
Perspective.....its not just for breakfest anymore
Re: smoking gun
Great stuff. You made the point I was trying to make, and much more clearly and in much more detail than I did. Agreed on all counts.Originally posted by Nikademus:
(lots of good stuff)
"... planning and preparations were made with great efforts with this day as a goal. Before this target day came, however, the tables had been turned around entirely and we are now forced to do our utmost to cope with the worst. Thi
Nik : while I like your post overall, you do tend to take some of the things I say way out of context. I am well aware, for example, of the nature of the demonstration attack by Mitchell. The attack lasted over two days against a stationary ship that had no crew. Yes, it was a publicity stunt.
But why did I even mention it? I said that there had been dozens of examples of the efficacy of aircraft against surface craft, going all the way back to Mitchell's demonstration attack. Any naval officer in the USN during WW2 was aware of the Ostfriesland stunt, and its nature. It was however, a relevant piece of the history of Naval avaition, and was the first major naval vessel to be sunk solely by aircraft. The fact that it was for publicity and in peacetime, notwithstanding. Many at the time believed it couldn't be done at all. Mitchell changed their minds.
Taken in this context, which was the context explicitly stated by me, its rather sophistic for you to "cringe" from it as an example.
There are other portions where you seem to have an agenda of discrediting what I am saying or my position, but I'll leave it at that. Please try to remember the context of my argumentation. Perhaps I am being defensive and taking what you say out of context. Your post has value, and is well thought out, but I think it would be even better without Parthian shots.
But why did I even mention it? I said that there had been dozens of examples of the efficacy of aircraft against surface craft, going all the way back to Mitchell's demonstration attack. Any naval officer in the USN during WW2 was aware of the Ostfriesland stunt, and its nature. It was however, a relevant piece of the history of Naval avaition, and was the first major naval vessel to be sunk solely by aircraft. The fact that it was for publicity and in peacetime, notwithstanding. Many at the time believed it couldn't be done at all. Mitchell changed their minds.
Taken in this context, which was the context explicitly stated by me, its rather sophistic for you to "cringe" from it as an example.
There are other portions where you seem to have an agenda of discrediting what I am saying or my position, but I'll leave it at that. Please try to remember the context of my argumentation. Perhaps I am being defensive and taking what you say out of context. Your post has value, and is well thought out, but I think it would be even better without Parthian shots.
Last time I checked, the forums were messed up.
No agenda to discredit you i can assure you. I made a point to not mention names or point (or poke) fingers at any one person.Originally posted by dgaad
Nik : while I like your post overall, you do tend to take some of the things I say way out of context. I am well aware, for example, of the nature of the demonstration attack by Mitchell. The attack lasted over two days against a stationary ship that had no crew. Yes, it was a publicity stunt.
But why did I even mention it? I said that there had been dozens of examples of the efficacy of aircraft against surface craft, going all the way back to Mitchell's demonstration attack. Any naval officer in the USN during WW2 was aware of the Ostfriesland stunt, and its nature. It was however, a relevant piece of the history of Naval avaition, and was the first major naval vessel to be sunk solely by aircraft. The fact that it was for publicity and in peacetime, notwithstanding. Many at the time believed it couldn't be done at all. Mitchell changed their minds.
Taken in this context, which was the context explicitly stated by me, its rather sophistic for you to "cringe" from it as an example.
There are other portions where you seem to have an agenda of discrediting what I am saying or my position, but I'll leave it at that. Please try to remember the context of my argumentation. Perhaps I am being defensive and taking what you say out of context. Your post has value, and is well thought out, but I think it would be even better without Parthian shots.
In fact the only time i did was to agree with a point you made
My "agenda" was to put a broad topic into perspective in relation to the twin (or four) tailed problem we've all been wrestling with.
As for Mitchell. You may know it.....I may know it.....others might not though. Thats how and why his stunt continues to generate misinformed opinions to this very day. Thus it begs being put into clear context for all to see.
Okay. Well, I plead guilty to paranoia.Originally posted by Nikademus
No agenda to discredit you i can assure you. I made a point to not mention names or point (or poke) fingers at any one person.
In fact the only time i did was to agree with a point you made
My "agenda" was to put a broad topic into perspective in relation to the twin (or four) tailed problem we've all been wrestling with.
As for Mitchell. You may know it.....I may know it.....others might not though. Thats how and why his stunt continues to generate misinformed opinions to this very day. Thus it begs being put into clear context for all to see.
Hopefully, a sane level of paranoia makes one a good general. An insane level of it would put you in the class of Vauban.Last time I checked, the forums were messed up.
-
Ron Saueracker
- Posts: 10967
- Joined: Mon Jan 28, 2002 10:00 am
- Location: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Careless A 10s
During an exercise in Grayling, Michigan in 1982, 2 A 10s accidently fired 20mm near my OP. Holyyyyyyyyyyyy Shite!!!:eek:
Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan
Re: Careless A 10s
Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
During an exercise in Grayling, Michigan in 1982, 2 A 10s accidently fired 20mm near my OP. Holyyyyyyyyyyyy Shite!!!:eek:
ouch.....talk about UNfriendly fire
SOME GENERAL HISTORICAL OBSERVATIONS
1) Airpower in general was critical to the campaign and was a key factor in the planning of vitually all operations. Airpower consisted of both land and sea components. Each had unique strengths and weaknesses. Both were important. Both had roles to play.
2) LBA level bomber units were generally raised and trained for the primary role of attacking stationary land targets. To change doctrine effectively would necessarily require the development of new tactics and then retraining to impliment those tactics. This would take time. Time spent being retrained should mean those air assets were unavailable for combat operations. IJN level bombers began the campaign period trained to support naval operations. The IJA had some capability. The USAAF had very little.
3) The objectives of many of the major WWII pacific operations was to take control of a location that contained or could contain a viable base for LBA (either for offensive/defensive operations or to deny the enemy the same capability). The importance of land bases to operations in the Pacific was two fold. They could be damaged but never destroyed(sunk) and they were vastly more effective in sustaining air operations (assuming supplyability) than CAG's remaining on station for long period's of time.
4) The presence of land based level bombers in an area would always be acknowledged as a threat by naval commanders in planning their operations. They were well aware that operating naval forces within range of level bombers would and could result in losses. It should not be taken as meaning that total annihilation was expected.
A PERSONAL OBSERVATION ON THE GAME
I purchased this game as I have a great interest in those simulations which cover operations in WWII where both sides are fairly well matched and both hold the initiative at one stage or another. I have read widely on WWII but I have not concentrated on any one area beyond getting a solid understanding of the operation then moving on to another.
I began playing the game with several expectations, the main one being that the game would reflect the historical strengths/weaknesses/weapons/doctrines/tactics of both sides and that victory would come from making best use of these. I think UV is a superb game but even against the AI, I find personally that, in several key areas, "historical" use of forces do not, in general, result in outcomes that have an "historical" feel to them.
This may be because I have drawn the wrong conclusions from my readings. In terms of the effectiveness of USAAF LBA level bombers, most general texts gave me the impression that that they were not the most effective way to engage naval and merchant vessels at sea in this theatre of operations at this time. The only exceptions were those where the pilots were trained and experienced in the use of specialised tactics (such as skip bombing) and often flying specific types of "level" bombers best suited to the role. On my understanding, their targets were normally slow moving merchant ships protected by a few 2nd Class escorts, neither of which types were equiped with the level of AA necessary to deter this style of attack (if there was such a level).
I have no major problems with the AI use of LBA level bombers as they tend to be used at a default altitude that result in shipping casualties that match my understanding of what historical losses would expect to be for a "normal" level bombing attack. My concern is with the way players can freely use regular level bombers at low or near sea level to deliver attacks that can devestate even the best protected CAG's. The concern comes from two areas. Firstly, it never happened historically and therefore it should be treated as conjecture not facts to shove down the throats of the uniformed. Secondly, there appear to be no real penalties for these types of attacks (ie need for specialist training and heavier casualties to larger aircraft). As to casualties, as these attacks never occurred, an educated guess is all it could be.
To avoid boring all the experts with an amateur's opinion, I will make a few final points in summary.
a) The best wargames allow you to try different approaches to the same problem to see if you can produce a different outcome. UV certainly gives you this ability. No one wants to refight the same battle over and over without the ability to be flexible. Correspondingly, that flexiblilty should always be based what was reasonable historically, otherwise you enter the realms of fantasy.
b) I would have thought that most people who purchase this game are wargamers who wish to play a game that allows them to refight the 42-43 campaign for the South Pacific and that the priority of the game designers would be to deliver a game that ACCURATELY models all the key elements of the campaign, including what could have been done with them (ie large scale use of LBA level bombers for low level attacks on shipping).
c) It is just possible that the game designers never intended for level bombers to have the impact in low level shipping attacks that they do. From visiting the forum, it would appear LBA is now the dominant factor in player vs player games. Some players agree with this and justify it by referring to specific actions. They are entitled to their opinion. All I can say is that it does not have the right feel to me. That is my opinion.
d) The final arbitor's are Matrix and 2x3. I may have missed threads here and there but the designers do seem to be silent on justifying/explaining why certain results are occurring in the game. I for one would be happy to be enlightened on the thinking behind low level LBA vs ships.
e) Half the fun of this forum is watching the debates unfold between obviously knowledgeable participants. As I stated previously, I am not an expert on any matters relating to WWII but, wrong or right, I did have expectations about how certain key elements would be handled in UV. I feel a large portion of the market for this game would come in with similar expectations (certainly the ones I know do). We pay our money and play the game. If we like it, we recommend it to others. If our opinions differ with the way the game handles a specific element, we can raise the question in this forum. Discussions occur with other players and in the end even the designers may enlighten us. If these discussions change my opinion, it just means I would enjoy the game more. If I dont, being told that I'm wrong, your right and thats it does not help. I've watched newbies like myself legitimately post their opinions and then be squashed by 'veterans' with an air of 'oh, not that stupid arguement again'. A word of caution to all the vets out there, be gentle with the virgins (can I say that here?). If they feel aggrieved enough, they may well give up on a game they do not feel is historical based, not recommend it others, reduce the market, make future releases less viable and leave all you vets sitting around talking about past glories.
Oops, I just fell off my soapbox.
1) Airpower in general was critical to the campaign and was a key factor in the planning of vitually all operations. Airpower consisted of both land and sea components. Each had unique strengths and weaknesses. Both were important. Both had roles to play.
2) LBA level bomber units were generally raised and trained for the primary role of attacking stationary land targets. To change doctrine effectively would necessarily require the development of new tactics and then retraining to impliment those tactics. This would take time. Time spent being retrained should mean those air assets were unavailable for combat operations. IJN level bombers began the campaign period trained to support naval operations. The IJA had some capability. The USAAF had very little.
3) The objectives of many of the major WWII pacific operations was to take control of a location that contained or could contain a viable base for LBA (either for offensive/defensive operations or to deny the enemy the same capability). The importance of land bases to operations in the Pacific was two fold. They could be damaged but never destroyed(sunk) and they were vastly more effective in sustaining air operations (assuming supplyability) than CAG's remaining on station for long period's of time.
4) The presence of land based level bombers in an area would always be acknowledged as a threat by naval commanders in planning their operations. They were well aware that operating naval forces within range of level bombers would and could result in losses. It should not be taken as meaning that total annihilation was expected.
A PERSONAL OBSERVATION ON THE GAME
I purchased this game as I have a great interest in those simulations which cover operations in WWII where both sides are fairly well matched and both hold the initiative at one stage or another. I have read widely on WWII but I have not concentrated on any one area beyond getting a solid understanding of the operation then moving on to another.
I began playing the game with several expectations, the main one being that the game would reflect the historical strengths/weaknesses/weapons/doctrines/tactics of both sides and that victory would come from making best use of these. I think UV is a superb game but even against the AI, I find personally that, in several key areas, "historical" use of forces do not, in general, result in outcomes that have an "historical" feel to them.
This may be because I have drawn the wrong conclusions from my readings. In terms of the effectiveness of USAAF LBA level bombers, most general texts gave me the impression that that they were not the most effective way to engage naval and merchant vessels at sea in this theatre of operations at this time. The only exceptions were those where the pilots were trained and experienced in the use of specialised tactics (such as skip bombing) and often flying specific types of "level" bombers best suited to the role. On my understanding, their targets were normally slow moving merchant ships protected by a few 2nd Class escorts, neither of which types were equiped with the level of AA necessary to deter this style of attack (if there was such a level).
I have no major problems with the AI use of LBA level bombers as they tend to be used at a default altitude that result in shipping casualties that match my understanding of what historical losses would expect to be for a "normal" level bombing attack. My concern is with the way players can freely use regular level bombers at low or near sea level to deliver attacks that can devestate even the best protected CAG's. The concern comes from two areas. Firstly, it never happened historically and therefore it should be treated as conjecture not facts to shove down the throats of the uniformed. Secondly, there appear to be no real penalties for these types of attacks (ie need for specialist training and heavier casualties to larger aircraft). As to casualties, as these attacks never occurred, an educated guess is all it could be.
To avoid boring all the experts with an amateur's opinion, I will make a few final points in summary.
a) The best wargames allow you to try different approaches to the same problem to see if you can produce a different outcome. UV certainly gives you this ability. No one wants to refight the same battle over and over without the ability to be flexible. Correspondingly, that flexiblilty should always be based what was reasonable historically, otherwise you enter the realms of fantasy.
b) I would have thought that most people who purchase this game are wargamers who wish to play a game that allows them to refight the 42-43 campaign for the South Pacific and that the priority of the game designers would be to deliver a game that ACCURATELY models all the key elements of the campaign, including what could have been done with them (ie large scale use of LBA level bombers for low level attacks on shipping).
c) It is just possible that the game designers never intended for level bombers to have the impact in low level shipping attacks that they do. From visiting the forum, it would appear LBA is now the dominant factor in player vs player games. Some players agree with this and justify it by referring to specific actions. They are entitled to their opinion. All I can say is that it does not have the right feel to me. That is my opinion.
d) The final arbitor's are Matrix and 2x3. I may have missed threads here and there but the designers do seem to be silent on justifying/explaining why certain results are occurring in the game. I for one would be happy to be enlightened on the thinking behind low level LBA vs ships.
e) Half the fun of this forum is watching the debates unfold between obviously knowledgeable participants. As I stated previously, I am not an expert on any matters relating to WWII but, wrong or right, I did have expectations about how certain key elements would be handled in UV. I feel a large portion of the market for this game would come in with similar expectations (certainly the ones I know do). We pay our money and play the game. If we like it, we recommend it to others. If our opinions differ with the way the game handles a specific element, we can raise the question in this forum. Discussions occur with other players and in the end even the designers may enlighten us. If these discussions change my opinion, it just means I would enjoy the game more. If I dont, being told that I'm wrong, your right and thats it does not help. I've watched newbies like myself legitimately post their opinions and then be squashed by 'veterans' with an air of 'oh, not that stupid arguement again'. A word of caution to all the vets out there, be gentle with the virgins (can I say that here?). If they feel aggrieved enough, they may well give up on a game they do not feel is historical based, not recommend it others, reduce the market, make future releases less viable and leave all you vets sitting around talking about past glories.
Oops, I just fell off my soapbox.
Have no fear,
drink more beer.
drink more beer.
This has definitly got entertaining...maybe a bit off track...but entertaining none the less.
Dgaad...you sure have a one track mind. You make it sound as if everyone was a major proponent of air power..heheh...we all know better than that. At least one thing for certain, we can all agree to disagree:)
I will have to disagree that the purpose of taking Leyte was to secure airfields for future Philipine operations...although I will not discount the fact that airfields were built there after its capture. It was selected because that was one of the weak links of the Japanese defense in the Philipines that would allow us to gain a foothold. And as for Saipan..it was taken to place B29's there for the boming of Japan...not to support operations in the Philipines...that's what Pelilieu was originally for...although later it was determined an unnecessary fight. Going back to the Philipines...there were many ppl that didn't want to waste the effort on taking back the islands...but it was primarily a political choice and not tactical.
Now for Guadacanal...sure..the Japanese took it as a staging point for future operations to NC (not N Carolina:) and to disrupt the Aussie-US supply line. But the US choice to take it was to deny them that capability not to mention the psychological impact it would have had on the Allies, having the airfield was a side benefit.
You have to realize that there were many leaders that did not consider airpower the key factor for operations, especialy in the early part of the war and that the vast majority of the Japanese operations was economical in nature...securing their Co-Prosperity empire...air played a supporting role just as did the ground and naval forces in achieving this goal.
In reality...there were only a few operations on either side that the main objective was to secure a place for LBA. Saipan and some of the operations in China comes to mind (I am sure there are a few more examples). Guam was taken by the US as a political move while Tinian was taken to prevent operations from interfering with the effort on Saipan.
Good discussion though...the ball is in your court Dgaad:)
Andy
PS: Ron...I was on a night operation in Germany many years back when one of the Cobra's inadvertently put a burst of 20mm into the FARP. heheh...them poor boys down in the FARP had to have been doing some fancy footwork cuz nobody was hurt and nothin of significance was hit. We had about 30,000 gallons of JP4 there not to mention several hundred 2.75 rockets, 30-40k of 20mm, and 40-50 TOW missiles all spread out among a half dozen landing pads...how nothin got hit is beyond me.
PSS: Drongo...very good post..I agree..it's a game and I for one have got my money's worth in playing against the AI:) I can't say the same for many games I have purchased over the years.
Dgaad...you sure have a one track mind. You make it sound as if everyone was a major proponent of air power..heheh...we all know better than that. At least one thing for certain, we can all agree to disagree:)
I will have to disagree that the purpose of taking Leyte was to secure airfields for future Philipine operations...although I will not discount the fact that airfields were built there after its capture. It was selected because that was one of the weak links of the Japanese defense in the Philipines that would allow us to gain a foothold. And as for Saipan..it was taken to place B29's there for the boming of Japan...not to support operations in the Philipines...that's what Pelilieu was originally for...although later it was determined an unnecessary fight. Going back to the Philipines...there were many ppl that didn't want to waste the effort on taking back the islands...but it was primarily a political choice and not tactical.
Now for Guadacanal...sure..the Japanese took it as a staging point for future operations to NC (not N Carolina:) and to disrupt the Aussie-US supply line. But the US choice to take it was to deny them that capability not to mention the psychological impact it would have had on the Allies, having the airfield was a side benefit.
You have to realize that there were many leaders that did not consider airpower the key factor for operations, especialy in the early part of the war and that the vast majority of the Japanese operations was economical in nature...securing their Co-Prosperity empire...air played a supporting role just as did the ground and naval forces in achieving this goal.
In reality...there were only a few operations on either side that the main objective was to secure a place for LBA. Saipan and some of the operations in China comes to mind (I am sure there are a few more examples). Guam was taken by the US as a political move while Tinian was taken to prevent operations from interfering with the effort on Saipan.
Good discussion though...the ball is in your court Dgaad:)
Andy
PS: Ron...I was on a night operation in Germany many years back when one of the Cobra's inadvertently put a burst of 20mm into the FARP. heheh...them poor boys down in the FARP had to have been doing some fancy footwork cuz nobody was hurt and nothin of significance was hit. We had about 30,000 gallons of JP4 there not to mention several hundred 2.75 rockets, 30-40k of 20mm, and 40-50 TOW missiles all spread out among a half dozen landing pads...how nothin got hit is beyond me.
PSS: Drongo...very good post..I agree..it's a game and I for one have got my money's worth in playing against the AI:) I can't say the same for many games I have purchased over the years.
Originally posted by Sabre21
This has definitly got entertaining...maybe a bit off track...but entertaining none the less.
Dgaad...you sure have a one track mind. You make it sound as if everyone was a major proponent of air power..heheh...we all know better than that. At least one thing for certain, we can all agree to disagree:)
Keeping up with responses on the threads is becoming a full time job. I have greater sympathy for Matrix moderators now. However, I post more than they do.
I am fully aware of the disagreement in naval circles on the efficacy of air power. Amazingly, this debate continues.
I will have to disagree that the purpose of taking Leyte was to secure airfields for future Philipine operations...although I will not discount the fact that airfields were built there after its capture. It was selected because that was one of the weak links of the Japanese defense in the Philipines that would allow us to gain a foothold. And as for Saipan..it was taken to place B29's there for the boming of Japan...not to support operations in the Philipines...that's what Pelilieu was originally for...although later it was determined an unnecessary fight. Going back to the Philipines...there were many ppl that didn't want to waste the effort on taking back the islands...but it was primarily a political choice and not tactical.
Need to be real clear on the basic premise : The capture, use or denial of land airbases was the dominant tactical consideration in all major operations in the Pacific War. Caveats : when we say "Pacific War" we are not talking, say, about China-Burma-India theaters. We are talking about the US-Japan struggle in the Central and South Pacific which lasted all the way to 1945.
The premise DOES NOT stand for the proposition that the ONLY goal of ALL operations was the capture, use, or denial of airbases. It was the "dominant tactical consideration". Big difference.
The Leyte campaign is a good example. The overarching goal of the Leyte campaign was to set the stage for Liberation of the Phillipenes, which would in turn contribute (in the opinion of MacArthur and others) to the defeat of Japan. Capturing Leytey would do an number of things. The most important thing it would do, tactically, is provide a staging and air base from which to launch the main invasion at Lingayen Gulf, and protect that effort, and support all other minor operations throughout the PI with air and other support.
Every phase and aspect of the Leyte operation prior to the landing was dominated by (although it was not the EXCLUSIVE concern) land airbase concerns. The most important initial tactical goal was to wipe out Japanese air capability which could interefere with the Leyte landings. This was accomplished by numerous carrier raids and some sorties from US long range LBA further south. Once this primary tactical goal was accomplished, all the other fell into place.
I should note that Phillipenes area army commander General Homma estimated that he had a total of 100 operational aircraft just around the time the Japanese began to figure that the next target of US operations was going to be the Philipenes. US carrier task forces at this time could put over 1000 aircraft into the air in a single operation. (The US had planned to build up to 500 Carrier Escort and Light Carriers if they had to. They didn't have to).
The destruction of Japanese LBA capability on Leyte and Luzon prior to the invasion of Leyte had a number of fallout effects, not the least of which was the utter destruction of most of the rest of the Japanese fleet in the naval battles which followed the Leyte invasion. Had the Japanese retained even a moderate LBA threat, these naval battles would have had different characters certainly, and different outcomes probably.
Now for Guadacanal...sure..the Japanese took it as a staging point for future operations to NC (not N Carolina:) and to disrupt the Aussie-US supply line. But the US choice to take it was to deny them that capability not to mention the psychological impact it would have had on the Allies, having the airfield was a side benefit.
As I said the premise is the capture use or *denial* of bases. Guadalcanal was *capture and use* for the Japanese, and *denial* for the Americans. After the Marines landed, the roles reversed.
You have to realize that there were many leaders that did not consider airpower the key factor for operations, especialy in the early part of the war and that the vast majority of the Japanese operations was economical in nature...securing their Co-Prosperity empire...air played a supporting role just as did the ground and naval forces in achieving this goal.
You are going higher up on the tactical / strategic chain. The goal of all operations in the Pacific War was to win. Winning is a political term. The dominant tactical consideration throughout the war was ownership and capabilities of airbases, these largely determined who would have the dominant military position.
Well, aside from my little field exercise, we also had a semi truck hit one of our tanks as it was crossing a hardball road. The semi truck was completely f***** up, driver dead, etc. The tank had a few sponson boxes bent, and would have continued the exercise except for things like stupid reports and investigations and such.
In reality...there were only a few operations on either side that the main objective was to secure a place for LBA. Saipan and some of the operations in China comes to mind (I am sure there are a few more examples). Guam was taken by the US as a political move while Tinian was taken to prevent operations from interfering with the effort on Saipan.
Good discussion though...the ball is in your court Dgaad:)
Andy
PS: Ron...I was on a night operation in Germany many years back when one of the Cobra's inadvertently put a burst of 20mm into the FARP. heheh...them poor boys down in the FARP had to have been doing some fancy footwork cuz nobody was hurt and nothin of significance was hit. We had about 30,000 gallons of JP4 there not to mention several hundred 2.75 rockets, 30-40k of 20mm, and 40-50 TOW missiles all spread out among a half dozen landing pads...how nothin got hit is beyond me.
PSS: Drongo...very good post..I agree..it's a game and I for one have got my money's worth in playing against the AI:) I can't say the same for many games I have purchased over the years.
Last time I checked, the forums were messed up.
Hi again Dgaad
I'm not really arguing the fact that airfields played a crucial role in determing some if not many of the Pacific operations...the header of this thread "Capturing Land Airbases was the central strategy of the Pacific War" by itself is not true...and is what I first brought up. Further in your threads you indicate that it is the dominant tactical consideration...and not really central strategy as the title indicates. Also the general term Pacific war includes CBI until you further defined your threads.
Besides...taking an island or enemy stronghold whether it has an airfield or not is not a tactical decision...that is a strategic and operational one. Once given the mission to take an objective, the landing force must then decide how best to tactically achieve the mission.
Now as for it being the dominant TACTICAL consideration...or even an Operational/Strategic one..I would agree to this in many of the operations...but not all. Again...there were many operations that took place that had other motives...such as the Raider operations, or taking Ulithi for a naval base. Another operation to consider is the Bouganvile landings...going in at Empress Bay threw the Japs off...the DOMINANT tactical/operational consideration there was surprise...as was the Leyte landings. It goes without saying that airfields are going to be built to support further operations...but if this was the DOMINANT tactical consideration...they wouldn't have gone in at Empress Bay. So if you were to either drop dominant or add "some" to your "dominant tactical consideration" statement..I would agree. But it was not the case in ALL operations. I would even go as far as saying it was one of several dominating factors...tactical and operational surprise imo is and was far more important.
Andy
I'm not really arguing the fact that airfields played a crucial role in determing some if not many of the Pacific operations...the header of this thread "Capturing Land Airbases was the central strategy of the Pacific War" by itself is not true...and is what I first brought up. Further in your threads you indicate that it is the dominant tactical consideration...and not really central strategy as the title indicates. Also the general term Pacific war includes CBI until you further defined your threads.
Besides...taking an island or enemy stronghold whether it has an airfield or not is not a tactical decision...that is a strategic and operational one. Once given the mission to take an objective, the landing force must then decide how best to tactically achieve the mission.
Now as for it being the dominant TACTICAL consideration...or even an Operational/Strategic one..I would agree to this in many of the operations...but not all. Again...there were many operations that took place that had other motives...such as the Raider operations, or taking Ulithi for a naval base. Another operation to consider is the Bouganvile landings...going in at Empress Bay threw the Japs off...the DOMINANT tactical/operational consideration there was surprise...as was the Leyte landings. It goes without saying that airfields are going to be built to support further operations...but if this was the DOMINANT tactical consideration...they wouldn't have gone in at Empress Bay. So if you were to either drop dominant or add "some" to your "dominant tactical consideration" statement..I would agree. But it was not the case in ALL operations. I would even go as far as saying it was one of several dominating factors...tactical and operational surprise imo is and was far more important.
Andy
Simple....win the war:) That is the central STRATEGIC consideration.
There are factors that play into the conduct of the war...strategic ones usually involve economic (taking and securing oil and raw materials), political (retaking the Philipines by US for instance), reducing the enemies capability to wage war (strategic bombing/unrestricted sub warfare), but the number 1 strategic would be to win.
Operational ones would include the specific island or base to attack or defend for whatever reason (airfields / ports / diversions / raids), operational surprise, size and composition of enemy forces, available friendly forces, time available to conduct the operation, the terrain over which it is to be fought (obviously taking Attu has different implications than taking PM), and of course the logistics needed to conduct the operation.
Then of course there are the tactical considerations...surprise, securing the objective, tactics to be used, this list can go on and on....and by no means did I list all the considerations in the other 2 levels.
Andy
There are factors that play into the conduct of the war...strategic ones usually involve economic (taking and securing oil and raw materials), political (retaking the Philipines by US for instance), reducing the enemies capability to wage war (strategic bombing/unrestricted sub warfare), but the number 1 strategic would be to win.
Operational ones would include the specific island or base to attack or defend for whatever reason (airfields / ports / diversions / raids), operational surprise, size and composition of enemy forces, available friendly forces, time available to conduct the operation, the terrain over which it is to be fought (obviously taking Attu has different implications than taking PM), and of course the logistics needed to conduct the operation.
Then of course there are the tactical considerations...surprise, securing the objective, tactics to be used, this list can go on and on....and by no means did I list all the considerations in the other 2 levels.
Andy