ORIGINAL: mdiehl
IJN almost gave as good as they got (1 CA + 1 DD lost by IJN, 1 DD lost and Boise nearly lost by USN)
I'd call that a selective accounting. USN 1 DD lost. Period. If you want to count battle damaged, there was alot more done to the IJN in that fight than the loss of a CA and a DD.
Yeah, selective accounting for both sides.Yes, there was moderate damage to Aoba and minor damage to Kinugasa. But then there was more damage to the USN than the loss of Duncan as well - Farenholt and Salt Lake City both received hits.
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Battle of Nov 13: both sides surprised, only 2 out of 13 USN ships left in condition to fight, the rest sunk or heavily damaged > mission kill only because Adm. Abe chose to disengage (had enough forces left for a bombardment), but cannot be called a USN "win", considering the losses
It was inexcusable for the Japanese to achieve anything other than a lopsided win considering that they entered that fight with 2BBs.
I'd call that Monday Morning Quarterbacking. From a position of hindsight one may expect more from 2 BBs against cruisers and destroyers, but when considering the circumstances (restricted waters, low visibility, close range, intermingled formations, incomplete information, confusion, bombardment ammo etc.) it is not surprising that the BBs could not be employed with maximum efficiency.
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Saved by performance of Washington, Lee knew how to exploit radar, but nevertheless lost his entire DD screen sunk or heavily damaged and South Dakota crippled
Please. A little less editorial bias. The USN lost 3 DDs (one to friendly fire), the Japanese lost 1 BB, 1 DD, and 4 transports. That is a hands down straight up win for the USN. And yes, it proves the superiority of USN radar directed fire over Japanese night doctrine. 40 IJN Type 93a's launched, no hits.
The transports played no part in the battleship action and do not count. I'm not aware of friendly-fire directed against the USN DDs. Walke and Benham were both hit and sunk by IJN torpedoes. But I agree on effectiveness of Washington's gunfire.
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Different circumstances each. I would not call the battle of Badung Strait much of an example of a great Japanese job. Shot at each other for a while, torpedoed a Dutch CL, took a battering from two USN DDs and another dutch CL, and had a Japanese DD crippled and towed back to safety. Rather chaotic by any standards, and no evidence of great surface gunnery on the IJN part.
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As I said, in 1942, the two were in my view equals at night combat. By 1944 the Japanese were hopelessly outclassed at it. Night combat. Day combat. Didn't really matter, the USN was simply much better at it.
Mmh, to return the "editorial bias" compliment: At Badung Strait, 4 IJN DDs did drive off a much larger Allied force (3 CLs, 7 DDs), their gunfire forced 2 USN DDs to break off action, they torpedoed and sunk a Dutch destroyer, severely damaged a Dutch cruiser by gunfire, sustained comparatively little damage themselves, and fulfilled their mission to protect the transports. Well done by any standards.
I do agree with some points (circumstances and commanders play a major role - not just at Balikpapan or Savo, USN getting better regarding information management, IJN being outclassed in 1944 day and night). But I rest convinced that the IJN was better prepared by training, equipment and doctrine and thus had an edge in night battles - until the USN technological advantages and experience introduced / gained during the 1942 battles made themselves felt. In 1942 the USN was not equal - but it learned from the 1942 battles (although drawing wrong lessons from Cape Esperance)and by the end of 1942 caught up and in 1943 pulled ahead of the IJN.