What good are battleships?

[crsutton]

In game they are much more useful as surface forces are much more effective and deadly than the actually were. So, there are a lot more bombardments, raids, and surface fights (by a power of ten [;)]) But for game purposes nobody seems to mind much as it happens to be a lot more fun. Basically, you use the for the same purpose that they were used historically. You just use them a lot more..

[Commander Stormwolf]

Basically Battle off Samar should have been a lot worse,
the commander opened fire too soon, didn't close the range, and then disengaged.
It was supposed to be a one-way mission to stop the invasion,

The forces of Surigao Strait, and the Carriers were all sacrificed so that Yamato could get through
and then the commander got cold feet and ran away after being attacked by a few small DE type ships

[chesmart]

Dont remind me my book budget has replaced my game budget when i bought AE and good naval books are expensive.

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

Another good book on the Battle of Samar is Sea of Thunder. It focuses on four commanders: Halsey, Evans, Kurita and Ugaki. An attmpt to sort of get inside the heads of these men and examine thier performances based on motives.

I just bought this book! I feel like I've just joined the very exclusive WITP: AE book club

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Sarconix

I've been doing some reading, and haven't found obvious answers for this...

If Pearl Harbor proved that naval aviation was the way to victory in the Pacific, what good were battleships? (either historically or in WITP) It seems like battleships were basically sitting ducks when faced with torpedoes and bombs from carrier-based (or land-based) aircraft.

I'd argue it was Dec 10th that proved once and for all that Naval Aviation had trumped the "Gun Club" and their battleships. What good were battleships? It has been argued with debatable success by authors (such as Bergerud) that the influence/impact of carrier aviation tends to get overrated a bit. While an effective platform, it still took on average a huge commitment of airpower to damage/sink the larger warships, particularily armored battleships. What made the BB obsolete was not that it suddenly no longer had a role, for it and other surface combatants did (compare the # of pure carrier battles to the # of surface skirmishes fought), it was now hands on proved after Dec 10 that for all the financial investment and time/committment that goes into a Battleship, one could ultimately not gurantee that your years to build behemoth could not be badly damaged, even crippled or sunk by a device that individually and even in moderate groups cost far less money to produce and far less man-hours to build.

That the battleship still had uses and that plans existed (only to be ultimately shelved as post war financial realities set in) to build new ones cannot be laid purely at the feet of psychological influences.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: wdolson


There is a very good book about Leyte I read a few years back. I forget the title right now. I loaned it to my father, so I can't look.

Know the book you are referring too, though the title escapes me. Awesome read. A facinating what if re: the Center Force was that Admiral Spruance on learning of the estimated dispositions and course of the enemy forces, was reputed to have pointed to the map and said that THAT was where Kurita was going to emerge and had he and not Halsey been in charge he would have ensured that the Battleship component was positioned there waiting for him. A night battle during that period......esp after the battering Kurita and his men had had to endure, would most likely have been a US victory. As it was.....Halsey went chasing after his revenge and quest for Decisive Battle. Ironic in that in this one instance, Yamamotto's desire to have the enemy do what was expected of him came to fruition....well after his death. Still......it's possible Kurita's force might have done better with the What If vs. the pell mell General Chase that occured later with hundreds of aircraft running interference.

[mdiehl]

It seems like battleships were basically sitting ducks when faced with torpedoes and bombs from carrier-based (or land-based) aircraft.

It depended on the BB and the circumstances. Recall that at the time there were no SAMs or AAMs. American BBs were hell on wheels for defensive antiaircraft capability, where most other nationalities BBs, especially the Japanese and German ones, were extremely weak in that arena owing to poor fire control, poor design of AAA guns, and poor covered arcs.

Also, Allied BBs *could* under the right circumstances control access to waters, as in the Med, around Guadalcanal, and in the restricted waters around the Philippines at night.

[YankeeAirRat]

The only problem is that it was the newer post-treaty US battleships (such as the North Carolina Class) that were hells on wheels as it came to AA defense and add in thier ability to keep up with the US carriers that made them useful to have with the fleet. Otherwise the older battleships weren't much useful until they made it through the upgrade path, in turn all they were really useful for then was to be bomb sponges and to project naval gunfire ashore. The British and French both had "fast battleships" as well, but thier AA defense had issues. It was the American's who learned the most, IMHO, and did the best to amplify what they learned in the first couple of years at war with regards to air defense via the AA gun with the battleship.

[mdiehl]

Quite so. The older US BB had poor AAA armament until they were upgraded (those that were retained in combat service during the war). I think my point was that among NEW BBs, the USN was light years ahead of everyone else. Yamato and Musashi were new construction, and had lots of AAA armament, but it was squandered by the use of poorly designed guns (slow traverse, not all gyrostabilized, often with obstructed fields of fire), poor distribution, and poor fire control.

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: Sarconix

ORIGINAL: Commander Cody

ORIGINAL: wdolson
For bombardment, large caliber guns on slow, largish gunboats would have done an equally good job.

Sounds like a great opportunity for a modder!

Was there anything actually like that, or are you speaking entirely hypothetical?

The RN had some gun boats in the Mediterranean, but I believe they didnt carry more than a 6" gun.

Or go back to WW1 for the large Light Cruisers, Glorious, Courageous & Furios which carried 4 x 15" in twin turrets. Converted after WW1 to Aircraft carriers.

I forgot,

HMS's Roberts, Abercrombie, Erebus & Terror, 2 x 15" guns in a single turret, used mostly in Europe.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The center force should have caused more havoc than it did, but the southern force was doomed to fail. The southern force was not well organized, had only two BBs, the US had excellent information about where they were going and when they would arrive, and the US had time to set up a layered defense that forced the Japanese to run the gauntlet of PT boats first, then DDs, then Cruisers, and finally coming under the guns of the bombardment force covering the transports.

When the BBs opened up they did all their shooting by radar and finished off the force that had already been ravaged by the first layers of the defense.

The center force was led by one of the few officers in the IJN who knew the Code of Bushido was bunk. His father was a scholar on medieval Japan and he knew how to read and write ancient Japanese. He knew from original sources what the samurai's code really was and knew that the Code of Bushido was a politically motivated warping of the original code.

Thus he valued saving Japanese lives over stupid suicide missions. He did what damage he could and retired before his force took further damage.

There is a very good book about Leyte I read a few years back. I forget the title right now. I loaned it to my father, so I can't look.

If the center force had turned on the landing ships. They would have run into Olendorf's surface fleet that had defeated the southern force the night before. Olendorf thought Halsey was covering the San Bernardino Straits, so he wasn't positioned to deal with a force coming at him from the north, and many of his ships were low on ammo, but the center force would have been boxed into a narrow space with a very large US surface force and the CVE's off shore would be on alert to send aerial aid. The center force also did not know that Halsey had taken the bait hook line and sinker and his fast mobile forces were finishing off the carriers to the north.

If Halsey had left his battleships covering the San Bernardino Straits, the Battle Off Samar would not have happened. The big gun boys would have found out what would happen if the Yamato squared off against Iowas. I suspect the Americans would have won easily because the Japanese had to go through the Strait single file and would have emerged into a crossed T with every ship spotted on radar and by aircraft long before getting into visual range. The long range gunnery would have been the Yamato and some older Japanese BBs vs something like seven US fast BBs with better radar and in prime position.

Bill

I respectfully disagree Bill!

The Japanese had complex (again [&:]) plan that deliberately meant sacrifice of part (or whole) of their fleet. All was done to insure that USN is drawn away and that US landing ships are destroyed / damaged / disrupted by all means possible...

And what happens when almost everything succeeded for the Japanese?

Kurita "drops the ball" and makes a whole lot of wrong decisions for the Japanese...

His failure (and it was failure because other parts of the Japanese fleet knowingly scarified themselves for his success) is unforgiving IMHO!

Also, how he saved Japanese lives when, for example, battleship Yamato withdrew from battle in "Battle off Samar" and never turned for the US landing ships where something useful for the Japanese could have been done?

Would that be suicidal?

Sure - but Japanese fleet finally might have done something (and dying for that would mean something in war terms - not only in "Bushido" point of view)!

Few months later battleship Yamato was sent to one way suicide mission without any hope of success and meaningful duty!


So... would Japanese suicide mission against US landing ships change the war?

Of course not - it might have prolonged it for few months - the outcome was inevitable (just as the outcome was inevitable the very second Japanese attacked the Pearl Harbor - they lost the war the minute they started the war)!


Leo "Apollo11"

[jmalter]

early USN BBs 'sunk' at Pearl were re-floated, re-paired & re-equipped. after modernization, they could hold a place in the battle-line, as SurfTF combat units, or as AA adjuncts. Rebuilt 'slow' BBs are an essential element for AmphTFs, they can be used in a protection role in SurfTF against enemy fleets, or as Bombardment TFs to soften enemy base targets, or as elements of an AmphTF, to suppress enemy defensive fires at an invasion hex.

as an attack force, when covered by air cap, they can deny sea-lanes to the enemy.

BBs can rule the waves, if they're used wisely!

[pharmy]

ORIGINAL: Apollo11


Few months later battleship Yamato was sent to one way suicide mission without any hope of success and meaningful duty!



Leo "Apollo11"

Not commenting on what happened at Samar, but operation Ten-Go (the Yamato suicide mission) is a perfect example of relatively sensible IJN officers losing out vs Hirohito/and Army clique that got them in the war in first place. Hirohito bullied the CIC of the combined fleet, Toyoda Soemu to do something to match the army's self sacrifice. The commander, Vice Admiral Seiichi ito actually refused to carry out the order. So the CIC sent his chief of staff Vice Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka (a man who also did not believe in suicidal missions) to convince Ito and the other captains of the combined fleet to carry out the operation. They unanimously refused !!!

And this is where the story starts to parallel operation Sho-Go, the admirals and captains were told that in truth its not about the pride of the Navy, but that they were supposed to carry out the mission to divert planes from the defense of Okinawa to allow a huge kamikaze operation to sneak through.

About 120 planes did indeed attack Okinawa on that day, but was the (unsuccesful) kamikaze attack dreamed up to give the navy commanders a rational reason to send Yamato on a suicide mission, or was it part of the plan all along?

[Mike Solli]

ORIGINAL: Sarconix

Thanks! So I have: AA platform and surface combat against a weaker force. How about bombardment?

Were they historically effective in these roles, or does this only apply to WITP?

I prefer CAs for bombardment. BBs carry much less ammo and get 1-2 shots before they have to find a port to rearm. CAs can shoot multiple times due to their high ammo load.

[Erkki]

They make excellent secondary targets, drawing shells, bombs and torpedoes away from more useful ships such as CAs and CVs. [;)] You also get to practice evacuation, damage control and ship repairing with them with a smaller risk of the hit ships sinking. [:'(]

[Mike Solli]

ORIGINAL: spence

As a Japanese player, I love them. If they catch an Allied cruiser/destroyer force, they'll shred them in return for a bit of chipped paint. You just need to be careful with them, as you do with all Japanese ships (and everything else for that matter).

Just like in real life??? All the skill displayed by IJN DD and cruiser captains in real life battles seems to have been offset by captains and admirals who commanded in the IJN Battleline.

I'm talking game, not real life. [;)]

I'm very cautious about committing Japanese combat power, especially early and mid war. Late war, you're just about always outnumbered unless your opponent makes a mistake (and you get lucky). I don't want even odds. I want overwhelming odds in my favor. This also goes for commanders. Over time, I check out all commanders for my important units (naval, air and ground). It's worth the PPs to replace the schmoes. Sure, sometimes the BBs take damage. There's a huge difference between damage and sinking. Basically, anything that sinks usually doesn't have a replacement in the queue. Also, lots of damage means that ship is out of combat for months. I do everything I can to minimize that damage.

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: Mike Solli

ORIGINAL: Sarconix

Thanks! So I have: AA platform and surface combat against a weaker force. How about bombardment?

Were they historically effective in these roles, or does this only apply to WITP?

I prefer CAs for bombardment. BBs carry much less ammo and get 1-2 shots before they have to find a port to rearm. CAs can shoot multiple times due to their high ammo load.

both BBs and CAs spend 2/3 of their main gun ammo during bombardment.

[mdiehl]

The Japanese had complex (again ) plan that deliberately meant sacrifice of part (or whole) of their fleet. All was done to insure that USN is drawn away and that US landing ships are destroyed / damaged / disrupted by all means possible...

I disagree. Dolson has it correct. The Japanese battle plan, complicated as it was, did not embrace or envision sacrificing the battle fleets in order to get at the carriers or anyone else. Nor did Kurita "drop the ball." He was getting his teeth kicked in by a relatively small US air force and a relatively small DD squadron in return for no apparent damage to the prey that he was seeking. He was not on a suicide mission. Those came later.

In my view, if he'd pressed the attack, he would have lost every ship in his TF. And he still would likely not have gotten to the other USN CVE task groups. He was losing badly. At that point in the war, the fire control systems on US light ships were so vastly superior to the ones on Japanese ships that any given USN DD could fight as effectively as a Japanese CA. Coupled with the damage he was taking from air power, withdrawal was both rational and, in my view, a "smart move" (given that he was NOT on a suicide mission).

And what happens when almost everything succeeded for the Japanese?

The USN was succeeding, not the IJN. Southern Force obliterated. Central force having its heart torn out by a.c. and a handful of USN DDs and DEs. He was losing the fight, with no good prospect of gaining the upper hand.

Few months later battleship Yamato was sent to one way suicide mission without any hope of success and meaningful duty!

Not Kurita's fault that he did not anticipate the profoundly stupid orders that were subsequently issued for the use of Yamato.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Apollo11
Kurita "drops the ball" and makes a whole lot of wrong decisions for the Japanese...

His failure (and it was failure because other parts of the Japanese fleet knowingly scarified themselves for his success) is unforgiving IMHO!

Had Kurita the detail control an AE player has, I'm sure he would have done better. [;)]

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Mike Solli
I'm talking game, not real life. [;)]

I'm very cautious about committing Japanese combat power, especially early and mid war. Late war, you're just about always outnumbered unless your opponent makes a mistake (and you get lucky). I don't want even odds. I want overwhelming odds in my favor. This also goes for commanders. Over time, I check out all commanders for my important units (naval, air and ground). It's worth the PPs to replace the schmoes. Sure, sometimes the BBs take damage. There's a huge difference between damage and sinking. Basically, anything that sinks usually doesn't have a replacement in the queue. Also, lots of damage means that ship is out of combat for months. I do everything I can to minimize that damage.

One does have to be alot more careful with BB's in AE. There's the ammo reload issue to be taken into account. The fuel cost, and the risk. You hit an important point. Once the damage piles up on a BB, it becomes a liability vs. an asset. Reg. SYS isn't so hard to remove but any major damage can take weeks/months to repair.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Apollo11
Kurita "drops the ball" and makes a whole lot of wrong decisions for the Japanese...

His failure (and it was failure because other parts of the Japanese fleet knowingly scarified themselves for his success) is unforgiving IMHO!

Had Kurita the detail control an AE player has, I'm sure he would have done better. [;)]

True... but it is interesting to notice that in both occasions IJN ships had a chance to directly attack US transport ships they missed the chance... [;)]

IMHO both Mikawa and Kurita should have tried to attack the US transport ships!


Leo "Apollo11"