OT: Blame for the Battle of Gettysburg

[tocaff]

Outnumbered, outgunned, against dug in interior lines on high ground clearly called for a pass.  Offensive attacks were horribly bloody affairs. Lee should have moved the army off towards Washington forcing the Meade to follow.  He then could have picked some terrain and fought what he did best, a defensive battle. 

[JeffroK]

But,

The Southern Armies under Lee had been whipping the Union Armies prior to this, what changed!!

A better commander, Better defensive terrain, the Southern Armies were starting to tire, No Jackson.

PS If a mod wants to stop the thread, great, I wish everyone else would leave it to them.

[FDRLincoln]

A frontal assault on a prepared position: bad idea. Lee was the commander, the ultimate responsibility was his.

As for Sickles, he was physically brave and had some decent military instincts but he was a political appointee, untrained and impetuous. If he had been a trained soldier, he would probably have been an effective general. IIRC, his concern about the high ground in front of him was because his troops had suffered losses in a previous battle due to not having the high ground and he wanted to avoid a repeat of that. He was trying to do the right thing, but he didn't have the big picture in mind.

[FDRLincoln]

There was also an arrogance factor at work here, the idea that Southern soldiers were better than Northern ones. It wasn't true...the South had better generals early in the war, but when properly-led Union soldiers were just as effective.

Which sort of does get back to the Pacific War, doesn't it? You have one side with huge industrial capacity, and another side without it that tries to defeat the stronger power with bravery and bravado, but that eventually gets ground down once the bigger power is fully mobilized and properly led.

[Chickenboy]

I don't consider myself an affectionado of the American Civil War. In fact, the subject is so distasteful to me that I have always had limited interest in studying its military ramifications (there were many) and history. Of the little that I do know of Gettysberg (and having been there a few times when I lived in PA), I agree with FDRLincoln.

Picket's charge across an open field, up a hill into fortified and prepared positions was folly. It should never have been ordered, let alone be the lynchpin for a Confederate plan. That it was ordered or attempted was Lee's fault. He gets the blame for it's failure.

"It's my fault, boys!" Damn straight.

Hear hear about the Minnesotans too. Stout men all.

[FDRLincoln]

I concur with Chickenboy in regards to this topic. Dangerous to comment further.

Rock Chalk Jayhawk.

[Canoerebel]

Thanks for insightful comments, gents, including one thoughtful PM on the subject.

I take from this a general feeling (from a variety of people ranging from barely familiar with the Civil War to men who are on a first name basis with everything that happened at Gettsyburg) that Lee, while a truly great man, made a serious error in judgment in attacking; that some of his generals contributed - Stuart and Ewell being the chief candidates, with Early, Heth and possibly A.P. Hill on a smaller scale.

I will look much more carefully at the allegation (made by the writer of the story submitted to our magazine) that Early was responsible. Unless I find some credible allegations out there, I'm going to ask the writer to back off that a bit and just say that more generally that Early jumped on Longstreet, but not to go so far as to suggest that Early lost the battle (I just don't see any way that claim can be made).

Also interesting to see how highly Longstreet is regarded by the AE forumites. He was reviled in the South in the late 1800s and first two-thirds of the 19th century, but his reputation seems to have been rehabilitated, in no small part due to Killer Angels, which is uncommonly beautiful writing (that book is literature).

I also take from this discussion a reinforced opinion that people have a deep appreciation for the Civil War and for the men involved.

Thank you, gents, for chiming in.

[FDRLincoln]

I have considerable regard for Lee, but he messed up here. And he realized it himself, as the "it's my fault!" quotation shows.

This is one of the great tragedies of war and why it is something to be avoided. Even a great general can have a bad day, and thousands suffer and die for it.

I much prefer my wars on computer. . Much better that way.

[Spook043]

This certainly is stepping off the beaten path of usual "Who did what right & wrong in various Pacific operations," but what the hey....

Was an earlier time (before wife & kids) that I paid multiple visits to the Gettysburg battlefield to have a look-see and get a sense of the terrain and vantage points. Funny thing, though, in the more recent years with much done in landscaping and clearing to restore some of the battletime appearance, that I still haven't gotten over.

Anyway, for anyone wanting to get into reviewing the command decision perspective, Edwin Coddington's "The Gettysburg Campaign" is required reading. Some of its info is dated (first print was the 1960's), but the late Coddington mined down deep IMO on the notable decision points, as well as pointing out some others often papered over.

Case in point of Ewell: so often the view is of whether or not Ewell should have pressed on to take Cemetery Hill in the later hours of 1 July. Given that Early felt his division was too "disrupted" moving through Gettysburg's streets, I actually don't hold much against Ewell not pressing Early to push on. If anything, Lee could just as well pressed harder with the divisions of Johnson (Ewell) and Anderson (Hill) that had come up that same late afternoon and evening from Chambersburg Pike and the northwest. What I do hold against Ewell was his insistence to maintain an extended frontage that stretched out his corps. At one point on the night of 1/2 July, Lee actually ordered for Ewell to pull back and reform further to the south, more along Longstreet's argued scheme. Ewell, not wanting to "give up ground," offered to Lee that he would "demonstrate" aggressively on his front the next day during Longstreet's expected push, and Lee relented. Coddington noted all of this.

As to Stuart -- allowing for all the circumstances against him, his ultimate command discretion fell short. He should have recognized, especially with a campaign into unfamiliar Union territory, that the greater bulk of the ANV cavalry was supposed to function as a screen for Lee's columns (and thus maintained contact throughout) instead of slowing leveraging into being an oversized, unwieldly raiding party. However, one myth to dispel is of Lee being completly "blind." He did hold back some cav brigades from Stuart, and one such was even attached direct to Ewell. Yet, ironically, even those cav units available to Lee at the critical time before midday of 2 July were not used very aggressively at feeling out where Meade was and where he wasn't.

I think much of what was done postwar to pin blame on Longstreet was ridiculous. But "Ol' Pete" doesn't quite get a free pass either. His march and countermarch on 2 July was just plain clumsy and wasted too much time. Longstreet felt when being spotted from Little Round Top that he had to backtrack his whole corps (instead of just having the column "about face"), but his artillery chief Alexander didn't backtrack his own artillery but was able to find and use a backslope path that kept his own column covered.

But ultimately to Lee, his was the responsibility to get his commanders moving when he resolved to stay engaged. Some sources hold that Lee had taken ill on 2 July, and that has to be allowed for if true. But the way that time was just burned away on 2 July in the way that it was did the most to decide the battle's ultimate outcome. Even the Union 6th Corps had come up before Longstreet started attacking that day. Fairly said in hindsight, it would've been better to press immediately in the early morning of the 2nd from Seminary Ridge right towards Cemetery Hill. That morning was particularly foggy, and the "Sunken Lane" running southwest of Gettysburg could have afforded some cover before closing the final distance to the Union positions there.

Again, though, many things can seem more obvious in hindsight.

Pickett had one inspired comment about how the CSA lost at Gettysburg. "I think the Yankees had something to do about it." They did indeed. Sure, some like Sickles had their missteps. But many a Union leader rose to the occasion at the critical moment, all up and down the field, on each day. The Union troops and commanders showed themselves too tough a nut to crack on this field. And after the Union army's consolidation by the afternoon of 2 July, the best chances for Confederate victory had gotten by. Allowing Sickles' mistake of extending himself and the collateral damage to Union 2nd & 5th Corps to shore things up, the reserves and interior lines still favored Union recovery.

Not that victory was absolutely impossible for the CSA after midday on 2 July. War still allows for those outlier events. Just that the probabilities for success went down a sharp downslope afterwards.

And that ultimately was Lee's responsibility. IMO.

[Torplexed]

ORIGINAL: FDRLincoln

Which sort of does get back to the Pacific War, doesn't it? You have one side with huge industrial capacity, and another side without it that tries to defeat the stronger power with bravery and bravado, but that eventually gets ground down once the bigger power is fully mobilized and properly led.

Alas. The poor Japanese couldn't count on war weariness to put a peace candidate into office as the Confederates hoped would happen. [:D]

[jmalter]

nice thread, guys. also a nice analysis by Spook.

i came late to a desire to look into any military history other than WWII, but i'm glad i did. Shelby Foote's volumes just fascinated me, imo the section 'Red Clay Minuet' (describing Sherman's campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta) was especially fine.

[CaptBeefheart]

I also used to play the AH Gettysburg game, which was one heck of a game. That's about all I will add to this discussion, since all of you guys are above my pay grade on the topic.

Cheers,
CC

[Ddog]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse


Sickles' advance made sense, in isolation. He advanced to more defensible terrain (Cemetery ridge petered out just north of his assigned position). IIRC, he consulted with reknowned Union artillerist Henry Hunt before shifting his position. Sickles' unforgivable military error was in not first getting permission from Gen'l Meade, or at least coordinating with Hancock to his right before moving forward into a position with his 'flanks in the air.'

I have to respectfully disagree. Sickles was a pompous ass that let his bravado get a lot of good men killed. He left a defensive position on high ground and advanced into a field for no good reason.

Some other facts about Sickles:

He doesn't have a monument at Gettysburg. This is because he served on the commitee that that worked to have monuments placed on the battlefield and he stole the money. After being found out and coming clean it was determined that he would not have a monument.

Sickles is also the first person to use the "Temporary Insanity Plea" in a murder trial. He killed Francis Scott Key's grandson for having an alleged affair with his wife.

[zuluhour]

General Lee for not listening to Longstreet and falling back to prepared positions. I believe Lee's health may have played a role in this. I can't remember the location Longstreet had in mind but it was not Gettysburg. He believed he could "lure" the Union to these prepared positions and inflict paralyzing losses.

I believe my view would be confirmed should you have a copy of Longstreets memoirs. I have an original from my grandfather but can no longer open it due to the damage is causes the bindings. One day I'll have to send it to Williamsburg for repair.

[bush]

Have any of you read Bonekemper's book on Lee? It lays out the thesis that it was lee who cost the South the war, Gettysburg is handled at both the tactical and strategic levels. I think it is a pretty good book as it gives a very different view from what is commonly found.

[pmelheck1]

A lot of the after battle speculation on what could have won the battle by the participants to me isn't very important at all. Longstreet in speculating at what could have happened had things gone different to me is like the Japanese wargaming Midway and changing the outcome to their expectations of the battle. What has always fascinated me was the drop of a hat decisions sometimes that had to be made with little to no input with sometimes the fate of nations in the balance. Sometimes folks make bad calls and that's the nature of the beastie. We all have the benefit of hindsight, we know what forces were arrayed, we know looming weather, We are aware of what was happening on the home front and in the army as a whole that the field commander might not have any idea of. To me that's the joy of wargaming. The ability to play those what if's that at least to me are a completely separate issue from the history of a battle. Both also make great discussion fodder[:'(]

[morganbj]

I think the union army with all of its customer cheatin' shopkeepers and bankers were responsible for the defeat of the valiant boys in gray who were fighting for self determination from the overbearing and insufferable Northern states. Who's with me?!!!?? [:D]

[LST Express]

Oh boy, here we go.[;)][:D]

[Canoerebel]

Just in case anybody took my "Pfft.  Minnesota" comment to Bullwinkle seriously, I had better explain (or, it might have been better not to have said it, even in jest, since sometimes electronic communication just doesn't come across the way it was intended).

I consider Bullwinkle a very good friend.  (I don't know what he consider me, and I'm afraid to ask. [:)]).  There is a longstanding practice in the good ol' USA of intersectional and inter-state rivalry and harrassment.  I poke fun at the New York Yankees.  John Dillworth would reciprocate by poking fun at the Atlanta Braves.  I "harrass" Minnesotans and Bullwinkle might respond by dissing Georgians.  All of this is normal and healthy and fun...as long as it's meant that way, which it almost always is.

Of course, the AE Forum has people of many different cultures and lands, so they may not be famliar with the ground rules, so comments like mine might seem edgy or mean spirited when they were anything but.

Just for the record, I have complete respect for the Union Army, including that portion which hailed from Minnesota.  [:)]

[John 3rd]

Cannot believe I missed this Thread Dan!

I have always held that Gettysburg was simply Lee's fault.

1. Day One was an accidental engagement. Meeting Engagements cannot be scripted and so Day One happens by pure chance. The error made here was in Lee not taking his new Corps Commanders in direct hand by DIRECTLY telling them to finish the job. Cemetery Ridge would have been a very costly attack as the day was ending. There were over 30 guns positioned on the hill plus a full Union Inf Div that had been unengaged. A serious effort would probably have taken it but with real casualties. Much of this is Ewell's fault since his boys were closest to the objective. AP Hill was a non-entity that day since he was dealing with 'personal' problems.

2. Lee continues the Offensive--HUGE mistake. Walking those grounds, as James McPherson writes, truly shows the strength of the Union position. The Longstreet 'right hook' was probably the right choice. Some of Day Two's fault hangs on the petulant Longstreet for taking SOOOOO LONG to get there. Had he been able to attack with Pickett--his WHOLE Corps--they just might have broken through the Left Flank. Without Pickett it was a tough chance at best. Those two Confederate Inf Div did some of the best fighting of the war during that attack and took over 50% Casualties for NOTHING. The only reason this is possible was due to that idiot Sickles advancing his Corps. YES--he didn't want to go through Chancellorsville again but in so doing this he nearly GAVE the ANV the victory. GO 1st Minnesota!

Yet AGAIN where was Ewell this day??? AWOL. Lee should have sat in his HQ to 'encourage' prompt support of Longstreet's assault.

3. Who on Gawd's green earth could have thought that 15,000 men could take the clump of trees??!! Insanity...

If you want some great popcorn reading, read Newt Gingrich's Grants Comes East Trilogy. He deals with this very scenario magnificently. His writing about the personalities and 'what if's' is wonderful. Him and William Forstchen's writings are always a delight for Alt Hist readers.

As to games, I loved Talon Soft's Civil War Series. Actually bought four copies of them and had my Civil War students in Community College play them and write about lessons learned from playing them. VERY fun and quite good at teaching why you don't charge Artillery, the proper use of Cavalry, etc... Our very own Matrix bought this series and you can get them on this site. It is a shameless plug but they are a blast to play! CR ought to buy the Chicamauga one and I could 'play' with him or we could try Gettysburg...