OT: If the carriers had been at Pearl Harbor, would they have put up a reasonable fight?

[Kwik E Mart]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

It wasn't until the Vietnam War that the US realized that most planes shot down were flown by rookies. If a pilot got in 10 missions, their chances of surviving the tour were much higher than they were in the first 10 missions. This is why the Top Gun school exists. It's an attempt in peace time to give pilots as many of those skills from the first 10 missions they can without live fire.

Bill

...actually, i thought Top Gun exists to give select fighter pilots a unique training experience (flying against agressor aircraft that simulate current enemy tactics and tendencies) that they are to take back to their respective squadrons and share...but perhaps i'm being too nitpicky...

[Commander Stormwolf]

the roman military maxim

"make ready in peace what you need in war"

[bradfordkay]

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf

In the first months of the war US fighters were not prepared to fight the Zero

Yep. And yet they had plenty of P-36 hawk fighters to practice dogfights with..
..seems like tactics could have been developed if they spent more time training.. less time on the beach [:D]

remember, "can't out run a zero, so don't try.. have to out fly em [;)]"

I can't believe that anybody would quote TMTSNBN in a serious discussion!

You do realize that even the P40B was faster than the A6M2?

[dorjun driver]

Japan did have six carriers with highly trained crews and pilots but the fact remains that in air to air carrier combat, each side was totally inexperienced with no precedent to guide them. Anything could have happened.

What kind of acid are you on? Would you care to share?

[Commander Stormwolf]

You do realize that even the P40B was faster than the A6M2?

Exactly. TMTSNBN was as badly confused as the tactics used by the early pilots in the war itself.

Hooray for matchsticks [;)]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thach_Weave

[LargeSlowTarget]

ORIGINAL: dorjun driver

Japan did have six carriers with highly trained crews and pilots but the fact remains that in air to air carrier combat, each side was totally inexperienced with no precedent to guide them. Anything could have happened.

What kind of acid are you on? Would you care to share?

[&:] There was no precedent for a carrier vs. carrier engagement prior to the battle of the Coral Sea, so both sides had in fact no experience in that kind of combat a the time of PH. Also see wdolson's post.

[ilovestrategy]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

ORIGINAL: dorjun driver

Japan did have six carriers with highly trained crews and pilots but the fact remains that in air to air carrier combat, each side was totally inexperienced with no precedent to guide them. Anything could have happened.

What kind of acid are you on? Would you care to share?

[&:] There was no precedent for a carrier vs. carrier engagement prior to the battle of the Coral Sea, so both sides had in fact no experience in that kind of combat a the time of PH. Also see wdolson's post.

I have to agree with this. Before the Coral Sea neither side had fought that type of battle.

[aether59]

[font="Arial"]Just a note on this discussion, not that I'm an expert or anything.

My father was a chief gunnery officer on the CV-2 Lexington on PH day and he went in the water when she was sunk in the battle of the Coral Sea. His job in the tower was to watch his quadrant of the radar and call out the incoming plane coordinates to the gun crews. The RCA CXAM radar were new then, and not very capable. From Wikipedia on that radar system, it says the Lex spotted incoming Zero's at 68 miles at Coral Sea, which is about at most 10 minutes warning. My father said the radar stunk at and was unreliable with altitude, and they called the antenna the "rotating bed mattress", because that's what it looked like.

Had they been at PH, and if there had been radar men, gun crews and pilots at quarters early that Sunday morning, how many planes can you scramble in 10 minutes?

He said the men were told, as to the reason they were steaming away from PH on Dec. 5th, 1941 was the Admiral thought they were getting lazy, and needed to go out on maneuvers. Makes sense on hindsight, I guess, since her and the Enterprise missions were secret for two reasons: Not to alert the Japs that the CV's were missing from PH and to keep the 12 planes on each a secret about being delivered to Wake and Midway.

Always seemed to me that would be an awful small job for such large carriers, but I guess they felt those planes were really needed on the islands.

I got the sense from him, as has been mentioned on this board, that the men were pretty green...after all, the Coral Sea was the first carrier to carrier combat. My father always said that it was fuel lines leaking that did the Lexington in, but the official report points more toward gas fumes erupting in the air ventilation system than the fuel supply lines.

Like most battle hardened vets, he never spoke much at all about the war...it took 40 years to get these few tid-bits out of him.

Though I do remember him talking about the Zero pilot who smiled and saluted to the men in the tower as he roared past. After the men were collected from the Coral Sea waters, the Navy dumped them on an island called Tonga-Tapu for a few weeks, because they were still in dangerous waters and the Navy couldn't spare a ship(s) to ferry them back stateside.

As you can imagine, the island natives were pretty awestruck by a bunch of dirty, oily SOB's that spoke funny being deposited on their island. But apparently the native women were quite enamored with their tee-shirts (the men didn't have much else). Only problem was, the shirts didn't fit the better endowed gals, so they cut two holes in them and walked around like that..!! Hmmmm..

Jon

[spence]

A few thoughts about the PH strike from various sources. I think the most likely result would have been that the carriers would have been sunk if they were in the vicinity of PH. If in the harbor their planes would likely have contributed nothing to the defense since they would have been parked wing-tip to wing-tip on the USN airfields (probably with no gas and no bullets and certainly with no bombs or torpedoes).

If the carriers had been in port, they all would have been sunk or put out of action in the first strike.

I think that the majority of the dive bombers in the first strike were targeted against the airfields. The torpedo bombers and level bombers were targeted on the battleships. Flexibility in the execution of the plan of higher command was not a trait frequently demonstrated in combat by the Japanese during the war. The plan called for the dive bombers of the second wave to attack carriers and cruisers. The actual attack contradicts my previous comment somewhat because the dive bombers of the second wave actually concentrated on the USS Nevada instead of the cruisers they were supposed to hit. The pilots were aware that Yamamoto had placed a premium on sinking BBs and in the event they didn't have to make a choice between Nevada and Lexington or Enterprise so they deviated towards the prime target (one might argue that Lcdr Fuchida placed a higher priority on carriers but if one did one would have to place undue reliance on his post-war interviews and writings which have been widely discredited [especially in Japan]).{Zimm: Attack on Pearl Harbor; Strategy, Combat, Myths Deceptions}

The Japanese probably were flying some kind of search. The Tone and Chikuma were along with their large sea plane contingent. These two cruisers were designed to use their air group as air search for the KB.

The Japanese were not inclined to use any strike (B5 or D3) aircraft for searching. Tone and Chikuma were designed and intended to scout for the carriers BUT their combined complement of seaplanes was only barely able to carry out a search of around 120 degrees. Such a search was dangerously thin especially if one considers how such a doctrine turned out at Midway. Certainly no "super-search ability" was demonstrated in that fight by these two ships. (Parshall and Tully: Shattered Sword).

The KB retained 48 A6M2s for fleet defense. Roughly 1/3 to 1/2 would have been airborne at any one time. The KB had no radar, no Fighter Direction Center and in many a/c: no radios. An escorted strike coming in on an unanticipated axis might well have caused some serious damage to the KB. The USN was not practiced in multi-carrier strikes in 1941 and plane characteristics and inexperience certainly made an uncoordinated strike a good if not likely possibility. But then again Yorktown and Lexington put together good coordinated strikes both against Lae/Salamaua and the Shoho pretty much right out of the on deck circle so dismissing the USN's ability to do so against KB is not entirely justified. At Midway 1 x 1000 lb bomb killed Akagi.

I've experimented with turning 1st Turn Surprise and Historical 1st Turn OFF and then stuck the Japanese with doing just what they did in the way they did it whilest the Allies get to try any and all surprises against the IJN. I'm afraid that the results obtained seemed pretty much what the IJN would have wanted. I admit that any IJ Player who continued after any other result would have to be a real diehard masochist but after quite a few run throughs it seems the system will not permit any great disaster for the IJN. The real IJN Command considered this a really high-risk operation: in the game it's not

[Skyros]

From Zimm's book on PH 16 Kate's were assigned the carrier moorings. Six went after Utah and ten changed to 1010 dock when they realized no carriers were in Port. A carrier or two would have drawn them all away from Utah, Helena and Oglala. And spared those ships.

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: Shellshock

You always hear it said that the loss of the battleline at Pearl Harbor forced hidebound admirals in the US to turn away from battleships, use it's carriers more aggressively and eventually see carriers as the primary weapon of the Pacific War. So, if one or two carriers are sunk and the BBs survive does that lesson still sink in?

Very unlikely IMO...at least not until after losing the battleline somewhere else to air attacks.

We already had the lesson of the British raid on Taranto and had learned nothing, would you really expect them to learn it if it had been the carriers and not the battleline that had sunk at PH? If anything, the lesson from that would be that the carriers were too fragile for fleet operations (you have to put yourself in the mindset of one of those battleship admirals).

[Nikademus]

The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse sent shocks far deeper than either PH or Taranto. That was because there were no more excuses. (Ships were in port......it was night, suprise attack etc.) Not just one but two capital ships lost the same day and soley to airpower. Combine that with the emerging realities of the Combined war effort, The USN's enthusiasm to go charging West would probably have been dampened.

Key word is "probably" The trashing of the USN battleline did indeed "Force" the US Admirals to not only discard older theories of warfare in favor of the new (because the core of that older theory had been taken out of the equation for a time), but to conceed sea superiority in the western Pacific for lack of assets.

With no PH....one can 'guess' say 'might', 'maybe', 'probable' etc etc. PH removed all doubt. It thus "forced" [:D]

[AW1Steve]

I really expect that Halsey's Enterprise would have fought valiantly! And fruitlessly , sinking bravely. [:(]
Even if she joined with Lexington , they would have been run over , by longer ranged Kates and Zeros. They would have definately lost what the Russian Navy used to call "The Battle of the 1st Salvo".

Husband Kimmel was always considered very agressive as a Battleship commander. I can visualize him on the bridge of his flagship , leading the surface fleet in a 1941 naval version of the "Charge of the Light Brigade" to their doom.

Reasonable? I can't imagine either force doing well (despite Historiker's AAR to the contrary) , and I suspect the best that would have been said of the USN would have been "They died bravely with their shores on". [:(]

[Commander Stormwolf]

what would be really interesting if the japanese didn't attack pearl,
and the USN made some type of counter-attack towards the philipines

combined their 7CV (bring ranger along) and 12 BB


round 1: betties and submarines

round 2: kido butai carrier planes

round 3: yamato and company


would have been quite a spectacle (one way or the other)

[Nikademus]

in all likelyhood, yes. Especially if Lex and York attacked seperately enough. IJN CAP is often maligned and it's weaknesses endlessly highlighted (to which it should be noted USN CAP wasn't all that either in 42), but in the one battle where 4 or more CV's were present, the IJN CAP accounted for 55 planes shot down over KB. Add to this that the USN escorts would not yet have gotten sufficient warning about the Zero could exaserbate the issue. The great irony of Midway is that of the four major carrier battles, it was this battle that the Japanese put in their best performance CAP wise. There were simply too many attackers coming in one after another. Much would depend on the timing and the weather variables. If the weather is clear enough and the attackers vector is along a largely single axis the IJN CAP was up to the job of causing higgidly piggidy and they'd have a numbers edge over the likely small escort. If the attack is more disjointed (multiple vectors) problems could ensue but then thats true of any CV force beset by angry bees.

Thus....the most important factor in pre 1943 CV combat was getting in the first strike. All it takes is one bomb or torpedo hit to ruin one's day for either side. Case in point....my last AI start using Da Babes.......Halsey indeed attacked a returning KB and given the die rolls that day, managed to trade Enterprise for Shokaku. The latter suffered an ammo explosion which coupled with the long distance from home led to her going glug glug. I was annoyed but what can you do when the gods turn their thumbs down on you?

Other times, its been a slaughter as KB pounces. I always steer well clear on Turn 2. Even if you reduce KB, its not worth the loss of a CV or two because it gives the Japanese an even larger window of initiative. Essex's will come but not for a good long while. Gotta protect the assets and play it like Nimitz did. Only expose if the gains are worth the risk. A situation where a KB isn't fighting with one armed tied behind it's back and there's an assumption of enemy carriers lurking is not what i'd consider good odds if i'm piloting a single carrier. I'd order my boys to evade and live to fight another day with better odds.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

in all likelyhood, yes. Especially if Lex and York attacked seperately enough. IJN CAP is often maligned and it's weaknesses endlessly highlighted (to which it should be noted USN CAP wasn't all that either in 42), but in the one battle where 4 or more CV's were present, the IJN CAP accounted for 55 planes shot down over KB. Add to this that the USN escorts would not yet have gotten sufficient warning about the Zero could exaserbate the issue. The great irony of Midway is that of the four major carrier battles, it was this battle that the Japanese put in their best performance CAP wise. There were simply too many attackers coming in one after another. Much would depend on the timing and the weather variables. If the weather is clear enough and the attackers vector is along a largely single axis the IJN CAP was up to the job of causing higgidly piggidy and they'd have a numbers edge over the likely small escort. If the attack is more disjointed (multiple vectors) problems could ensue but then thats true of any CV force beset by angry bees.

Thus....the most important factor in pre 1943 CV combat was getting in the first strike. All it takes is one bomb or torpedo hit to ruin one's day for either side. Case in point....my last AI start using Da Babes.......Halsey indeed attacked a returning KB and given the die rolls that day, managed to trade Enterprise for Shokaku. The latter suffered an ammo explosion which coupled with the long distance from home led to her going glug glug. I was annoyed but what can you do when the gods turn their thumbs down on you?

Other times, its been a slaughter as KB pounces. I always steer well clear on Turn 2. Even if you reduce KB, its not worth the loss of a CV or two because it gives the Japanese an even larger window of initiative. Essex's will come but not for a good long while. Gotta protect the assets and play it like Nimitz did. Only expose if the gains are worth the risk. A situation where a KB isn't fighting with one armed tied behind it's back and there's an assumption of enemy carriers lurking is not what i'd consider good odds if i'm piloting a single carrier. I'd order my boys to evade and live to fight another day with better odds.

Yamamoto did love huge and complex battle plans (with dispersion of force)... IJN paid dearly for it at Midway...


Leo "Apollo11"

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

in all likelyhood, yes. Especially if Lex and York attacked seperately enough. IJN CAP is often maligned and it's weaknesses endlessly highlighted (to which it should be noted USN CAP wasn't all that either in 42), but in the one battle where 4 or more CV's were present, the IJN CAP accounted for 55 planes shot down over KB. Add to this that the USN escorts would not yet have gotten sufficient warning about the Zero could exaserbate the issue. The great irony of Midway is that of the four major carrier battles, it was this battle that the Japanese put in their best performance CAP wise. There were simply too many attackers coming in one after another. Much would depend on the timing and the weather variables. If the weather is clear enough and the attackers vector is along a largely single axis the IJN CAP was up to the job of causing higgidly piggidy and they'd have a numbers edge over the likely small escort. If the attack is more disjointed (multiple vectors) problems could ensue but then thats true of any CV force beset by angry bees.

Thus....the most important factor in pre 1943 CV combat was getting in the first strike. All it takes is one bomb or torpedo hit to ruin one's day for either side. Case in point....my last AI start using Da Babes.......Halsey indeed attacked a returning KB and given the die rolls that day, managed to trade Enterprise for Shokaku. The latter suffered an ammo explosion which coupled with the long distance from home led to her going glug glug. I was annoyed but what can you do when the gods turn their thumbs down on you?

Other times, its been a slaughter as KB pounces. I always steer well clear on Turn 2. Even if you reduce KB, its not worth the loss of a CV or two because it gives the Japanese an even larger window of initiative. Essex's will come but not for a good long while. Gotta protect the assets and play it like Nimitz did. Only expose if the gains are worth the risk. A situation where a KB isn't fighting with one armed tied behind it's back and there's an assumption of enemy carriers lurking is not what i'd consider good odds if i'm piloting a single carrier. I'd order my boys to evade and live to fight another day with better odds.

I think the whole Imperial Naval Staff suffered from that affliction! Don't forget the Leyte plan which was concieved long after Isoruku was room temperature! [:D]
Yamamoto did love huge and complex battle plans (with dispersion of force)... IJN paid dearly for it at Midway...


Leo "Apollo11"

[wdolson]

The US had intelligence that the IJN was likely to hit American targets sometime in early December, but nobody really knew where. I suspect somebody who knew the potential of carriers made sure the USN CVs stayed at sea as much as possible during that window. The big gun admirals held most of the highest command positions within the USN, but Joseph Reeves had just retired.

Reeves was the visionary admiral who established most of the successful carrier doctrines and he ended his carrier as CNO. This is a good biography http://www.amazon.com/All-Factors-Victory-Origins-Carrier/dp/B006G83LRY/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&qid=1342826795&sr=8-9&keywords=Joseph+Reeves

One of Reeves' former staff may have been in an important position and made sure the CVs were kept busy.

After PH the USN realized the CVs were not ready for prime time yet and they spent most of the next 5 months on raids to train up the air groups. When the intelligence gave them an opening, they would send in one or two carriers on a raid to give the Japanese a bad day. The most spectacular was the Enterprise's raid on the Marshalls in, I believe February 42. Intelligence firmly place the KB well to the west, so the Enterprise was sent to the Marshalls to see what kind of havoc it could do.

Bill

[Commander Stormwolf]

Not only were the carriers to the west, but also IJN LBA was grinding itself down above the philipines / dei

a properly garrisoned marshals (bettys at roi-namur, maloelap, and wotje would have made halsey swim home)



one thing i wonder: just how accurate was allied intelligence on japanese land based airpower numbers in 1942

[ilovestrategy]

According to Shattered Sword, Yamamato wasn't concerned about American carriers raiding but was concerned that there were American carriers at all. He really wanted to bag them at Pearl.