Russian BF

[DRF99]

If I read the original post correctly, it is the base force unit rather than the pilots that have the high fatigue levels.

I found a similar thing with AVG and British BF-like units in Burma early in the game and it took a very long time of resting for them to recover.

Cheers,
DRF

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: ckammp
You have had 3 1/2 game-years to prepare the Soviet infrastructure and plan for activation. If you are not prepared, the fault is, again, yours and not the game designers.

I'm curious how you would plan for it, given you can't actually issue the Soviets any orders (bar training air groups) until they activate.

And by then - its a bit late, innit? [8|]

[jmalter]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana
I'm curious how you would plan for it, given you can't actually issue the Soviets any orders (bar training air groups) until they activate.

And by then - its a bit late, innit? [8|]

at '41 start, and ev'ry 4 months or so, check out the Sovs.
port/airfield/fort expansion ON where desired?
LCUs w/ engrs in Defend mode, w/ full TOE strength?
BFs set to accept replacements?
check LCU morale, adjust Rest mode as needed?
pilot strength at max in all sqns?
sqn training missions and a/c complement as desired?
mebbe a few ldr changes in BFs or sqns (tho' spending PP for Uncle Joe has gotta be about the last thing on the priority chart)?

yeah, 8/45 is kinda late to start doing all that stuff.

[CRations]

ORIGINAL: ckammp

ORIGINAL: Chris H

ORIGINAL: ckammp





Soviet VVS Base Forces start the game on 7 Dec 41 with 30 AV each. Their TOE is 90 AV each.
Automatic Soviet activation, as per the manual, is 1 Aug 45. The build rate for Aviation Support squads for the Allies is 600/month. By the time of Automatic Soviet activation, the Allies will have produced over 25,000 Aviation Support squads.

If you don't have your VVS Base Forces at full AV strength by 1 Aug 45, the fault is yours, not the game designers.

Where are you in game time? If you have reached the 15 Aug 1945 than you and +1 below will understand the problem.

So for your benefit I will put the problem in figures.

There are 3 Air HQ with 180 each, 25 VVS BF each with a max of 90 AS, 6 Outpost with 8 AS each and 3 named BF of 30, 60 and 120 AS. Grand total of 3348 Aviation support. On the 1 Aug all BF were at max AS.

There are 127 air units with 32 max plus a further 34 with varying numbers of a/c for a grand total of 4406 aircraft. All air were also at max (except for one outpost) on the 1 Aug.

This is a shortfall of 1058 aviation support. Some of those were under training/rest but not a quarter of the avilable a/c and certainly not at the start of a campaign that historically steamrollered the Japanese. Further given the Soviets have just spent the last three and half years training and are all mainly 60 plus in their necessary skill training has little effect.

Two weeks in the end result is some very tired engineers. and aircraft that are not being repaired.

250 AV is the max for any base. The Soviets have more than enough AV to max out several bases.

You have had 3 1/2 game-years to prepare the Soviet infrastructure and plan for activation. If you are not prepared, the fault is, again, yours and not the game designers.

ckammp - your attitude sucks. If you can't be constructively helpful you could at least be polite.

CR

[jmalter]

politeness is good, but IMO the OP wrote a moan about the game providing inadequate AVsupport, that it was unrealistic and 'needs changing'.

now from what little i know of the Soviet FarEast ops in 8/45, their forces were pert' massive, armed w/ their latest stuff, & tasked to 'go for broke' in the classic late-war Soviet Armored offensive style.

an AE player can emulate that style, but must also deal w/ the consequences (running high air-ops rates from inadequately supported bases is gonna take a toll).

or an AE player can pursue operations at a more measured pace, or at least xfer his excess air sqns back to the off-map lvl-10 airfields.

the Sov AVsupport may or may not reflect what was historically available, my guess is that the game-design adequately represents the best knowledge available. if the AV support is low, mebbe the player should take that into account. the OP has run 2 weeks of turns, he's had adequate time to realize that his op-tempo outstripped the available support capability.

mebbe that don't deserve a slam, but mebbe it does deserve a spanking?

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: jmalter

now from what little i know of the Soviet FarEast ops in 8/45, their forces were pert' massive, armed w/ their latest stuff, & tasked to 'go for broke' in the classic late-war Soviet Armored offensive style.

I usually come at these kind of threads from the far end of the question. I start with "so what?" and move backwards.

I've played the GC to main engine shutdown in 1946, so I've played the Sovs as much as they can be played. In general I found their air ops just got in the way, slowed me down, and were fiddly. The Red Army in August 1945 was only rivaled in history by the Golden Horde in terms of their offensive press. (Don't even try to run any Blownaparte past me . . .) The forces you get at activaiton vis a vis the Japanese forces in Asia at that point are hammer vs. fly. It's trivial to invest even the largest metro hexes with 30 divisions of motor-rifle infantry and armor, supported by 40 heavy artillery units. And when the Sovs built armor divisions they didn't dink around.

After I cleared the Asian mainland of every last stinkin' master race proponent I used the Red Air Force to cover the USN pulling up to Korea to lift the Red Army across onto Shimonseki. In the HI they proceeded to take every single Japanese hex, aided in the north by a huge US effort coming the other way. The USA and Britain have plenty of air power, and better, relieving the Soviets of the need to lift their Av. support across the strait. Once the Reds are in the HI it's a rout. Smash, grab, move on. Did my heart good to see it.

My advice--let the flyboys drink vodka and watch. The infantry will dig out whatever pieces and parts the arty leaves standing just fine.

[jmalter]

that campaign must've been bulk fun, Moose - i had to lie back & have a smoke after reading your description of the end-game.

but heh, USN providing sealift to the Red Army? ughrealistic! strains historical credulity! needs fixin'!

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: jmalter

that campaign must've been bulk fun, Moose - i had to lie back & have a smoke after reading your description of the end-game.

but heh, USN providing sealift to the Red Army? ughrealistic! strains historical credulity! needs fixin'!

Read David McCullough's soaring, Pulitzer Prize-winning bio of Harry Truman. A realist and a man who listened to the American people, if Russians had volunteered to die in place of American boys Harry would have given them a ride to the rodeo. And worried later on about Joe taking root.

[jmalter]

hmm, my take on HST sez, he wouldn't give Stalin a bent nickel, post-Yalta. and he had the successful Trinity test in his pocket. no way he'd've approved USN assets putting Red Army troops into the HI. If Trinity had failed, and the Kyushu invasion was stalemated, then HST might've grudgingly put a few USN amph-assault assets at the service of Red Army ops in the Kuriles.

HST was canny, i'd guess he was just as worried about 'Joe taking root' as was the IJHQ command.

despite the overwhelming Soviet victories in Manchuria, the final defeat of IJ has always been acknowledged as a wholly-owned product of US power-projection and tech prowess, w/ subsidiary help from allied forces.

also, i love to read D McC's books, 'Path between the Seas' is my fave. i enjoyed 'The Greater Journey' & look forward to a re-read.

[michaelm75au]

Soviet units will still take replacements and upgrades when not yet activated.
So if they start off at 30 AV, they should have plenty of time to get to 90 AV which seems to be the TOE on some units.

[Chris21wen]

ORIGINAL: michaelm

Soviet units will still take replacements and upgrades when not yet activated.
So if they start off at 30 AV, they should have plenty of time to get to 90 AV which seems to be the TOE on some units.

There is, more than enough time. As I said previously, all my manned bases with engineers and enough supply were at max. . All air units were fully trained with most being above 60 it their required skills, all were full eqiupped with the most up-to-date a/c. All LCUs were fully manned with the latest TOE, etc. (Isolated bases such as Magadan wearn't).

Problems come when the campaign starts.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: jmalter

hmm, my take on HST sez, he wouldn't give Stalin a bent nickel, post-Yalta. and he had the successful Trinity test in his pocket. no way he'd've approved USN assets putting Red Army troops into the HI. If Trinity had failed, and the Kyushu invasion was stalemated, then HST might've grudgingly put a few USN amph-assault assets at the service of Red Army ops in the Kuriles.

HST was canny, i'd guess he was just as worried about 'Joe taking root' as was the IJHQ command.

despite the overwhelming Soviet victories in Manchuria, the final defeat of IJ has always been acknowledged as a wholly-owned product of US power-projection and tech prowess, w/ subsidiary help from allied forces.

also, i love to read D McC's books, 'Path between the Seas' is my fave. i enjoyed 'The Greater Journey' & look forward to a re-read.

In my game I had dropped five A-bombs already and strangely the Japanese hadn't surrendered.[:)] I was far past auto-victory.

It's easy to say HST would have kept the Russians out, but if he had allowed a half-million US KIAs when the Soviets offered troops I think he would have been impeached. In my undergrad days I did extensive research into contemporary media in 1945 and HST was facing a race with US public war weariness to a far greater extent than is acked these days. He also had immense economic pressure building behind the dam for consumer products, industry change-over go-aheads, and a widespread assumption that there would be a deep recession when war contracts ended and industry down-shifted to convert. It was so widely assumed this would happen it was a truism in public discourse. We were scraping the bottom of the military manpower bucket, and VE Day was months in the past. The public wanted to know why the war wasn't over when The War had been over since May. HST had very limited political maneuvering room to delay or to lose men, the Cold War notwithstanding. The Soviets had already reniged on free elections in Poland, but the true extent of Soviet post-war plans was not wholly apparent. The Greek civil war and the Iron Curtain speech by Churchill were still a couple of years in the future.

The US public did not see any long-term upside to occupying Japan either. They didn't care if it was all us, or us with help. They wanted it over, as cheaply as possible. The usefulness of Japan as a Cold War bulwark in the Korean War and after was also well in the future. I doubt Stalin would have promised troops in the quantity I used. But if the war had gone into 1946 I think he would have invested substantial numbers in order to stake a claim to Japanese real estate. Where the Red Army went it did not withdraw, until 1989. And I believe the USN would have carried those forces across the water. The political pressure at home on Truman would have been immense.

[jcjordan]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: jmalter

hmm, my take on HST sez, he wouldn't give Stalin a bent nickel, post-Yalta. and he had the successful Trinity test in his pocket. no way he'd've approved USN assets putting Red Army troops into the HI. If Trinity had failed, and the Kyushu invasion was stalemated, then HST might've grudgingly put a few USN amph-assault assets at the service of Red Army ops in the Kuriles.

HST was canny, i'd guess he was just as worried about 'Joe taking root' as was the IJHQ command.

despite the overwhelming Soviet victories in Manchuria, the final defeat of IJ has always been acknowledged as a wholly-owned product of US power-projection and tech prowess, w/ subsidiary help from allied forces.

also, i love to read D McC's books, 'Path between the Seas' is my fave. i enjoyed 'The Greater Journey' & look forward to a re-read.

In my game I had dropped five A-bombs already and strangely the Japanese hadn't surrendered.[:)] I was far past auto-victory.

It's easy to say HST would have kept the Russians out, but if he had allowed a half-million US KIAs when the Soviets offered troops I think he would have been impeached. In my undergrad days I did extensive research into contemporary media in 1945 and HST was facing a race with US public war weariness to a far greater extent than is acked these days. He also had immense economic pressure building behind the dam for consumer products, industry change-over go-aheads, and a widespread assumption that there would be a deep recession when war contracts ended and industry down-shifted to convert. It was so widely assumed this would happen it was a truism in public discourse. We were scraping the bottom of the military manpower bucket, and VE Day was months in the past. The public wanted to know why the war wasn't over when The War had been over since May. HST had very limited political maneuvering room to delay or to lose men, the Cold War notwithstanding. The Soviets had already reniged on free elections in Poland, but the true extent of Soviet post-war plans was not wholly apparent. The Greek civil war and the Iron Curtain speech by Churchill were still a couple of years in the future.

The US public did not see any long-term upside to occupying Japan either. They didn't care if it was all us, or us with help. They wanted it over, as cheaply as possible. The usefulness of Japan as a Cold War bulwark in the Korean War and after was also well in the future. I doubt Stalin would have promised troops in the quantity I used. But if the war had gone into 1946 I think he would have invested substantial numbers in order to stake a claim to Japanese real estate. Where the Red Army went it did not withdraw, until 1989. And I believe the USN would have carried those forces across the water. The political pressure at home on Truman would have been immense.

Did you find the AB as underwhelming as I did as far as damage for the vp costs?

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: jcjordan

Did you find the AB as underwhelming as I did as far as damage for the vp costs?

Yes, this is a long-discussed thing, going back to WITP. I think the AB needs its own agorithms rather than being treated as just a very big iron bomb. Look in the editor for its stats. There is no real good way to model the heat flash in the conventional math, or the air burst. Or the persistent radiation.

GG decided as well that two was th elimit before very substantial penalties woudl accrue to the Allies, and using three or more is relaly not worth it in VP terms. I did 3-5 after I passed auto victory, and mostly to target different City target types and see what each did by peeking at the Japanese side after the strike.

[Alfred]

This thread discusses the use of the atomic bomb in the game.

tm.asp?m=3019336&mpage=1&key=atomic%2Cbomb&#3025760

Alfred

[Commander Stormwolf]

wouldn't mind if it were removed altogether (from a scenario 3 or otherwise)

usn could not (and did not) fight the war on the assumption that it would be available

[crsutton]

My question would be was there perhaps a historical basis for these limitations that whoever designed the Russian front OOB set into place? As far as I know there was only one single track railroad from the west to the east to support this build up and offensive. Thunderbolt or not, I would expect logistical limitations.

I also don't know why Soviet motorized divisions are foot units when they have hundreds of trucks. Never really got a clear explanation for that.

Even so, looking at the OOB of the Soviet mech and armor divisions, I don't really think I have much to worry about when the leash is cut loose.

[CaptBeefheart]

I just took an Ironman game to sometime in May 1946. I had untold millions of Allied troops (probably 90% of the inf/arm/arty/HQ OOB of the Allies, including Russkies, but not much Chinese) against 1.7 million IJA troops. The game went into an endless loop at that point: it couldn't handle a land battle of that scale. Holy anti-climax, Batman!

The Moose has some good points: The Red Air Force is pretty short-legged so it's not the best ground attack vehicle--your ground troops will easily outpace your Il-2s and other bombers. However, with level-9 bases staffed by at least 250 aviation support you can concentrate the Sov aircraft into a few bases that are fully supported. Sov fighters are great at point defense and as short-ranged escort fodder and some of the recon is quite good. Also, in a pinch, send a U.S./UK base force across the straits to Korea.

Cheers,
CC

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

My question would be was there perhaps a historical basis for these limitations that whoever designed the Russian front OOB set into place? As far as I know there was only one single track railroad from the west to the east to support this build up and offensive. Thunderbolt or not, I would expect logistical limitations.

I found one reference stating the the Trans-Siberian Railway, a 12-day trip from Moscow to Vlad., in 1950 could sustain 14,000 tons per day of miliitary cargo for use in the Korean War. This was using primarily WWII surplus rolling stock. The TSR has several offshoot lines in its eastern half, including down into China. For much of its length it is straight, flat, and does not need to slow down to pass through cities.

Additionally, in a contemplated Soviet major effort in Asia and the HI in 1946 most of the logistics could have been brought into Vlad. on Liberty/Victory ships. The Japanese had no navy or airforce left to speak of.