Sherman Tanks and Panthers

[henri51]

Germans have changed their policy only after it turned out that they are facing masses of T-34s and KVs in Russia. After France they were still confident enough in the successful "tank destroyer policy" (letting 88s and 105s handle the heavy armour) to attack Russia without tanks capable of fighting heavy tanks.

Correct me if my memory is defective, but as far as I remember, using 88s as an antitanmk weapon did not originate in the 1941 battle for France, but either in Africa or during the Operation Goodwood battle (Von Luck) against the British after the invasion of normandy. If so it could not have been a policy during the invasion of Russia.

Henri

[Brindlebane]

88s were first used in the Spanish civil war by the Condor Legion i believe,as anti-tank and artillery.There were four versions of the 88 in the course of the war.Flak 18,36,37,41.I thought Rommel had revolutionised the use of the 88 in Africa also but apparently not.

[Txema]

Several 88s were also used in anti-tank role by Rommel at the infamous counter-attack executed by the allies at Arras, in 1940, during the battle of France.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arras_(1940)

Txema

[Perturabo]

ORIGINAL: henri51

Germans have changed their policy only after it turned out that they are facing masses of T-34s and KVs in Russia. After France they were still confident enough in the successful "tank destroyer policy" (letting 88s and 105s handle the heavy armour) to attack Russia without tanks capable of fighting heavy tanks.

Correct me if my memory is defective, but as far as I remember, using 88s as an antitanmk weapon did not originate in the 1941 battle for France, but either in Africa or during the Operation Goodwood battle (Von Luck) against the British after the invasion of normandy. If so it could not have been a policy during the invasion of Russia.

They were already used in 1940 in France to destroy B1 and Matilda tanks. Most of B1 tanks destroyed by gunfire were destroyed by 88s and 105s. 88s had AP ammo at least since 1939 or even from the start.

Also, they were already used in AT role during Spanish Civil war.

But the use of heavy AA guns against tanks goes back even further - to WWI. In battle of Cambrai 88mm K-Flak guns have destroyed 64 British tanks.

By the way, Germans still got almost to Moscow (taking territory larger than both France and Poland together) despite not having heavy tanks and Russians having lots of them. They got into the superweapon fetishism only after they practically lost the war.

[altipueri]

There were a couple of occasions when the 3.7 inch British AA gun was used in anti tank role - in the desert I think. Our great war department refused to consider developing an anti tank round for it.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Perturabo


They were already used in 1940 in France to destroy B1 and Matilda tanks. Most of B1 tanks destroyed by gunfire were destroyed by 88s and 105s.

Correct. Mostly by 88mm Flak 36 units, others by howitzers (also used in Russia).

88s had AP ammo at least since 1939 or even from the start.

The original "Handbook for the artilleryman" from 1939 points out, that 88mm Flak 36 crews had shells with impact fuzes (direct fire mode, or ballistic artillery fire mode), time fuzes (AA-role or to lay series of air-bursts on enemy infantry in woods or over trenches/fortifications) and AP rounds at their disposal.
So it's safe to say that the 88mm Flak pieces had AP ammunition since 1939, at least.

Also, they were already used in AT role during Spanish Civil war.

What's your source for this?

Right at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, Germany helped Franco with initial small arms deliveries and sent 2 warships to escort and protect Nationalist troop transports from Spanish West Africa through the Straight of Gibraltar to Southern Spain. Without that help the Coup would have failed right in the beginning already, most likely. During another operation, which took several months, around 15,000 troops were transported by German JU 52s (with quite some of them being Spanish Foreign Legion troops) from Spanish Morocco to Cadiz and Malaga in Spain. The most important factor, though, before the deployment of Germany's "Legion Condor", was the vital financial aid. The Germans founded a company for handling the financial and military aid, and obtained - as compensation for that aid - mining rights for (rare) raw materials amounting to 480 Million Reichsmark. The idea behind that was to secure vital raw materials for Germany's armament industry, such as tungsten, lead, copper, iron, tin, cobalt and nickel, resources that were then delivered to Germany until 1944.

Germany sent volunteers, the Luftwaffen unit "Legion Condor", small arms and the most important factor: vital amounts of money. Some sources indicate that light tanks were delivered as well, but afaik "high tech" weapons, such as modern AA guns, newest fighter planes etc. were not handed over.


EDIT:

ORIGINAL: Perturabo

Germans have changed their policy only after it turned out that they are facing masses of T-34s and KVs in Russia. After France they were still confident enough in the successful "tank destroyer policy" (letting 88s and 105s handle the heavy armour) to attack Russia without tanks capable of fighting heavy tanks.

The Russians didn't have masses of KV and T-34 tanks. On the onset of the German invasion, the Russians had ~960 T-34 and ~500 KV tanks, according to Erickson, which includes the rather low amount of KV-2 tanks, most likely.
These roughly 1500 tanks were concentrated into 5 corps (of a total of 29 mechanized corps).

While the appearance of KV-1 (and KV-2) tanks might have been an unpleasant surprise to the Germans, the appearance of the T-34 was a shock. A relatively low profile, sloped armor and decent mobility in difficult terrain could have presented a great showstopper for the German onslaught.

In reality, the Russians lost ~20,000 tanks in 1941 and lost more than 7 tanks for every German tank killed, according to Zaloga and Fowler. Krivosheev and Erickson assess that 2,300 of these losses (in 1941) must have been T-34s and more than 900 of them heavy tanks (mostly KVs).
That means that even replacements that just had left the factories and got handed over to the units, either got destroyed or broke down quickly as well. The mechanical reliability (eg. gearbox) of early T-34 was pretty low.
According to Solonin, the 5 Corps, that were equipped with the new tanks, had lost most of their T-34 and KV tanks within weeks only.
Zaloga concluded, that at least half of the losses during summer/autumn were the result of mechanical breakdowns, (subsequent) abandonment or lack of fuel, and not the result of direct fire from tanks or German artillery.

While there were situations where say a single KV-2 (rotated in and out of a group of around 5) was able to stop the bulk of a Recon Bn, and even the Division itself for 1 or 2 days, the fact that the Germans' mobile forces were equipped with radios consistantly, giving them a higher tactical mobility, enabled them to flank or ship around Russian heavy tanks, or to try to bring forward some 88s to either track or to destroy such tanks.

Also, unlike the rare situation described above, tactical handling of the precious Russian tanks was poor, quite often.

By the way, Germans still got almost to Moscow (taking territory larger than both France and Poland together) despite not having heavy tanks and Russians having lots of them. They got into the superweapon fetishism only after they practically lost the war.

The first sentence of your assessment is correct, I corrected your "lots of them" assessment above, already. Military planners and officers in charge of supplies and armament stressed - before the attack on Russia, that the level of supplies and fuel would not be sufficient to support the campaign for more than 6 months, where some materiels would even only last 3 months only. In a way, despite the capture of fuel and weapons depots, the stubborn Russian defense near Moscow in Winter 1941, the bad weather conditions and the corresponding partial immobility of forces at the front, and the massive loss of German vehicles during the Russian counter-offensive, saved the Germans from a total collapse of the supply system.
The German High Command ignored these warnings from the supply officers, as they saw the Russian military machine to be in shabby condition and most if not all of their tanks as outdated. They thought that the lack of firepower of the bulk of the German tanks and anti-tank guns could be made up by superior use of combined arms and higher mobility. A common thought was, that the war would be over by x-mas.

Superweapons:
The Germans had massive rail guns and mortars, which I would consider to range in that class, well before things went downhill.

Even though the Germans inspected captured T-34 tanks thoroughly, the Germans had experimented with sloped armor before, but it did not make it into more serious design phases. It seems like reports from the Russian front, about successful Russian T-34s raids or operations, resulted in plans for the predecessor of the Panther, the VK 20.02 (M), though.
Mass production of the Panther was then planned to start in late 1942 already, at a point where the Germans had rolled over the Crimea and where the fight in North Africa was still raging. Probably delivery problems of parts/resources (Allied bombing efforts started to increase too), probably coupled with problems caused by the design of the new undercarriage, delayed the start of the serial production, which finally started January 1943. The output numbers did not increase sufficiently until May 1943.
While the Panther wasn't exactly a superweapon, it was a perfect tool to counter the T-34 and even heavy tanks, and it was planned/designed way before the Germans had to go onto defensive.

Also, the Germans had examined the KV-2 and the T-35 and had figured that such beasts were unpleasant opponents, but not mobile enough to avoid being flanked. They were also really big targets for the German airforce. In general, the Germans saw such (Super)Heavy tanks as obsolete and outdated.

Only the Maus, the Super Heavy Tank project, started on direct order from Hitler (which he made in 1941 already), may have picked up elements of the Russian heavy and super heavy tank concepts.
Hitler envisioned superior armor and tremendous fire power, basically turning them into mobile fortresses or "rolling bunkers", though. Initially, 150 tanks were supposed to be produced. Difficulties with the engine (187 tons toal weight, a motor fuel engine that was supposed to deliver enough electricity for 2 E-engines acting as main drive) and Allied bombings delayed production and assembly of the 2 prototypes, so that the first Maus couldn't be assembled for testing before December 1943.

In turn, the Tiger II tank was supposed to be superior to every Allied tank out there. Due to the attempt to streamline the design of (shared) parts for the upcoming Panther II tank, the production of the first prototype was delayed until December 1943 (although ordered and planned to be finished in January 1943). The changing situation at the Russia front also influenced design and delayed the serial production even more, as better protection for the crews and better armament was favored over speed now. Specs for this tank were issued by the Heereswaffenamt in August 1942 already, though.
So if you consider this project to be "fetishism" too, then it was initiated well before Germany went onto the defensive.

I would agree with you if you would consider projects like the V2 or the Horton flying wing to be such fetishism, as the Germans hoped that these and other projects could lead to tools able to reach say New York for example, and eventually turn the tide in their favor. All these projects were based on long-term research and development either started before or early in the war, though, with the Nazi government really digging most of these concepts when things went downhill already, though.

[BletchleyGeek]

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy
Germany sent volunteers, the Luftwaffen unit "Legion Condor", small arms and the most important factor: vital amounts of money. Some sources indicate that light tanks were delivered as well, but afaik "high tech" weapons, such as modern AA guns, newest fighter planes etc. were not handed over.

The direct military involvement of Nazi Germany in the Civil War was quite substantial, deploying equipment which would see a lot of action during WW2. Condor Legion didn't comprise just "voluntary" Luftwaffe personnel, was the blanket term that denominated the Wehrmacht expeditionary force into Spain (see Hugh Thomas, History of the Spanish Civil War, http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Spanish-Civ ... 0141011610).

[*] Luftwaffe component

Arrived in Spain in November 1936, under the command of Von Sperrle and with Von Richtoffen as chief of staff. Regarding planes early in the war the Condor Legion was equipped with at least 48 Ju-52 for troop transport, so the part of the Spanish Army that supported Franco could ferry substantial amounts of personnel from the Spanish colony in Morocco.

Here you have the OOB of the Condor Legion in November 1936

Jagdgruppe J/88: 4 Heinkel He 51 staffeln (48 planes).
Kampfgruppe K/88: 4 Junkers Ju 52 staffeln (48 planes).

This Luftwaffe detachment latter included all the models which would later see action in the World War, He-111, Ju-88 which were used to bomb the Basque city of Gernika and Barcelona, as well as the Do-17 and a experimental Ju-87 unit (5 planes).

Bf-109s were also deployed along the war fronts, although details on their organization are sketchy:

http://www.zi.ku.dk/personal/drnash/mod ... bf109.html

piloted by either Luftwaffe personnel, or Spanish personnel trained by Lufwaffe officers.

[*] Heer component

A "proof of concept" battalion-size kampfgruppe, including AA and AT artillery, along with two Panzer "companies", equipped with 4 Panzer I each along with amored cars. This force was under the command of Von Thoma, and at some point during the war it had the 88mm.

Later in the war, Von Thoma would take command of a German equipped and Spanish crewed armored unit (organized in four battalions), which had a decisive impact in the offensive that cut Catalonia (north eastern Spain) from the rest of the Spanish Republic in early 1938.

There was also a Kriegsmarine component, which doubled in service of the blockade on weapons deliveries to Spain enacted by the ill-fated League of Nations (allowing weapons and materiel being delivered to Franco controlled harbors, of course).

Compared with the Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany direct involvement was quite small but qualitatively substantial.

I don't say "Germany" because there was a good deal of Germans (and Italians) fighting for the Spanish Republic in the International Brigades.

EDIT: Whoops, I cut out something and forgot to glue the text together.

[BletchleyGeek]

Some more references (I don't want to derail the thread):

Condor: The Luftwaffe in Spain 1936-1939
Patrick Laureau, 2001
http://www.amazon.com/Condor-The-Luftwa ... 1902109104

Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War
Raymond L. Proctor, 1989
http://books.google.com.au/books/about/ ... edir_esc=y

Hitler And Spain: The Nazi Role In The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939
Robert H. Whealey, 2004
http://books.google.com.au/books/about/ ... edir_esc=y

Regarding ground forces:

Soldiers of Von Thoma: Legion Condor Ground Forces in the Spanish Civil War
Lucas M. Franco, 2008
http://www.amazon.com/Soldiers-Von-Thom ... 076432926X

There's a substantial review-spoiler on Amazon:

The Condor Legion is commonly associated only with Luftwaffe "volunteers" and aircraft, such as Werner Molders and Adolf Galland, (who flew both He-51 biplanes, and Bf-109s in Spain), as well as with the Stuka, Ju-52, and He-111 squadrons which assisted Franco's Nationalist forces.

There was however, also a lesser known German Army ground contingent which befell beneath the overall aegis of the Condor Legion known as Gruppe IMKER (Group BEEKEEPER) commanded by a future general, Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma, which with his staff coordinated and maintained all direct communications to Germany. IMKER's Panzer units were codenamed Gruppe DROHNE (Group DRONE). These ground contingents were to establish training centers throughout Nationalist Spain for the following: infantry officers; infantry officer candidates; infantry NCOs; tank, antitank, and flamethrowing training; artillery training; and signals training.

On September 20, 1936, the officers, NCOs, and men from the 1st and 2nd Battalions, Panzer Regiment 6 "Neuruppin" of the 3rd Panzer Division, were assembled at their base and asked by their commanders if they would be willing to participate in a foreign undertaking of historical significance. Before giving their answer, they were informed that to volunteer meant possible imprisonment if captured or, at worst, death. They accepted the challenge. They then stored all their personal belongings and were transported to Doberitz, near Berlin, and then onto to Stettin, where the 1st Panzer Company boarded the SS Passages and the 2nd Panzer Company boarded the SS Girgenti. Crated Panzerkampfwagen 1 Ausf. As and Bs, trucks, weapons, and ammunition were also placed on board below decks.

On October 7, 1936, both ships entered Spanish waters and were met there by the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer, the Deutschland, and the torpedo boat See Adler. Later that day, the men were offloaded with the crates and traveled by rail from Seville to Caceres where they were welcomed by General Franco. Their first class of Spanish students began on October 22, 1936 and once the class was completed, the Spanish troops retained these tanks and took them to the front.

The German training companies would then receive another supply of tanks to be used for the next training session. Army ground personnel in Spain never exceeded 600 men at any time. Besides the regular German Army personnel, a number of Germans residing in Spain, who were veterans of World War I, also participated as instructors and translators. These individuals were extremely valuable for not only had they mastered the Spanish language, but also understood the mentality of the Spanish soldier.

All-in-all, 56,000 Spaniards took part in one or more of the training programs, a significant contribution to Franco's Nationalist cause. Whenever a need for technical services arose (infantry, artillery, signals, and anti-tank), there the Germans could be found. During the summer campaigns of 1937, they took over the means of all communications in Nationalist Spain, especially the telephone and telegraph at the fronts. Such operations were generally carried out by a mixed German/Spanish crew with German equipment and under German supervision.

After the first Spanish tank companies had been trained, equipped, and sent to the front, German crews were then allowed to take an active part in the fighting (Thoma personally led the Nationalist armored attack on Madrid in November, 1936). They remained close to the Spanish companies, however, to advise and assist them if the occasion rose. It should be noted that while Luftwaffe volunteers were automatically rotated back to Germany, the Panzer troops could remain in Spain longer than the normal nine months if they wished.

Von Thoma, for example, was active in Spain from 1936-1939, with only one leave at home. Also, all officers, NCOs, and men were promoted one full rank while in Spain, but were demoted back upon return to Germany. This compelling book contains both new historical information, color illustrations, and some never before published photographs.

SOLDIERS OF VON THOMA: LEGION CONDOR GROUND FORCES IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939 is in the truest sense of the phrase, a remarkable contibution to the military history of the Spanish Civil War-so much so that this book establishes itself, immediately, as the definitive work on the Condor Legion's ground contingent and its charismatic commander Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Bletchley_Geek

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy
Germany sent volunteers, the Luftwaffen unit "Legion Condor", small arms and the most important factor: vital amounts of money. Some sources indicate that light tanks were delivered as well, but afaik "high tech" weapons, such as modern AA guns, newest fighter planes etc. were not handed over.

The direct military involvement of Nazi Germany in the Civil War was quite substantial, deploying equipment which would see a lot of action during WW2. Condor Legion didn't comprise just "voluntary" Luftwaffe personnel, was the blanket term that denominated the Wehrmacht expeditionary force into Spain (see Hugh Thomas, History of the Spanish Civil War, http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Spanish-Civ ... 0141011610).

My statement you quoted was a list of components that were sent. By saying "volunteers" I meant volunteering forces of various types, then the "Legion Condor", and so on.

The ground forces comprised of up to 3 (the number changed throughout the civil war, afaik) tank companies, an anti-tank commando and few support contingents, plus instructors from several different branches of the Army serving in spanish military schools. The Officers and NCOs of these tank companies were delegates from the German Panzerregiment 6, taking turns training the spanish crews and leading them into combat.

This force was under the command of Von Thoma, and at some point during the war it had the 88mm.

If there was a 88mm (sources?), it surely must have been operated by German crews, especially since target acquisition and leading with the aiming device of a 88 in a direct fire role (aiming at a moving enemy tank) takes well trained crews. Hence my posting before, where I doubt that complex/sophisticated/new (high tech) equipment was handed over to Spanish troops. Even at the time, the Pz I was ordered and used as training vehicle only, despite its actual combat use by the German army from 1939 to its decomission in 1941.

Also, IF there was a 88 deployed and used against tanks, as described by Perturabo, then this 88 must have served as part of the rear support elements, and not as part of the AT-commando, which was most likely equipped with Pak 36s or similar guns, or - even more likely - with anti-tank rifles, which could penetrate such tin cans like 1936 light tanks easily.

...part of the Spanish Army that supported Franco could ferry substantial amounts of personnel from the Spanish colony in Morocco.

I mentioned that part in my posting already. Ju 52s were also used for bombing missions, where in the very beginning the JU 52s did not have bomb bays or bomb mounts, bombs had to be dropped by the crew (by hand), according to vet accounts on German TV.

He-111, Ju-88 which were used to bomb the Basque city of Gernika and Barcelona, as well as the Do-17 and a experimental Ju-87 unit (5 planes).

The HE-111 did not hit serial production stage before 1939, with the P and H-models. Heinkel produced batches of pre-series, and the Luftwaffe incorporated these into their ranks quickly, though:

The very first plane of the A-mini series (7 planes) left the factory in May 1937, but all of these 7 planes were quickly sold to China, because the engines turned out to be too weak, and serial production was canceled. The B-series (300 planes), starting in January with the B-1 series, and later on the B-2 series, were bombers delivered to the Luftwaffe. The C-series was a civil version mini-series (5 planes delivered to Lufthansa), but the order was canceled because the airline assessed that the engines were too weak, so the planes (with canvas wings) ended up as recon planes for the Luftwaffe.

Even though some sources indicate that 30 HE 111 B-2 were used by the Legion Condor for testing purposes eventually, starting around March 1937, the initial bombing of Guernica was executed by a single Do-17, which then led 3 Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 medium bombers to the target area around 10 minutes later, followed by 27 Ju 52 bombers dropping their bombs around 90 minutes later. Escorts comprised of German HE-51 fighters of the 3rd squadron of Jagdgruppe 88 and Bf 109s of the 1st and 2nd squadron of Jagdgruppe 88.
The Kampfgruppe 88, with the Jadggruppe 88 (fighter group) the main component of the Legion Condor, received the first HE 111 in late April 1937, several days after the bombing of Guernica, but did not had full complements of HE 111 squadrons at its disposal, at first.

Initially, the Ju 52s used to be the main bomber component of the Kampfgruppe 88, until the appearance of fast Russian fighter models had made daylight bombings almost impossible, due to their (the Ju 52s) low speeds. After additional crew training for the new types in germany, the experimental "Versuchsbomberstaffel 88" ("test bomber squadron") had received 4 HE 111, 4 Do-17 and 4 JU-86D in February, and eventually, in August 1937, the experimental squadron was dissolved, its HE 111 planes incorporated into the Kampfgruppe 88 (as 4th Squadron), while its Do-17 were re-assigned to the Recon Squadron 88. All remaining Ju86D were deemed to be obsolete and were handed over to Fanco's airforce, the Aviacion Nacional, as the Legion was going to receive 3 Ju-87A in January 1938, with the following delivery of 2 JU-87A during the Battle at the Ebro in July 1938. Later on, these 5 planes were replaced by 5 new JU-87B.

There was also a Kriegsmarine component, which doubled in service of the blockade on weapons deliveries to Spain enacted by the ill-fated League of Nations (allowing weapons and materiel being delivered to Franco controlled harbors, of course).

I roughly outlined that already when I mentioned the 2 warships. Now, I could have mentioned that there were a couple of German submarines involved, with more or less fruitless missions, as the Germans feared that the unmarked subs could have started an international uproar, if their origin had been discovered, where that risk made them pull out the subs out of the mediterranean eventually, and I could have mentioned general German patrol operations conducted by surface vessels to control shipping lines (as part of an international effort to block approaches to Spanish harbours, officialy) in favor of the Nationalists, but I tried to keep my posting short.

Compared with the Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany direct involvement was quite small but qualitatively substantial.

Correct assessment. My original point was, though, that the "high tech" equipment, maybe with the exception of some light tanks/outdated tanks of German origin (the Panzer I you mentioned), was operated by German personnel and not handed over to Franco's troops. Equipment deemed to be outdated (it's possible that monoplanes or biplanes with open cockpits, like the HE-50 and the Hs 123, might have been handed over, but there are sources that clearly indicate that the outdated JU-86s bombers were handed over), was given to the Aviacion Nacional, where all of these planes were in fact used planes with a high amount of operation hours on their belts, already. Considering how much maintenance pre-war planes and their engines needed, and the low amount of operation hours before parts and engines had to be overhauled and/or replaced completely, this equipment was almost scrap.

In general, both sides - Nationalist troops and Republican troops - were forced to use a high amount of outdated equipment, with the Republicans having advantages regarding materiel quality (in terms of firepower or operation hours) and quantity at the beginning, and with the Nationalists, despite the support from Italy, Germany and few other sources, being forced to use captured outdated Republican equipment as well. Vital numbers of the Republicans' small arms were up to 60 yrs old, as they had to obtain weapons on the international weapon market, with 30 different sources eventually. The only semi-high tech tools there might have been the russian (monoplane) fighter planes, actually.

For training purposes, Spanish nationalists were accepted into the ranks of Kampfgruppe 88, starting in August 1938.

I don't say "Germany" because there was a good deal of Germans (and Italians) fighting for the Spanish Republic in the International Brigades.

Of the 35-40000 troops of the "international brigades", around 5000 were Germans, indeed. The Germans, the 4000 Italians and 7500 French, the 3000 Polish citizens and 2800 Americans formed the biggest contingents there.

The German contingent comprised of communists with either jewish or christian background. I believe there weren't many non-communists involved, probably just a few anti-fascists, or Jews, whatsoever, all must have sympathized with the republic, for their own reasons. Most of them either had to leave Germany, as they were persecuted or endangered to be persecuted, or they had decided to leave fascist Germany after the Nazis had come to power.

[BletchleyGeek]

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy
My statement you quoted was a list of components that were sent. By saying "volunteers" I meant volunteering forces of various types, then the "Legion Condor", and so on.

Well, I read it as if you were dismissing, what I think it's proven fact, that Spain was the proving grounds for Nazi Germany weaponry (including high-tech planes, even in small quantities), tactics and doctrine (up to where Franco allowed the Germans to go).

Thank you for the precisions regarding deployment times, etc. Nazi Germany involvement in Spain has been muddled up over the years, especially by the Franco-led Spanish government, as they tried to develop a working relationship with the United States and NATO during the 1950's.

[swkuh]

Interesting discussions, all said.

Try this perspective: Allied planners-let's make 40,000 reliable Sherman and get them where needed ASAP. Axis planners-let's make 1500 not-so-reliable world beating AFV and get them to the battlefield when its too late.

Gamers' heaven: Let's model 1 wunderbar AFV vs 1 Sherman and see what happens. Sherman loses. OK, try 2 or 3 Sherman. Sherman still loses. Case closed.

I think Axis planned war in 1939 against 1936 enemies and didn't think ahead. At some point this mistake became apparent to many still living.

[jimcarravall]

ORIGINAL: rrbill

Interesting discussions, all said.

Try this perspective: Allied planners-let's make 40,000 reliable Sherman and get them where needed ASAP. Axis planners-let's make 1500 not-so-reliable world beating AFV and get them to the battlefield when its too late.

Gamers' heaven: Let's model 1 wunderbar AFV vs 1 Sherman and see what happens. Sherman loses. OK, try 2 or 3 Sherman. Sherman still loses. Case closed.

I think Axis planned war in 1939 against 1936 enemies and didn't think ahead. At some point this mistake became apparent to many still living.

Strategically, the allies won World War II based on their ability to outproduce the enemy with weapons manufactured in the US and beyond the Urals in the Soviet Union while destroying their enemies' means of production.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Bletchley_Geek

...Spain was the proving grounds for Nazi Germany weaponry (including high-tech planes, even in small quantities), tactics and doctrine (up to where Franco allowed the Germans to go).

Yup, correct.

Nazi Germany involvement in Spain has been muddled up over the years, especially by the Franco-led Spanish government, as they tried to develop a working relationship with the United States and NATO during the 1950's.

Yep, that's true. After World War II, the Franco regime's propaganda tried to paint Franco as a guy who resisted Hitler's demand to occupy Gibraltar, and nationalists and former franquists still praise Franco for that "big achievement" - even today: Spain's halfway neutral postition during WWII (apart from sending the "Blue Legion" and supporting/refueling German subs and supporting the German spy network in Spain and especially North Africa).

I just stumbled over a German newspaper article from 2006, which picked up a press release of the Spanish news agency EFI, which is a good example for such muddling, check the photos:

http://translate.google.com/translate?s ... 85565.html

Google Translate.... I edited it (bold fonts) quickly (so unedited parts may still sound funny and do not reflect my actual English language skills [;)] ), as some of these google translation parts are really bad and could be misunderstood, plus I added a thought here and there in --> []:

"The Spanish news agency Efe has announced that two of its most common historical photos have been significantly retouched or mounted. Both show the only meeting between Hitler and Franco on 23 October 1940 at the station of the town of Hendaye near the French-Spanish border. With the first photo, the retouchers of the the state news agency exchanged the rather tumb/round looking face of Franco, who the camera caught with his eyes closed, - in accordance to Spanish propaganda intent/policy - with a different photo that shows Franco with open eyes and forward posture. The right hand's fingers seem stretched out convulsively on the original photo, whereas the retouched version features a hand with a more military-controlled total expression. As a third measure Efe increased the light values ​​in the right half of the image so that the viewer's attention focused on the smaller of the two dictators.

The trouble is understandable because of the meeting between Hitler and Franco there are circulating numerous interpretations in Spain to this day, which reflect the political interests of the interpreter. After the collapse of Nazism, Franco, who had won the Spanish Civil War with the military aid of Germany and Italy, announced that at the nine-hour meeting with Hitler he had resisted the German demands staunchly and despite verbal threats from his powerful counterpart, in order not to be drawn into the Second World War. Up to this day, Spanish historical revisionists mark Spain's neutrality, resulting in a rest-period for a country that got battered by the civil war, as a major strategic performance of Franco. This neutrality (and Franco's resistance) formed the foundation for the international rehabilitation in the fifties and the seamless integration of Spain into the Western camp.

An unsuccessful meeting

However, there are many reasons in favor of Franco-British historian Paul Preston's portrayal of events, which he described in his Franco biography. According to him, it was a meeting of two First Duty statesmen who had no concern for each other's interests and where both wanted to return home with the desired results. Admiral Canaris had already warned Hitler, that he would rather meet a "sausage" [means a small fry, a sad case] than a hero. Even the delay of 8 minutes, at which Franco's train had arrived at Hendaye, where Hitler's special train "Erika" waited, became the object of irritation.

The original photo: Franco marched with his eyes closed

Hitler, as Preston concludes, wanted to explore, by meeting with Laval (on October 22), Franco (23 October), and Pétain (24 October), what the Vichy government's and Spain's collaboration would cost. On the military-side of things, Hitler could expect little from Franco's regime. In any case, Hitler planned not to give in to possible Spanish demands regarding North African territory.

[basically, it seems like Franco demanded military equipment/goods and civil goods Hitler couldn't deliver, plus territory in North Africa that was occupied by the French Vichy troops, where - in turn - Hitler had to consider Vichy's interests.]

Mutual resentment, personal antipathy and [Hitler's?] tendency to talk in monologue made the encounter a fruitless where Hitler is supposed to have muttered: "You can't do anything (go anywhere) with this guy." This fits the second image manipulation, EFE has now given: a just recently found original negative shows the empty train station platform of Hendaye, where the laughing figures of Hitler and Franco had been copied into it, obviously. However, according to EFE's quirky comment this photo was not a fake, because the meeting (where the photo was made) had really taken place."

There's another comment attributed to Hitler, basically saying that Hitler would rather have someone pull several of his teeth, before negotiating with Franco ever again.

ORIGINAL: jimcarravallah

Strategically, the allies won World War II based on their ability to outproduce the enemy with weapons manufactured in the US and beyond the Urals in the Soviet Union while destroying their enemies' means of production.

It's a bit more complex, but that assessment's first part ("...ability to outproduce the enemy with weapons manufactured in the US and beyond the Urals in the Soviet Union") is right on.

While the Allies did not manage to "destroy" the Germans' means of production, Germany's shortage of motor engine fuel and aviation fuel starting in around 1942 already, the inability to reach the Russian production hubs (Ural) due to the lack of long range bombers, and the Western Allies' bombings attempting to damage/cripple industrial capacities, were vital factors for losing the war. A very limited manpower pool, insufficient output numbers in the tank production sector, insufficient numbers of semi-automatic rifles and the loss of the Romanian oil fields were the last nails needed to close Germany's coffin, like we say.

[Perturabo]

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

ORIGINAL: Perturabo

Germans have changed their policy only after it turned out that they are facing masses of T-34s and KVs in Russia. After France they were still confident enough in the successful "tank destroyer policy" (letting 88s and 105s handle the heavy armour) to attack Russia without tanks capable of fighting heavy tanks.

The Russians didn't have masses of KV and T-34 tanks. On the onset of the German invasion, the Russians had ~960 T-34 and ~500 KV tanks, according to Erickson, which includes the rather low amount of KV-2 tanks, most likely.
These roughly 1500 tanks were concentrated into 5 corps (of a total of 29 mechanized corps).

While the appearance of KV-1 (and KV-2) tanks might have been an unpleasant surprise to the Germans, the appearance of the T-34 was a shock. A relatively low profile, sloped armor and decent mobility in difficult terrain could have presented a great showstopper for the German onslaught.

In reality, the Russians lost ~20,000 tanks in 1941 and lost more than 7 tanks for every German tank killed, according to Zaloga and Fowler. Krivosheev and Erickson assess that 2,300 of these losses (in 1941) must have been T-34s and more than 900 of them heavy tanks (mostly KVs).
That means that even replacements that just had left the factories and got handed over to the units, either got destroyed or broke down quickly as well. The mechanical reliability (eg. gearbox) of early T-34 was pretty low.
According to Solonin, the 5 Corps, that were equipped with the new tanks, had lost most of their T-34 and KV tanks within weeks only.
Zaloga concluded, that at least half of the losses during summer/autumn were the result of mechanical breakdowns, (subsequent) abandonment or lack of fuel, and not the result of direct fire from tanks or German artillery.

While there were situations where say a single KV-2 (rotated in and out of a group of around 5) was able to stop the bulk of a Recon Bn, and even the Division itself for 1 or 2 days, the fact that the Germans' mobile forces were equipped with radios consistantly, giving them a higher tactical mobility, enabled them to flank or ship around Russian heavy tanks, or to try to bring forward some 88s to either track or to destroy such tanks.

Also, unlike the rare situation described above, tactical handling of the precious Russian tanks was poor, quite often

I meant masses in comparison to amount of French S-35s and B1s and the massing of T-34s and KV1s in armoured divisions.

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

Superweapons:
The Germans had massive rail guns and mortars, which I would consider to range in that class, well before things went downhill.

Even though the Germans inspected captured T-34 tanks thoroughly, the Germans had experimented with sloped armor before, but it did not make it into more serious design phases. It seems like reports from the Russian front, about successful Russian T-34s raids or operations, resulted in plans for the predecessor of the Panther, the VK 20.02 (M), though.
Mass production of the Panther was then planned to start in late 1942 already, at a point where the Germans had rolled over the Crimea and where the fight in North Africa was still raging. Probably delivery problems of parts/resources (Allied bombing efforts started to increase too), probably coupled with problems caused by the design of the new undercarriage, delayed the start of the serial production, which finally started January 1943. The output numbers did not increase sufficiently until May 1943.
While the Panther wasn't exactly a superweapon, it was a perfect tool to counter the T-34 and even heavy tanks, and it was planned/designed way before the Germans had to go onto defensive.

Also, the Germans had examined the KV-2 and the T-35 and had figured that such beasts were unpleasant opponents, but not mobile enough to avoid being flanked. They were also really big targets for the German airforce. In general, the Germans saw such (Super)Heavy tanks as obsolete and outdated.

Only the Maus, the Super Heavy Tank project, started on direct order from Hitler (which he made in 1941 already), may have picked up elements of the Russian heavy and super heavy tank concepts.
Hitler envisioned superior armor and tremendous fire power, basically turning them into mobile fortresses or "rolling bunkers", though. Initially, 150 tanks were supposed to be produced. Difficulties with the engine (187 tons toal weight, a motor fuel engine that was supposed to deliver enough electricity for 2 E-engines acting as main drive) and Allied bombings delayed production and assembly of the 2 prototypes, so that the first Maus couldn't be assembled for testing before December 1943.

In turn, the Tiger II tank was supposed to be superior to every Allied tank out there. Due to the attempt to streamline the design of (shared) parts for the upcoming Panther II tank, the production of the first prototype was delayed until December 1943 (although ordered and planned to be finished in January 1943). The changing situation at the Russia front also influenced design and delayed the serial production even more, as better protection for the crews and better armament was favored over speed now. Specs for this tank were issued by the Heereswaffenamt in August 1942 already, though.
So if you consider this project to be "fetishism" too, then it was initiated well before Germany went onto the defensive.

I consider the moment Germans have lost the war to be when Soviets have successfully evacuated their production facilities from western territories.
Huge siege weapons were merely an answer to the tendency to build huge fortification systems like the Maginot line. Germans already used superior siege weapons in WWI to destroy Belgian fortifications. These were very specialised weapons designed to use very special targets.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Perturabo

I meant masses in comparison to amount of French S-35s and B1s and the massing of T-34s and KV1s in armoured divisions.

If you consider that you have to divide each number (~960 T-34s and ~500 KVs) by 5 (let's just assume the Russians distributed these tanks to the 5 Corps equally, for a second), resulting in 192 T-34s and 100 KVs per corps, if you consider the KV-1's and KV-2's low speeds, and if you consider the high likelyhood that the Russians did not (risk to) deploy these 5 Tank corps at one place (and leave other fronts without precious tank support), then you'll probably see that there were no "masses" (no notable numbers of these vehicles amassed) in 1941. Eventually, for the Battle of Rhzev in 1942, the Russians deployed 3 Cavalry Corps and 1 Tank Corps, with the Germans having 3 tank divisions at their disposal.

ORIGINAL: Perturabo

I consider the moment Germans have lost the war to be when Soviets have successfully evacuated their production facilities from western territories.

In stark contrast to popular belief,

• the Russian production was not moved to the Ural completely. At least 2 vital armament and tank production hubs (don't recall the names right now) remained at their places. Even facilities in the besieged city of Leningrad kept producing war materiel. There might have been more places.
• British and (starting in August 1941 already) American deliveries of equipment, vehicles, food, raw materials and weapons (under "lend and lease") were needed to compensate for the production losses during the mover.
• during the course of the war, the USA delivered roughly 60% of the aviation fuel consumed by Russian aviation units, 53% of all explosive agents, almost 50% of the copper, aluminum and rubber tires, ~57% of the railway tracks placed by the Russians during the war, 1900 railroad engines and more than 11,000 (railroad) freight cars. In contrast, the Russians, depending on railroad networks for the military supply system - in the main, at least until very late 1943, possessed only 93 railroad engines and only 1048 freight cars, produced in Russia. In very late 1942, 5% of the Russian military vehicles had been obtained from foreign sources (UK, USA), whereas that amount had sextupled towards the end of the war (30%). Eventually, a vital amount of Russia's truck pool consisted of either Ford or GM trucks, if I am not mistaken, as even until 1943, at least, Russia had a severe lack of transport vehicles.
• according to the total weights of the individual US deliveries, almost 50% were food deliveries.
• the Russian armament production multiplied quickly, but did not peak before 1944.
• the Russian production outbalanced the German production in many sectors, finally, at some point in 1944, despite the German production peak that occurred somewhere between March-June 1944.
• more simple weapon and vehicle designs allowed the Russians to manufacture a similar amount of arms, but with way lower amounts of iron ore.
• the centralization of the economy was a great benefit for production efforts and for efforts to streamline (parts) production.
• in contrast to Hitler, Stalin trusted his military leaders (to a vital extent, at least). He understood that some generals possessed (way more) expertise to conduct successful operations.

Richard Overy's book "Russia's War", 2003, is an interesting book that details some of the facts I listed above, and describes how Russia was able to defeat the German Wehrmacht, a military organization that was deemed to be the most powerful military in 1941, eventually.
It took many factors, one was that Russia seemingly possessed unlimited resources in men and materials (which came from Allied countries, to some or even quite some extent, as outlined above). But even the Russians had difficulties to keep their overextended supply lines working and even they saw that the long war had taken its toll, during the push to the river Oder (Weichsel-Oder Operation, January-February 1945), as there were, when they had reached the Seelow Heights, no notable reserves in the line-up that was deployed to attack the heights, eventually (well, 1 Million Russian troops were facing ~100,000 German troops).

Huge siege weapons were merely an answer to the tendency to build huge fortification systems like the Maginot line. Germans already used superior siege weapons in WWI to destroy Belgian fortifications. These were very specialised weapons designed to use very special targets.

There were other rail guns designed to hit cities. The 21-cm gun 12 (E) had a range of 115 kilometers, in theory. In 1940, a shell (fired from a location in France) hit Rainham Marshes in Kent, traveling ~89 kilometers. That gun was inspired by the German Empire's 21-cm "Paris-Guns", 3 guns that were designed and used (in 1918) to bombard Paris. These guns had max. ranges of around 130 kilometers, and were purely designed to deliver "Angst" and confusion, means to harass French civilians. Aiming at Paris, ~800 shells were fired.

EDIT:
In 1918, in order to be able to hit Paris, the gunners of the "Paris-guns" had to perform complex calculations, as the shells traveled to altitudes of around 40,000 meters (only the V2 had a higher ballistic flight path), so - with the long travel time (3 minutes) - they had to consider the earth's rotation speed and lead their aim accordingly, as if they were aiming at a moving target with a giant gun. German Spies (reporting the impact locations) and - in the beginning - French Newspapers reporting about impact sites, helped to assess the accuracy of the aiming process and aided the actual aiming, to some extent.

They also had to up the sizes of the shells and amounts of propellant after each round, as the calibre changed (widened) after every single shot, so corresponding shells had to be produced beforehand and numbered/marked accordingly. After 65 shots, the barrels had to be sent back to Krupp to bore up the calibre, to 22.4 cm, then to 23.8.
With every calibre increment, the (propellant) gas pressure got lower, decreasing the gun's performance.

I consider such guns and other projects to be Superweapons (as well), either due to their sheer size, their performance, their (technical) superiority, their design or their predominance when meeting opponents.

[Phoenix100]

EDIT:
In 1918, in order to be able to hit Paris, the gunners of the "Paris-guns" had to perform complex calculations, as the shells traveled to altitudes of around 40,000 meters (only the V2 had a higher ballistic flight path), so - with the long travel time (3 minutes) - they had to consider the earth's rotation speed and lead their aim accordingly, as if they were aiming at a moving target with a giant gun. German Spies (reporting the impact locations) and - in the beginning - French Newspapers reporting about impact sites, helped to assess the accuracy of the aiming process and aided the actual aiming, to some extent.

They also had to up the sizes of the shells and amounts of propellant after each round, as the calibre changed (widened) after every single shot, so corresponding shells had to be produced beforehand and numbered/marked accordingly. After 65 shots, the barrels had to be sent back to Krupp to bore up the calibre, to 22.4 cm, then to 23.8.
With every calibre increment, the (propellant) gas pressure got lower, decreasing the gun's performance.

That's fantastic stuff. Really interesting. Thanks Goodguy

[henri51]

In his autobiography, Von Luck describes how 4 88mm cannons stopped Operation Goodwood in Normandy 1944, after the officer responsible for the 88s refused to use them against the British tanks saying that his job was AA and that armor was the job of Von Luck, and Von Luck put a pistol to his head and said that he would either be a hero or he would be dead! So although it may not have been the first use of 88s against tanks, it is clear from this account that it was not very widespread even in 1944. Over 40 British tanks were destroyed by the 4 88s, and Operation Goodwood ground to a halt.

This famous story is probably instrumental for the movie "Saving Private Ryan", where a few days after the invasion an officer reports that they are delayed by Von Luck's 88s and the SS. Von Luck was not fighting the Americans at this time, and I don't know of any account of 88s being used against US tanks during the first two weeks after the invasion, and there were no SS units facing the Americans at this time (the only SS unit on the front at this time was the 12th SS PZ Division fighting the Canadians around Caen.

Hans Von Luck, Panzer Commander pp 188- (Dell Publishing, 1989).

[Perturabo]

ORIGINAL: henri51

In his autobiography, Von Luck describes how 4 88mm cannons stopped Operation Goodwood in Normandy 1944, after the officer responsible for the 88s refused to use them against the British tanks saying that his job was AA and that armor was the job of Von Luck, and Von Luck put a pistol to his head and said that he would either be a hero or he would be dead! So although it may not have been the first use of 88s against tanks, it is clear from this account that it was not very widespread even in 1944.

Sounds like it was an independent Luftwaffe unit or just a problem with a single officer. 88s were pretty infamous for their ubiquitous anti-ground use.

[jimcarravall]

From Goodguy:
=================================
They also had to up the sizes of the shells and amounts of propellant after each round, as the calibre changed (widened) after every single shot, so corresponding shells had to be produced beforehand and numbered/marked accordingly. After 65 shots, the barrels had to be sent back to Krupp to bore up the calibre, to 22.4 cm, then to 23.8.
With every calibre increment, the (propellant) gas pressure got lower, decreasing the gun's performance.
=================================

Even with significantly improved steel and composite recipes and hardening processes, more accurate manufacturing methods, and better targeting systems installed on heavy weapons, wear and tear still requires retubing all weapons at pre-determined rounds fired intervals.

Fortunately, those rounds fired intervals are significantly greater than the 65 shots for the large cannon.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: henri51

[]...... and I don't know of any account of 88s being used against US tanks during the first two weeks after the invasion, and there were no SS units facing the Americans at this time (the only SS unit on the front at this time was the 12th SS PZ Division fighting the Canadians around Caen).

That's not correct.

As reaction to the Normandy landings, the 17. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division "Götz von Berlichingen" was assigned to the 7th Army (in charge of the Normandy sector), and was then sent to Balleroy (not more than 39 km south-west of Carentan), where it engaged Allied units right away, resulting in heavy fighting. The unit's march route to Balleroy:

Laval - Fougéres - Avranches - Villedieu - Torigny - Balleroy

When elements of the US 101st Division were rushed to the Carentan area (9th/10th), in an attempt to secure this vital hub, Regiment 37 of the 17. SS-Division was then inserted into the front just south of Carentan (during the Battle for Carentan), while Regiment 38 was used as mobile battle group.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... _-_Map.jpg

They then had to face and attack 3 US divisions, eventually. After massive and continuous shelling from Allied warships, artillery units on the ground, and attacks from the air, the 17. SS-Division had to pull back to the Perriers area, to the West of St. Lo.
On 30th of June 1944, the division reported to have 16,976 troops, which exceeded the required strength by almost 500 men, but it did have no tanks when it had arrived at Carentan weeks ago. Its Panzergrenadier-Regiments 38 and 37 were then destroyed around September.

The 17. SS-Division's Flak-Abteilung 17, with 4 batteries, though, had been the organic AA-element of the Division since it was formed in November 1943, and it's very well possible that either elements of that SS-Flak-Abteilung, or AA-elements part of Kampfgruppe Elms had faced the US tanks (supporting the US PIR units) or the PIRs themselfs.
Also, 88mm-Flak guns and artillery kept pounding the landing areas, scoring a number of hits and hampering unloading efforts on those bigger landing crafts that transported ammunition, troops and vehicles to the beaches. Several vessels were destroyed/sunk.

The factual error in "Private Ryan" is that in fact Von Luck was leading a Kampfgruppe at Bénouville, just south of Ouistreham (which was clearly in the British landing sector), ~83km away from the Carentan perimeter, where he started an attack east of the river Ourne around 5 pm on 6th of June, in an attempt to get to the ourne bridges. Further reinforcements allowed his Kampfgruppe to attack again on 9th of June, after the first attack had failed, but this attack failed as well. With that stalemate, Luck went on the defensive and held the German right flank at Caen, when Operation Epsom was started. That said, he did not commit or lead forces in US sectors, at the time.

While the 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division was focused on Carentan, I wouldn't deny the possibility that a detachment of the mobile battle group had been called/sent to help defending a Flak site that kept bombarding the beaches, or that a US infantry unit, that had been part of the force coming ashore and now on its way inland, had stumbled over the actual SS-flak unit, but I consider the attack on the flak site depicted in "Band of Brothers" (which made it to become a model assault taught at West Point) to be more accurate, as you can see troops in Wehrmacht (Army) uniforms operating and defending the Flak guns: reinforced sites at the main front (beach walls and gun nests) and mortar/arty positions inland were manned by Army troops, usually. Also, I tend to think that this SS-Panzergrenadier-Division would have kept their Flaks mobile, away from infantry threats, and focusing on supporting the Carentan counterattack.

The screenplay author of "Ryan" might have picked up some infos about a Para unit (Lt. Winter's Coy) disabling an entire flak site, so it's possible that he put in some vague pointers, spiced with some "SS troops unwilling to give up their 88's", in order to make the task sound more dramatic and difficult. There are lots of factual errors in that movie.

Well researched facts then made it into the Brand of Brothers series, which was planned after they had figured how much material and vet accounts they had collected during the research for "Ryan", already, as - with some more thorough research - there was great potential to turn the vet accounts into a genuine war movie series. Screenplay writing for "Ryan" was sloppy and was influenced by real events here and there, but the story is mostly fictional, plus even the realistic depiction of tactics and movement was partially sacrificed to maximize the dramatic effect.


Whatsoever, other SS units were either held back or delayed, either by Allied air attacks or by concerted attacks and sabotage missions executed by French Resistance fighters, like the delay of the 2. SS-Panzerdivision "Das Reich".

ORIGINAL: henri51

[]..... So although it may not have been the first use of 88s against tanks, it is clear from this account that it was not very widespread even in 1944.

No, that's a misjudgement, and it ignores the actual historical practice, too.

The movie "When Trumpets Fade" (by John Irvin, HBO production) gives a good idea of how 88mm Flak guns were used in a direct fire role against infantry/ground targets, during the battles in the Hürtgenwald (Hürtgen Forest)- in that case.
One part of the mini-series "Band of Brothers", based on veteran accounts, realistically depicts the attack on the village of Foy just North of Bastogne, where the US paras then launch an attack on the village that is being defended by German infantry and some armor, and where then a single 88mm-flak gun is the core element during the attempt to stop the US advance.

Fixed (eg. like at the Son bridge) or hastily forwarded 88mm guns, protecting sites like bridges or approaches of villages in Holland and Belgium, were used against tanks and infantry.
"Joe's Bridge", which was later used as staging point for the "Garden"-part of Market Garden, was a reinforced wooden pontoon bridge, as the original bridge had been demolished by Belgian troops in 1940, already. That bridge was protected by a single 88mm-Flak gun.
Afaik, at Son, a single 88mm-Flak and a MG caused a vital holdup which gave the German defenders time to blow up the Son bridge, before Allied troops could secure it. An Allied attack on the bridge(s) at Best failed, afaik, due to hefty direct fire from a Flak-position.
There were so many other events, listing them all would probably fill dozens of pages.

The direct fire role was a common role of 88mm-Flak guns in 1944.
Vital amounts of German troops who had fought in North Africa and Russia (where direct fire became a common procedure), and who got deployed to France eventually, either possessed combat experience with such flak-artillery pieces, or had seen them in action, or had spread the word in other theaters about how effective these guns were. Also, triggered by reports from frontline units, higher echelons emphasized the direct fire role and the guns' AT- or Anti-Infantry capabilities, by passing down such reports to subordinated units in their theaters.

EDIT:Oh, and since the Flak 88 manual's version from 1939 already emphasized that "for fighting ground targets (Panzer - AFVs)" each Flak 88 would have "Panzergranaten (AT shells) at its disposal", every officer or NCO neing trained on (or in charge of) a 88mm gun who was able to read, should have been well aware of that capability, unless he had used the manual as toilet paper without actually reading it. [;)]

With von Luck's account, the officer in charge of the Flak guns probably didn't want to loose his equipment/men (or die himself), especially since the dimensions of a 88mm-Flak gun turned it into a pretty big/tall target.

He also might have feared that replacements may not (or not in sufficient numbers, at least) make it to his unit, considering the degrading replacements/resupply situation at the time. Units that lost their vehicles or heavy weapons were often ordered to change to a new role until replacements arrived (if at all): Infantry combat.

EDIT:

ORIGINAL: Perturabo

Sounds like it was an independent Luftwaffe unit or just a problem with a single officer. 88s were pretty infamous for their ubiquitous anti-ground use.

That's what I think.