why cant we have the option to choose how the game starts?

Gary Grigsby's strategic level wargame covering the entire War in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945 or beyond.

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mdiehl
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Post by mdiehl »

The JCS and Roosevelt strategically motivated deployments were contingent upon a particular set of historical circumstances that, being changed in an alt start date or altered strategic Japanese objective scenario (ex: Indonesia first), would definitely result in changed directives and changed deployments. The Allied player should accordingly have just as much ahistorical flexibility as the Japanese player. If the Japanese player selects *any* option other than the historical one, the Allied player/AI should have a free hand to fully redeploy any and all units, and there should be a random chance of upgraded Allied facilties pre-war.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?
TIMJOT
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Post by TIMJOT »

Originally posted by pasternakski


Yup, I have read of that line, too. It all smacks of Mahanism, gunboat diplomacy, and a general lack of preparedness. The Pacific Fleet comprised a collection of weenie boats at the time, and I suspect that the command structure from top to bottom realized as much without saying it. As in Europe, the Allies were playing for time - and hoping not to be defeated in the meantime. The act that would have taken place historically? Probably a stern note of warning just after the bombs started falling and the torpedoes started splashing, IMHO.

But what were we sending? Clem and Fred? Besides, the pipeline stuff got through, eventually, to the places the Allies still held and could get to. A scenario starting before 12/7/41 needs to take into account the realities of the materiel and capabilities of the forces involved - on both sides (we haven't even begun to talk about how the Japanese would have been hamstrung by an early start, which I think could have been disastrous for them). A lot of development, research, and serious contemplation required by the design crew if such a scenario is to be produced, I think. I hope that the editor is freewheeling enough that we can experiment on our own in this regard. If we get such a scenario with the original, great, but I'm not counting on it.

Anyway. I like yer stuff, TIMJOT, and when we get the real article, let's fire 'er up and see what she's got. I'd bet that you're gonna be a real NASTY player in this game (when we finally get the darned thing).

P-Q4?
Well, I dont know how good a player I will be, but I'm sure going to have fun finding out. Count me in.
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Oleg Mastruko
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Post by Oleg Mastruko »

Originally posted by mdiehl

US stationed ships in Iceland in 1940, and enforced neutrality patrol *into* Greenland in 1941, even though Greenland was a possession of occupied Norway.
Denmark, not Norway. It is always a great feeling to out-nitpick the Great Wizard of All Nitpicks in the world.

:cool:

Now back to regular programming.

O.
TIMJOT
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Post by TIMJOT »

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Mdiehl says:

"Why? The US deployed at UK bases well-before Germany was at war with the US. US stationed ships in Iceland in 1940, and enforced neutrality patrol *into* Greenland in 1941, even though Greenland was a possession of occupied Norway. There's no doubt that the US would have finagled some mutual defense agreement and lend-lease agreement in the PTO had the necessity arisen."
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Why? because Churchill begged for the US to station a fleet at Singapore and was flately refected. He offerered the US bases at Rabaul and in the Gilberts and was also rejected.

Besides the US never deployed at UK bases before the DOW they deployed at what were *now*US bases that were *leased* from the UK. Before you say they could have done the same in SEA. I say to you that there is a *BIG* difference between leasing bases in the western hemisphere, which can be argued in the name of national security and justified within the framework of the Monroe Doctorine; and baseing forces at a belligerent's base within a war zone.

Baseing US forces at Singapore or Java sans a US DOW would be tantamount to basing US forces at Gibralta or Malta not Greenland or the British Bahamas

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Mdeihl says

" There's no doubt that the US would have finagled a mutual defence agreement and lend-lease agreement in the PTO had the neccessity"
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No doubt??? There is every doubt. Churchill pleaded with FDR repetedly for mutual defence aggreement and was turned down everytime. The Dutch asked for one in exhange for going along with the embargo and were turned down. They went along anyway because they had no choice.

The notion that the US could simply lease Malaya, Singapore, DEI if Japan attacked has absolutely no basis in the geopolitical realities of the time.

At best, you could argue for the *possibility* of some sort or lendl-lease agreement for some out-lying bases such as British Fiji or Tonga, which due to there proximity to US Samoa, could be somewhat justified in the name of national defence.

Mdhiel; FDR was a president not a dictator.
TIMJOT
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Post by TIMJOT »

Originally posted by Oleg Mastruko


Denmark, not Norway. It is always a great feeling to out-nitpick the Great Wizard of All Nitpicks in the world.

:cool:

Now back to regular programming.

O.

Amen brother ;)
Jeremy Pritchard
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Post by Jeremy Pritchard »

There are actually many limitations to the deployment of both side's forces in the Pacific.

The US could not deploy forces to British/Dutch bases primarily because it was doing as much as it could to deploy forces to Hawaii and Philippines. As new equipment was given to US formations at Hawaii and the West Coast, the older stuff was shipped to the Philippines. The US was able to cover its own territorial posessions, but I don't think they would be able to extend this to their Allies. Indeed, when the war did start, they were not able to send troops to their closest ally (Australia) until many months into the campaign, which also took months to fully train. Imagine had these units been sent undermanned and undertrained to Singapore?

Should there be an option #3, the US player SHOULD get full control over...

#1. Their force deployment in any US territory, and/or possibly Australian.

#2. The US can declare war on Japan on ANY turn, citing undue aggression (possibly faking an incident in the Philippines). Basically initiative is given to the US as to when the war will start.


There were DISCUSSIONS between allied and future allied forces about mutual defenses. The Dutch were connected with the Australians and Malaya Command, and the USAFFE connected with Malaya Command. They had some rough plans of action, plans of coordination and assistance, but these ended up to be fairly limited (some Dutch planes did go to Malay, and ABDA was established). Had war broken out, the US would not have the time to take part in active defenses unless they were full partners. What would you do if a US division was sent to Java and the Japanese land before war is declared? How would the US government explain this?


Redeploying forces by both sides before the war is also full of unhistoric holes. There were limitations to deployment of forces due to priorities of defending home-territory over your allies. Imagine the uproar if the public knew that US forces were sent to defend the East Indies while the Philippines fell. The US could send forces in the Atlantic to Iceland and Greenland without sacrificing much as neither of the two bases were in imenent danger of invasion, nor was the US East Coast. These were primarily positioned as to stop any risky attempt at invading (if these bases were totally undefended then the Germans might risk sending a battalion, but with the still forming USMC formations sent this was very impractical).

The Atlantic also did not have the comittment of US forward bases (Philippines, Guam, Aleutian Islands, Hawaiian Islands, etc...). These bases needed more then 'token' forces of occupation to stop 'potential raids' or 'weak invasions' but defend against full scale attack. I could possibly see forces sent to Australia (like a lot of support units as were there early in the war), but not to Malaya or the East Indies.

Yet, to not just beat up on the Allies, the Japanese are also limited to deployment. They really did not have the men to spare any more then the formations delegated to the Pacific. Requirements in China/Manchuria were very heavy. Realistically, the Japanese don't need a change of deployment, as they are almost totally free to deploy any unit (those that were attached to South Army) to any base almost instantly.

Fighting the war before 1941? One game that was pretty good about representing this was "Rising Sun's: Grand Campaign". Basically, you were given a number of points per turn, and in order to fight in a theatre you would have to use up points. If you went beyond this, you run risks of not being as potent against the Allies when the real war started. Both sides were really at arms length from eachother, and any offensive would require a lot of effort and resources. Also, Japan had gained most of the valuable territory in China, with the rest being in the center and far out of reach. Doing better then the Japanese would be difficult, as they did pretty good in achieving all of their objectives. You will basically be repeating a pattern with the war against China, as there really are not any other targets to attack then the ones attacked.

If you also want the game to start earlier, prepare for about another year's delays in the game being released. A very tough part of creating the game is scenario creation and playtesting. You now have to create 2+ years more of units, ships, planes, air groups, etc.. that have to arrive at historic times and so on, and you have to make it work.


So, if there are pre-war options, they should be limited to some historic possibilities. Instead of allowing total human manipulation of deployment, maybe there should be a set of options on deployment? Carriers at War II had a series of alternate beginnings to scenarios. There were different deployments and numbers of troops, however, either historic or taking an alternate history route (i.e., what if the Dutch had managed to build two battlecruisers before the war?). This way, your opponent did not have exact knowledge of deployment, but it was not too unhistoric. Possibly there should be a randomizer of troop deployments, making some areas stronger, and/or others weaker based on possibilities?
Jeremy Pritchard
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Post by Jeremy Pritchard »

What mdiehl is getting at, is "if it can be done for the Japanese, then why not for the Allies?"

Do we want to create a realistic game, or do we want to create one with too many unrealistic, and one sided handicaps against the big boys?

If the Japanese can have some unrealistic changes in doctrine, then why can't the US have unrealistic changes in politics? I would personally perfer neither, but if one is pushed to be included, then the other side must get appropriate options.

Every single point of information that you make against FDR doing one thing can be brought against the Japanese Government as well. Realistically, they did not have an option but to either attack the US or surrender. The reason for attacking when they did had nothing to do with the Dutch or the British, but the US embargo. This embargo was done through a 'legal' occupation of French Indo-China as a part of the Armistice, imagine what the US would do if Japan started an aggressive war? Without the embargo, there would have been no war in the Pacific (however, without Japan attacking Indo-China and China there would be no embargo).

I really think that the elements for when and why the war started are beyond the scope of a strategic wargame. Invariably the war will always start in late 1941/early 1942, as this is when Japan was feeling the brunt of tension from the US.

Basically, everything before the war was political manovering. Forces were generally limited to deployment due to the political instability of the region.

Was it realistic for the US to deploy forces to Malaya? No.

Was it possible for the Japanese to attack better in China? No.

Most of the requests on this thread are good alternate history scenarios, but I do not think that the creation of a new engine to suit them would be wize. However, remember the stimulus response catch. If you change one side, invariably the other side will be different to suit the changes of one. Should the Japanese manage to secure more Chinese bases in a 1939 scenario the US would have a good chance in going to war in 1940 (which would be VERY bad for the Japanese). Should the US deploy forces to Malaya, possibly an anti-war stance in the US will be stronger due to the use of US soldiers to defend British Imperialism?
TIMJOT
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Post by TIMJOT »

Quotes Jeremy Pritchard
Should there be an option #3 the US player should get full control over

#1 their force deployment in any US territory and/or possibley Australia

#2 The US can declare war on Japan on any turn, citing undue agression.


I agree with #1 but I cant agree with #2. A decision to go to war in option 3 would be a political one not a miltary one. I therefore think that it should be taken out of the players control. Sure the program should have a percentage chance on every turn that the US declares war and this could be increased incrementally based on the aggressiveness of the Japanese player.

I agree that alt/hist scenerios spanning years (aka sino/japan war 1937) would be better off left to an expansion pack if witp does well. I dont think option 3 falls in this category however.
TIMJOT
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Post by TIMJOT »

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
What mdiehl is getting at, is "if it can be done for the Japanese, then why not for the Allies?"

Do we want to create a realistic game, or do we want to create one with too many unrealistic, and one sided handicaps against the big boys?

If the Japanese can have some unrealistic changes in doctrine, then why can't the US have unrealistic changes in politics? I would personally perfer neither, but if one is pushed to be included, then the other side must get appropriate options.

Every single point of information that you make against FDR doing one thing can be brought against the Japanese Government as well. Realistically, they did not have an option but to either attack the US or surrender. The reason for attacking when they did had nothing to do with the Dutch or the British, but the US embargo. This embargo was done through a 'legal' occupation of French Indo-China as a part of the Armistice, imagine what the US would do if Japan started an aggressive war? Without the embargo, there would have been no war in the Pacific (however, without Japan attacking Indo-China and China there would be no embargo).

I really think that the elements for when and why the war started are beyond the scope of a strategic wargame. Invariably the war will always start in late 1941/early 1942, as this is when Japan was feeling the brunt of tension from the US.

Basically, everything before the war was political manovering. Forces were generally limited to deployment due to the political instability of the region.

Was it realistic for the US to deploy forces to Malaya? No.

Was it possible for the Japanese to attack better in China? No.

Most of the requests on this thread are good alternate history scenarios, but I do not think that the creation of a new engine to suit them would be wize. However, remember the stimulus response catch. If you change one side, invariably the other side will be different to suit the changes of one. Should the Japanese manage to secure more Chinese bases in a 1939 scenario the US would have a good chance in going to war in 1940 (which would be VERY bad for the Japanese). Should the US deploy forces to Malaya, possibly an anti-war stance in the US will be stronger due to the use of US soldiers to defend British Imperialism?

I dont think opton 3 is unduely advantages to one side or the other. Not attacking the US probably has as many risk to the Japanese players as rewards. It leaves the US player relatively free to reinforce its bases and gather its strength unmolested. A japanese player would have to weigh heavely the pros and cons of such a strategy.

Jeremy I agree with a lot of what you say, but I cant agree with you statement that every contraint that FDR was under would be the same in the Japanese governemt. The US government is a demcracy the Japanese governement was basically a military
junta. As such they had much greater freedom to act as they saw fit.

The option wasnt attack US or surrender. It was get their own source of oil or surrender. They didnt neccessarly need to attack the US to accomplish that. Sure it would be risky (ie; the PI) not to do so, but there were factions in the Navy, Army, and government that advocated limiting the attack to the Euro-colonies.

Actually according to Pettie&Evans"Kaigun" and VanderVat "The Pacific Campaign" The so called neccessity to attack the US advocated by the IJN may have been more to due with the IJN need to justify over 40 years of its existence than any actual real threat the USN posed to an advance south.
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byron13
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Post by byron13 »

I'd opt for a scenario #3 as well. As it is, the Japanese forces start the game deployed in positions to execute post-December 7th strategy. I see the November start date as being a way for the Japanese to redeploy units to optimally execute the player's chosen strategy and is in lieu of using an editor to edit start locations. I could see where the Japanese player could be prohibited from making any attacks during November except in China, and the Allies would be prohibited from making any moves at all. Again, it is a poor man's way of providing a starting location editor.

But, as was said, the game is probably pretty far along to be programming this kind of stuff. Cheers, gentlemen. Can't wait for the game. Maybe Santa will stuff a beta version in my Christmas stocking.
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mdiehl
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Post by mdiehl »

Denmark, not Norway.
Denmark, Norway ... they're all bloody Vikings at heart. ;)
It is always a great feeling to out-nitpick the Great Wizard of All Nitpicks in the world.

Ah, well, perfection is so difficult to achieve now that I'm so close.

Basically Jeremy covered most of my opinions on this. When I was speaking of full redeployment I was thinking primarily of Australia and the US Pacific bases. Singapore would have been a truly lousy choice fro military/strategic reasons. But hey, for the Japanese players, the Allied player that redploys PacFleet to Singapore is handing you a gift, so why look at it askance? The US was generally averse to putting forces in places where they could not be adequately supplied. Rabaul is an example of such a place. Very close to teh Japanese supply train and major airbase and anchorage at Truk, and way too far from mutually supporting Allied bases. Again, if the Allied player hand such a gift to the Japanese player....

What I had in mind was something like a lend-lease arrangement for the Pacific. It is *completely* plausible because the analog is the lend-lease arrangement in the Atlantic. Yeah, it pissed off the Germans. Yeah, it pissed off the loyal anti-war opposition in the US. Yeah, it pissed off the American Axis Fanboys at FMC. And, yeah, Roosevelt asked for it and Congress gave him what he wanted. Given the generally higher level of disrepute in which Japan was held (and the generally stronger undercurrent of racism), it is (to me anyhow) completely believable, plausible, even likely that certain Dutch or UK holdings (Borneo, the lower Indonesian Barrier such as Timor and western New Guinea) would be leased to the US. In such circumstances, basing US troops there presents no more political difficulty than any other overseas staion, because these holdings are in a sense US controlled and therefore neutral. If you assume thatr a lend-lease arrangement is secured, then an attack by Japan on one of these locations is tantamount to an attack against the US.

The best part of teh lend-lease arrangement is that it does not require *lots* of troops. A US garrison at leased Balikpapan could be a few hundred soldiers and one of Asiatic Fleet's flushdecks. The US controls the oil and has men on the ground. Japan is then in a bind; do you attack the US lease-hold and start the war, having not prepared for this contingency and with the unassailed PI sitting directly on your supply lines? This is *exactly* the kind of political high play at which FDR was, quite possibly, the world's finest player. And it gives him what he wants. Japan still can't get all the oil it wants and Japan still has to hit the US if Japan wants to take it by force.

As to the rest. Japan was a plural parallel hierarchy, not a Banana Republic. At minimum three vying factions among those in power: the palace, the army, and the navy. Don't pretend to me for a moment that there was substantial unity of purpose or much agreement on the long range military, strategic or political objectives. There was not. Japanese military political hiearchy was about as internally fractured as the CSA (albeit for different reasons), even when it was clear that he war was being lost. Japan is remarkable for its disunity when the crap really hit the fan, and the US remarkable for its unity. Centralization of power does not necessarily lead to greater efficiency, quicker action, or greater unity of purpose.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?
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Nikademus
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scenerio/alt options

Post by Nikademus »

While all this discussion on political aspects is facinating, we should really focus on the value of scenerio and game options that make the game more interesting to a wider audience.

One comment i will make though is that it has been suggested that Japanese options should be limited due to game-produced advantages that they have in regards to knowlege of starting forces, their quality/prepardness, reinforcement shedule etc etc.

I dont see this as a serious issue simply because the Allies have just as much hindsight as the Japanese but they go one major step better. Any allied "player" who knows his general history (and we can assume most do since why else are they interested in buying this game?!) knows that time, and the elements are all on his side. The player knows exactly Japan's weaknesses, her reinforcement schedule, strong and weak points in tactical areas (night fighting, ASW etc), ground troop limitations (China), and the specific aspects of certain key weapons, some of which were not known at the time of the actual fighting (Long Lances being a great example)

As such, i've seen situations in the last PW game where Allied players would go so far as to try to pull troops completely out of front line areas and, well before the "front lines are established by actual events", set up defences in the historical areas such as PH, Midway, Normura, and sometimes Lunga, even well before the Japanese get there!

So I think most can agree that 'both' sides benefit more or less equally from hindsight.....so scenerio options should focus on aspects that will make the game more interesting.



My suggestions:

1) Alternate Pearl Harbor:

To be honest, i dont see why this causes so much fuss as many complain about the just discussed "hindsight" factor, so why not create a situation that seeks to create a totally new situation?

a) Suprise vs alerted

pros: makes for an interesting new direction to go in

cons: Japan: if her carrier force is damaged.....it might make playing the game through a wasted excercise or at least....a game restart (if players agree)

USA: see 'b'

b) random PH fleet OOB at time of attack

pros: Creates a new situation, potentially satisfies the what-if crowd if say some or all of the PF carriers are present as the Japanese hoped for.

cons: a big potential rasberry for the US player...."if" carriers are caught in harbor and destroyed, could produce one of those situations where the player goes....."what can i do for the next 2 years of game play????!!"

c) Pearl Harbor, or no Pearl Harbor:

Not really a scenerio option, but an in-scenerio option similar to that portrayed in GGPW.....give the Japan player the option to conduct the attack or not. This could be made interesting by coupling it with an alternate PH scenerio, so that Japan is essentially faced with the same limited Intel picture they had historically.....i.e. If i choose to attack, do i achieve suprise? and what forces are present in the harbor at the time of attack? Is it better to call off the operation and preserve my force?


2) No or reduced carrier/naval air power


The defunct wargame "Pacific Tide" which was to do what WitP will hopefully acomplish had a very interesting alternative campaign game option called "Washington's Cherry Trees : A pacific conflict without the Washington naval treaty.

This scenerio preposed a 1941 Pacific war in a world where the famous Washington naval conferences never happened. As such, there was no famous 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 rule and more importantly, it suggested that carrier/naval air development would have been severely retarded as a result. Thus battleships would truely remain the "capital" warship, and one would see the ships that were either not built or were converted to carriers. (i.e. Akagi, Kaga, Lexington and Saratoga etc etc)

If anything else it would resolve all the PH questions as there could not really be a PH raid without a developed and populated carrier force :)

How interesting such a campaign would be would of course be dependant on how enhanced the surface combat model will be from UV. Right now surface combat is retarded due to the inability of surface forces to "react" to nearby enemy forces. They have to somehow end up in the same ocean hex to fight which is a rare thing and difficult to acomplish. Thus, surface fighting is mostly limited to base hexes.

If modified though, i think this idea from PT would make for an interesting alternative scenerio allowing the US player to test his "Plan Orange/Rainbow 5" strategy and Japan, her "decisive battle" fought at close quarters to her shore (assuming both parties go that route)




Alternate play options

Most grognard types i know can care less about "points" issues.....they play the game to achieve either a historical or ahistorical conclusion to see if their generalship and luck can do a better than the real gang did.

One problem though is that the plain historical reality is that there is little to no chance that Japan could ever truely win a war with the United States because of the industrial disperity betwenst the two. After that, there are various tactical/operational issues that only exaserbate the first point.

as such: game options i would suggest

1) Enhanced pilot replacement/quality option for Japan

Already present in UV.....havn't had a chance to try it yet but its a great idea as it would help produce different results vs the same old attrition strategy which is a virtual lock for a winning Allied strategy.

2) An increased industrial option for Japan

again, nothing new.....GGPW had same option....makes for a nice "what if" on how things might go if the US faced a power with similar industrial capacity.....strategy and tactics would become the deciding factor....not numbers

3) US prepardness in Phillipines

historically, attempted too late...but it was on the agenda. This could cause a situation similar to the PH scenerios though but it would be nice to see what MacArthur's airforce might have achieved if it hadn't been inexcusibly caught on the ground.

4) Troop limitations

It may be frustrating but troop deployment limitations are *essential* to a historical campaign to prevent abuse by players so in answer to another thread my vote is no to a Japan player deciding from day one to shuttle in half of the million + troops he/she has stationed in China to flood the Pacific theater (or invade India? :) )

same for the Allied player......I would be perturbed to find Austrialian home guard troops suddenly popping up in Manila in Jan of 1942!!!! It defies logic and the historical reality of what those troops were stationed there for. The China troops arn't there because they like visiting the Great Wall......and the Aussies arnt' home because they're waiting for Monty to call them back to the desert. There were reasons for their being there and political considerations which while outside the scope of the wargame, were valid and real-world none-the-less.

Still......it makes a great "what if" potential, so make it an option but attach it to a events generator. I.E. similar to what was seen in War in Russia. You can tap China troops, but tap too many and it might trigger an "Event" such as Russia invading (the chance progressing from highly unlikely to more likely as her situation improves) to a Chinese offensive.

This is less plausible for Aussie troops as i cant see any Dominion government approving the despatching of valuable troops off on adventures.

A "Japan first" option for US troop availability could be fun and makes for a more plausible option than the situation in Australia


5) Better Japan ASW

The silent service practically won the war for the USN after it got it's torpedo and doctornal issues resolved. Japan's ASW was simply aweful in retrospect and will greatly impede any Japan player's efforts to conduct war operations and supply their economy if WitP does a better job simulating this than GGPW did (and this i feverently hope!!!!!)

As such it makes for an easy play option, similar to the UV option on Japanese sub doctorine

6) speaking of which,,, Japan sub doctorine....on or off

a UV retention.....what if Japan gave up the warships only priority and attempted to attack those long USN supply lines?


7) US torp problem....on or off

Another simple what if...pretty much self explanitory

8) US Codebreaking......on or off


Assuming WitP represents this correctly this will give the Allied player a HUGE advantage in the game and one that if acted upon correctly will give the Japan player nightmares about

It can also lead to easy frustration as the "Japan" player will be aware of this weakness (unlike the historical situation) but will be able to do little about it short of tricky "game" tactics to try to throw the other player off the scent.

So make it an option for a more interesting game......on or off. I would personally much rather play an optioned game where i didn't know the other player's movement in a realistic fashion vs having to play someone who in order to disquise his intentions, does things that in real life would never be or could never be done (like using CVE's in TF's and sending them to Dutch Harbor in the hopes that they get spotted and reported as a "CV")

Dont see much validity for any alternate pre-game fleet/troop deployment ala "Singapore" or Java and such. Here the "political" aspect is too great a consideration. The US shied away from any suggestions on this part by the British, not only because of the obvious logistical challenges but more importantly because of how the American public would have viewed it. It was considered highly undesirable to present an image that US forces were or would be used to protect a foreign power's "colonial interests"


If Matrix decides to stick with a simple "historical" game, thats fine too as at this point, like others, I JUST WANT THE GAME. So before i get roasted like chestnuts over an open fire, please keep that fact in mind.

The wait has been long and much of what i've suggested could be built later with a properly designed editor. (except for some of the game "options")
Jeremy Pritchard
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Post by Jeremy Pritchard »

When you base the creation of a game purely on the basis as to 'please the widest market' you have lost the reason for creating a game.

The best games that I have seen are done by those who steadfast refuse to majorly expand beyond the scope that they imagine their game. They listen to ideas, but will not change their product merely to sell a few more copies of the game.

What results when you do this is that the game is merely a product, and not a piece of work that you are dedicated in creating. I can cite countless larger developers that try to please the greatest market and end up with a piece of garbage, while others who do not take every majorchanging detail and create a product similar to their manifesto, end up with a very high quality game.

Why does this happen?

This primarily happens because the developers of the game are truely interested in a period of time and a particular war (in regards to wargames). They based a lot of their personal life and research toward these theatres of combat. They truely enjoy the topic. Now, when they start listening to every idea it no longer becomes their project and they merely do it for the money, not for the love of it. Larger corporations have a hard time keeping a hold of their good developers, as they are continually told to scrap what they believe in, in a game, and put in a feature that would sell more copies, but not necessarily enhance the game to those who would buy it anyway.


VP's are a actually a great way in measuring a Grognard's ability against another Grognard. Most Grognards want as many historical impasses to exist, as winning the war with realistic restrictions is much more satisfying then knowing that you can do things that your historic counterpart would only dream of being able to do. Without these VP's, or reasons, all that a Grognard can say is "I defeated you as the Japanese so I am better then Tojo, but, I didn't have to worry about IJA and IJN friction, the political pressure to sink USN CV's after the Doolittle Raid, an obsolete and ingraned Submarine doctrine, etc...". There is no URGENCY without some form of VP's based on time, which gives the Allied player an unprecidented way to win the game, as they can pick and choose whenever they take any target.

How else can you make the game playable for the Japanese without giving them unrealistic ways to win the war? Grognard's hate winning a historic game through unrealistic means. Winning against the Allies by getting a high kill rate due to modifiers is not very pleasing to someone who knows that this is no way to signify your playing ability as they know full well that the US player could be kicking their butt, but manage to lose becuase of a modifier.
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Nikademus
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Post by Nikademus »

I guess we just disagree here Jeremy. For me, the simple logic of the matter is that one is simply 'not' preposing that the "historical" campaign game be sacrificed in any shape, manner or form. Just as with GGPW, it "will" be there.

And as you yourself pointed out, tactical and operational variences aside, 99 out of 100 times, the Allied player will still be victorious due to the presence of certain historical truths, first and foremost the industrial factor.

The alternatives i have voiced do not viloate this structure. They simply provide alternatives to it, for the sake of making the game more interesting.

These alternatives should appeal to both the grognard as well as the "lighter" type wargamer as well. Have you never asked yourself one of these "what ifs?"

I dont see them as detriments, but as bonuses because they are simply alternatives!

Like in UV....the options and alternative scenerios are there for the player to use, or discard at their own discretion.

Certainly these options do not impinge on the quality of the product itself for they are but variations on the same theme. Since they are but variations, one can assume that the finished product will still be quality material just as it is with UV. The alternate scenerios there do not in any shape or form detract from the quality of UV.....they ENHANCE it.

VP's are fine.....maybe some measure victory or level of victory through it. I'm only speaking through my own experiences and i can truthfully say, i've never looked at VP's with more than campyness.....the real-world results are all i look at and i dont feel i'm much alone in this matter.

Its not a matter of realistic vs unrealistic....its a matter of brainstorming, of saying what if certain changes were made or if certain conditions were different....how would the war have turned out then? Wargames arn't simply about repeating the past, or alternating the past based on the same patterns, they are also about postulating different situations.

Again.....no-one's suggesting the "historical" campaign that will without question be the heart of WitP be altered or sacrificed in favor of fanciful and whimsical scenerios. Its about providing a venue for exploring different paths and opportunities, to erase hindsight etc etc.

Given Matrix's proven record, I at least, assume that the base product will have a fully credible and historical base campaign.
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Post by Jeremy Pritchard »

The thing that I am reading by this discussion is that it is presumed that the game will really only be worth while for the Japanese player is by using unhistoric events, while playing the historic campaign will be useless for the Japanese as all that matters is absolute victory.

I didn't say that I cared wether or not there were alternate history mods, just that I care that these would be the ONLY way to get the game to be playable for a Japanese PBEM opponent that wants a good chance at winning.

You might not look at VP's, but these are a concrete way in stating that one has just won the game. Otherwize, you will just be looking at the final reault (inevitably a US victory). What is in it for the Japanese to hold out longer then historic if they still are going to lose totally?

You want the option for playing alternate history scenarios, I just want an option to play a worthwhile historic scenario, that does not rely on campy ways to give the Japanese player a sense at winning (like PacWar's kill multipliers), but a way at saying in a concrete way that you lost the war, but you won the game.
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Post by mdiehl »

Any Allied "player" who knows his general history ... knows that time, and the elements are all on his side.
That's not counterfactual. Both combatants knew before the war began that a sustained war favored the US because of the industrial imbalance of power.
The player knows ... her reinforcement schedule
Unless you are proposing that there be no player control over production this will not be the case.
strong and weak points in tactical areas (night fighting, ASW etc)
True, if Matrix decides to model Japanese weaknesses in this area. There is no compelling evidence so far that they've modeled these details well. The IJA inherent squad AT capacity in UV being an example. How'd those guys get AT ratings 3 times as good as the Allies? Since Japanese rifle squads lacked any form of AT weapon, what're they using, harsh language?
ground troop limitations (China)
I've not heard that Matrix will not allow the Japanese player to withdraw troops from China. It was do-able in PW.
and the specific aspects of certain key weapons, some of which were not known at the time of the actual fighting (Long Lances being a great example).
It does not affect the campaign though. As the Allies, unless there is something counterfactual that you can do to *thwart* the type 93 your choices remain resist (and take the risk) or run away. As the Japanese player, I'm happy to have an opponent who's so convinced he can't win that he runs away all the time until he has overwhelming numerical superiority.

...i've seen situations in the last PW game where Allied players would go so far as to try to pull troops completely out of front line areas and, well before the "front lines are established by actual events", set up defences in the historical areas such as PH, Midway, Normura, and sometimes Lunga, even well before the Japanese get there!
I see no problem with such strategic choices on the part of the Allied player. Unless you have a rule that requires the Japanese player to attack in exactly the same historical locations as did Japan, with the same exact combat units, at the same exact historical times, I see no reason to limit the Allied player's ability to withdraw and consolidate to positions of his choosing.
1) Alternate Pearl Harbor:
Option a. Paraphrasing you: 'If Japan suffers losses, the game ends.' Comment: That's a lousy choice. Either the Japanese do as good as or better than historically or the Japanese player wimps out? Option b. 'Axis Fantasy realized. US Carriers sunk at PH. Game continues.' Comment: An option I'd never use if I were the Allied player unless combined with option A. That is, there is the risk that the US loses CVs at PH, but there is an *equal* risk that Japan loses as many CVs at PH. But I'd not start such a game against an IJN player who would quit if the results did not favor Japan. Option c. 'Japan gets flexible option to attack somewhere else.' A perfectly valid option, IMO, provided that the Allies get to redploy their forces before the game starts.
2) No or reduced carrier/naval air power.
In which CVs operate primarily as scouts for their respective battle lines, using a/c designed to the doctrines in place in, say, 1936? This would almost require a whole new counterfactual OOB but would be interesting. Axis Fanboys would not like it, however, since there would be no A6M, no Val, and Betties would not carry torps. The only dive bombers in the game would be American (USN Helldiver I's, a biplane DB) and its subsequent derivatives (SBD, Helldiver II).

Most grognard types i know can care less about "points" issues...
Count me among the grogs who think that a VP system is the only decent way to establish game victory where the force structure is grossly imbalanced.
1) Enhanced pilot replacement/quality option for Japan.
Its a great idea as it would help produce different results vs the same old attrition strategy which is a virtual lock for a winning Allied strategy.
It could be an option selectable when, for example, two Axis Fanboys want to get together to see how badly they can lose the war for the Allies. Not something that should be an inherent feature of the historical campaign. My principle historical objections are that (1) The US strategy was not one of attrition. It was one of superiority. USN pilots were better, from the start, and hampered only by a mediocre plane. USAAF rookie pilots were better trained than the most experienced Japanese veterans by August 1942, and (2) the doctrinal and attitude shift required of Japan is on the magnitude of one required to get, for example, an analog to the Type 93 on board Allied CAs and DDs.
An increased industrial option for Japan.
Might as well play Stellar Conquest, or Chess. If I thought a game came with this as an option I'd not even purchase it. Says too much about the mindstate of the game designer if he/they waster production costs on this ultimate of AF Fantasies.
3) US prepardness in Phillipines. Historically, attempted too late...but it was on the agenda. This could cause a situation
similar to the PH scenerios though but it would be nice to see what MacArthur's airforce might have achieved if it hadn't been inexcusibly caught on the ground.
I'm not sure what you mean. The Clark A/F contingent was caught on the ground, quite by accident. USAAFFE ground troops were understength, and lacked air cover, but their "readiness" was fine. If anything, the GGPW underestimated readiness, allowing the Japanese (human, not AI) player to routinely finish the PI campaign by the end of February 1942.
4) Troop limitations
Mostly I agree. Depends on how China is modeled, though. If by withdrawing troops there is very serious risk of losing ground it might be reasonable. Probably easier to just skip the option though.

Five, Six, Seven and Eight. I'm coming round to Pasternaski's POV on these. Making these optional is ahistorical, and the logical ramifiations are extreme. Might as well chase UFOs with a butterfly net.
Don't see much validity for any alternate pre-game fleet/troop deployment ala "Singapore" or Java and such. Here the "political" aspect is too great a consideration. The US shied away from any suggestions on this part by the British, not only because of the obvious logistical challenges but more importantly because of how the American public would have viewed it. It was considered highly undesirable to present an image that US forces were or would be used to protect a foreign power's "colonial interests"
Well, there's no "validity" for any of the counterfatuals that you listed. But I don't buy the argument that the US was averse to commitments to Indonesia or Malaya because of what you call "political reasons." The US avoided these places because they were a tactical liability, and rightly so. The US public did not substantially object to any of the other really controversial choices, like lend-lease, the "neutarlity zone," the AVG and so forth. So the argument that there'd be too much internal dissent to allow these does not work for me. Funny thing is that alternate at-start deployment is the easiest code change of all the counterfactuals that you've come up with. Same OOB. Same combat rules. All you have to do is have a pre-game setup phase using the extant convoy routines, basing rules and so forth.

Certainly these options do not impinge on the quality of the product itself for they are but variations on the same theme.
Ah. But they DO impinge on game quality. Time wasted on the counterfactuals is time that could be committed to getting the historical model right.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?
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Post by Nikademus »

Originally posted by mdiehl


That's not counterfactual. Both combatants knew before the war began that a sustained war favored the US because of the industrial imbalance of power.



Yes, it is when one includes specific knowledge of Japanese force levels, key production statistics and replacement schedules. Add to that fore-knowledge of how thing went the first time around. Hindsight favors both sides equally.

Unless you are proposing that there be no player control over production this will not be the case.


I would like to see limited to no player control over production as this is an oft abused feature. If it's an option i'm all for it.

True, if Matrix decides to model Japanese weaknesses in this area. There is no compelling evidence so far that they've modeled these details well. The IJA inherent squad AT capacity in UV being an example. How'd those guys get AT ratings 3 times as good as the Allies? Since Japanese rifle squads lacked any form of AT weapon, what're they using, harsh language?


Poor evidence. I dont agree that the IJA AT rating is a gross error but i've already stated my thoughts on this and unless Matrix speaks out on it there is little point for further speculation. Having played UV, i find that Matrix and 2b3 have done an overall good job portraying the details.


I've not heard that Matrix will not allow the Japanese player to withdraw troops from China. It was do-able in PW.


This should definately be an option then as it can have long term balance effects on the game.

It does not affect the campaign though. As the Allies, unless there is something counterfactual that you can do to *thwart* the type 93 your choices remain resist (and take the risk) or run away. As the Japanese player, I'm happy to have an opponent who's so convinced he can't win that he runs away all the time until he has overwhelming numerical superiority.


It does affect the campaign. Your own example proves it :)


Option a. Paraphrasing you: 'If Japan suffers losses, the game ends.' Comment: That's a lousy choice. Either the Japanese do as good as or better than historically or the Japanese player wimps out? Option b. 'Axis Fantasy realized. US Carriers sunk at PH. Game continues.' Comment: An option I'd never use if I were the Allied player unless combined with option A


Since your paraphrasing me, you might have noticed that i listed the above as a "con" to the idea of an alternate PH. It has nothing to do with Axis or Allied fantasies or the preferences of the players. It was a realistic appraisal of how two players might react at the very start of an extremely long game Carriers are the capital ships of the game and if one side or the other immediately losses a good portion of their carriers, they may not wish to continue as much as 1.5 (game)years worth of turns in which they can do little but sit back. Game issue......not historical issue.

In which CVs operate primarily as scouts for their respective battle lines, using a/c designed to the doctrines in place in, say, 1936? This would almost require a whole new counterfactual OOB but would be interesting. Axis Fanboys would not like it, however, since there would be no A6M, no Val, and Betties would not carry torps. The only dive bombers in the game would be American (USN Helldiver I's, a biplane DB) and its subsequent derivatives (SBD, Helldiver II).


Please spare me your derogratory comments about other potential players of this game. I am not interested. Yes it would require an alternate OOB. A logical assumption would be that the nations involved would build their orignal battleship programs of the early and mid 1920's. The Depression would/should nix further hyptheticals, easing the job of those who might be interested in creating such an alternate campaign. There would be little in terms of carrier air support and yes, it would be more of a scouting force vs a striking force. To re-emphasis, the value of such an alternate campaign will depend on how dynamic and flexible the surface combat model is. If the UV model is preserved as it runs now, it would not be very interesting and would not be worth the research for the new OOB's.

Count me among the grogs who think that a VP system is the only decent way to establish game victory where the force structure is grossly imbalanced.


Assuming you play the game in question. :)


It could be an option selectable when, for example, two Axis Fanboys want to get together to see how badly they can lose the war for the Allies. Not something that should be an inherent feature of the historical campaign. My principle historical objections are that (1) The US strategy was not one of attrition. It was one of superiority. USN pilots were better, from the start, and hampered only by a mediocre plane. USAAF rookie pilots were better trained than the most experienced Japanese veterans by August 1942, and (2) the doctrinal and attitude shift required of Japan is on the magnitude of one required to get, for example, an analog to the Type 93 on board Allied CAs and DDs.


I'm not interested in being diverted into another of your USN uber alles rants. My objective here, is to discuss alternative and interesting campaign options for WitP. Most of the suggestions are not new and have been portrayed in one form or another in previous wargames, tactical and operational. Since you believe so highly in utter US superiority, then logically you should agree that the Japanese player should be presented with balance options that will give them a better chance to survive longer before going down into the ruin of defeat.

Might as well play Stellar Conquest, or Chess. If I thought a game came with this as an option I'd not even purchase it. Says too much about the mindstate of the game designer if he/they waster production costs on this ultimate of AF Fantasies.


Fine. Dont buy it anymore than you did UV.

I'm not sure what you mean. The Clark A/F contingent was caught on the ground, quite by accident. USAAFFE ground troops were understength, and lacked air cover, but their "readiness" was fine. If anything, the GGPW underestimated readiness, allowing the Japanese (human, not AI) player to routinely finish the PI campaign by the end of February 1942.


It is simple enough.....you have complained after all that too many options favor the Japanese only. This is an option that favors the Allies. An alerted Philippines/PH resulting in an early battle royal.


Mostly I agree. Depends on how China is modeled, though. If by withdrawing troops there is very serious risk of losing ground it might be reasonable. Probably easier to just skip the option though.


I would agree in terms of the historical campaign. China, Aussie and US home guard troops should stay where they are to present players with the same limitations and challenges faced during the war. However many players have wanted this feature since the days of GGPW so to satisfy both, make it either an option or an alternate scenerio. Far easier to code than say the Washington Cherry tree scenerio, but i would like to see an Events generator to prevent the Japanese player from pulling too many troops out.

Five, Six, Seven and Eight. I'm coming round to Pasternaski's POV on these. Making these optional is ahistorical, and the logical ramifiations are extreme. Might as well chase UFOs with a butterfly net.


The logic is simple for those who play these games. It makes for a more challenging scenerio. It is not a question of historcial vs ahistorical. We know what is historical. It is simply suggesting ways to make the game more interesting and to give both sides better opportunities for victory, limited or otherwise. As with UV, if one dislikes the option, simply dont use it. Butterfly net not included.

Well, there's no "validity" for any of the counterfatuals that you listed.


A contradiction in terms. Since the options are as you so quaintly put it, "counter-factual", they do not require "validity". They are simple suggestions for balancing the game and allowing a venue to say "what if" For example, "What if?...the Japanese had realized their codes were being read with frequency? Would there still be a battle of Midway? etc etc. There was no "validity" required for the alternate scenerios provided in UV, other than that they provided interesting alternatives to the standard historical game. They need no justification, thats why they're "counter-factual"


Ah. But they DO impinge on game quality. Time wasted on the counterfactuals is time that could be committed to getting the historical model right.


Dont agree. Previous wargames that i've owned and played that had alternate scenerios and/or various balancing options only enhanced the game in question. Case in point......the most popular scenerio in UV appears to be #17 since it is mentioned so much. Players, including myself, were thrilled at the chance to see how the IJN might have preformed had they not suffered the disaster at Midway. I enjoyed this scenerio playing either side.
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Post by Nikademus »

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
The thing that I am reading by this discussion is that it is presumed that the game will really only be worth while for the Japanese player is by using unhistoric events, while playing the historic campaign will be useless for the Japanese as all that matters is absolute victory.

I didn't say that I cared wether or not there were alternate history mods, just that I care that these would be the ONLY way to get the game to be playable for a Japanese PBEM opponent that wants a good chance at winning.

You might not look at VP's, but these are a concrete way in stating that one has just won the game. Otherwize, you will just be looking at the final reault (inevitably a US victory). What is in it for the Japanese to hold out longer then historic if they still are going to lose totally?

You want the option for playing alternate history scenarios, I just want an option to play a worthwhile historic scenario, that does not rely on campy ways to give the Japanese player a sense at winning (like PacWar's kill multipliers), but a way at saying in a concrete way that you lost the war, but you won the game.
I understand. I too want a worthwhile historic scenerio. Never suggested otherwise. I just also see the value of providing alternative scenerios as well as 'options' that allow players to explore different paths.

What is "in it" for the Japanese player is to see, within the limitations of the game of course, if they can do better using the historical timeline as a measuring stick. Its also a way to explore fighting the war if certain key conditions were altered. Havn't you ever wondered how the fight would go if some of those aspects were changed? Same for the US player. Present a more challenging scenerio and interest in the game remains because of it's variety.

True, in almost all scenerios, the ultimate result will still be IJ defeat. but so what? The Pacific campaign is probably the most sure bet there can be for determining the victor, yet players are still interested in gaming it. Its not all about winning and losing, but exploring as well.....whether it be tactics, alternate strategies or different production schedules
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Post by mdiehl »

Since the options are as you so quaintly put it, "counter-factual", they do not require "validity".


Sure. But then why would you say that there's no "validity" to a US deployment to Indonesia or Singapore, since these options too are counterfactual? Or is it merely that a US deployment to these areas is so unbelievable as to not be worth modeling, whereas a Japan with the same general productive output as the US is plausible enough to be worth modeling?

Regarding IJN rifle squad AT capability, you say "poor evidence." Why? Is there some IJA pocket knife with an espcially effective can operner that I've missed? The evidence is actually very good. The standard IJA rifle squad (indeed company) did not come equipped with an ATR, an anti-rank rocket of any kind, an antitank magnetic mine, or an anti-tank rifle grenade, in 1942. So what are the Japanese using to rate a more effective atw score? Bear in mind that you can't assume that every squad tossing about the battlefield has access to a coke bottle and a liter of gasoline. So I'll repeat the question, what are they using, "harsh language?" Twelve fellows each an Arisaka, rifle rounds, some fragmentation grenades, and bayonets could close-assault a buttoned-up light tank all day and not impair the tank.
I would like to see limited to no player control over production as this is an oft abused feature. If it's an option i'm all for it.
:eek: Zounds! Looks like we're in agreement on something.
Since your paraphrasing me, you might have noticed that i listed the above as a "con" to the idea of an alternate PH.
True. But the same "con" applies to the other at-start options you listed. So, er, if you're saying they're interesting ideas but the negatives outweight the positives, I agree.
Please spare me your derogratory comments about other potential players of this game.
There are no players of this game, as yet, and the comment was not directed at any individuals, but rather, mindsets. It's not even my own term, but I find that it is an extremely fitting and appropriate term to describe said mindset. I'll use it when I want to. If it makes you uncomfortable, that's unfortunate.

A contradiction in terms. Since the options are as you so quaintly put it, "counter-factual", they do not require "validity."
Then are you rescinding your earlier objection to US pre-war or early war deployments to Malaya or the Indonesian Barrier on the grounds that they are "invalid?" That *was* the context of my remark, after all.
Dont agree. Previous wargames that i've owned and played that had alternate scenerios and/or various balancing options only enhanced the game in question.
All the wargames that I've owned had alt scenarios and balancing options. The balancing options that I've seen (variants on Flat Top, ERS/A3R, WW2:PTO, PW (Vic) and several of the early SPI Pacific entries) achieved balance through a VP system, a definable set of conquest victory conditions (a la SL/ASL) that are challenging to the side with the advantage, or a believable set of counterfactual circumstances drawn from the historically available force pools of the combatants. Their quality has varied but some of these have been pretty good. None of these has imagined Japan with, for example, the same productive capacity as the US. I'd be interested in hearing the laundry list of balancing options you'd propose were such an option available.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?
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Post by Jeremy Pritchard »

Originally posted by Nikademus

Dont agree. Previous wargames that i've owned and played that had alternate scenerios and/or various balancing options only enhanced the game in question. Case in point......the most popular scenerio in UV appears to be #17 since it is mentioned so much. Players, including myself, were thrilled at the chance to see how the IJN might have preformed had they not suffered the disaster at Midway. I enjoyed this scenerio playing either side.
Using #17 as an example, this is a very different situation then having, say, the Japanese change their doctrine of fighting the war. Here are the reasons.

#1. The sinking of the carriers at Midway was actually a fluke of luck. The USN was never able to repeat this after many countless scenarios after the war. So it is not very unlikely that the IJN not come out the victor, at least not totally defeated.

#2. This occurs as the game is going. You start the game BEFORE Midway occurs, and you just do not experience Midway as a loss of IJN Carriers.

#3. This scenario just removes one simple pin in the course of the war, not changing doctrine, or requiring massive amounts of luck or an unrealistic possibility occuring. In fact, having Midway constantly happen would be an unrealistic occurance. Midway happened in part as a result of what happened during the Battle of the Coral Sea. If this first battle was different, of course Midway would be affected.

It isn't like you go back in time and drastically change things.


Most of the games that I played that hapve alternate options or scenarios usually had only minute changes. One such change is Operation Crusader. It had reasons behind the changes as well. If Malta was invaded, of course German supplies would be higher, and British Lower. It was not like total doctrine was changed or removed to make the game simpler and have more control for a player, but was done to make the game easier for novices, and harder for veterans.


Being a part of a development team (albiet for a free update patch), I can tell you that we had to cut MANY ideas from the game primarily due to time and manhour constraints. Many people were upset by all that could not be included, but we would probably be still working on PacWar version 2.0 if we listened to all of the requirements for features and alterante options. So, we would either be still working on 2.0, or 2.0 would be released with fewer fixes and a less thourough revision of files, but it would have more options, but be totally unplayable.
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