The Fatal flaw in WitE

[Hermann]

Yes but did you check into the function of the panzergruppes ? And yes they were ALL attached to armies. The attachment was twofold. The army group gave orders. But the Army provided supply - remember the panzergroup had no independent logistical organization

[Hermann]

My point here is that there are 4 logistic headquarters in Wite that provide a massive advantage to the german that simply don't exist. The panzergroups were attached to the armies admistratively for the supply umbilical not for command and control like the corps. Corps add even more imbalance by being allotted depot status for HQ buildup etc... corps were not part of the supply chain.

[No idea]

ORIGINAL: Hermann

I just figured out the problem. In June 1941 Panzergruppes were just that. They functioned as command and control Headquarters just like corps and were reliant on armies for supply. It was in 1942 they were reorganized as armies and functioned as administrative units responsible for their own supply - That's why theres such a huge imbalance in the opening turns of WiTe. Panzergruppes in WiTe are treated as Armies and this gives the Germans a huge advantage in moving them about. Linking them to Armies forces them to draw supply from armies meaning they cant jump around the map. That's something the designers MUST address

Panzergruppes were called Panzerarmees in October 1941. It was the Panzerkorps name the one that was introduced in 1942, March, to be more precise. Before they were just called like any other Armeekorps but with "mot." (Indicating motorised).

Organically speaking the change from panzergruppes to panzerarmees was more aesthetic than anything else, as the panzergruppes already worked as independent armies, although they were formally attached to one. Renaming them as Panzerarmees simply was a way of recognizing the coming of age of Panzergruppes.

[Hermann]

youre totally wrong the change was dramatic remember that to supply 150,000 men you need an enormous logistic organization - the panzergroups simply piggybacked armies. look at all the oobs available. they didn't have depots. simply command and control. the panzer armies DID have the entire logistic networks - that was mainly due to limited rail lines and a shortage of motor vehicles and drivers. Slaving the panzergroups to the armies logistically is huge and an excellent way to break the imbalance. easy to code in and test.

[SigUp]

If you have sources to back up your claim, then show them, I'd be very interested. But frankly, Panzergruppen did possess their Nachschubführer organisations with supply columns, parks etc. etc. Here's an example of the service troop organisation of Panzergruppe 3 on 22nd June 1941:

http://www.niehorster.org/011_germany/4 ... pport.html

They were far from simple corps-like c&c structures. Otherwise, how could they have led operations like the ones by Panzergruppe 1/2 in August-September 1941 when they were all over the place? Also, everywhere the restructuring of Panzergruppe into Panzerarmee is talked about as redesignation. And frankly, it's logical, how could they have - as you claim - added an enourmous organisation on the fly while in the midst of big combat operations? Remember, Panzergruppen 1/2 were redesignated armies in October 41, the other two on 1st January 1942.

[Hermann]

My information comes from multiple sources. The Reichs greatest resource vol.1 and 2, the german army Handbook, Germany at war vols IV, VIa and VIb for instance. The Panzergroups had transport units. Yes because its the responsibility of the panzergroup or the corps to TRANSPORT its own supplies from army dumps to the divisional dumps or railheads. That's why the corps was formed consolidating transport to feed multiple divisions rather than than having the divisions provide transport clear back to army. the division was required to move it from the Railhead to its units, so the sequence goes factory/acceptance depot/ OKW strategic depot/Army depot/Railhead.

[No idea]

ORIGINAL: SigUp


And frankly, it's logical, how could they have - as you claim - added an enourmous organisation on the fly while in the midst of big combat operations? Remember, Panzergruppen 1/2 were redesignated armies in October 41, the other two on 1st January 1942.

This alone should tell that Panzergruppes were already operating as armies, with all or most of the armies functions and support.

[swkuh]

An interesting discussion, but hardly a "fatal flaw."

How Panzer Groups vs. Armies are organized & equipped may not have affected how supply was actually distributed. Believe total supply and transportation is most important but should be distributed to priority units, as is now somewhat possible (TOE settings.) Not perfect, but hardly "fatal."

If there's a fatal flaw it might be micro-management.

[Wuffer]

I have no clue how the Germans solved their (huge) supply problems, but they did it mostly and often as good as it gets.
In other words, they were handselected, highly trained pro's with not only combat xp of the great war, but also in conquering Poland, France and the Balkan. It was their fourth 'campaign'...

[morvael]

Except they didn't. They didn't solve them, they learned to cope with what they had, and achieved as much as was possible with those supply constrains. Much more could have been achieved if there would be no limits on fuel, supply, ammunition, and spare parts deliveries (even more with the ability to maintain units at original strength, but for that there was not enough equipment, men and horses at home).

[swkuh]

@morvael:

"they learned to cope with what they had" probably so and very well, too.

"Much more could have been achieved, if..." believe game does model limited national supplies adequately (IMHO).

"...there was not enough equipment, men and horses at home..." WitE probably accounts for effects of Western Allies campaigns, but one hopes for some factors that Axis side can manage to moderate these effects.

Its all about what makes an interesting, good game. No complaints here about that. WitE is a good one.

[Hermann]

Grrr. after the rusian winter offensive germans supply was reorganized with transport columns being removed from most divisions and and centralized - it was at this time the corps sized transport units of the panzergroups were expanded to army strength.

[SigUp]

According to Niehorster the transport units of 3rd Panzer Army in June 1942 for example wasn't bigger than the one of Panzer Group 3 a year earlier. And a Panzer Group's transport unit was certainly much bigger than the one of a corps.

[Hermann]

Panzergroups had a corps level supply staff till spring 42

Panzergruppen-Nachschubführer was a simple renaming of the corps HQ
Bevollmächtigter Transportoffizier (Bv.TO) Is an army level command staff

[Hermann]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

According to Niehorster the transport units of 3rd Panzer Army in June 1942 for example wasn't bigger than the one of Panzer Group 3 a year earlier. And a Panzer Group's transport unit was certainly much bigger than the one of a corps.

Of course - its a staff its part of the High command transport network
Each staff has its own responsibilities.
Look at the Arko or artillery commanders artillery units were attached or withdraw according to need.
Point here is that the Transport staff of the panzergroups were corps level and reported to the transport staffs at the army level. The Operation Buffalo nightmare was supposed to fill these new commands

[Hermann]

A transport unit is lent to the corps divisions to aid in the movement of supply. divisions don't have the ability to handle strategic transport. it takes organization, depots and repair facilities

[Hermann]

http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/n ... ect/zoom/8

This is a schematic of the german supply organization as it stood in the fall of 1941.

[Hermann]

Notice there are only 13 Kommando Heeres Rucksbereit. These were the units that provided supply to the armies. Each Army had one. Panzergroups didn't.

[Denniss]

Those are not supply troops but security/police.

[HITMAN202]

Since fatal flaws are being raised (and the logjam of troop movements is huge.. BTW there was an SSI Napoleonic operation game with the French versus Austrian pre Russian invasion in which major penalties in mobility happened when separate regiments concentrated to form divisions, when divisions formed corps, when corps formed armies, etc..) another one is that as the Russians got closer to Berlin, more soldiers saw the coming victory and wanted to survive to enjoy the good life. Motivation to party and rest greatly reduced combat units effectiveness.