Tosa Class....

[showboat1]

A late to mid 1930's game might be interesting, but it would have to be a different game. It would have to focus much more on China, wouldn't you think? That would be the cause, US intervention in the Japanese invasion of 1937.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by showboat1
A late to mid 1930's game might be interesting, but it would have to be a different game. It would have to focus much more on China, wouldn't you think? That would be the cause, US intervention in the Japanese invasion of 1937.

Starting a game in the mid-thirties (34-36) puts it BEFORE
the major China Incursion. I'd see a scenario something like
this.
1) The Japanese decide to secure their resource base BEFORE
making any attempt to conquer China. Actual enemies at the
start of the war would be Britian, France, and Holland---who
control the resources the Japanese are after. An isolationist
US glowers and utters platitudes on the sidelines.

2) US "Intervention" would be based on an "atrocity" table,
with the Japanese Army committing one every time it siezes a
defended city. This forces the Europeans to try to fight rather
than run away. Also, the Japanese could try to pre-empt the
Americans by siezing US-held Pacific possessions and bringing
on a war. Or you could use a "propaganda" scale, with the
chances of US intervention increasing over time as the Western
Press (which gave the "China Incident" low priority---but could
be counted on to report events effecting Europeans much more
vociferously) excited American interest.

3) However you chose to handle the politics, the much less
capable aircraft of 1934-35 would make for a different game.
And if you want to complete some of the victims of the Washington Treaty as well, fine. The one thing you would want
is a good surface action sub-routine. In THIS game, there will
be some "decisive battles" involving battleships.

[LTCMTS]

A few comments:

According to Friedman, et al., the USN was already having second thoughts about the Constellation CBs in 1920. It seems the plan for the future would have been to use the materiel gathered to build two carriers on a new design from the keel up, in the same size range as the CBs. A new fast BB design would be used to replace the cancelled ships in the program, which included 10 more ships beyond the 6 S. Dakota BBs and the 6 Constellation CBs. So even without a Treaty, you would have ended up with two very large carriers by 1927 in the USN. Aditionally, the budget approved for FY20 and FY21 did not include enough funding to complete the Constellations according to plan anyway, with building times stretching from five to seven years from keel laying.
The Japanese would have had a great deal of trouble completing their program also. They just didn't have the industrial capacity to complete even one large BB/CB a year, much less the two to four they were planning. So their program would have been stretched out with the Kaga and Tosa completing in 1923/24, the Amagi/Takao and Akagi completed as CVs by 1927/28, two ships added to the Kiis, completing between 1926-34?
Same for the Brits. The 4 G3 and 4 N3 would not even have been laid down before 1922. They still would have converted the three large light cruisers. One change would be to have Admiral Harrington (?) (d*mn I've forgotten his name) not die in 1939. He did some real good work in carrier ops with the Furious, Glorious and Courageous acting as a TF in the early '30s.
The Treaty was inevitable. The US had the capacity and the funding, but not the willpower, the Japanese, the willpower, but not the capacity or funding and the Brits, the capacity, but not the willpower or funding. The Germans, French, Italians and Soviets were even worse off after 1918.
You could keep the 16" limit and up the standard to 45,000 tons, but creates the problem in that it basically obsoletes anything smaller and the French, Italians and Soviets had no designs remotely near this size. The 1914-20 programs would have also prevented the US, Jap and Brit modernization programs that provide so many interesting designs.
As a historical alternate, I would propose you keep the Treaties, the 16" and 35,000 ton limits, but change the overall tonnage limits, possibly the 10-10-6 relationship, but definitely end the building holiday in 1931. This would allow most of the BB's built between 1914 and 1922 to remain relevant, allow the building of some of the French and Italian programs for the 1914-22 period without being obsolete, allow the modernization programs to be executed and result in relevant ships and give us some interesting classes, such as the various designs drawn up by the US, Jap and Brits from 1928-1937. Then go up the escalator in 1937 with Jap withdraw and get the Lions in 1942 ILO Anson and Howe, or USN slow 45,000 ton BB as the South Dakotas, etc.

[TIMJOT]

LCTMS

Some interesting stuff. I was unaware the USN was considereing building fleet sized carriers before the treaty. At the risk of sounding stupid. What specific source does Freidman refer to? I would like to read about it. Also just curious why do you believe that the Amagi's would be finished as CVs even without the treaty? According to "Kaigun" (Evans & Pettie) the holy grail of the IJN was the 8/8 fleet ( 8 BBs & 8 BCs) Its hard to believe they would have sacrificed this dream and there limited resources for an unproven new fangled weapons like the Fleet CV. They did see aircraft as a great potential equalizer, but until the treaty CVs proved there worth the emphasis was on LBA.

[mogami]

Hi, I doubt the Lexington and Saratoga would have been converted to carriers without the Washington Treaty.
In 1920 there were no aircraft in service that could carry a ship killing bomb (and no ship killing bombs in the inventory)
Torpedo's were the anti ship weapon of the day and there were no aircraft that could attack a moving ship armed with AA.
The USN did (using Lexington and Saratoga as test platforms)
develop specifications for both bomber and torpedo planes and then began designing carriers from the keel up.
With the possible exception of Shokaku and Zuikaku the USN
designed the best carriers in the world.
Many of the IJN CV/L are quite unsuited for carrier battles, because they were designed and built before the more modern aircraft were developed.
The USN recognized the technology was advancing and waited before designing and building carriers. (Budget might have played a small part in this)

[elcid]

16 Inch guns did not come from Kure Naval Arsenal! They come from a government arsenal in the still semi-secret Muroran. And the 16 inch guns were built!!! They were even deployed!!! Actually, these are the guns on the Nagato and Mutsu. Also, three additional turrets were already complete when the Treaty was signed, and they also were used!!! They are found on Aki, Iki and near Pusan - covering the entire Tsushima Straits from Korea to Japan!!! They are described as "the most modern and sophisticated coast defense installations in the world" by post war ordnance specialists. They were concealed - indeed concealed so well the sites have not been located in spite of the fact there is not the slightest doubt they were built. These guns were deployed in special Army turrets which, however, used much of the naval turret and associated equipment, and which had 12 inch armor plate. They were twins, and they were self sufficient, a great deal like Fort Drum in the Philippines, but not visible from the sea or air. They also were defended by a brigade of troops including infantry battalions (typically two) and small gun batteries (anti-landing craft and AAA). These turrets were range limited, though, by limited elevation, because the distances required to be covered were not as large as the theoretical performance of the guns. There is no doubt whatever the guns could have been built for the ships intended to use them. The critical limitation on Japan (and the USA) was steel, and steel committed to battleships would indeed have reduced the steel available for other purposes, military or civilian.

[LTCMTS]

Check especially Friedman's U.S. Carriers: A Illustrated Design History, U.S. Battleships: A Illustrated Design History, U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Design History, Conways' All the World's Fighting Ships 1922-46 (or the extracted All the World's Battleships, 1906 to the Present), War Plan Orange, Sunburst, among others.

The USN decided on carriers as an essential component of the battle fleet by Aug 1918 (the British had already demonstrated the ability of 1917 design aircraft to carry and drop torpedoes and had been gaming and planning torpedo aircraft attacks against German warsjhips at sea or in harbor for 1919). The first two designs, one by Goodall (on loan from the British) were 800-825' and 22,000-24,000 tons. The next step was a carrier with casemated 8in guns at around 27, 500 standard. By 1920, 20,000 ton carriers were being rejected as too small, as in Nov 1920, the GB called for 24 VTBs and 48 VFs with 36 stowed reserve aircraft. 30 to 35 knots was a must. As the only available design for a large, fast warship was the "Lexington" CBs, the final design was up to 35,000 tons (and could barely contain the CB powerplant). The USN had asked for carriers in the FY 20 and FY21 budgets, but Congress refused. Congress also only appropriated enough funding to cover 10% of the building costs of the 1916 program. One approach, as of Sept 21, was to use the materiel gathered for the least advanced CB, the Ranger, to build a carrier, which would have equated in size to the converted CBs, but with much better ordnance stowage and aircraft handling arrangements. This was all prior to the Treaty.
On a different note, when Goodall showed up with the final design for the "Hood", at around 39,000 tons standard, 32 knots, 8 x 15in and 12in belt, the GB, BuOrd and Taylor, the Chief Constructor and the CNO, ADM Benson, became convinced that the fast BB was the wave of the future. ADM Sims, CINC US Fleet in Europe, had already proposed a redesigned "Lexington" CB with 12in side armor. The problem was that the "Lexington" design was too tight to just slap a 12in belt in place of the original 7in. The US was also becoming aware of the RN's outlines for the follow on design to Hood which became the G3 (46,000 tons, 9 x 16in and 14in belt). A US version of the "Hood" with 8 x 16in, 12in belt and over 30 knots was "springstyled" along with several fast BB's and BCs (one of which was 30 knots, 12 x 16in, 9in belt armor, 45,000 tons) for the 1919 program. Remember that the 1919 program was for ten CBs/BBs as a follow on to the 1916 program. Also remember that RN programs drove the USN far more than the IJN at this time. It wasn't till after the Treaty (and even then there were Plan "Red" flare ups) that "Orange" became the singular focus.
As I pointed out before, the Congress had been reluctent to continue to fund the suspended 1916 program. The appropriated funds for FY20, 21 and 22, would have been enough to complete the "South Dakotas" between 1924 and 1927. The first "Lexington" CBs could not have completed before 1926. There would have been no external pressure to step up funding. The US had 8 12in, 11 14in and 4 16in BBs completed or funded for completion by the end of 1923. Most of the RN was obsolete, the core being the 11 13.5in and 10 15in armed BBs and the 2 13.5in and 3 15in CBs completed between 1912 and 1920, most of which required major overhauls and did not reflect the lessons of WWI, such as defense against long range gunfire and the future of torpedoes and bombs). The British were flat broke and war weary. The G3s could not have been laid down before 1923 for completion by 1927-1929 with the N3s following 1929-32. By 1930, the USN would begin completing ships from the 1919 program. As for the Japanese, they had 4 12in, 4 14in, 2 16in BBs and 4 14in CBs completed by 1922. They would complete the two Tosas by 1924, but with Amagi damaged by earthquake, they would only add 3 more 16in gun CBs by 1927. The Kiis were not even laid down. They had prospered during WWI and they had the willpower, but the capacity to lay down and complete a CB or BB every year from 1921 to 1935 was (in 1921) beyond their industrial base. The Diet recognized this and had only approved funding for the "Tosas" and the "Amagis" until 1920. There were solid reasons why the Japanes went to Treaty Conference, one of them being that they could complete every ship of the "eight-eight-eight" program ,and still have less than 60% of the USN's tonnage under the 1916 and 1919 programs. The admirals, like Kato Tomosaburo, that controlled the IJN in 1920 recognized this fact and took the IJN to the Treaty table. It wasn't till later that the "Big Navy" faction regained control under the militarists and unconstrained growth became policy. But even in 1941, the IJN expansion plans were totally unrealistic.
So even without a Treaty, there would have been an enormous amount of constraint on beginning new ships, much less completing the laid down and planned ships of each of the major powers programs. Given the lessons of WWI, I would suggest that the Naval Staffs would take a "tactical pause" in their building plans to absorb and integrate those "lessons". This could have resulted in the cancellation of programmed ships which were not going to be funded or completed in reasonable time, and the funding transferred for better, more balanced and modern designs which would be completed not all that later than the cancelled ships.
As far as the conversion of the Amagis, first, I would suggest that three CBs would have unbalanced the IJN's organizational structure. Given the input by the British into the IJN's carrier program, the same input which was being provided to the USN, there would have been a need on the part of the IJN for large carriers. The Hosho was experimental (like the Langeley) and the Ryujo was a Treaty response, not a considered design. The IJN would have ended up with a similar situation as the USN, and given the design relationships to the Kiis (which could do everything the "Amagis" could do but better), it would have been easier to convert at least one of the hulls in response to the USN's building of a CB derived CV. As indicated above, the IJN leadership in 1920 had come to the conclusion that the "8-8-8" plan was beyond Japan's capacity and that even the "8-8" might have to be sacrificed to gain security in the post-War period. The trade of CBs for CVs, especially when the Japanese were continuing to develop their "attritional" prelude to a "thruster" strategy on the part of the USN would not have been a great loss.
The development of a large, land based aviation contingent by the IJN was driven by both the lack of carriers and the possible availability of advance air bases. The IJN did not see the use of land based bombers as a replacement for CVs, but as a substitute for carriers and battleships it could not build under the Treaty, and as an integral response within their technological and industrial capabilities to their tactical/operational requirements of their "attrition" strategy against the USN. The IJN would have built as many carriers and as many land based bombers as their integrated op plans required and that could be accomplished within the political, technological and economic constraints of Japan from 1927 to 1941. At least this is my reading of "Kaigun", along with several other resorces, including USNI reports from after the War and the Strategic Bombing Surveys.
My point is that something like the Treaty was inevitable, and that the programs of the major naval powers in place in 1920 would have been drastically curtailed, modified and adjusted to reflect the political and economic realities after WWI. This is not to say that ahistorical databases and scenarios cannot be explored, since that's a great part of the fun of simulations, is being able to change things. It's just pointing out the spectrum along which these scenarios lie.

[LTCMTS]

As a way of continuing to instigate further exchanges of opinions, here's a little text file on all the naval weapons that should be in PITW.

[Mike Scholl]

Thanks for a really informative pair of comments. I'm sure
you answered the question for a number of less well read
contributors. But you left out one other reason to let well
enough alone with the Washington Treaty. Without it we
wouldn't have all those wonderful "Treaty Cruisers" and the
amazing amount of cheating that went into them. World War
Two in the Pacific WITHOUT (the) MOGAMI?

Just think.., an 8.000 Ton (sic) Treaty Light Cruiser with 15
6.1" guns---that went to war as a 12,600 Ton Heavy Cruiser
with 10 8" guns! And all the wonderful convolutions that went
on in between. Probably the single most obvious result of the
Washington Treaty was to move the "Dreadnought Race" DOWN
a class---making it affordable to the participants again. And
these folks want to throw all those wonderful CA's and CA-
sized CL's away just for a few rather clumsy-looking BB's and
BC's? What a loss!

[LTCMTS]

Actually, in a world of unconstrained resourcing, we would have seen the 10,000 ton cruisers. The RN was completing the "Hawkins" (which became the prototype for the Treaty cruiser) and both the USN and IJN were exploring large, fast 8in gun scouts, from 6,000 to 12,000 tons, more like an extension of the light cruiser line of reasoning, than a lighter branch of the armored cruiser, which essentially had been absorbed into the battlecruiser. What the Treaty did was, as you pointed out, redirect the funding and effort to the Treaty cruiser. It would be interesting if the emphasis would have remained on the large Treaty cruiser, if the building holiday for CB/BBs had been lifted in 1931 and the Depression not hit so hard or governments had used defense spending as a work program for unemployment relief. It also resulted in a paucity of reasonably expendable capital ships, as was the case in WWI, leading to the substitution of the "A" class or Treaty heavy cruiser as the core of the major powers surface action groups, in essence "surrogate" capital ships. An interesting side bar is that the IJN actually maintained a number of its newer armored cruisers for subsidiary roles. The USN even looked a rebuilding the Tennessee class armored cruisers in the mid-1920s with geared turbines for 26 knots, oil firing for increased endurance and higher elevation for the 10in turrets (say to 26-29 kds) for subsidiary force flagships, like the Far East or convoy escort. Again, this points out the number of waypoints that you can find on a line of ahistorical, but historically based scenarios. As a point, and one not even I would like to game, what if the Brits had gotten their way in 1931 and the capital ship had been redefined to 25,000 tons and 12in guns?

[Mike Scholl]

Actually, the British "Hawkins" Class were designed primarily
for long-ranged commerce protection---a role few other navies
took seriously. True, the Japanese were impressed with the
heavy armament when they saw them---but that was about the
time Washington Treaty was pouring water on their larger dreams.

Without the treaty, I think it's more likely that cruisers would
have continued to occupy the "Scout" and "Leader" roles---neither of which required the heavier armor or armament of the
"Hawkins" Class. The roles the treaty cruisers occupied were
those envisioned for the Battle Cruisers originally, so if more of
them were available why build "inferior" ships? And for the roles
of "Scout" or "Leader", speed would be the most important
consideration and 5-6,000 tons would be more than adequate.

Of course, this is just one man's opinion. But I don't see the
rational for the "Heavy Cruiser" with real "Capitol Ships" being
more plentifully available. They were a compromise Washington
forced on the navies of the world.

[TIMJOT]

LCTMTS,

Again a lot of interesting info, but I dont think anyone is disputeing the reasons for the treaty or that carrier development would not exist without the treaty. For my part I simply proposeing that an Alt history scenerio of no Treaty is plausible and that no treaty would most likely have resulted in *retarded* CV development.

First the treaty. I tend to discount the Brits, because I agree with you that they had niether the will or the means to complete their program. On the otherhand however the IJN had to be dragged to the table by Adm.Kato Tomasburo and according to (Evans & Pettie) "the pursuit of naval arms limitation was not the dominant view of the IJN". That being said, it is certainly not out of the relm of reason that under any number of certain circumstances the Japanese may not have signed onto the treaty. For example; had Adm Kato Tomasboro sucumbed to his cancer a year earlier, Is there any doubt that the Kato Kanji faction had the will and probably could have mustered the means to complete the 8/8 program? If so isn't then also plausible that the USN would have at least completed its 1916 program?

Second Carrier development. I think you are overstateing when you say the USN saw the carrier as "ESSENTIAL" to the battle fleet by 1918. Certainly there were some air minded visionaries in the fleet, but were not the powers that be the same ones that scoffed at Billy Mitchells claims? It has been my understanding that the potential of the carrier at that time was as an eyes of the fleet auxillary not as a battle fleet strike weapon. I personally never read of *serious* plans of a 30,000+ ton fleet carriers prior to the treaty and even if there were. You said your self that congress refused funding for CVs. So at the very least it can be said that the continued expenditure for the construction of BBs and BCs would have delayed the commisioning of the large fleet CV. This delay would have had a corrosponding ripple effect on the development of CV design, tactics and doctorine.

All that being said. I do agree with you that the last of the Constellations BCs might have been completed as a carrier, but it might also have been just as likely; given the depression and the fact that the US didnt historically even build up to treaty limits; would have been cancelled altogether. However, if it were completed as a CV. I agree that it is also then plausible that given the Amagi demise, that one of her sisters could have been completed as a CV to counter the USN CV. Makeing an 8-6-1 fleet.

JMHO
Regards

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
And these folks want to throw all those wonderful CA's and CA-sized CL's away just for a few rather clumsy-looking BB's and
BC's? What a loss!

No Mike, no one is suggesting anything of the sort. All those wonderful CAs and CLs will be in the historical campaign. :rolleyes:

What we are suggesting is that after playing the historical campaign time and again. It might be a fun change of pace to play an Alt history scenerio that models the *possible* ramifications of no treaty. As long as those ramifications are based on plausible outcomes. Whats wrong with that? It is a game after all. "What ifs" is what wargaming is all about. Going back to when it was practically invented at Newport.

BTW I agree with LTCMTS, either way you are going to have at least some of those CAs -CLs. The development of the Type A cruiser was based on relevent tactical and doctorinal needs regardless of the treaty. However, certainly there would have been less of them.

Regarding "clumsy looking BBs & BCs". Have you ever seen the drawings of the Constitution BCs? They would have been beautiful ships. Cant say much for the SoDak's though. That trunked funnel looked gawd awful.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl

Of course, this is just one man's opinion. But I don't see the
rational for the "Heavy Cruiser" with real "Capitol Ships" being
more plentifully available. They were a compromise Washington
forced on the navies of the world.

The role of the IJN CA was to blast a path through an enemy's screen, from which the desflots could close with the USN battleline and attrit it in a night action prior to commiting those indespensible BBs and BCs. The role of the USN CAs CLs were to counter this treat. The CAs to deal with the IJN CAs and the giant CLs with their rapid fire guns to deal with the Desflots. Since the DD threat would be there regardless of the treaty. We can summize that the remedies would also.

The only way I see that CAs and big CLs are not developed is if no treaty somehow negates the Fubukis from being developed. I see no indication of this would be the case since torp attack at night by light forces had been an integral part of IJN doctorine since the very beginning of IJN's existence.

Regards

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
The role of the IJN CA was to blast a path through an enemy's screen, from which the desflots could close with the USN battleline and attrit it in a night action prior to commiting those indespensible BBs and BCs. The role of the USN CAs CLs were to counter this treat. The CAs to deal with the IJN CAs and the giant CLs with their rapid fire guns to deal with the Desflots. Since the DD threat would be there regardless of the treaty. We can summize that the remedies would also.

The only way I see that CAs and big CLs are not developed is if no treaty somehow negates the Fubukis from being developed. I see no indication of this would be the case since torp attack at night by light forces had been an integral part of IJN doctorine since the very beginning of IJN's existence.

Regards

I think I'll have to dissagree with your assumption. If the "role
of the IJN CA was to blast a path...", it would be way over-armed
with an 8" gun. Screening vessels have little or no armor, so
giving up rate-of-fire for penetration makes no sense. A 5-6"
gun is perfectly adequate for shooting up a screen (I include
the 5" DP because at some point the concept/need of an AAA
Cruiser is going to occur to someone---otherwise a 5.5 or 6"
would be logical for range), and the higher rate-of-fire essential
for tracking fast targets.


With more BC's available, the 8" Heavy Cruiser would be neither
"fish nor fowl"---too big and expensive to be out chasing DD's; and not powerful enough to deal with real capitol ships. You
might see a few for merchant protection/commerce raiding (this
was the basic idea behind the Hawkins), but otherwise they don't
come off as much of a bargain.

The "super" CL, on the other hand, probably is a more likely development under thse assumptions, so you could make a case
for Mogami's, Brooklyn's, and Colony's being built. But with the
BB's and BC's sucking up resources, and DD's and CL's needed
for screaning them, I just don't see much left over to play around
with "Treaty-Type" Heavy Cruisers. The only reason the 8" Cruiser was in the Treaty was because the British didn't want to scrap their brand new Hawkin's. And no-one else had the volumn of world-wide trade to require such large and expensive vessels for commerce protection.

[TIMJOT]

From "KAIGUN" (Evans & Pettie) Chpt 7 pg.223 "The emergence of the A-Class Cruiser."

The Fubuki-class destroyers provided the IJN with a suberb weapons system for the delivery of night torpedo attacks. Yet ever since WWI the Japanese tactitions had two concerns about the use of destroyers in this capacity. One was the problem of coordination and control, and the other was the possibility of heavy losses by destroyers before they came within attacking range of the enemy's capital ships. In both cases, the solution to these difficulties seemed to lie with the development of the cruiser, first as a destroyer squadron flagship and then as a heavier warship whose speed could yet match that of destoyers but whose fire power would allow it to blast a path through enemy defenses and make way for destroyer flotillas.";* " Starting form this early dual role as a fleet scout and torpedo flotilla flagship in the 1920s, the curiser was developed by Japanese naval architects adn technicians into a far more formidable fleet unit - the "A" class, or heavy cruiser - which became the core of the navy's night combat force."

*edited for content

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
[
The "super" CL, on the other hand, probably is a more likely development under thse assumptions, so you could make a case
for Mogami's, Brooklyn's, and Colony's being built. But with the
BB's and BC's sucking up resources, and DD's and CL's needed
for screaning them, I just don't see much left over to play around
with "Treaty-Type" Heavy Cruisers. The only reason the 8" Cruiser was in the Treaty was because the British didn't want to scrap their brand new Hawkin's. And no-one else had the volumn of world-wide trade to require such large and expensive vessels for commerce protection. [/B]

The only reason the Japanese went in the direction of the super CL IIRC was due to the 2nd London treaty which imposed the same tonnage limits on heavy cruisers as the 1st treaty did with carriers and battleships (in terms of total #'s of warships). The British in particular wanted the type limited in the same vein as battleships because of their need for large numbers of cruisers for commerce protection but treasury constraints made building large #'s of big 8inch guned cruisers cost prohibitive given the #'s they needed. Hence their design focus was on economy, so they favored small, lightly protected, and lightly to modestly gunned 6 inch cruisers....cheaper and easier to produce. However the strategy would backfire if the other 'big two' navies built a bunch a bigger stronger, more heavier armed 8-inch cruisers, which in turn would force the British to have to build even greater #'s of inferiorly armed cruisers to compensate. Catch-22. As it was the Brits were none too happy with the IJN/USN exploration of the 'super'-CL armed with 15x6inch guns and protection much imporved over the 1st gen CA's.

CL's or more specifically 6 inch guned cruisers were not regulated so both the US and IJN explored the type. It should be noted that given Japan's ever mindful stance that she would be outnumbered in any likely conflict, she tended to favor designs that incorporated either maximum firepower or a firepower advantage. hence even in the Mogami type the provision for revertment to 8 inch weapons was built in (and implemented)

Without a treaty, i doubt the Mogami class as originally designed would ever have been built.

Possibly so for the USN....where there was a lively debate between the 8inch gun club and the 6 inch gun club, but given that most navies tended build based on what the 'other guy' was doing, if Japan stuck with 8inch designs, most likely so would have the US.

[Mike Scholl]

I think you missed the basic logic of my argument. Even
Nation-States have limits on their resources. If we are postulating a non-Treaty world, then those big BB's and BC's
are going to be sucking up most of those resources. And the
need to provide anti-sub and anti-torpedo boat screens for all
of them will eat up the rest. Without the treaty placing an
uper limit of 10,000 tons and 8" guns on new construction designs
in the 20's and early 30's, where is the pressure to design and
build a "Class A" (Treaty Designation) Cruiser?

KAIGUN is describing events in a world where the Washington
Treaty was reality.., but without the Treaty, the logic falls apart.
A 10,000 ton 8" Cruiser is too damned big and expensive to
be a torpedo foltilla flagship! By definition, those need to be
expendible. A 10,000 ton ship would have trouble making the
speeds necessary to keep up with the new destroyers (36 kts
would be a minimum design speed) without sacrificing guns and
armor. An it's size would make it a tempting target for those
screens it was to "blast through".

As a "scout", you could see a better case---but for
something like the Tone design with a large number of float A/C.
Even then, it's hard to say what "unfettered" ship designers would have come up with to meet specifications like:
1) Long-Ranged enough to operate on it's own for extended
periods at sea. 2) Fast enough to outrun Battleships and BattleCruisers. 3) Heavily armed enough to defeat Light Cruisers
4) capable of operating a worthwhile number of scout A/C And 5)
Cheap enough to be expendable if necessary.

To Nikademus:

I said the "large" 6" Cruisers were more likely because of human nature. Half-a-dozen 6" guns on a 36 knot hull would make an exceptable Destroyer Leader/Flagship. But if the other
side builds one with 6-6" guns, then there is a temptation to put
8-9 on your new design to "beat" him. In that sense a 12 gun
design starts looking possible---even if it tramples on the rational for making "Leaders" small, fast, and expendible in the first place.
But the 8" gun doesn't make sense. The rate-of-Fire is considerably lower, and the improved penetration unnecessary against the targets envisioned. A 6" is perfectly adequate to "reach out and touch" a DD at any practical range available before radar gun direction arrived around 1940. More might look like a good idea, but bigger and slower doesn't. So I think the
Mogami might be more likely than the Takao under these circumstances.

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
I think you missed the basic logic of my argument. Even
Nation-States have limits on their resources. If we are postulating a non-Treaty world, then those big BB's and BC's
are going to be sucking up most of those resources. And the
need to provide anti-sub and anti-torpedo boat screens for all
of them will eat up the rest. Without the treaty placing an
uper limit of 10,000 tons and 8" guns on new construction designs
in the 20's and early 30's, where is the pressure to design and
build a "Class A" (Treaty Designation) Cruiser?

KAIGUN is describing events in a world where the Washington
Treaty was reality.., but without the Treaty, the logic falls apart.
A 10,000 ton 8" Cruiser is too damned big and expensive to
be a torpedo foltilla flagship! By definition, those need to be
expendible. A 10,000 ton ship would have trouble making the
speeds necessary to keep up with the new destroyers (36 kts
would be a minimum design speed) without sacrificing guns and
armor. An it's size would make it a tempting target for those
screens it was to "blast through".

As a "scout", you could see a better case---but for
something like the Tone design with a large number of float A/C.
Even then, it's hard to say what "unfettered" ship designers would have come up with to meet specifications like:
1) Long-Ranged enough to operate on it's own for extended
periods at sea. 2) Fast enough to outrun Battleships and BattleCruisers. 3) Heavily armed enough to defeat Light Cruisers
4) capable of operating a worthwhile number of scout A/C And 5)
Cheap enough to be expendable if necessary.

To Nikademus:

I said the "large" 6" Cruisers were more likely because of human nature. Half-a-dozen 6" guns on a 36 knot hull would make an exceptable Destroyer Leader/Flagship. But if the other
side builds one with 6-6" guns, then there is a temptation to put
8-9 on your new design to "beat" him. In that sense a 12 gun
design starts looking possible---even if it tramples on the rational for making "Leaders" small, fast, and expendible in the first place.
But the 8" gun doesn't make sense. The rate-of-Fire is considerably lower, and the improved penetration unnecessary against the targets envisioned. A 6" is perfectly adequate to "reach out and touch" a DD at any practical range available before radar gun direction arrived around 1940. More might look like a good idea, but bigger and slower doesn't. So I think the
Mogami might be more likely than the Takao under these circumstances.

Respectfully disagree. The only reason the Japanese stopped building 8inch gunned cruisers was because of the London Treaty. The Japanese were always acutely aware of their limited ship building capacity so their preference was to build larger, more heavily gunned warships. The 8 inch gunned cruiser was seen as much more powerful component to support and supliment their DD and fleet tactics vs the old CL type destroyer leaders. Their flexibility was greater due to their combat power.

As i stated earlier, the Mogami's were built due to the treaty as 6 inch gunned cruisers...yet in the end, the Japanese converted them to 8inch to increase their #'s of CA's. The original defects and woes of the class did not warrent them being re-armed, they could have been modified and strengthened without changing the armament. Yet it was changed....a clear indication of Japanese preference. The USN did not follow suit with the similar but less critical defects in the Brooklyn were exposed.

Future Japanese build programs showed the same preference for heavier, larger gunned warships. (Tone, Ibuki class) with only a small smattering of lighter types (Agano, Oyoda) The simple reality was that Japan never had the capacity to build all that she wanted, hence the fixation of size and firepower.

[showboat1]

I could be wrong, but I THINK that once hostilities started, Japan did not finish any additional CA type warships by war's end. I know the Ibuki was started, then a CVL conversions was started, but no CA's were completed during the war. Were other CA's planned and started but not finished?