Battle of Savo Island

[spence]

nteresting comment. It really seemed like it mattered who was in charge. A lot of admirals did not trust the new fangled things and would routinely place the ships with the best sets in the worst possible places in the line. Fletcher and Honolulu come to mind.....

I think Callaghan understood radar very well and was able to profit from that. Some of the other guys, not so much.....

Adm Callahan put himself on USS San Francisco with its inferior SC radar rather than on USS Helena that carried the much improved SG radar. The cobbled together TF he commanded managed a costly strategic victory because the Japanese leadership was little if any better.


Adm Lee and the CO of USS Washington (whose name escapes me) drilled their men extensively in firing the ship's guns by radar control and proved what that meant by sinking HIJMS Kirishima and driving off the Japanese TF two nights later.

And then The Battle of Tassafaronga 2 weeks later demonstrated "that there's always 10% (or more) who didn't get the word".

[Fishbed]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

Fletcher left because he claimed that he lost too many fighters. If I recall correctly, the alert for the big air raid was the only time when "Condition Very Red" was ever called out by the US Navy.

Frank Jack Fletcher did not last much longer as a carrier TF commander.

Well, that is true enough - although, if you are referring to the previous post, actually by "Fletcher and Honolulu" I think he meant "USS Fletcher" and "USS Honolulu" at Tassafaronga, and the confusion happening under the orders of Admiral Wright that night [;)]

Took me some time to realize that too.

[geofflambert]

Australia definitely needs to christen a tugboat as the "HMAS USS US OF A". Or maybe a minesweeper.

[Fishbed]

ORIGINAL: fcooke

I think Callaghan understood radar very well and was able to profit from that. Some of the other guys, not so much.....

Regards,
Frank

Ah, maybe there's a confusion here. If you mean Cape Esperance, then it's Norman Scott, not Callaghan. As Spence pointed out, Callaghan was and is still criticized for what he did with radar.

Although I am not sure if Cape Esperance really qualifies as a fair battle, radar or not: USS Boise was there.

[RangerJoe]

Boise is easy to sink. Three aerial torpedoes followed by a surface action. Six shell hits and one Long Lance is all it took then. [:D]

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

ORIGINAL: fcooke

I think Callaghan understood radar very well and was able to profit from that. Some of the other guys, not so much.....

Regards,
Frank

Ah, maybe there's a confusion here. If you mean Cape Esperance, then it's Norman Scott, not Callaghan. As Spence pointed out, Callaghan was and is still criticized for what he did with radar.

Although I am not sure if Cape Esperance really qualifies as a fair battle, radar or not: USS Boise was there.

There too, Helena had the best radar and tracked the Japanese easily while Scott on San Francisco was trying to sort out the blotches on the plot and ascertain if they were US or Japanese. Helena had to ask for permission to open fire and the ambiguous reply she got was selectively interpreted as "OK", so she started firing and quickly smashed the lead cruiser, Aoba. More proof of the efficacy of the SG radar if the ship's crew and captain knew how to use it.

I took the other comment about Fletcher and Helena to mean First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal where DD Fletcher was placed at the tail end of the line and Helena was several ships back from the lead. Both ships could not use their radar effectively because it was screened by other US ships.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy
There too, Helena had the best radar and tracked the Japanese easily while Scott on San Francisco was trying to sort out the blotches on the plot and ascertain if they were US or Japanese. Helena had to ask for permission to open fire and the ambiguous reply she got was selectively interpreted as "OK", so she started firing and quickly smashed the lead cruiser, Aoba. More proof of the efficacy of the SG radar if the ship's crew and captain knew how to use it.

The initial pulverising of the Aoba was courtesy of Boise and Salt Lake City. Helena's initial targets were contacts on the left flank of the Japanese formation, likely DD Hatsuyuki and possibly the unfortunate USS Duncan. Helena did later turn her guns on the Furutaka though, as she came in to replace the Aoba as the next big thing on the US to-do list.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

Well as with most things in life there are two or more ways of looking at it. Mikawa's initial action was suitably aggressive. But one would have thought he didn't intend to risk the destruction of his cruisers just in order to sink a few enemy cruisers. The whole point of that audacious - and risky - move south was to destroy the invasion fleet.

There was every chance his fleet would be spotted on the way back too so why not press on and try and find the transports? Perhaps the folly of his premature withdrawal was shown by the fact that Mikawa lost (Kako iirc) on the way back to a submarine.

Set against that of course was the knowledge that, having won a 'great' naval victory, why would Mikawa want to risk his irreplaceable cruisers and so nullify that victory?

I can't recall how aware he was of the transports - I believe he would have had to get his fleet back into line before attack and then go searching for them - with no guarantee of success.

With hindsight Mikawa's decision was poor, but then.....

Although Mikawa's pre-battle plan didn't involve going after the transports, his charts were destroyed by one hit from the Quincy, making navigation more risky and dawn was soon approaching.

Had Mikawa successfully sank those supply ships, he could have had both a tactical and a strategic victory. But, like Nagumo at Pearl Harbor, the longer he stuck around, the greater the odds against him became.

After all, these attacks were hit and run raids, not amphibious operations.

warspite1

I'm curious to know why Mikawa would have risked his cruiser fleet for a very long-range and highly risky 'hit and run' mission that was not designed to deal with the invasion and supply shipping? Seems strange.....

Mikawa's risky attack was much shorter than Imperial Japan's other very long-range raid on Pearl Harbor that also neglected to destroy the harbor's fuel reserves as well as other important logistical targets.

Both raids resulted in quick one-sided victories for Imperial Japan with unforeseen long-term consequences.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: geofflambert

Australia definitely needs to christen a tugboat as the "HMAS USS US OF A". Or maybe a minesweeper.

1+

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.




Although Mikawa's pre-battle plan didn't involve going after the transports, his charts were destroyed by one hit from the Quincy, making navigation more risky and dawn was soon approaching.

Had Mikawa successfully sank those supply ships, he could have had both a tactical and a strategic victory. But, like Nagumo at Pearl Harbor, the longer he stuck around, the greater the odds against him became.

After all, these attacks were hit and run raids, not amphibious operations.

warspite1

I'm curious to know why Mikawa would have risked his cruiser fleet for a very long-range and highly risky 'hit and run' mission that was not designed to deal with the invasion and supply shipping? Seems strange.....

Mikawa's risky attack was much shorter than Imperial Japan's other very long-range raid on Pearl Harbor that also neglected to destroy the harbor's fuel reserves as well as other important logistical targets.

Both raids resulted in quick one-sided victories for Imperial Japan with unforeseen long-term consequences.

warspite1

Not sure why you are comparing the two. You also assume the Japanese had the ordnance to destroy the fuel tanks. I don't have the knowledge to comment - but there were knowledgeable people on the forum who stated they didn't.

Anyway, as said at the start, there is almost always more than one perspective and more than one way of looking at things. Regardless of Mikawa's motivation or plan of attack, history judges that he made a mistake. Whether that mistake was not going for the transports in the first place, or deciding not to search for them after his initial success, can be debated. Fact was Mikawa's thought process - like much of Japan's naval thinking during WWII - was found wanting.

[fcooke]

BB - you are correct - I meant the ships and confused the Honolulu and the Helena. Should not have posted after half a dozen beers.

Wife is currently in London so now a higher priority to find a pub near Saint Pauls that does a proper Sunday roast. Not easy to do in that part of the City. She may have to go south of the river.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: fcooke

BB - you are correct - I meant the ships and confused the Honolulu and the Helena. Should not have posted after half a dozen beers.

Wife is currently in London so now a higher priority to find a pub near Saint Pauls that does a proper Sunday roast. Not easy to do in that part of the City. She may have to go south of the river.

warspite1

There should be some eating/drinking places near HMS Belfast - the Galleria I think its called. Try that [:)]

[fcooke]

Galleria and the pubs directly on the water are a bit on the touristy side (I know she is technically a tourist but we did live in London for 7 years). I told her to head to the George or Borough market. We shall see. Last boarded the Belfast a year ago, and then went to the IWM and was crushed that it has now become so touristy as opposed to what it was like 15 years ago.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

I'm curious to know why Mikawa would have risked his cruiser fleet for a very long-range and highly risky 'hit and run' mission that was not designed to deal with the invasion and supply shipping? Seems strange.....

Mikawa's risky attack was much shorter than Imperial Japan's other very long-range raid on Pearl Harbor that also neglected to destroy the harbor's fuel reserves as well as other important logistical targets.

Both raids resulted in quick one-sided victories for Imperial Japan with unforeseen long-term consequences.

warspite1

Not sure why you are comparing the two. You also assume the Japanese had the ordnance to destroy the fuel tanks. I don't have the knowledge to comment - but there were knowledgeable people on the forum who stated they didn't.

Anyway, as said at the start, there is almost always more than one perspective and more than one way of looking at things. Regardless of Mikawa's motivation or plan of attack, history judges that he made a mistake. Whether that mistake was not going for the transports in the first place, or deciding not to search for them after his initial success, can be debated. Fact was Mikawa's thought process - like much of Japan's naval thinking during WWII - was found wanting.

Mikawa's thought process was that of a samurai, i.e., destroy capital ships, not supply ships, which were not even listed as targets in his pre-battle plans.

At Pearl, Nagumo's carrier TF was planning to launch a third strike, so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks. And after the Savo surface battles, Mikawa's cruiser force had just under 50 percent shells and torpedo's left -- more than enough to do the job. So there are strong comparisons between these two engagements.

[Schlussel]

Thanks for the Link Joe D.

The publisher of the video (Montemayor) has similar videos on pearl harbor, coral sea, and even Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign (Links below), that are also very informative. And Warspite will be happy to know that there aren't any USS/HMAS Australia gaffes in those. [:D]

Coral Sea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NB5hH3ksvKE
Pearl Harbor: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f6cz9gtMTeI
Jackson's Valley Campaign: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCgi9BNjj6c

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.




Mikawa's risky attack was much shorter than Imperial Japan's other very long-range raid on Pearl Harbor that also neglected to destroy the harbor's fuel reserves as well as other important logistical targets.

Both raids resulted in quick one-sided victories for Imperial Japan with unforeseen long-term consequences.

warspite1

Not sure why you are comparing the two. You also assume the Japanese had the ordnance to destroy the fuel tanks. I don't have the knowledge to comment - but there were knowledgeable people on the forum who stated they didn't.

Anyway, as said at the start, there is almost always more than one perspective and more than one way of looking at things. Regardless of Mikawa's motivation or plan of attack, history judges that he made a mistake. Whether that mistake was not going for the transports in the first place, or deciding not to search for them after his initial success, can be debated. Fact was Mikawa's thought process - like much of Japan's naval thinking during WWII - was found wanting.

At Pearl, Nagumo's carrier TF was planning to launch a third strike, so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks.

warspite1

Well you may be right - but the argument against, presented on this forum previously, sounded pretty convincing.

I would be grateful if you have a source for your statement "so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks".

Thanks.

As for:

Mikawa's thought process was that of a samurai

I am not really interested whether he was thinking as a 'Samurai' or not. The idea that Mikawa may have decided to launch his attack without really giving too much thought to what he may find and what he really needed to achieve, is perfectly believable given the mindset of the Japanese military in WWII. Such a mindset gives a rationale for his actions, but it does not excuse the limitations of his thinking any more than one would seek to excuse the likes of Ichiki.

[Lecivius]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.
And after the Savo surface battles, Mikawa's cruiser force had just under 50 percent shells and torpedo's left -- more than enough to do the job. So there are strong comparisons between these two engagements.

I read this with some surprise. It was my understanding that ordnance availability after the initial battle was all circumspect. There was even a lot of speculation that Mikawa's force was almost winchester, and contributed to his decision to retire. May I ask where you got this information?

[Buckrock]

It's fairly clear from the Japanese accounts what the primary goal of Mikawa's Savo operation was.

When he decided on the 7th Aug to make a naval sortie, Mikawa's stated intent was to strike at the Allied transports and cargo vessels, catching them at night while they were at anchor off Guadalcanal and Tulagi so as to maximise the carnage. The "at anchor" bit somewhat suggests it was hoped the Japanese arrival at the anchorages would be achieved without prior detection. It also appears that there was an underlying assumption at this early stage in the plan that any Allied warships protecting the invasion shipping at night would most likely only be encountered patrolling near the anchorages, allowing the Japanese to kill two birds with one stone at each anchorage. If all went well, the Allied warships would simply become collateral damage during the attacks on the main Japanese objective, the two anchorages containing the invasion shipping.

And Mikawa's forces would be well clear of the area come dawn. Neat.

[spence]

At Pearl, Nagumo's carrier TF was planning to launch a third strike, so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks.

You may find that your conclusion here is more in line with American post-attack hysteria than with the facts of the matter. Alan Zimm in his book "Attack on Pearl Harbor" discusses this particular aspect of the alleged Japanese plans (Lcdr Fuchida seems to be the principle proponent of his own insistence that there be a 3rd strike targeting the fuel reserves - his veracity has been called into question by Japanese sources).

Zimm finds that Bunker C or NSFO is very difficult to set afire in the first place so dropping an HE bomb on a tank was not in any way like dropping a match into a bucket full of gasoline (these fuels have to be heated to more than 140 degrees so that they will even flow - their vapor pressure is very low). In addition each tank was surrounded by an earthen berm such that essentially a bomb (assuming it would set the tank afire) would be required for each and every tank.

[AcePylut]

My first wife's grandfather was on the DD BLue at this battle. In short, she's "one lookout's bad eyesight" away from "not existing".

"Action south of Savo

To avoid Blue, Mikawa changed course to pass north of Savo Island.[9]:36 He also ordered his ships to slow to 22 knots (41 km/h), to reduce wakes that might make his ships more visible.[1]:103 Four minutes later, Mikawa's lookouts spied either Ralph Talbot about 16 kilometres (10 mi) away or a small schooner of unknown nationality.[1]:103[10]:171[24] The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 guns at Blue, ready to open fire at the first indication that Blue had sighted them.[9]:36 When Blue was less than 2 kilometres (1 mi) away from Mikawa's force, she suddenly reversed course, having reached the end of her patrol track, and steamed away, apparently oblivious to the long column of large Japanese ships sailing by her.[10]:171–3 Seeing that his ships were still undetected, Mikawa turned back to a course south of Savo Island and increased speed, first to 26 knots (48 km/h), and then to 30 knots (56 km/h). At 01:25, Mikawa released his ships to operate independently of his flagship, and at 01:31, he ordered, "Every ship attack."[14]:197 "