ORIGINAL: sithlord_shag
So thats when I started to think over, exactly along the same lines you are, as to why the hell would you need 50% of the field army there??? So I had a look at what was around and got my hands on The Italian Army in Slovenia
Strategies of Antipartisan Repression, 1941–1943 by an Italian historian. I've read the first few chapters, and the distinct hint that I am getting is that 35 divisions was not enough lol.
I can't imagine there were more than about twelve million people under Italian occupation in the Balkans, and a good chunk of that was supposed to be the pro-Axis Croatian regime. I really think it has more to do with keeping a good chunk of the Italian army out of harm's way. For comparison, when they launched Barbarossa there were only eight German divisions in the entire Balkans, most of which were two-regiment garrison divisions which had only been organised two months earlier while the occupation of the Balkans was still in progress.
With regard to North Africa, it might indeed have been feasible to ship more troops to Tripoli but there was a sharp limit on how much could be supported out to the Egyptian frontier based on the available motor transport.
