OT: WW2 Documentary

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

No, there was never any real prospect of France and Britain going to war with the USSR.

Having declared war for the right reasons, sadly the actions of the French and British in 1939-40 were a lesson in muddle, confusion, inaction and indecisiveness. I am sure there are plenty more words that can be ascribed too.

We know what happened and so the Allied plan to wait until 1941 to launch offensive action against Germany, while the French and British built up their forces, is seen as wrong. However there was no reason to believe the Germans could achieve what they ultimately did and, with their superior purchasing power compared to Germany, the Allied plan was maybe not that off the wall. It was felt Germany's military lead would gradually be eroded over time and there was the hope that Hitler would be overthrown before a shooting war on the Western Front came about.

So while this 'Phoney War' came about (the German plans to attack in the west in the autumn of 1939/early 1940 never took off for a couple of reasons - another amazing piece of Hitler luck in the early war) what was to be done? After the horrors of the First World War, the French were desperate to have the fighting take place anywhere but on French soil. The British and French were also happy to undertake limited operations, but wanted the other to be in charge in case it all went wrong.....

The French plan to bomb the Caucasus (I've always read it was a spiffing wheeze dreamed up by Gamelin) was only ever really a contingency - at least for the British - and I don't think it ever remotely had any chance of being acted upon. The Allies realised they had bitten off quite a bit with Germany, without bringing the USSR in against them too.

But a shooting war with the Soviet Union was perhaps more likely had the Anglo-French expedition to Finland have taken off. However, this too was never really going to happen. The French wanted it to happen (the lack of action to support the Finns cost Deladier his job) but there was the thorny issue of how to get there (and how to actually man the project.....). Proving that off the wall nonsense was not just the preserve of the French, the British dreamed up the 'plan' of landing in Norway with an expeditionary force that would move overland to Finland, stopping off via the Swedish iron ore mines (which would just happen to stop German supply of iron ore from this source - well that's a nice coincidence!).... There was only one problem with this 'plan' - it was all total cobblers. How the Norwegians - let alone the Swedes - would react was not really considered over and above the idea that they would be delighted at help being provided to their fellow Scandinavians. After garrisoning the Swedish ore mines, what size force would actually make it to Finland was probably no more than a platoon of reservists and a Dachshund named Colin. This whole tragic-comedy episode could have its own thread.

So no, it was never really likely that the Allies would seek to go to war with the USSR in 1939/40.

Hear, hear. [&o]

[Ian R]

Militaries make lots of contingency plans. Some are more far fetched than others. Many are just theoretical things that assist force projection and acquisition policies.

Does anyone know the code name of the current US plan to stage a suprise tri-service assault from Japan bases to seize the Nakhodka-Vladivostok base area in the event of a Russian Federation melt-down?

Tell me there isn't one.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Ian R

Militaries make lots of contingency plans. Some are more far fetched than others. Many are just theoretical things that assist force projection and acquisition policies.

Does anyone know the code name of the current US plan to stage a suprise tri-service assault from Japan bases to seize the Nakhodka-Vladivostok base area in the event of a Russian Federation melt-down?

Tell me there isn't one.

No time to make such a plan. Currently working on seizing China from Taiwan ...[:'(]

[Ian R]

Are yes, Operation Hidden Tiger. Or id that Couching Dragon?

No doubt the PRC will cite the mere existence of said plan (even if their cyber warrior directorate actually invented it as a elite maskirovka exercise directed at the proletariat) as a reason to invade the ROC.

I had started, 20 years ago, to think the collapse of the bipolar world order & economic enmeshment of the PRC and the immediate west (or their east - ROC, ROK, Japan etc) had made the concept of commencing economically dislocating military hostilities unthinkable.

I am, unfortunately, starting to think that the current autocratic regime is so arrogant and belligerent that it might actually try.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Maallon

ORIGINAL: rustysi

And to be fair, your point ultimately boils down to distrust.

OK, possibly to a degree, but I think it was more that Stalin wanted the BBD (Bigger Better Deal, at least in his eyes), no matter where he got it.

And in all fairness I do believe Stalin knew that a confrontation with Germany was bound to happen, sooner or later.

As far as I remember the deal came to a halt because Poland didn't want to allow soviet troops passage through their territory as they feared they would never leave again. Also the UK and France feared that this would ultimately lead to an Soviet hegemony in the east which they certainly didn't wanted. So it came down to it that the western Allies, especially Poland, didn't trust the USSR. Given what happened in the Baltic after the occupation of Poland, I would say that that distrust was well founded.
Only after the negotiations were suspended to an undefined time the USSR and Germany made an effort to make negotiations of their own.

What Stalin really thought about all this is hard to say, while he probably expected that a war with Germany was bound to happen, he certainly didn't expected it to happen so soon.
Stalin actually had a tendency to have deluded views on many things. He for example believed a report during the Finnish war that the Finnish people were just about to start a communist revolution and help the red army in "liberating" the country. This of course was not true and should have been hard to believe anyway because the red army currently killed the fathers and sons of these very people who were supposed to help the red army.
Not the best basis for cooperation.
So what Stalin thought at any given time can be hard to comprehend, maybe he put up this whole thing with the Allies as a farce to get a better deal out of Germany, maybe he actually would have preferred to get the deal with the Allies and Germany was his second choice. Without hard evidence, that I am not aware of exists, it is really just speculation. But it can be said for certain that the Allies didn't accept the deal with the USSR because they just simply didn't trust them enough in the end.

warspite1

As you say, the deal with the Western Allies was never going to happen because Poland (quite reasonably) wouldn't allow it. Britain and France had nothing really to offer Stalin - and certainly nothing Stalin would get excited about. But then along came Hitler with a tempting bag of goodies.....

I still think the most plausible reason for the deal with Hitler was that Stalin (again quite reasonably) thought of WWI and foresaw the Germans and Western Allies slaughtering each other to a standstill.

Ergo. The west (inc. Germany) is no longer a threat to the USSR and, if he wants to, Stalin can start dictating the terms of the NS Pact 2.0. The The straits would be high on the agenda no doubt.....

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: Ian R

Are yes, Operation Hidden Tiger. Or id that Couching Dragon?

No doubt the PRC will cite the mere existence of said plan (even if their cyber warrior directorate actually invented it as a elite maskirovka exercise directed at the proletariat) as a reason to invade the ROC.

I had started, 20 years ago, to think the collapse of the bipolar world order & economic enmeshment of the PRC and the immediate west (or their east - ROC, ROK, Japan etc) had made the concept of commencing economically dislocating military hostilities unthinkable.

I am, unfortunately, starting to think that the current autocratic regime is so arrogant and belligerent that it might actually try.

Kinda, sorta, like a North Central European country during the early to mid 20th century . . . [:(]

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Maallon

ORIGINAL: rustysi



OK, possibly to a degree, but I think it was more that Stalin wanted the BBD (Bigger Better Deal, at least in his eyes), no matter where he got it.

And in all fairness I do believe Stalin knew that a confrontation with Germany was bound to happen, sooner or later.

As far as I remember the deal came to a halt because Poland didn't want to allow soviet troops passage through their territory as they feared they would never leave again. Also the UK and France feared that this would ultimately lead to an Soviet hegemony in the east which they certainly didn't wanted. So it came down to it that the western Allies, especially Poland, didn't trust the USSR. Given what happened in the Baltic after the occupation of Poland, I would say that that distrust was well founded.
Only after the negotiations were suspended to an undefined time the USSR and Germany made an effort to make negotiations of their own.

What Stalin really thought about all this is hard to say, while he probably expected that a war with Germany was bound to happen, he certainly didn't expected it to happen so soon.
Stalin actually had a tendency to have deluded views on many things. He for example believed a report during the Finnish war that the Finnish people were just about to start a communist revolution and help the red army in "liberating" the country. This of course was not true and should have been hard to believe anyway because the red army currently killed the fathers and sons of these very people who were supposed to help the red army.
Not the best basis for cooperation.
So what Stalin thought at any given time can be hard to comprehend, maybe he put up this whole thing with the Allies as a farce to get a better deal out of Germany, maybe he actually would have preferred to get the deal with the Allies and Germany was his second choice. Without hard evidence, that I am not aware of exists, it is really just speculation. But it can be said for certain that the Allies didn't accept the deal with the USSR because they just simply didn't trust them enough in the end.

warspite1

As you say, the deal with the Western Allies was never going to happen because Poland (quite reasonably) wouldn't allow it. Britain and France had nothing really to offer Stalin - and certainly nothing Stalin would get excited about. But then along came Hitler with a tempting bag of goodies.....

I still think the most plausible reason for the deal with Hitler was that Stalin (again quite reasonably) thought of WWI and foresaw the Germans and Western Allies slaughtering each other to a standstill.

Ergo. The west (inc. Germany) is no longer a threat to the USSR and, if he wants to, Stalin can start dictating the terms of the NS Pact 2.0. The The straits would be high on the agenda no doubt.....

Stalin's nightmare was an Anti-Bolshevik crusade scenario with Germany, Britain, and France allied against him. In his deluded mind, Poland's objection to foreign troops was meaningless. He did not understand the role public opinion played in democracies, and that a 2nd Munich-like deal was politically impossible for Britain to contemplate.

It's odd that Stalin apparently believed Hitler would not break the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and attack him, in spite of Hitler having broken other treaties (and breaking many himself). Did Stalin make the mistake of believing his own propaganda?

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

It's odd that Stalin apparently believed Hitler would not break the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and attack him, in spite of Hitler having broken other treaties (and breaking many himself). Did Stalin make the mistake of believing his own propaganda?

I suspect that Stalin didn't think AH crazy enough to attack USSR while still having an active war against CW.

Edit: And because Stalin planned to be the one breaking the pact, or modifying it to better favour USSR, Stalin didn't want to do anything to provoke AH.

[rustysi]

ORIGINAL: Maallon

ORIGINAL: rustysi

And to be fair, your point ultimately boils down to distrust.

OK, possibly to a degree, but I think it was more that Stalin wanted the BBD (Bigger Better Deal, at least in his eyes), no matter where he got it.

And in all fairness I do believe Stalin knew that a confrontation with Germany was bound to happen, sooner or later.

As far as I remember the deal came to a halt because Poland didn't want to allow soviet troops passage through their territory as they feared they would never leave again. Also the UK and France feared that this would ultimately lead to an Soviet hegemony in the east which they certainly didn't wanted. So it came down to it that the western Allies, especially Poland, didn't trust the USSR. Given what happened in the Baltic after the occupation of Poland, I would say that that distrust was well founded.
Only after the negotiations were suspended to an undefined time the USSR and Germany made an effort to make negotiations of their own.

What Stalin really thought about all this is hard to say, while he probably expected that a war with Germany was bound to happen, he certainly didn't expected it to happen so soon.
Stalin actually had a tendency to have deluded views on many things. He for example believed a report during the Finnish war that the Finnish people were just about to start a communist revolution and help the red army in "liberating" the country. This of course was not true and should have been hard to believe anyway because the red army currently killed the fathers and sons of these very people who were supposed to help the red army.
Not the best basis for cooperation.
So what Stalin thought at any given time can be hard to comprehend, maybe he put up this whole thing with the Allies as a farce to get a better deal out of Germany, maybe he actually would have preferred to get the deal with the Allies and Germany was his second choice. Without hard evidence, that I am not aware of exists, it is really just speculation. But it can be said for certain that the Allies didn't accept the deal with the USSR because they just simply didn't trust them enough in the end.

All good points, agree with most.

[rustysi]

I still think the most plausible reason for the deal with Hitler was that Stalin (again quite reasonably) thought of WWI and foresaw the Germans and Western Allies slaughtering each other to a standstill.

Yup, and shook him quite a bit when AH marched straight into Paris.[X(] At that point Germany looked unbeatable.

After that the only way for him to buy the time he wanted was not to piss Germany off.

Didn't work, did it?[8|]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: rustysi

I still think the most plausible reason for the deal with Hitler was that Stalin (again quite reasonably) thought of WWI and foresaw the Germans and Western Allies slaughtering each other to a standstill.

Yup, and shook him quite a bit when AH marched straight into Paris.[X(] At that point Germany looked unbeatable.

After that the only way for him to buy the time he wanted was not to piss Germany off.

Didn't work, did it?[8|]

warspite1

No it didn't work and, with hindsight, we know that only a German defeat before Barbarossa would have stopped Hitler from trying to achieve what he thought was his destiny.

It's why I feel so strongly about those that criticise Chamberlain and Daladier, but feel that Roosevelt, Stalin, the German people, the German Army and the leaders of the smaller nations all get a free pass for their role in Hitler and the events leading up to the start of WWII.

[mind_messing]

Some quite flawed understanding of the diplomatic landscape within Europe.

Some points worth remembering:

- The UK didn't establish permanent diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until 1929, and the Soviet Union was quite the political football in UK internal politics.

- The Munich Agreement set an uncomfortable precedent for the Soviet Union, regarding both the value of a military alliance with France and at the limits that the French and British were willing to go to accommodate Hitler.

- Both the Soviet Invasion of Poland and of Finland were not likely to make the Soviets comfortable allies, and elsewhere, in many respects the "Great Game" was still on-going.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Some quite flawed understanding of the diplomatic landscape within Europe.

warspite1

Care to elaborate on what where the 'flawed' understanding is?

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: rustysi

I still think the most plausible reason for the deal with Hitler was that Stalin (again quite reasonably) thought of WWI and foresaw the Germans and Western Allies slaughtering each other to a standstill.

Yup, and shook him quite a bit when AH marched straight into Paris.[X(] At that point Germany looked unbeatable.

After that the only way for him to buy the time he wanted was not to piss Germany off.

Didn't work, did it?[8|]

warspite1

No it didn't work and, with hindsight, we know that only a German defeat before Barbarossa would have stopped Hitler from trying to achieve what he thought was his destiny.

It's why I feel so strongly about those that criticise Chamberlain and Daladier, but feel that Roosevelt, Stalin, the German people, the German Army and the leaders of the smaller nations all get a free pass for their role in Hitler and the events leading up to the start of WWII.

I don't give any of those people a free pass.

[Zorch]

"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

Edmund Burke

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Some quite flawed understanding of the diplomatic landscape within Europe.

warspite1

Care to elaborate on what where the 'flawed' understanding is?

Happily.

In post #10, I think there's an underestimation of the extent to which the Molotov-Robbentrop (M-R) Pact took the Western Allies by surprise. While acting within the letter of the respective Polish alliances, there is no doubt that Britain and France's reactions were very much against the spirit of said agreements (as evidenced by subsequent perceptions).

Post #14 ignores the fact that it was Munich that really served to put Stalin at a distance from the Western Allies diplomatically.

Post #25 again ignores Munich. The prospect of Britain and France acquiescing in the cession territory of a Central European state at the demands of Germany was something that rang serious alarm bells in Moscow. Any faith in the 1935 Anglo-French (which was never significant on the French side after Barthou's death) was completely gone and the prospect of Germany having a one-front war in the east was on the cars.

More widely, Soviet foreign policy of this time needs to be understood as having the overall desire to tie German resources down (in either in France or elsewhere) to reduce the forces that could be arrayed against the Soviet Union. M-R was driven by the fact that a second front against Germany was by no means guaranteed, and a rapprochement with Germany offered better prospects for defence (both in terms of buffer territory in Poland and the Baltic States, and in terms of time).

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Happily.

In post #10, I think there's an underestimation of the extent to which the Molotov-Robbentrop (M-R) Pact took the Western Allies by surprise. While acting within the letter of the respective Polish alliances, there is no doubt that Britain and France's reactions were very much against the spirit of said agreements (as evidenced by subsequent perceptions).

Post #14 ignores the fact that it was Munich that really served to put Stalin at a distance from the Western Allies diplomatically.

Post #25 again ignores Munich. The prospect of Britain and France acquiescing in the cession territory of a Central European state at the demands of Germany was something that rang serious alarm bells in Moscow. Any faith in the 1935 Anglo-French (which was never significant on the French side after Barthou's death) was completely gone and the prospect of Germany having a one-front war in the east was on the cars.

More widely, Soviet foreign policy of this time needs to be understood as having the overall desire to tie German resources down (in either in France or elsewhere) to reduce the forces that could be arrayed against the Soviet Union. M-R was driven by the fact that a second front against Germany was by no means guaranteed, and a rapprochement with Germany offered better prospects for defence (both in terms of buffer territory in Poland and the Baltic States, and in terms of time).

warspite1

Okay thanks, but I’m still not getting the ‘flawed’ understanding reference.

Re post #10, there is simply no underestimation whatsoever. I fail to see how it could be argued that the Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a surprise to the Western Allies. It caught the German (and their would-be allies) and Soviet populations by surprise (and disgust), so it’s hard to see how such a pact would not be surprising to Daladier and Chamberlain (or their would be allies). I don’t follow where you think post #10 even refers to this, let alone underestimates this.

Equally I’ve no idea where you think I’ve suggested that the actions of the British and French, as regards Poland, were either within, or indeed without, the spirit of the guarantee to Poland or, for that matter, what that specifically has to do with my post.

You seem to have created a ‘debating point’ for no apparent reason. For the avoidance of doubt, the NS Pact shocked and surprised the world and so was therefore a shock and surprise to Britain and France. The Poles believed that the British and French would attack in the west. There are reasons why this never happened, but the Poles were right to feel they were left in the lurch.

Re post #14, I am not sure what you expected to come from talks of an alliance with the Soviet Union. Sure, you can ignore Poland if it helps your argument, but that doesn’t make it right. Neither side – British/French and the Soviet Union - trusted the other or ideally wanted each other as allies – in fact they hated each other. It was exactly the same with Germany and the Soviet Union. But there was of course some vital differences in the two situations that meant a deal between the dictators could be done, but not with the Western Allies.

Re #25, I have not ignored Munich at all. Your comment suggests I think Stalin wrong to have signed the pact. Looking at the pact from a Soviet perspective I think nothing of the sort. Stalin was, quite rightly, looking out for Stalin and the Soviet Union. It’s what all leaders do; they seek first and foremost to protect their own. My post does not seek to ignore Munich. Munich had happened, the British and French were tooling around, and Stalin was offered a deal. Why did he take the deal? Well I set that out in Post #25.

Your last sentence is strange given you stated there was a flawed understanding, because your last sentence largely repeats – albeit using different words – what I said in post 25.


Now I think I understand where you are coming from, I will respond to your post #32

- The UK didn't establish permanent diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until 1929, and the Soviet Union was quite the political football in UK internal politics.

Yes but how is that relevant to anything? Adolf Hitler didn’t come to power until 1933 and if the USSR was a political football to the west, then what on earth do you imagine it was to Nazi Germany? The inter-war years were a fast moving feast. The length of time two countries had had diplomatic relations meant absolutely nothing; if there was a deal to be done and both sides thought it expedient to do so, it got done.

- The Munich Agreement set an uncomfortable precedent for the Soviet Union, regarding both the value of a military alliance with France and at the limits that the French and British were willing to go to accommodate Hitler.

I don’t see there is anything I’ve said that has suggested otherwise.

- Both the Soviet Invasion of Poland and of Finland were not likely to make the Soviets comfortable allies, and elsewhere, in many respects the "Great Game" was still on-going.

Sorry but I still don’t understand the relevance of this comment. Comfortable allies for who? Germany? Well the NS had been signed and so the moves mentioned were as expected in the secret protocols (it was Stalin’s moves further south that really unnerved Hitler - in Besserabia - I don’t think he read what he signed off on…. attention to detail Adolf! and Northern Bukovina – cheeky Josef, who agreed that?!). The Soviet Union were never likely to be ‘comfortable allies’ to Germany (and so it proved during that almost 2-year period). Britain and France? Well they weren’t allies were they – and as we know, they weren’t going to be until the Soviet Union were at war with Germany? And once they were allies? No, Stalin continued to be an uncomfortable bedfellow….

[mind_messing]

Okay thanks, but I’m still not getting the ‘flawed’ understanding reference.

Well, read on and see.

Re post #10, there is simply no underestimation whatsoever. I fail to see how it could be argued that the Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a surprise to the Western Allies. It caught the German (and their would-be allies) and Soviet populations by surprise (and disgust), so it’s hard to see how such a pact would not be surprising to Daladier and Chamberlain (or their would be allies). I don’t follow where you think post #10 even refers to this, let alone underestimates this.

I don't follow you here at all. You contradict yourself by saying that you cannot see how an argument could be made for the M-L catching the Western Allies by surprise, then say that it's hard to see how the pact would not surprise Daladier/Chamberlain.

Clarification would be helpful.

More widely wrt post #10, the point on the strategic surprise of the M-L pact partly (but not completely) explains the strategic listlessness of Britain and France. Put it more simply, what worked in the last war was now no longer an option and the landscape geopolitically had changed to be quite different from 1914.

You can ascribe this strategic inertia to Hitler "being lucky" if you wish. He certainly rolled a few double-sixes. However in terms of academic study, you'll find that there's generally a more rational approach to looking at the matter.

Equally I’ve no idea where you think I’ve suggested that the actions of the British and French, as regards Poland, were either within, or indeed without, the spirit of the guarantee to Poland or, for that matter, what that specifically has to do with my post.

You've not mentioned it, which seems a glaring omission. It certainly seems relevant to the original topic (Western Allied attacks on the Soviet Union), given the agreements between Poland with France and Britain.

You seem to have created a ‘debating point’ for no apparent reason.

No, I have my reasons - mainly as I felt the discussion was going down the line of "History Channel diplomacy" (and not from the "good" days).

For the avoidance of doubt, the NS Pact shocked and surprised the world and so was therefore a shock and surprise to Britain and France. The Poles believed that the British and French would attack in the west. There are reasons why this never happened, but the Poles were right to feel they were left in the lurch.

That clarifies things. Related to my point above wrt treaties, the absence of a British and French reaction to the Soviet invasion of Poland certainly fuelled those notions.

Re post #14, I am not sure what you expected to come from talks of an alliance with the Soviet Union. Sure, you can ignore Poland if it helps your argument, but that doesn’t make it right. Neither side – British/French and the Soviet Union - trusted the other or ideally wanted each other as allies – in fact they hated each other. It was exactly the same with Germany and the Soviet Union. But there was of course some vital differences in the two situations that meant a deal between the dictators could be done, but not with the Western Allies.

This section highlights what I was referring to by a flawed understanding.

At this level of diplomacy, emotions are kept to the side. Ideology, likes, dislikes, political inclination, all of this is subordinated to diplomatic pragmatism.

In this arena, the British and French simply had less to offer the Soviets.

Re #25, I have not ignored Munich at all. Your comment suggests I think Stalin wrong to have signed the pact. Looking at the pact from a Soviet perspective I think nothing of the sort. Stalin was, quite rightly, looking out for Stalin and the Soviet Union. It’s what all leaders do; they seek first and foremost to protect their own. My post does not seek to ignore Munich. Munich had happened, the British and French were tooling around, and Stalin was offered a deal. Why did he take the deal? Well I set that out in Post #25.

Glad to see that the above chimes with my comments regarding pragmatism.

There's more than one view of Soviet foreign policy for this timeframe. On the one hand, the trajectory of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland has a distinct eastward trajectory - effectively putting German ambitions on the Soviet doorstep. An alternative view is that it was all a ploy to embroil the western powers in a war.

Yes but how is that relevant to anything? Adolf Hitler didn’t come to power until 1933 and if the USSR was a political football to the west, then what on earth do you imagine it was to Nazi Germany? The inter-war years were a fast moving feast. The length of time two countries had had diplomatic relations meant absolutely nothing; if there was a deal to be done and both sides thought it expedient to do so, it got done.

I would have thought that would have been obvious.

If you've only established formal diplomatic relation less than ten years previously, there's only so much progress you can make in terms of thawing the relationship. Granted, the earlier commercial agreements would have helped.

There's also significant benefits associated with having established, long-standing diplomatic relations with countries in terms of efficient communication, understanding who the important players are and their motivations, and a whole host of other benefits.

While you're correct in that pragmatism rules the roost when it comes to getting deals done, there needs to be sufficient understanding to be able to identify the potential for a deal - before any deal can be agreed, common ground needs to be identified and that's where long-standing relations can contribute best.

I don’t see there is anything I’ve said that has suggested otherwise.

That's correct - because I didn't make that comment with you in mind. Not always about you, warspite [;)]

Sorry but I still don’t understand the relevance of this comment. Comfortable allies for who? Germany? Well the NS had been signed and so the moves mentioned were as expected in the secret protocols (it was Stalin’s moves further south that really unnerved Hitler - in Besserabia - I don’t think he read what he signed off on…. attention to detail Adolf! and Northern Bukovina – cheeky Josef, who agreed that?!). The Soviet Union were never likely to be ‘comfortable allies’ to Germany (and so it proved during that almost 2-year period). Britain and France? Well they weren’t allies were they – and as we know, they weren’t going to be until the Soviet Union were at war with Germany? And once they were allies? No, Stalin continued to be an uncomfortable bedfellow….

I was referring to the "Great Game" in the context of the tensions between Great Britain and the then Russian Empire in Central and South Asia, but I made the comment thinking more generally around the 1924 elections and the challenging post-war political and social landscape in the UK.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I don't follow you here at all. You contradict yourself by saying that you cannot see how an argument could be made for the M-L catching the Western Allies by surprise, then say that it's hard to see how the pact would not surprise Daladier/Chamberlain.

Clarification would be helpful.

warspite1

Please tell me where I've contradicted myself. You appear to be trying to put words in my mouth. How can you be suggesting anyone is arguing that the British and French weren't surprised when the whole world was freakin' incredulous??

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

More widely wrt post #10, the point on the strategic surprise of the M-L pact partly (but not completely) explains the strategic listlessness of Britain and France. Put it more simply, what worked in the last war was now no longer an option and the landscape geopolitically had changed to be quite different from 1914.

warspite1

The decision to guarantee Poland was taken in early 1939. There was no alliance with the Soviet Union at that time. The decision to make good on the guarantee (if one can call it quite that) was made after the NS Pact was signed. The signing of the pact had very little to do with the 'listnessness' of Britain and France - though wouldn't that be a nice excuse. I encourage you to read about the period 1939-40. The British and French inability to go to war effectively was sadly caused by far more than the signing of the pact - surprising to everyone as it was.