The Italian Army in Heroes and Leaders mod

[asl3d]

20. Heavy MG

Large-bore direct infantry support is supplied by an outdated (1913) World War I mountain gun; the Cannone da 65/17. This weapon has at least one point to recommend usage—its ability to use AP and HEAT rounds. It is less expensive than the 47/32 AT gun, and more versatile. It has no gunshield and is not a QSU weapon. In effect, this combines to demand that, for most effective use the crew must carefully site the 65/17. When properly situated, and perhaps in tandem with an 81mm MTR, it can give any opponent pause.
The final Italian piece, their Cannone-mitragliera 20/65, is totally unsuited for its original role of air defense. Nor, due to its small bore size, is a suitable AT weapon. But, used in the role many Italian officers adapted it to (i.e., as a heavy MG), this particular weapon can serve quite well as a deadly threat. Due primarily to its long range, placed on an elevation with a good field of fire, the 20/65 can dominate any route of advance. Particularly impressive is its ability to fire in a limbered state. It is a very common weapon and appeared in all theaters.
Overall, once again the Italians suffered from a marked lack of modern weaponry. Their most common ordnance pieces are all outdated, and hence underpowered, designs often forced into roles for which they were not designed. Only the 81mm Mortaio proves an exception. Still, if carefully handled, and the range of engagement kept within reason, these must serve. Depending on date and what is faced, they may even serve quite well.

[asl3d]

20/1 Experience in AFV design

In the late 1930s the Italian Army officially committed itself to a program of mechanization, believing that if so equipped it could win swift and decisive victories, thereby avoiding the stalemates and appalling casualties of the Great War. Unfortunately for those ultimately involved in the impending conflict, the implementation of this program was severely impeded by a number of factors. Among these were a basic lack of raw materials, a relatively small industrial base with little experience in AFV design, a general lack of funds due to the financial stringencies of the 1930s, and the conservatism of certain high-ranking officers and officials. In the autumn of 1939 the army possessed about 1,500 hundred "tanks", but the overwhelming majority of them were marginally useful L3 tankettes. When Mussolini declared war in June 1940, his army was far from ready. Its total number of "tanks" had increased only to some 1,660, while the army's rapid expansion had created widespread equipment shortages in areas from those as crucial as motor transport to items as normally taken-for-granted as helmets. Moreover, the approximately 11,700 infantry, artillery and AA guns of a 65mm in service included less than 250 modern (i.e., '30s-era) pieces—the newest of the remainder being World War One veterans.

[asl3d]

20_2 Italian AFV characteristics

The small Italian armaments industry could not, in view of everything working against it, provide prodigious numbers of AFV. From June 1940 to August 1943 it produced only about 3,300 tanks, SP guns and armored cars. The highest monthly total was but 170 vehicles, of which 65 were medium tanks. There was some discussion with the Germans of building the PzKpfw III, IV and V in Italy— but this withered on the vine for a number of reasons, including the opposition of several high Italian officials and industrialists.
Italian AFV were characterized by their light weight, generally low horsepower-to-weight ratio and thin armor (the latter a policy resulting at least in part from the constant shortage of funds and raw materials). The armor plate was of poor quality, tending to crack and split when hit; and was attached by rivets, which further diminished its overall integrity while increasing the danger to the crew inside. The design of new and radically better tanks was not accorded a high priority, due to both military conservatism and the loss in production that extensive retooling would cause. Indeed, Mussolini (who, unlike Hitler, neither fully understood the correct priorities in tank design nor took much interest in such matters) had to order the development of a tank with a 75mm gun (the P26/40), as the army saw no need for one. And yet, despite the absence in the field of more-combat-effective tanks and SP guns until nearly the end, Italian AFV crews continued to fight bravely in their obsolete vehicles even when hopelessly outmatched.
At the start of the war, the nomenclature for Italian tracked AFV followed the format "letter #/#". The letter classed the vehicle as either light ("L"; <= 5 tons), medium ("M"; > 8 but <= 15 tons) or heavy ("P"; > 15 tons). The first number indicated the design weight in tons, and the second the year of acceptance.
All Allied Italian combat formations were re-equipped by the British in early 1945.

[asl3d]

21. Armor

Italian interest in tracked armored vehicles dates back to September 1916, when the first British tanks made their appearance on the Somme; shortly there-after Italy succeeded in obtaining a French Schneider tank and tests were immediately begun. Although tanks were totally unsuitable for the bloodbath in the Corso region, in 1918 Italy convinced French authorities to provide three Renaults and another Schneider. In the meantime, Fiat—Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino, the major Italian automotive firm—undertook the construction of a tank of its own design, a ponderous machine weighing 40 tons. In 1918, Fiat received an order for a series production of a modified version of the Renault FT (known as the Fiat 3000, of which 100 were delivered to the army). Between the time of their delivery in 1921 and the acquisition of the British Carden-Loyd tankette in 1929, Italian tank development languished. From 1929 until 1935, Italian efforts centered on the carro veloce, as the Italian-built version of the Carden-Loyd was known. All of these fledgling Italian AFVs would be thrown into action during the war. But Italian actions in Ethiopia high-lighted the need for a heavier tank, and the General Staff authorized design of a medium tank. An 8-ton turretless design armed with a short-barreled 37mm was built in prototype but failed to be accepted. Instead, in 1939, the 11/39 was adopted. Shortly afterwards the design of the L6/40 was also accepted for production.

[asl3d]

22. Design and production

During the war, Italian tank development and production suffered from a variety of faults, ranging from a critical lack of raw materials to a gross miscalculation on the advent and duration of the war. Italian officers had, as early as 1939, realized the need for a tank heavier than the proposed M13, but there was no priority given to the development of such. As a result, when the P40 was first planned, the engine as well as the chassis itself had to be designed from scratch. The time lag between design and production stages was understandably lengthy. The manufacture of German designs in Italy seemed to offer a partial solution to the problems of tank development, but plans such as that to built the PzKpfw III in Italy withered on the vine. Nor did limited use of captured equipment (notably French) supplied by Germany suffice.
Italian industry showed its ability to improvise with what was at hand at several points. But the crux of the problem remained: at the outset of the war the Italians had only limited experience in designing their own armored fighting vehicles, and were able to draw upon their automotive industry, already hard-pressed by the war effort, only to a limited extent for the major components that were needed. The two principal areas in which Italian AFVs feel short of their German and Allied counterparts were in quality of armor plate and their horsepower-to-weight ratio. The armor plate was prone to crack and split when hit and, generally speaking, the deficiency in quality was not compensated by an increase in thickness. Italian crews improvised by sandbagging and affixing track links to vital areas in order to improve their chances of survival. Production models of Italian tracked vehicles also suffered from an unfavorable hp-to-weight ratio throughout the war. Efforts to increase horsepower, as in the case of the M15, did not significantly enhance the speed or maneuverability of the vehicles, and parity with Allied and German AFVs was never achieved in this respect.

[asl3d]

23. Armored units

The armament mounted on Italian vehicles was quite another story. The 47mm gun of the M13 was a satisfactory weapon, and the 75/18 gun-howitzer of the SPA was an extremely reliable and accurate weapon that, although not designed as such, was used as an AT gun with excellent results. The 90/53 gun on a self-propelled mount is another example of the occasional first-rate weapons that can be found in the Italian arsenal, and indicates the direction in which Italian efforts were being forced at the time of the armistice in 1943.
The organization of Italian armored units was modified continuously throughout the war. This was due to a variety of reasons, among them the destruction or disbanding of some armored formations and the uneven introduction of new types of armored vehicles. Italian armored divisions were never armor-heavy, but rather were an almost equal mix of armor, artillery and infantry. By the end of 1941, organization of the armored divisions had been standardized, and consisted of a tank regiment (equipped with M13s), a Bersaglieri regiment, an artillery regiment with six groups (two of which were self-propelled), an engineer battalion and various support service units. Strength had been increased to 8,600 men and 189 medium tanks. Further organization of the divisions were some-what elastic, the actual composition of the regiments varying from time to time, depending on the situation, availability of replacements and the phasing in of new equipment.

[asl3d]

24. Performance

Of Italy's more than 70 combat-effective divisions, only three might be classed as armored—the 131st Centauro, the 132nd Ariete and the 133rd Littorio. A second-generation Ariete was organized in April 1943, and fought against the Germans on the outskirts of Rome immediately after the declaration of the armistice; it was disbanded by the Germans after its surrender. Plans were under way to convert a cavalry divison to an armored formation, to be designated the 134th Freccia Division, but were not implemented before the armistice. The 136th Giovani Fascisti has at times been referred to as an armored division, but in reality it was nothing more than an infantry division with some of its artillery mounted on trucks.
Although Italian armored units fought on all fronts, from Russia to Tunisia, most of their activity was conducted in North Africa; it would have to be in the context of desert combat that the record of Italian armor personnel during World War II should be judged. On balance, the performance of the armored units (and the armored artillery as well) was at the very least adequate, but probably could be better described as having been as good as that of German armored units in the desert. Too often, accounts making reference to "Italian armor" are misleading. Reports of engagements during O'Connor's offensive furnish a prime example, when L3s were pitted against Matildas and the actions labelled "tank battles". On the other hand, when Italian tanks were matched against comparable AFVs , such as happened at Bir el Gobi in November 1941 when 13/40s faced British Crusaders, results were far more equitable. As the war progressed, with the steady attrition of Italian armor and the simultaneous build-up of British and American forces, there was little hope in the long run. But the performance of Italian armored crews was, however, superior to the end—especially when one considers the relatively inferior equipment which they had to work with most of the time.

[asl3d]

25. Tankettes

As pointed out by numerous AFV authorities, Italian designs lagged two to three years behind that of the common AFVs of other combatants. For example, by the time the M15/42 came into service, it was already obsolete on the European battlefield.
The L3/35 tankette was derived from the Carden-Lyod Mark VI, 25 of which were acquired in 1929. Italian authorities showed an understandable interest in a small, light AFV suitable for use in mountainous terrain—such as that common along the northern borders; a joint venture of Fiat and Ansaldo promised just that. The Fiat-Ansaldo built version would eventually number 2,500, and see action (in various guises) in virtually every theater in which the Italian army operated. The CV was never meant to be used in lieu of heavier tanks, but was instead designed according to Italian doctrine of the time for security and recon duties and elimination of small pockets of bypassed resistance. However, the outbreak of hostilities earlier than anticipated forced them to be committed as the only AFVs available. More than three-quarters of the "tank formations" encountered by the British in their desert offensives of late 1940 and early 1941 were comprised of L3s, whose armor was not even proof against the armament of British armored cars.
When it became apparent that the M11/39 did not constitute a satisfactory design, the development of a suitable successor was initiated. The basic hull of the M11 was used, but the rest was much revised and took on a conventional appearance (with the MA mounted in the turret) with horsepower increased from 105 to 125 to compensate for the added weight. The M13/40 was the best known of the Italian tanks used in the war, and along with its improved (a 145-hp engine was installed) version the M14/41, was the standard AFV of their armored divisions. The M13 suffered from frequent mechanical breakdowns in the desert, but in this respect was no worse than British tanks of the period. In 1942 or later, the M13/40 and M14/41 were outclassed by most of the Allied armor encountered. Used in mass, or against enemy infantry, they can be quite effective however. The M15/42 was an upgunned version, but with a use limited—given that the bulk of them were used to equip the new Ariete, and hence surrendered to the Germans in 1943 after their brief defense of Rome.

[asl3d]

26. Transports

Mounting a 75* weapon, the Italian Semovente M42 da 75/18 did not have good armor penetration ability, despite its larger bore size over the M13/40 series of tanks. Its armor protection it wasn't too effective either. Compare this with the German StuG with its 75L and a good armor protection, it is possible to understand why the Italians often referred to their assault guns as tascabili ("sardine cans"), which had nothing to do with similarities in appearance. However, of all the vehicles considered thus far, this one has the least opportunity of seeing use, due to its extremely limited time of availability—September 1943.
Only the Autocarretta of the Italian arsenal seems to function much as intended. As a specialized towing vehicle for artillery pieces, any Italian leader should consider it a valuable asset in mobile situations. It has, however, two real drawbacks—a low capacity to transport infantry troops, and a low speed (making off-road travel, with or without a gun in tow, was a slow proposition). Due to these limitations, beyond providing a tow for any on-board guns, many times it will be used to transport infantry teams (HS/crews) and their heavy SW (dismantled HMGs or MTRs). As with the Russians, the rest of the fleet of trucks are rather rare but do compare favorably with similar vehicles in other TO&Es.

[asl3d]

27. Defence

Poorly led, equipped and motivated, the Italian soldier was not generally to be feared during the days of World War II. This is not to say that he could not give a good account of himself; if carefully handled any enemy force can find them a tough nut to crack—defensively. Mussolini himself recognized this, for in his note of 31 March 1940 in which he defined the various roles the Italian armed forces were to play in each theater, only on the Abyssinia front did he envision an offensive (which the Duke of Aosta promptly declared could not be carried out). A rather modest program for what il Duce assumed would be a short war against the decadent Western European democracies. Once involved in a modern war against nations with vast resources, both material and manpower, Italy simply was outclassed. In short order, the defeats in Africa sapped the morale of the Italian military; the horrendous losses in first the Balkans, and then Russia, only accelerated the process by filling the gaps with troops of ever more dubious conviction and ability.
Even the best of Italian troops are of but average morale; and the limitations placed on all but the elite forces can cripple the Italian leader's plans. Their weaponry, with a few notable exceptions, is barely adequate. Unlike the Americans and Russians, who improve as the war progresses, the Italian experience level of combat, his leadership and squad quality remain fairly constant throughout the war. The most enjoyable of tactical actions will see the Italians on the defensive, as they were much of the time, where they can make the most of their firepower at short range while clinging to sheltering terrain as the enemy nears. With polished management and a touch of luck, the Italians can prove victorious—and victory by any means is just as sweet.

[asl3d]

28. Italian bravery

The Italian soldier has become the brunt of much unjustified ridicule since the war. The absence of a dedicated officer corps, and the distaste with which many Italians regarded the Italian cause, naturally impaired their fighting ability. When well led, their performance was as good as any; Gurkha regimental non-coms who encountered them in Ethiopia stated they were the bravest they had yet met—and the Gurkhas should know a bit about valor. During the war, the Italian soldier faced the best of each of the other major European combatants, in climes ranging from the snows of Russia to the deserts of North Africa. And, once the bulk of the army came under the jurisdiction of Allied command (excepting a few die-hard Fascists), it proved to be a valuable asset to their war effort. With the defection of Italy from the Axis cause and the granting of co-belligerent status to the new Italian government, a new era dawned. While training was still of dubious quality, their forces gained vast new stocks of modern equipment and there was no doubting Italian resolve. Italian units played a considerable role in the liberation of the rest of their country, occupied by the Germans and outlawed Fascists.

With skill and tenacity, luck and experience, the Italian leader will be able to say: Veni, vidi, vinci.