Vid of CMO Tu-22/AS-4 attack on a Tico

[kch]

The Backfire regiment threat has always reminded me of the AShBM threat. For it to actually work, a lot has to be in place and work just right. There's so little room for error on the Chinese side that I have always wondered if its worth the investment.

That was one of the points I tried to illustrate in the Kobayashi Maru scenario: coordinating a multi-axis strike that can sink a CVN is tough (but not impossible). In fairness, the defense against such a strike is also difficult. All the equipment needs to be working and the crews need to be on top of the situation and respond promptly and effectively to the threat. IRT the AShBM threat: that may be a more difficult threat to counter, because relatively few weapons platforms are capable of detecting and engaging the AShBM. The flip side of the issue is that ships still need to be found and localized, which is also not easy (although it is easier than it was when I was on active duty).

Do you expect that the AShBM will be able to easily make a direct hit on a manouvering vessel? Unless they use tactical nuclear warheads, then I could imagine that it would be tricky for the missile to hit. (I know it is not directly comparable, but the Iskanders in the current war seem to have a hard time hitting point targets, but I dont know whether that is due to the guidance package or the inability to manouvre).

[CV60]

The Backfire regiment threat has always reminded me of the AShBM threat. For it to actually work, a lot has to be in place and work just right. There's so little room for error on the Chinese side that I have always wondered if its worth the investment.

That was one of the points I tried to illustrate in the Kobayashi Maru scenario: coordinating a multi-axis strike that can sink a CVN is tough (but not impossible). In fairness, the defense against such a strike is also difficult. All the equipment needs to be working and the crews need to be on top of the situation and respond promptly and effectively to the threat. IRT the AShBM threat: that may be a more difficult threat to counter, because relatively few weapons platforms are capable of detecting and engaging the AShBM. The flip side of the issue is that ships still need to be found and localized, which is also not easy (although it is easier than it was when I was on active duty).

Do you expect that the AShBM will be able to easily make a direct hit on a manouvering vessel? Unless they use tactical nuclear warheads, then I could imagine that it would be tricky for the missile to hit. (I know it is not directly comparable, but the Iskanders in the current war seem to have a hard time hitting point targets, but I dont know whether that is due to the guidance package or the inability to manouvre).

I really don't have any insight on the accuracy of AShBMs, and it is likely that any information would be highly classified. But here's the real issue: the damage caused by a single hit of an AShBM would kill even the largest vessel due to the kinetic/shock damage. Given the risk of loss of a national asset such as a CVN, would the navy deploy it in harms way, even if the chance of being hit was only 10%?

[kch]

Very true.. They will definitely have a massive amount of kinetic energy when they are coming down.

[BDukes]

I really don't have any insight on the accuracy of AShBMs, and it is likely that any information would be highly classified. But here's the real issue: the damage caused by a single hit of an AShBM would kill even the largest vessel due to the kinetic/shock damage. Given the risk of loss of a national asset such as a CVN, would the navy deploy it in harm's way, even if the chance of being hit was only 10%?

Hard to say. strategy vs. practice has been very murky on whether a rollback is occurring or not. Strategy has a lot of the light mobile and stealthy stuff forward. More units are becoming shooters and Guam is getting more ABM. At the same time, USN is continuing to base a CSG and Amphib group in Japan which seems high-risk. This being said we civs only see part of the picture. Hoping that's the murkyness

In terms of gaming in the CMO environment, I'd roll back or design toward giving options to disrupt the chain or obscure targets. Tried to do this in Chains of War. Might have a go at a more modern take at some point (5+ years later and so much has changed!).

Mike

[Gunner98]

I would think the highest risk window for the Japan based CSG is the annual 3 month maintenance period. A CVN in drydock is a lot easier to hit then finding and then hitting one on the high seas. I understand that doing the work there is much handier and saves a lot in transit time but is it worth the risk?

B

[BDukes]

I would think the highest risk window for the Japan based CSG is the annual 3 month maintenance period. A CVN in drydock is a lot easier to hit then finding and then hitting one on the high seas. I understand that doing the work there is much handier and saves a lot in transit time but is it worth the risk?

B

I don't think so.

Could you imagine what it is like to be CO of that strike group? You obviously paid your dues and landed the dream job but you know that the odds are good you take the first sucker punch. Makes for good game design but talk about being on the spot in real life. Course these people are wired a little differently than most..

Really hope folks are taking this stuff seriously where it counts. Chinese buildup isn't for nothing and the US shouldn't be losing its brightest for appearances.

Mike

[thewood1]

There is some mitigating rationale about the exposure of the carrier group. If China went after Taiwan, with a plan to hobble the USN in the Western Pacific, it would hit Guam and a few other forward bases and facilities for the US in that region. But there is no guarantee that Japan, or for that matter South Korea, would enter the war. But if you hit Japanese or South Korean soil in the opening salvo, you are now pretty much guaranteed to have most of the big US allies coming after you in full force. In fact, US basing can be a leverage point for China once the war starts. The threat of strikes if allied countries don't limit US military activity on native soil might be a big and realistic one.

Thats a pretty big risk to take in knocking out one carrier with minimal personnel onboard and most of its aircraft ashore. And if you don't even hit it, you have squandered an opportunity to limit allied intervention. Even if you do hit it, you will completely galvanize US public support with almost no chance of winning the PR battle in the west.

Not saying China doesn't have a non-zero chance of hitting the carrier, but in a port environment, the radar returns would be tough to discern there's a better chance for a miss than a hit. China's best bet is hold the DF-21s and DF-26s for a real knockout blow on a couple carriers engaged in war-like maneuvers. That way you can even out the PR landscape and also not force South Korea and Japan into the war.

[BDukes]

There is some mitigating rationale about the exposure of the carrier group. If China went after Taiwan, with a plan to hobble the USN in the Western Pacific, it would hit Guam and a few other forward bases and facilities for the US in that region. But there is no guarantee that Japan, or for that matter South Korea, would enter the war. But if you hit Japanese or South Korean soil in the opening salvo, you are now pretty much guaranteed to have most of the big US allies coming after you in full force. In fact, US basing can be a leverage point for China once the war starts. The threat of strikes if allied countries don't limit US military activity on native soil might be a big and realistic one.

Thats a pretty big risk to take in knocking out one carrier with minimal personnel onboard and most of its aircraft ashore. And if you don't even hit it, you have squandered an opportunity to limit allied intervention. Even if you do hit it, you will completely galvanize US public support with almost no chance of winning the PR battle in the west.

Not saying China doesn't have a non-zero chance of hitting the carrier, but in a port environment, the radar returns would be tough to discern there's a better chance for a miss than a hit. China's best bet is hold the DF-21s and DF-26s for a real knockout blow on a couple carriers engaged in war-like maneuvers. That way you can even out the PR landscape and also not force South Korea and Japan into the war.

Think they'd use ASBMs if it was in port or standard ballistic missiles?

Mike

[thewood1]

Standard BMs. I'm not even sure antiship missiles would be effective in a crowded port. With a drydock being a large static target, that would a better fit. The only issue with a BM is collateral damage. That's only if they were worried about that.

The strategy is pretty simple. Do what you can to isolate the US, get the USN to commit HVTs. Then try to pummel them and sue for peace before the rest of USN shows up.

The scenario version is keep SK and Japan only unfriendly, unless a missile hits their territory. But balance the points out the if Japan and SK become US allies, change objectives and penalize the US with points. Something like that.

[SunlitZelkova]

Standard BMs. I'm not even sure antiship missiles would be effective in a crowded port. With a drydock being a large static target, that would a better fit. The only issue with a BM is collateral damage. That's only if they were worried about that.

The strategy is pretty simple. Do what you can to isolate the US, get the USN to commit HVTs. Then try to pummel them and sue for peace before the rest of USN shows up.

The scenario version is keep SK and Japan only unfriendly, unless a missile hits their territory. But balance the points out the if Japan and SK become US allies, change objectives and penalize the US with points. Something like that.

About that...

https://news.usni.org/2022/05/11/great- ... ese-desert

Hit dead center on the target. But we don't know if this was a standard ballistic missile or an ASBM. The Chinese do possess aircraft carrier targets mounted on rails in the desert for testing ASBMs, so it is possible it was an ASBM.

Something highly important to note however is that Yokosuka, where a carrier would be docked, is protected by two JASDF PAC-3 batteries set up very close to the base itself. The JASDF will shoot down any missile headed towards Japanese territory, not only because of their obligation to do so but the JMSDF's Yokosuka base is virtually connected to the American base and it would be difficult to tell if a missile was headed for theirs or the American base.

In a period of heightened tension, the JMSDF would also likely deploy one of their own Aegis destroyers off the Tokyo Bay area to protect Yokosuka.

I personally don't think they would attack Guam or Okinawa without the US attacking first. They are probably betting on the US doing something similar to Ukraine- warning China repeatedly but not actually coming out to fight and instead providing intelligence, weapons, and so on. Of course, they are probably then chuckling in their offices in the August 1st Building because Taiwan is an island and it would be extremely difficult to ship arms to Taiwan without having the transports attacked by the PLAN- a fact which makes the speculation regarding a US decision not to intervene but still somehow support Taiwan rather silly on the part of think tank employees, politicians, media commentators, and the others who have raised that idea since the war in Ukraine broke out. I don't see any option for US support of Taiwan beyond intelligence sharing and putting sanctions on China- but a huge problem with the latter is that that would inflict equal damage on the US and its allies.

[Nikel]

A short video of Tu-22M3 aircrafts, one with the huge Kh-22, anti-ship and anti-civilian buildings missile.

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/stat ... XOu8wqAAAA