Here's a theory....

[SunlitZelkova]

First of all, I'd like to see some actual sources backing this up because this is a hot geopolitical take. I can at least point to POTUS stating on air that the US would defend Taiwan, which while rapidly rolled back is at least makes one think that maybe making blanket statement that the US won't lift a finger to defend Taiwan is a comical oversimplification. Its thinking like this that's gonna actually lead to a global conflict. "Well since X didn't lead to US intervention, now we can do what ever we want!" Yeah, nuclear weapons seem like a big deterrent. Admittedly, so far they are. No nuclear powers have fought each other. However, I'm not sure thats an assumption that's going to hold true forever.
I could write a book on the fundamental differences between Ukraine and Taiwan (US national security interests wise), but the US has been geared toward defending Taiwan since the 1950s. Ukraine? Not as much.
Suffice to say, the logic that since the III US Corps didn't get deployed to defend Ukraine = "We'Ll nEvEr InTeRvEnE eVeR!" is laughable. Maybe you are right, maybe we won't...but that's not a bet I'd make

True. However, it isn't the 1950s. The paradigm has changed greatly then. China now has the means to target the US, and Taiwan is no longer recognized officially by the US.

Oh my! China has nuclear weapons! Its all over! Oh wait. So does the US. You know the functional word in MAD is "Mutual," right?

What's your point?

Taiwan is not a US treaty ally. If it was, I would say MAD would prevent a conflict. But Taiwan is in a bad limbo state, similar to how Ukraine cooperated heavily with the EU and NATO, yet was not part of them and thus not subject to protection from them. It's extremely vulnerable to Chinese attack, and I don't think offhand comments that the US will defend them are any more of a deterrent than offhand comments would have prevented Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Another gross oversimplification...at minimum Taiwan going under would mean the liberal rules based international order just got taken out back and shot, which for all of the grievances some people have with it, at least keeps the world somewhat stable. The US (and most of the rest of world) likes "somewhat stable" so again, there's a whole lot more at stake here than computer chips. But computer chips alone are important, and it is again laughable the US would shrug and just try and build them in the US. If you told the US populace "we either keep Taiwan or no one is going to have smartphone for 25 years"...Hell even some of social media influencers might support the war. (ok not the best analogy but you get my point.)

An invasion of Taiwan would not destroy the international rules based order anymore than the invasion of Ukraine "destroyed" it. I mean, Putin has his fantasies that it is in collapse, but that obviously isn't the case.

The US did not intervene in 1973 to bring peace to the region and end the oil crisis. Shortages went on, but the world didn't end.

You mention earlier that China would not be incompetent as Russia. And maybe you are right. But keep in mind the invasion of Taiwan would surpass D-Day in complexity, and was conducted by a coalition that had an awful lot of experience in working together jointly in amphibious operations. China has none of that experience, and will have to do so in against an opponent that has had decades to plan against in eventuality. Let me put it this way: if somehow through some freaky Friday scenario, the US was now China and had to invade Taiwan...lets just say that's not a fight I'm looking forward to given geography or the the trends in technology.

When I was talking about how China has their own satellite network and ability to produce their own munitions, I was simply saying they don't need support from Russia in the same way Ukraine needs support from NATO.

Also, the assumption that China would roll over Taiwan is another over simplification. Proximity and mass does not always equal speed. Everyone plans quick, short wars. They rarely ever end up that way.

I am suggesting that China has learned from Ukraine not to expect a short war. They will spend months bombing military and infrastructure targets, blockading ports, before attempting an amphibious assault.

I am highly skeptical they are going to thunder run their amphibs onto Taiwanese shores, in the face of the hundreds of missile boats, ASM batteries, and coming fleet of drones Taiwan has/will have.

Taiwan probably wont be an easy fight for China, and the US probably will be motivated to intervene. I fully acknowledge that politics in the US is in an...interesting state at the moment, but as a poster I think mentioned earlier, if there are two thing that will unify Washington is A) China on the march and B) (if they launch a preemptive strike) images of a burning US carrier.

I agree it won't be easy, but it will probably be more like Afghanistan for the Soviets than Ukraine for the Russians.

I disagree the US will be motivated to intervene, but agree the US might be unified by a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Russia's assault on Ukraine unified NATO and gave it a renewed purpose despite comments from certain American politicians questioning its usefulness- but it didn't lead to a no-fly zone over Ukraine.

*sigh* ok I shouldn't wade into this as there are some...hot geopolitical takes but you know sometimes you have to argue with strangers on the internet every once in a while.

Thank you for coming to my TED talk. I may or may not respond to rebuttals.

I eagerly await your response. You brought up some good points in your response, and I'm interested to see how you'll respond this time.

[Currahee150]

True. However, it isn't the 1950s. The paradigm has changed greatly then. China now has the means to target the US, and Taiwan is no longer recognized officially by the US.

This is all undeniably true. However, I believe Taiwan is fundamentally a different scenario than Ukraine, for reasons I'll get to. The world gave the US a pass on Ukraine, since it wasn't a NATO member, it was a former Soviet state, it had corruption issues, etc etc. But since it was a democracy, the West broadly came together to ensure Russia paid a price for its invasion (which it most certainly has). Furthermore, the US has taken a "boil the frog" approach...for all of Russia's blusters about X NATO equipment receiving a Y (usually nuclear) response, or Crimea being off limits...well those have all happened, and no NATO capitals have gone up in nuclear fireballs. My point is that although the US didn't directly confront Ukraine with military assets, it is constantly demonstrating that Russian "red lines" are anything but.

What's your point?

My point is that is a awfully high rung up the escalation ladder. Both the US and China have second strike capabilities. Just because CSGs were were ordered to engage the PLAN doesn't automatically equal nuclear Armageddon. It is true that no nuclear armed powers have fought each other in direct conflict. However, the assumption that this will always hold true may run out of road if China invades Taiwan.

An invasion of Taiwan would not destroy the international rules based order anymore than the invasion of Ukraine "destroyed" it. I mean, Putin has his fantasies that it is in collapse, but that obviously isn't the case.

Here is where I fundamentally disagree. If China subjugates Taiwan, the US can say goodbye to being the leader of the free world. It no longer has the diplomatic or strategic maneuver room to argue other wise. If it had happened before Ukraine or Afghanistan, then yeah there's a better chance we wouldn't have. But if the US completely flunks the Afghanistan-Ukraine-Taiwan pop quiz it has been handed, then NATO and its Pacific treaty allies will collapse in any real sense of the word, because US promises will not longer be worth the paper they are printed on. Further, while Taiwan isn't technically a US treaty ally, it is written in US law in (Taiwan Relations Act) that it will be provided with defense. Granted, it is vaguely written, in my opinion so Taiwan doesn't declare independence and drag the US into a conflict. But I'm not sure its so ambiguously written to write off US intervention, and again, it brings us back to the point: if the US ignores the TRA if China invades, then countries the world over will wonder if the US will every positively interpret treaty obligations, and the whole "rules based international order" falls apart. Ukraine, on the other hand, was never written in US law to be defended, but paradoxically has brought the West collectively together to ensure Russia pays a price for naked aggression. I mean we have freakin CANADA and GERMANY sending Leopard 2s to fight Russians. That sounds like a really bad technothriller plot line I would have laughed at a few years ago. We did what we did with Ukraine because we could preserve the "rules based international order" without directly fighting Russia. We will not have that luxury with China. Intervention is highly likely to reassure US allies and preserve US leadership in the world.

The US did not intervene in 1973 to bring peace to the region and end the oil crisis. Shortages went on, but the world didn't end.

This is admittedly out of my wheelhouse since it deals with economics which I understand more of in broad strokes than specifics, but I'll take a stab. There was a lot more leeway, supply wise, with oil in the 70s. The US was a net producer of oil. Don't get me wrong, it hurt, but as you said life went on. I'm far from certain that will be the same if the TMSC factory gets smote by IRBMs or conquered by China. Electronic chips are a strategic resource that the US cannot afford falling into our pacing adversaries hands without a fight, and the factories we are standing up in the US come no where close to replacing the supply Taiwan provides. I think it would more akin to if the USSR seized the gulf oil fields in the Cold War. That's something the US would not let slide, and I don't think the US will let a strategic resources that the collective economy of the West depends upon change ownership to a major hostile power.

I was simply saying they don't need support from Russia in the same way Ukraine needs support from NATO.

This is true. China will not need outside help. However, I will posit this: what if China has rot like Russia, and we won't see it until it is put to the test? All militaries have rot/hollowness to some degree, even the US (especially the US). The Chinese military certainly presents itself as large, competent and modern, but it is also untried, inexperienced, and will be doing the most complicated operation it has ever been asked to do. If even one small aspect has "rot," it can quickly have second and third order effects that can jeopardize the operation. This has to be in the back of many Chinese senior leader's minds. Don't get me wrong, I don't think the PLAN is anywhere near the debacle the Russian army was (is?), but they probably aren't the 10 foot tall juggernaut we think them to be.

They will spend months bombing military and infrastructure targets, blockading ports, before attempting an amphibious assault.

I agree, in a perfect world, China would conduct months of shaping operations before they landed troops. Unfortunately, they have a bit of a catch 22. If they take weeks or months to set the conditions for an invasion, then it gives the rest of the world - especially the US - time to change their minds, amass forces at their leisure, and intervene. So the multi-month blockade and bombardment might be a nonstarter in the first place. If the launch a lighting invasion (which, would be difficult to achieve surprise because you cant conduct D-Day 2.0 with out some MASSIVE indicators and warnings), then the chances of their invasion failing are much higher. Taiwan is not stupid, and while its military is far from perfect, there's only so many beaches you can land on in Taiwan, and right lessons from Ukraine or not, Taiwan can contest these landings and at minimum make them very costly, and more importantly, time consuming. And if China pre-emptively strikes the US...well, as I said earlier, nothing brings the US together quicker than surprise attacks on USN assets. Footage of a burning US carrier won't exactly cause the US to back down, nukes or no.

I disagree the US will be motivated to intervene, but agree the US might be unified by a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

Overall, I think the US will be motivated to intervene - to reassure its allies, to preserve the "rules based international order," to remain a global leaders, and to prevent a strategic resource from falling into the wrong hands.
If there is one thing I think that has bipartisan support at this godforsaken period of American politics, it is standing up to China. I sense the national mood as considerably more supportive of combating China. Ukraine, not so much, but China is a different story. (To be fair, I will fully admit, we all live in our own social media/personal interactions bubble/echo chamber, so this is anecdotal). Maybe you are right, maybe we won't intervene, but that is not a bet I -and I hope China - would make. Which is the principle of deterrence in the first place. Yeah, China has gotten more powerful...but are they powerful enough to guarantee success against Taiwan and a potential US intervention?

I eagerly await your response. You brought up some good points in your response, and I'm interested to see how you'll respond this time.

So we are at an impasse. I think Taiwan is vital enough to US interest to merit intervention, and you disagree. And we will not know who is right or wrong until, well, China actually invades Taiwan. If you are right, then I guess I will necro this thread, say "well, SunlitZolkova was right all along, I will never speak of geopolitics on the internet again as my penance," then try to get used to $10,000 smart phones and begin learning mandarin. If I am right, well to be honest I will probably be very busy for certain reasons so I won't even remember about this thread. I really just hope neither of us ever find out who is right and this remains a theoretical argument. Either way, thank you for humoring me with a rational, civilized discussion on a modern geopolitical issue. Maybe I should do this more often. What was this thread about again in the first place?

[DWReese]

I read both of the responses, and I agree with both conclusions. How is that possible? I believe that both are based on what is logical, or is based on rules and/or agreements. That being said, the occupant of the White House is the one pulling the strings. Depending on who is in charge will determine what the US response will be. I don't believe that many will argue with that. So, this becomes the wild card.

If China were to wait, and if it appears that there will be a regime change, then it would behoove them to act before then, ready or not. But, if they believe that the same will win re-election, then they have been granted another 4-year window to operate in.

Both of your assessments are derived from what the US should do. Both have logic. But, after seeing the Afghan withdrawal, I don't believe that the US actions are based on a position of strength any longer. Right or wrong, they now seem to be based more on appeasement.

We joke about this scenario being Tom Clancy techno-thriller, and claim that real life could never be like this or that. But, as you pointed out, years later we find that many of those things actually do come to pass. For instance, with the southern border reporting the interdiction of so many individuals from a terrorist list, who is to say that some (few/many/lots) aren't here right now? How would the US respond if what has just happened in Israel were to happen within the continental US? Sure, the terrorists would all be killed, but it would shake the US to its core, just like in 2001. But, instead of Bush as president, we have someone else. Right or wrong, who that person is determines what the US would do. So, the "rules" that you mentioned are more or less guidelines. Would we come out swinging, or would we stick our proverbial heads in the sand and turn to the area of diplomacy and appeasement? What would be the consequences of either?

No one knows the answer, and that would really depend on who occupies the White House.

Again, I agree with both of your assessments. I'm just stating that the politics of the situation has far more 'say so' as to what WILL happen, as opposed to what SHOULD happen.

[SunlitZelkova]

This is all undeniably true. However, I believe Taiwan is fundamentally a different scenario than Ukraine, for reasons I'll get to. The world gave the US a pass on Ukraine, since it wasn't a NATO member, it was a former Soviet state, it had corruption issues, etc etc. But since it was a democracy, the West broadly came together to ensure Russia paid a price for its invasion (which it most certainly has). Furthermore, the US has taken a "boil the frog" approach...for all of Russia's blusters about X NATO equipment receiving a Y (usually nuclear) response, or Crimea being off limits...well those have all happened, and no NATO capitals have gone up in nuclear fireballs. My point is that although the US didn't directly confront Ukraine with military assets, it is constantly demonstrating that Russian "red lines" are anything but.

Very good point.

My point is that is a awfully high rung up the escalation ladder. Both the US and China have second strike capabilities. Just because CSGs were were ordered to engage the PLAN doesn't automatically equal nuclear Armageddon. It is true that no nuclear armed powers have fought each other in direct conflict. However, the assumption that this will always hold true may run out of road if China invades Taiwan.

Another thing that strengthens your argument is China's no-first use policy. So long as the US doesn't use nukes, theoretically China shouldn't either. Such political statements can be worthless- China and Russia issued a joint declaration a few months ago calling for respect for the UN Charter while both blatantly violate it- but it is something to consider.

China also has incentive not to use nuclear threats. They want to be seen as a responsible world power resolving an internal issue, not an evil empire bullying a neighbor into submission. Nukes threats would destroy their claims of being benevolent.

Here is where I fundamentally disagree. If China subjugates Taiwan, the US can say goodbye to being the leader of the free world. It no longer has the diplomatic or strategic maneuver room to argue other wise. If it had happened before Ukraine or Afghanistan, then yeah there's a better chance we wouldn't have. But if the US completely flunks the Afghanistan-Ukraine-Taiwan pop quiz it has been handed, then NATO and its Pacific treaty allies will collapse in any real sense of the word, because US promises will not longer be worth the paper they are printed on. Further, while Taiwan isn't technically a US treaty ally, it is written in US law in (Taiwan Relations Act) that it will be provided with defense. Granted, it is vaguely written, in my opinion so Taiwan doesn't declare independence and drag the US into a conflict. But I'm not sure its so ambiguously written to write off US intervention, and again, it brings us back to the point: if the US ignores the TRA if China invades, then countries the world over will wonder if the US will every positively interpret treaty obligations, and the whole "rules based international order" falls apart. Ukraine, on the other hand, was never written in US law to be defended, but paradoxically has brought the West collectively together to ensure Russia pays a price for naked aggression. I mean we have freakin CANADA and GERMANY sending Leopard 2s to fight Russians. That sounds like a really bad technothriller plot line I would have laughed at a few years ago. We did what we did with Ukraine because we could preserve the "rules based international order" without directly fighting Russia. We will not have that luxury with China. Intervention is highly likely to reassure US allies and preserve US leadership in the world.

I'm also inclined to agree here, because now that I have thought about, the language being used to describe Taiwan by both American and Japanese officials is very different from Ukraine.

Ukraine was more about defending democracy and nations right to do something different (leave Russian sphere of influence and join EU). In contrast, while the democracy part about Taiwan is nice, Taiwan seems to be discussed far more in strategic terms than Ukraine.

No one was saying NATO would be at threat of collapse if Ukraine fell. If Ukraine had fallen in three days as the JCS predicted, it would still be business as usual for NATO (+Sweden and Finland once they joined). But people are saying the fall of Taiwan would give China unprecedented Pacific access, threaten Okinawa, and generally pose a major security challenge for the US in the decades afterwards. It's frequently being described as unacceptable. I don't recall hearing that word about Ukraine, although to be honest, I wasn't following European developments that much prior to the war.

This is admittedly out of my wheelhouse since it deals with economics which I understand more of in broad strokes than specifics, but I'll take a stab. There was a lot more leeway, supply wise, with oil in the 70s. The US was a net producer of oil. Don't get me wrong, it hurt, but as you said life went on. I'm far from certain that will be the same if the TMSC factory gets smote by IRBMs or conquered by China. Electronic chips are a strategic resource that the US cannot afford falling into our pacing adversaries hands without a fight, and the factories we are standing up in the US come no where close to replacing the supply Taiwan provides. I think it would more akin to if the USSR seized the gulf oil fields in the Cold War. That's something the US would not let slide, and I don't think the US will let a strategic resources that the collective economy of the West depends upon change ownership to a major hostile power.

This is also a good point!

It could also be argued an invasion of Taiwan would loosely be akin to China trying to use its SCS assets to impose a tax on passage through the supposedly Chinese territorial waters. It'd be suicide for China and trigger international condemnation. A lot of the reason why the SCS has been ignored is because China hasn't done anything but be there, but if that were to change...

This is true. China will not need outside help. However, I will posit this: what if China has rot like Russia, and we won't see it until it is put to the test? All militaries have rot/hollowness to some degree, even the US (especially the US). The Chinese military certainly presents itself as large, competent and modern, but it is also untried, inexperienced, and will be doing the most complicated operation it has ever been asked to do. If even one small aspect has "rot," it can quickly have second and third order effects that can jeopardize the operation. This has to be in the back of many Chinese senior leader's minds. Don't get me wrong, I don't think the PLAN is anywhere near the debacle the Russian army was (is?), but they probably aren't the 10 foot tall juggernaut we think them to be.

I accept your argument, but still disagree China would need to wait for Ukraine to wrap up before invading Taiwan. They could simply buy munitions from North Korea, which should have thousands and would have no problems getting rid of them given that Kim is shifting his reliance to nuclear arms.

I agree, in a perfect world, China would conduct months of shaping operations before they landed troops. Unfortunately, they have a bit of a catch 22. If they take weeks or months to set the conditions for an invasion, then it gives the rest of the world - especially the US - time to change their minds, amass forces at their leisure, and intervene. So the multi-month blockade and bombardment might be a nonstarter in the first place. If the launch a lighting invasion (which, would be difficult to achieve surprise because you cant conduct D-Day 2.0 with out some MASSIVE indicators and warnings), then the chances of their invasion failing are much higher. Taiwan is not stupid, and while its military is far from perfect, there's only so many beaches you can land on in Taiwan, and right lessons from Ukraine or not, Taiwan can contest these landings and at minimum make them very costly, and more importantly, time consuming. And if China pre-emptively strikes the US...well, as I said earlier, nothing brings the US together quicker than surprise attacks on USN assets. Footage of a burning US carrier won't exactly cause the US to back down, nukes or no.

This is also a very good point. I've read the Gulf War (I think) was a lesson for authoritarian powers that you need to act fast in war, and not give the enemy time to respond in the same way the US had months to build up their coalition.

If war does break out, it will be interesting to see how long Taiwan's airfields survive. A big question everyone asked in the days after Russia invaded was "Why didn't they hit the airfields?" Here we are almost two years later and Ukraine still has a functioning air force. Maybe the ability of short range ballistic missiles to crater runways and close down airfields is overstated in CMO. Taiwan also has trained to deploy their fighters to highways in a similar manner to Sweden.

Overall, I think the US will be motivated to intervene - to reassure its allies, to preserve the "rules based international order," to remain a global leaders, and to prevent a strategic resource from falling into the wrong hands.
If there is one thing I think that has bipartisan support at this godforsaken period of American politics, it is standing up to China. I sense the national mood as considerably more supportive of combating China. Ukraine, not so much, but China is a different story. (To be fair, I will fully admit, we all live in our own social media/personal interactions bubble/echo chamber, so this is anecdotal). Maybe you are right, maybe we won't intervene, but that is not a bet I -and I hope China - would make. Which is the principle of deterrence in the first place. Yeah, China has gotten more powerful...but are they powerful enough to guarantee success against Taiwan and a potential US intervention?

So we are at an impasse. I think Taiwan is vital enough to US interest to merit intervention, and you disagree. And we will not know who is right or wrong until, well, China actually invades Taiwan. If you are right, then I guess I will necro this thread, say "well, SunlitZolkova was right all along, I will never speak of geopolitics on the internet again as my penance," then try to get used to $10,000 smart phones and begin learning mandarin. If I am right, well to be honest I will probably be very busy for certain reasons so I won't even remember about this thread. I really just hope neither of us ever find out who is right and this remains a theoretical argument. Either way, thank you for humoring me with a rational, civilized discussion on a modern geopolitical issue. Maybe I should do this more often. What was this thread about again in the first place?

You've actually convinced me to sort of turn my opinion around. Whereas before I did not believe there was a single chance of the US intervening, I now believe there is a good possibility they will. Japan, too, may intervene. This conversation has inspired me to do some research on Japanese politics and see if there is even a possibility Japan would intervene even if the US doesn't.

I advise against "giving up on geopolitical discussions" just because of a mistake. I've had some incorrect takes in the past, and at times my takes are totally emotional, bombastic, and outright wrong, but I don't go back and delete them. I accept I was wrong (usually in a small reply) and move on, having hopefully learned a lesson from my mistake.

I agree, hopefully we don't have to find out about all these hypotheticals. I want to play CMO v.1000 in my 60s, pondering a what if if China had invaded at any point between 2022 and 2052, not die in the seas or in the skies of the East China Sea.

I'm of age to be theoretically drafted, so perhaps I have a bias towards believing (hoping) the US won't intervene. You've convinced me to change my opinion though.

Thank you too for the discussion!

[thewood1]

China is more at risk on chip manufacturing than the US. China's chip production technology is over 10 years behind the market. Even Taiwan's chip production is dependent on lithography from ASML in Germany and advanced sensors from MKS in the US. The US could and would be able to make enough chips to support the military pretty quickly. China could also, but with fairly old and limited technology. Cutting off TSMC from lithography and sensor development would slowly starve both China and Taiwan of advanced chip manufacturing technology.

Semiconductor manufacturing is a very delicate manufacturing process that brooks no disruption. If Taiwan fell to China, it would not be difficult to disrupt fabs and the supplies to those fabs. TSMC is VERY dependent on foreign sources to maintain its production. If China took Taiwan, you would see standard chip production move to India and Vietnam and advanced development happen in the US and Japan. Would it be disruptive to electronics? Yes, but it would recover fairly quickly.

I have said this in multiple threads, and I still strongly believe that China is much more at risk to catastrophic transformation due to a war over Taiwan than the US. Its economy continues to be a house of cards. Its only advantage is that its population is well controlled and can take a lot of abuse. But that is a big advantage.

[Currahee150]

No one knows the answer, and that would really depend on who occupies the White House.

For better or worse, there's no denying this. Again, I think the US would be highly, highly, likely to intervene, however, depending on who occupies the Oval Office, that could be downgraded to merely "likely," or depending on if you take what some people say in the their national convention debates at face value, even "unlikely." That being said, I am pretty sure there would be absolute hell to pay for which ever party "appeased China" during the next election cycle... which again complicates the calculus.

the language being used to describe Taiwan by both American and Japanese officials is very different from Ukraine. Ukraine was more about defending democracy and nations right to do something different (leave Russian sphere of influence and join EU). In contrast, while the democracy part about Taiwan is nice, Taiwan seems to be discussed far more in strategic terms than Ukraine.

No one was saying NATO would be at threat of collapse if Ukraine fell. If Ukraine had fallen in three days as the JCS predicted, it would still be business as usual for NATO (+Sweden and Finland once they joined). But people are saying the fall of Taiwan would give China unprecedented Pacific access, threaten Okinawa, and generally pose a major security challenge for the US in the decades afterwards. It's frequently being described as unacceptable. I don't recall hearing that word about Ukraine, although to be honest, I wasn't following European developments that much prior to the war.

Exactly! The language being used to describe Taiwan is much more strategic in nature. In the alternate reality where the Russian military was as good as advertised and Ukraine fell in three days, NATO was still going to come out the other side of the those three days stronger and more unified than before and with clear purpose. Taiwan falling calls into question an awful lot of Pacific security agreements. Even if we ignore the chip argument, there are serious strategic implications if China breaks out of the first island chain, and none of them increase long term stability in the Pacific (at least, IMO).

but still disagree China would need to wait for Ukraine to wrap up before invading Taiwan

I actually 100% agree with you. They don't technically need to wait for Ukraine to wrap up, because it has little to no bearing on their strategic readiness. However, I will caveat that most things I have read point to a late 2020s timeframe, so Ukraine may be a moot point by then. But yes, Ukraine is not a deciding factor in their calculus to invade.

If war does break out, it will be interesting to see how long Taiwan's airfields survive. A big question everyone asked in the days after Russia invaded was "Why didn't they hit the airfields?" Here we are almost two years later and Ukraine still has a functioning air force. Maybe the ability of short range ballistic missiles to crater runways and close down airfields is overstated in CMO. Taiwan also has trained to deploy their fighters to highways in a similar manner to Sweden.

So two things. First, I think the failure of Russia to truly secure air superiority was a reflection of their inability to conduct SEAD in deep strikes without having to worry about fratricide. Its just not something they seem to have practiced. Don't get me wrong, on paper, their have seemingly modern airframes with seemingly decent munitions...but unlike what we've been used to seeing with western air forces, they can never put them together in sustained, coordinated strikes against targets...because they just don't have the institutional knowledge to do so. The USAF, on the other hand, has done it at multiple times for real (admittedly, with varying degrees of success and against IADS that weren't exactly on the varsity level) and god knows how many times in the Nevada desert. This might be China's problem. China has built, on paper, a very large, modern, and seemingly tech-savvy force. But do they know how to put it all together, during what will probably be most intense air, land, and maritime conflict of the early 21st century? Do their pilots have enough flight hours to do the complicated ballet that is SEAD and strike packages in a denied environment? Has their AD practiced enough to not accidently shoot their pilots out of the sky? Will the invasion surface escort remain rational under attack and not do a redux of what happened to the second airdrop into Sicily? My point is there a lot of ifs, which lead to a lot of friction, which can lead to a invasion timetable that is behind schedule, which for a myriad of reasons, is very bad.
Ok that was a tangent. Here's the second thing: I think that even against a wet-behind-the-ears Chinese military, the life expectancy for the pointy end of the Taiwanese Navy and Air Force are numbered (ok I can see the Air Force holding out for while with some luck and intervention on their side). Taiwan was not blessed with the geographic luxury Ukraine had (just as there's only so many beaches you can land on on in Taiwan, there also only so many airfields you can disperse to and they are all in range of an really high number of missiles. Ukraine had a good bit more strategic depth to play with.) That's an awful lot of mass pointing at the Taiwanese assets to ensure they go away...eventually. Taiwan knows this. They will preserve those assets long enough to make (maybe not complete suicide, but not mission I would want to go on, at least) attacks on amphibious transports to complicate the invasion to the possible point of failure. The F-16Vs, the second-hand Kidd class destroyers, the diesel electric subs...eventually they will be a non-factor for China because they will be expensive scrap, but what matters is what did they take with them before they went down? And as mentioned before, does China have the experience to both attrit those assets quickly enough to remain on timetable, and can they actually take all of them out? One F-16 with some harpoons that slips in during the chaos in an air raid can delete some very important PLA formation in short order, which again will induce more friction in a plan that is already quite bold as it is.

Japan, too, may intervene.

Japan is not guaranteed to intervene...but I think they are an awful lot more motivated to now that they were a decade or so ago. Again, they are another wild card for China that already has to contend with the most complex amphibious operation since WWII, a potentially pissed of USN, a Taiwanese military that, at peak performance or not, is going to at minimum require time and firepower to deal with, and the distinct possibility that nations ranging from Australia to Borneo may join the fray (even basing rights for tankers is a win for the US). Oh, and pre-emptively striking the USAF on Okinawa isn't going to make Japanese intervention any less likely, so there another issue.
Again, that's an awful lot of uncertainty for China...which I hope holds up the deterrent part of this whole thing.

I agree, hopefully we don't have to find out about all these hypotheticals. I want to play CMO v.1000 in my 60s, pondering a what if if China had invaded at any point between 2022 and 2052, not die in the seas or in the skies of the East China Sea.

I'm of age to be theoretically drafted, so perhaps I have a bias towards believing (hoping) the US won't intervene. You've convinced me to change my opinion though.

Thank you too for the discussion!

It's definitely an awful lot more fun (or at least less worrying) wargaming scenarios that are no longer hanging over a sword of Damocles sword, completely agree. And if its any consolation, I offer the following points: 1) calmer heads have yet prevailed mostly, 2) as mentioned above there's an awful lot of uncertainty for China regarding an invasion of Taiwan, which hopefully will make them demur, and 3) Even for a longer-ish war over Taiwan, in my opinion the scenario where we need to start drafting people is...unlikely, recruiting crises or no. (I think Taiwan, although having a land component that would be decisive, would be a much bigger air and maritime affair, so hopefully not the manpower grind that we've seen both in the past and in current events.) If we do get to that point though, oh boy have we officially gone off the map.

China is more at risk on chip manufacturing than the US. China's chip production technology is over 10 years behind the market. Even Taiwan's chip production is dependent on lithography from ASML in Germany and advanced sensors from MKS in the US. The US could and would be able to make enough chips to support the military pretty quickly. China could also, but with fairly old and limited technology. Cutting off TSMC from lithography and sensor development would slowly starve both China and Taiwan of advanced chip manufacturing technology.

Semiconductor manufacturing is a very delicate manufacturing process that brooks no disruption. If Taiwan fell to China, it would not be difficult to disrupt fabs and the supplies to those fabs. TSMC is VERY dependent on foreign sources to maintain its production. If China took Taiwan, you would see standard chip production move to India and Vietnam and advanced development happen in the US and Japan. Would it be disruptive to electronics? Yes, but it would recover fairly quickly.

I have said this in multiple threads, and I still strongly believe that China is much more at risk to catastrophic transformation due to a war over Taiwan than the US. Its economy continues to be a house of cards. Its only advantage is that its population is well controlled and can take a lot of abuse. But that is a big advantage

While I'm not sure I agree chip production would quickly recover in other places (it seem the domestic US production is hitting an awful lot of hurdles, and I think a Taiwan conflict would make COVID supply disruptions look comically undisruptive by comparison both in length of time and depth of effects), I would agree that it would have, uh, significant economic repercussions for China. The problem is...will they know, and will they care (i.e. not hand wave it away)? To use a cliché example, an awful lot of countries have invaded (or done something to detrimentally effect) the hand that feeds them. UK-Germany were major trading partners before WWI, US-Japan were major trading partners before WWII, GER-USSR were major trading partners before Barbarossa...heck even Russia must have figured it would have some form of economic contraction for invading Ukraine. But they all still did it, because rhetoric, ideology, or just straight up different economic calculus (admittedly, very poor economic calculus) led them to invade.
What I'm getting at, yeah its gonna be excruciatingly painful for the world economy and maybe even fatal for China's economy...but will they have been so blinded by their own goal of reunification to care?

[thewood1]

I agree that supply chain disruptions would be huge. My point is that China is completely unprepared for those disruptions. As dependent as people think the US and Japan are dependent on China and Taiwan for trade, they are much more dependent on the West than the West is on them. And quickly is s relative word. Critical advanced chips would recover quickly. Capacity on consumer-grade chips would be much slower just due to the volume needed.

[maverick3320]

1. Iran fears a Israel/US/Saudi "alliance" in the Middle East.

2. By Hamas attacking Israel and committing atrocities, they know Israel's reaction will be a ground invasion, and ultimately, an insurgency.

3. Israel will struggle with the insurgency, and innocent Arabs will be killed.

4. Arabs will put pressure on MBS to pull Saudi out of any deal.

I doubt Russia and China have much to do at all with this, other than to smirk on the sidelines as the "West" gets tied up again.

[BDukes]

1. Iran fears a Israel/US/Saudi "alliance" in the Middle East.

2. By Hamas attacking Israel and committing atrocities, they know Israel's reaction will be a ground invasion, and ultimately, an insurgency.

3. Israel will struggle with the insurgency, and innocent Arabs will be killed.

4. Arabs will put pressure on MBS to pull Saudi out of any deal.

I doubt Russia and China have much to do at all with this, other than to smirk on the sidelines as the "West" gets tied up again.

Yeah that is my take on this too.

This was probably an unexpected boon for Russia or China, who were probably waiting for the 2024 election to pull stuff.

Mike

[DWReese]

Not that this is really going to happen, but, since it was mentioned......

https://www.yahoo.com/news/north-korea- ... 08294.html

[SunlitZelkova]

Tyler Rogoway, the journalist from The Drive who reports on military matters (sometimes his articles have been linked in the Naval & Defense News section), has posted an interesting opinion on Twitter.

He does not believe this is some how coordinated between the "authoritarian axis", but there are dangers of the conflict spiraling.

But I wonder, to what extent is the US military "stretched thin" as he claims?

Regarding Taiwan, the Ronald Reagan is currently in the East China Sea, and Carl Vinson is en route there. Ford and Eisenhower will be in the Middle East.

I'm a little skeptical of an invasion of Taiwan taking place now, only because the "2027 deadline" for China's military modernization to be able to take Taiwan has been mentioned by both US intelligence and in pro-CPC circles. I don't see why Xi would completely forget about it, only because the extent to which the US military has been "drained" by supplying Ukraine (and in the coming months, maybe Israel) seems exaggerated. From what I've read, the shortages are mainly in artillery rounds, HIMARS, and ATGMs like Javelin. Most of those things aren't really important in a potential Taiwan conflict. There are still mountains of Harpoons, Tomahawks, and so on for fighting a naval war.

But turning to Iran, I'd be more concerned, not because Iran would think the US is weak and would desire war, but for a combination of other reasons-

1. If Iran wanted to pull a "Vietnam" and suffer tactically while forcing the US to sue for peace strategically, now would be the time. Palestinian casualties are mounting, and outside of government circles, there is either support for Palestine or indifference because of the mass death in the war. If Iran were to intervene under the pretext of protecting Palestine, it could cause a major division in the US public with those who are, ahem, quote on quote "anti-war" (support Palestine) and those who support Israel.

2. The activities of Hezbollah are increasing. ATGM and mortar attacks have been occurring on the northern border almost everyday. Hezbollah is more of an Iranian puppet than Hamas is, and its actions could indicate Iranian intentions.

3. If Iran were to provoke war now, while the Israeli military is causing many civilian casualties in Gaza, and then trigger an Israeli strike on the nuclear sites, it could result in sympathy towards Iran given how many in the West seem to be turning against the Israeli military.

4. Iran currently faces two big regional threats- Israel and Saudi Arabia. Going to war now, in defense of Palestinians, would leave Saudi Arabia unable to intervene against Iran without looking like it was abandoning the plight of Gaza. In contrast, waiting and possibly having war break out following a future strike on the nuclear facilities, say, five years from now, could result in Saudi Arabia fighting alongside Israel to degrade Iranian capabilities.

Finally, the Iranian Foreign Minister reportedly stated that "if Israel's assault in Gaza continues, it will be consumed by an earthquake that will destroy it". It's been framed as an ultimatum by the think tank that reported it on Twitter, and could simply be a bluff, but it is still concerning, especially given the increasing activities of Hezbollah.

[DWReese]

Here's some more developments for our scenario: Chinese warships enter the Med. You probably wouldn't even have all of this happening in a Tom Clancy book. <lol>

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/militar ... -past-week

[Nikel]

A chapter of the book could be written from this pic (by MT ANderson)




Regarding the Chinese ships, here is a another link considering it routine. Anyway the names of the ships are provided if anybody plan to create a scenario.

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202310/1300424.shtml

[DWReese]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/worldwide-wa ... 38406.html

........as we march closer and closer toward Tom Clancy.

[DWReese]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/lebanese-hez ... 28168.html

Here's another story of what could happen.......

[BrianinMinnie]

Got me thinking,
When was the last time the Chinese PLAN launched (Naval or Air Force) a strike package against.....?
Fought a weapon caused fire at sea or on a military base?
I assume reading a manual\training is a bit different then actual combat.
The US and the top5 NATO counties(and a few smaller members) have all been involved in real world combat.
Has the PLAN forces done the same and does it even matter?
Does the border snafu with India count?

[WillpowerDisturbance]

It would be interesting to see what the the Chinese/PLAN response would be to a Hezbollah ASM hitting one of their ships in the Med. They would probably blame the US but maybe we we would get to see a Chinese CSG in action.

[DWReese]

This current conflict has presented an interesting situation in the terms of evaluating weaponry. Some of these nations are using these their proxy elements to literally test their recently created-weapons against their enemies without the nations actually going to war themselves.

War used to be easier. Nations fought one another. Now, the attacking elements are often no longer clearly defined, and the attacks keep the actual enemy on the sidelines as their weapons are being evaluated.

[thewood1]

This current conflict has presented an interesting situation in the terms of evaluating weaponry. Some of these nations are using these their proxy elements to literally test their recently created-weapons against their enemies without the nations actually going to war themselves.

War used to be easier. Nations fought one another. Now, the attacking elements are often no longer clearly defined, and the attacks keep the actual enemy on the sidelines as their weapons are being evaluated.

This is absolutely not true. The Balkans and China in the early 20th century. The Spanish Civil War. These were used as tests for tactics and equipment, as well as a training ground. Its why these regional wars were all so interesting and continue to be interesting. The Ethiopian-Eritrean War is another more modern example of the same thing. There's a lot more. People forget history very quickly.

Edit: I accidently hit report post when hitting quote. Please disregard.