Nomad wrote:One thing that I feel adds to all this is that sub crews( and by extension, all navel vessel crews) do not have a morale and fatigue rating. They would force the player to rest the sub/navel crews more which would bring the usage to a more historical/realistic level. How many times have players turned around subs the same day they come back to port for more torpedos and fuel? Time after time?
True Nomad, and as you say all naval crews could be attributed morale and fatigue ratings.
The Battle of Savo Island is a good example of the effect high fatigue levels can have on performance. The Allied crews had been at a high state of readiness for days and were exhausted. I believe supposed IJN superiority in night fighting has been overstated a little as a result of this engagement.
Many times after this the Allies did as well or better than the IJN in night engagements due to their better radar controlled gunnery.
Ok Guys chew on this for a while, all US and IJN Sub losses by cause. Remember some of the loss causes will never be known this list is based on best available information. So here is the raw historical data play with it any way you want, Bottom line IJN ASW is at best AWFUL, US ASW Not so good in early 42 but gets better in later half then gets better and better US depth Charges are very effective.
The only thing I'll add is I would "Like" to see subs be able to hit enemy mines and subs shoot subs in WITP.
US Submarine Losses
Albacore SS-218,
Probably sunk by mine north of Hokkaido, 11/ 7/44
Amberjack SS-219,
Probably sunk by Japanese torpedo boat Hiyodori and sub chaser #18, off Rabaul, 02/16/43
Argonaut SS-166,
Sunk by Japanese destroyers off Rabaul, 01/10/43
Babel SS-316,
Sunk by Japanese aircraft SW of Palawan Island PI, 02/04/45
Bonefish SS-223,
Sunk by Japanese warships in Toyama Wan, Honshu, 06/18/45
Bullhead SS-332,
Probably sunk by Japanese aircraft off Bali, 08/06/45
Capelin SS-289,
Missing off Halmahera Island, December 1943
Cisco SS-290,
Sunk by Japanese warships and aircraft in Sulu Sea, 09/28/43
Corvina SS-226,
Torpedoed and sunk by I-176, SW of Truk, 11/16/43
Darter SS-227,
Stranded off Palawan Island, destroyed to prevent capture, 10/24/44
Dorado SS-248,
Probably sunk in error by US aircraft in Caribbean Sea, 10/1243
Escolar SS-294,
Probably sunk by mine in Yellow Sea, October 1944
Flier SS-250,
Sunk by mine in Balabac Strait, 08/13/44
Golet SS-361,
Sunk by Japanese warships N of Honshu, 06/14/44
Grampus SS-207,
Sunk by Japanese destroyers off New Georgia, 03/05/43
Grayback SS-208,
Sunk by Japanese aircraft in East China Sea, 02/26/44
Grayling SS-209,
Probably sunk by Japanese freighter Hokuan Maru, W of Luzon PI, 09/09/43
Grenadier SS-210,
Sunk by Japanese aircraft off Penang, 04/22/43
Growler SS-215,
Probably sunk by IJN warships in East China Sea, 11/08/44
Grunion SS-216,
Probably sunk by I-25, off Kiska, 06/30/42
Harder SS-257,
Sunk by IJN destroyer, off Caiman Point, PI. 08/24/44
Herring SS-233
Sunk by shore batteries off Matsuwa Island, Kuriles, 06/01/44
Kete SS-369,
Missing central Pacific, March 1945
Lagarto SS-371,
Sunk by IJN minelayer Hatsutaka, Gulf of Siam, 05/03/45
Perch SS-176,
Damaged by IJN warships N of Java, scuttled, 03/03/42
Pickerel SS-177,
Missing off N Honshu, April 1943
Pompano SS-181,
Missing E of Honshu, August 1943
R-12 SS-89,
Foundered off Key West Fla., 06/12/43
Robalo SS-273,
Sunk by internal explosion or mine off Palawan, PI., 07/16/44
Runner SS-275,
Missing off Kurile Islands, June 1943
Scamp SS-277
Probably sunk by patrol vessel off Tokyo Bay, 11/06/44
Sculpin SS-191,
Sunk by IJN destroyer Yamagumo, off Truk, 11/19/43
Sealion SS-195
Sunk by Japanese aircraft Cavite PI., 12/10/41, hulk destroyed to prevent capture 12/25/41.
Seawolf SS-197,
Sunk in error by DE Richard M Rowell, off Morotai, 10/03/44
Shark SS-314,
Sunk by IJN warships E of Menado, Celebes, 02/11/42
Snook SS-279,
Missing off Okinawa, possibly sunk by IJN sub, April 1945
Swordfish SS-193,
Missing S of Kyushu, January 1945
Tang SS-306,
Sunk by own torpedo off Taiwan, 10/24/44
Trigger SS-237,
Sunk by warships and aircraft off Nansei Shoto, 03/28/45
Triton SS-201,
Sunk by IJN destroyers, N Admiralty Islands, 05/15/43
Trout SS-202,
Sunk by IJN warships S of Okinawa, 02/29/44
Tullibee SS-284,
Sunk by own torpedo, N of Palau, 05/26/44
Wahoo SS-238,
Sunk by Japanese aircraft in La Perouse Strait, 10/12/43
S-26 SS-131,
Sunk in collision with PC-460, Gulf of Panama, 01/24/42
S-27 SS-132,
Grounded on reef, Amchitka Island, Aleutians, 06/19/42
S-28 SS-133,
Failed to surface after training off Pearl Harbor, 07/04/44
S-36 SS-141,
Grounded Taka Bakang Reef, Makassar Strait, 01/20/42
S-39 SS-144,
Grounded Rossel Island, 08/14/42
S-44 SS-155,
Sunk by Japanese destroyer off Paramushiru, 10/07/43
IJN Submarine Losses
DC=Depth Charge
(For the purposes of this list Mousetraps and Like weapons are considered DC )
GF=Gun Fire
MC= Marine Casualty, Cause Simply Unknown
RO-60,
Ran aground and wrecked, Kwajalein, 12/29/41
RO-61,
Sunk by aircraft and DC USN DD Reid, off Atika Island, 08/31/42
RO-64
Mine, Hiroshima Bay, 04/12/45
RO-65,
Hit rocks while submerging under air attack, Kiska, 11/04/42
RO-66,
Sunk in collision with RO-62, Wake Island, 12/17/42
I-1,
Damaged DC, HMNZ Kiwi and Moa, scuttled Kamimbo Bay, 01/29/43
I-2,
Sunk DC, USN DD Saufley, Off New Hanover, Island, 04/07/44
I-3,
Torpedoed PT-59, NE of Kamimbo Bay, 12/10/42
I-4
MC, 12/42
I-122,
Torpedoed, USN SS Skate, Toyama Bay, 06/10/45
I-123,
Sunk DC, USN DM Gamble, ESE of Savo Island, 08/29/42
I-124,
Sunk DC, USN DD Edsall, Clarence Strait, 01/20/42
I-60,
Sunk DC, HMS DD Jupiter, WNW of Krakatoa Island, 01/17/42
I-164,
Torpedoed, USN SS Triton, SE of Kagoshima, 05/17/42
I-165,
Sunk USN aircraft, E of Saipan, 06/27/45
I-166,
Torpedoed HMS SS Telemachus, off Singapore, 07/17/44
I-168,
Torpedoed USN SS Scamp, off New Hanover, Island, 07/27/43
I-169,
Flooded and sank during air raid, Truk, 04/04/44
I-70,
Sunk aircraft USN Enterprise, NE, Pearl Harbor, 12/10/41
I-171,
Sunk DC USN DD Guest and Hudson, W of Buka Island, 02/01/44
I-172,
Sunk DC USN DMS Southard, off Cape Recherche, 11/11/42
I-73,
Torpedoed USN SS Gudgeon, W of Midway, 01/27/42
I-174,
MC 04/44
I-175,
Sunk DC USN DD Walker 02/01/44
I-6,
MC 06/44
RO-33,
Sunk GF HMAS Arunta, SE of Port Moresby, 08/29/42
RO-34,
Sunk GF USN DD O'Bannon, off Russell Island, 04/05/43
I-7,
Ran aground SSW Kiska after damage from GF USN DD Monaghan, Scuttled, 07/03/43
I-8,
Sunk DC USN DD Stockton and Morrison, SE of Okinawa, 03/31/45
I-9,
Sunk DC USN DD Frazier, off Kiska, 06/11/43
I-10
Sunk DC USN DD David W Taylor and DE Riddle, ENE of Saipan, 07/04/44
I-11,
MC off Ellice Island, 11/44
I-15,
Sunk DC USN DD McCalla, N of San Cristobal, 11/02/42
I-17,
Sunk DC HMNZ Tui and aircraft SE Noumea, 08/19/43
I-19,
MC 10/43
I-21,
Sunk aircraft USN CVE Chenango, off Tarawa, 11/29/43
I-23,
MC 02/42
I-25,
Sunk DC USN DD Patterson, 09/03/43
I-26,
MC off Leyte, 10/44
I-27,
Sunk DC HMS DD Paladin and Petard, NW of Addu Atoll, 02/12/44
I-28,
Torpedoed USN SS Tautog, SSE of Truk, 05/17/42
I-29,
Torpedoed USN SS Sawfish, Balinang Channel, 07/26/44
I-30,
Mined off Singapore, 10/13/42
I-31,
Sunk DC USN DD Farragut and Edwards, off Kiska, 05/12/43
I-32,
Sunk DC USN DE Manlove and PC 1135, S of Wotje, 03/24/44
I-34
Torpedoed HMS SS Taurus, off Penang, 11/13/44
I-35,
Sunk GF and ramming USN DD Frazier, off Tarawa, 11/22/43
I-37,
Sunk DC USN DE Conklin and McCoy Reynolds.
I-38,
Sunk DC USN DD Nicholas, S of Yap, 11/12/44
I-39,
Sank DC USN DD Boyd, 11/26/43
I-16,
Sunk DC USN England, off Choiseul, 05/19/44
I-18,
Sunk DC from aircraft and USN DD Fletcher, S of San Cristobal, 02/11/43
I-20,
MC New Hebrides, 10/42
I-22,
MC Solomons, 10/42
I-24,
Rammed USN PC 487, NE of Attu, 06/11/43
I-176,
Sunk DC USN DD Franks, Haggard, Johnston, N of Cape Alexander, 05/16/44
I-177,
Sunk DC USN DE Samuel S Miles, NNE Augaur, 10/03/44
I-178,
Sunk DC USN SC 669, off Espiritu Santo, 05/29/43
I-180,
Torpedoed USN DE Gilmore, SW of Kodiak, 04/26/44
I-181,
MC, St. George Channel, 01/16/44
I-182,
Sunk DC USN DD Wadsworth, 09/01/43
I-183,
Torpedoed USN SS Pogy, S of Ashizuri Cape, 04/28/44
I-184,
Sunk by aircraft from USN CVE Suwannee, SE of Guam, 06/19/44
I-185,
Sunk DC USN DD Newcomb and Chandler, 06/22/44
RO-35,
Sunk DC USN DD Ellet, 08/25/43
RO-36
Sunk DC USN DD Melvin, E of Saipan, 06/13/44
RO-37,
Sunk DC USN DD Buchanan, ESE of San Cristobal, 01/22/44
RO-38,
MC 11/43
RO-39
Sunk DC USN DD Walker, E of Wotje, 02/02/44
RO-40,
Sunk DC USN DD Phelps, NW of Kwajalein, 02/16/44
RO-41,
Sunk DC USN DD Haggard, Se of Okinawa, 03/23/45
RO-42,
Sunk DC USN DE Bangust, ENE of Kwajalein, 06/11/44
RO-43,
Sunk aircraft USN CVE Anzio, WNW of Iwo Jima, 02/26/45
RO-44,
Sunk DC USN DE Burden R Hastings, E of Eniwetok, 06/16/44
RO-45,
Sunk DC USN DD MacDonough, Stephen Potter and aircraft from CVL Monterey, SSW of Truk 04/30/44
RO-46,
Torpedoed USN SS Sea Owl, 04/18/45
RO-47,
Sunk DC USN DE McCoy Reynolds, SW of Yap, 09/25/44
RO-48,
MC off Saipan, 07/44
RO-49,
Sunk DC USN DD Hudson, W of Okinawa, 04/05/45
RO-55,
Sunk DC USN DD Thomason, off Luzon, 02/07/45
RO-56,
Sunk DC USN DD Monssen, and Mertz, E of Okinawa, 04/09/45
RO-100,
Mined W of Buin, 11/25/43.
RO-101,
Sunk DC USN DD Saufley and aircraft E San Cristobal, 09/15/43
RO-102,
Sunk GF USN PT 150 and 152, 05/14/43
RO-103,
Mined, 07/28/43
RO-104,
Sunk DC USN DE England, NNW of Kavieng, 05/23/44
RO-105,
Sunk DC USN DE England, NNW of Kavieng, 05/31/44
RO-106,
Sunk DC USN DE England, NNW of Kavieng, 05/22/44
RO-107,
Sunk DC USN DD Taylor, E of Kolombangara, 07/12/43
RO-108,
Sunk DC USN DE England, NE of Manus, 05/26/44
RO-109,
Sunk DC USN DE Horace A Bass, 04/25/45
RO-110,
Sunk DC HMIS Jumna and HMAS Ipswich and Launceston, 02/11/44
RO-111,
Sunk DC USN DD Taylor, 06/11/44
RO-112,
Torpedoed USN SS Batfish off Camiguim Island, 02/11/45
RO-113,
Torpedoed USN SS Batfish off Babuyan Island, 02/12/45
RO-114,
Sunk DC USN DD Melvin and Waldleigh, W of Tinian, 06/17/44
RO-113,
Sunk DC USN DD Bell, O.Bannon, Jenkins and DE Ulvert M Moore, 01/31/45
I-40,
Sunk DC USN DD Radford, 11/25/43
I-41,
Sunk DC USN DE Lawrence C Taylor, E of Samar, 11/18/44
I-42,
Torpedoed USN SS Tunny, SW of Augaur, 03/23/44
I-43,
Torpedoed, USN SS Aspro, ESE of Guam, 02/15/44
I-44,
Sunk by aircraft from USN CVE Tulagi, 04/29/45
I-45,
Sunk DC USN DE Whitehurst, ENE of Surigao, 10/29/44
I-46,
Sunk DC USN DD Helm, 10/28/44
I-48,
Sunk DC USN DE Conklin, Corbesier and Raby, NE of Yap, 01/23/45
I-12
MC Central Pacific, 01/45
I-54,
Sunk DC USN DE Richard M Rowell, E of Surigao, 10/25/44
I-56,
Sunk DC USN DD Heermann, McCord, Collett, Mertz, Uhlmann, E of Okinawa, 04/18/45
I-52,
Sunk aircraft USN CVE Bogue, SW of Azores (Atlantic) 06/24/44
I-55,
Sunk DC USN DD Wyman and Reynolds, E of Tinian, 07/28/44
I-361,
Sunk by aircraft USN CVE Anzio, SE of Okinawa, 05/30/45
I-362,
Sunk DC USN DE Flemming, NNE of Truk, 01/18/45
I-363
Mined off Kyushu, 10/29/45
I-364,
Torpedoed USN SS Sea Devil, ESE of Yokosuka, 09/16/44
I-365,
Torpedoed USN SS Scabbardfish, SE of Yokosuka, 11/28/44
I-368,
Sunk by aircraft USN CVE Anzio, W of Iwo Jima, 02/27/45
I-370,
Sunk DC USN DE Finnegan, S Iwo Jima, 02/26/45
I-371,
Torpedoed USN SS Lagarto, Bungo Strait, 02/24/45
I-372,
Suk by aircraft TF 38, Yoksuka, 07/18/45
I -13
Sunk by aircraft USN CVE Anzio, E Yokosaka, 07/16/45
I-351,
Torpedoed USN SS Bluefish, ENE of Natuna Besar Island, 07/14/45
I-373,
Torpedoed USN SS Spikefish, SE of Shanghai, 04/17/45
The 50% penalty the was applied to Japanese ASW in one of the patches should be removed. Also, maybe 1 allied sub sunk per month was historical but the in-game numbers should be MUCH higher since players use their subs much more recklessly than they were used in real-life.
The stacking limit has been relaxed somewhat in WitP to account for the bigger scale. In playtest, i have been having decent results with 2 and 3 sub "TF's"
My motivation was simple lazyness On Turn 2 of Sc#1 especially there are a HUGE # of subs that the Allied player can deploy and creating all those single sub TF's can be a pain. Little trick i started using was to create one massive sub TF (20+ subs!), send it to a general area i wish to deploy and then start breaking them up into little 2 or 3 sub TF's to cover likely "Hot spots" Dont consider them "Wolf packs" as much as i consider them being 2 subs in one TF, each patroling half of a 60 mile square area of ocean. Basically i'm duplicating the old land defense using subs strategy that proved so futile in real life but does bag me a couple merchants usually.
beware though.....shallow water (i.e. Harbor) hexes remain very dangerous....i had a sub just a bit ago take a shot at a merchant on it's first patrol day and end up eating a depth charge in return for no hits (sub didn't sink but it suffered minor SYS damage and moderate flooding, causing an abort back to Manila)
I think one thing people are forgetting is the IJN subs had the diving and manueverabilty of a beached whale while the USN subs were much better at getting away once discovered.
Now having said that I wanted to throw something out. One big reason for IJN ASW ineffectiveness was their inability to appreciate what was necessary to counter the USN subs. Convoys, air patrols/coverage, use the few CVE's as escorts etc. I think its fair to say in almost every aspect the Allies were better at adopting new tactics as the situations warranted.
But in a wargame or simulation(take your pick) why should we be limited to ineffective tactics that were historically used? Isn't a great deal of the challenge to improve on history? To see what happens when historical mistakes are avoided? I know that's why I play.
So if the IJN in WiTP were to quickly adopt convoys and set up an effective air patrol why should they be limited to historical performance? If the USN player can use the his subs more effectively/aggressively why can't the IJN use the potential ASW assets more effectively?
I think the USN should always be better at ASW at least partially because of the poor handling capabilities of the IJN subs. But if proper tactics are used the IJN shouldn't be as poor as in UV. At the least they should more often be able to keep the subs down and not able to attack .
But in a wargame or simulation(take your pick) why should we be limited to ineffective tactics that were historically used? Isn't a great deal of the challenge to improve on history? To see what happens when historical mistakes are avoided? I know that's why I play.
So if the IJN in WiTP were to quickly adopt convoys and set up an effective air patrol why should they be limited to historical performance? If the USN player can use the his subs more effectively/aggressively why can't the IJN use the potential ASW assets more effectively?
I think the USN should always be better at ASW at least partially because of the poor handling capabilities of the IJN subs. But if proper tactics are used the IJN shouldn't be as poor as in UV. At the least they should more often be able to keep the subs down and not able to attack .
Anyway my .02c worth. Quark
I'd say that you hit the nail on the head. Japanese ASW equipment was inferior
to US or British, but it wasn't totally ineffective. Likewise, their subs were
somewhat clumsy, but their torpedoes at least worked.
In the game, the Japanese player should have the option to use their assets
as intelligently as they can. If they can find enough excorting vessels to use
convoys, then they should certainly be able to. Though one thing you need
to remember is that a convoy is not an anti-submarine weapon. It's a tactic
designed to bring submarines into contact with the excort's ASW---you put
all the targets together and you force the subs to come into range of the
escorts. Of course if the excorts are weak or incapable, Convoys just make
the subs job easier. So it's a two-edged sword for the Japanese because most
of their escorts weren't that good at ASW---if they can't use reasonable num-
bers of escorts for a convoy they may be better off not using them. US ships
were better equipped to start with, and when they learned the tactics to use
their equipment, more effective. Later in the war, when they were equipped
with the latest British equipment, they were really dangerous. The DE England
went through a whole flotilla of Japese Subs like a threshing machine in 1944,
proving just how good they had become. The Japanese never had the tech-
nology to be that good, but they could still be useful when there were several
available or they had some air support.
On the other hand, Japanese subs should be MORE effective offensively during
the first half of the war because they did have effective torpedoes. Using them
against US Merchant Shipping could be an excellent tactic for two reasons. One
is in sinking some cargo..., but perhaps more importantly in forcing the US to
detach escorts to cover them. Even the Americans didn't have enough Escorts
before 1943, so stretching them makes the US job more difficult. It should be
a valid game tactic for a Japanese player.
Twiddling with tactics would not have improved Japanese ASW performance. There were doctrinal, tactical, material and strategic differences that made Allied ASW substantially more effective:
1. Doctrinal. Escorts were trained from the get go to coordinate attacks and to operate with convoys. Japanese escorts were not in general substantially trained in the effort, although they seem to have improved at this as the war progressed.
2. Tactical. For the most part, Japanese escorts were not heavily drilled in teamwork against submerged submarines. Owing to the nature of sonar/asdic it was very difficult to estimate the depth of a submarine. VERY VERY VERY heavily trained Allied escorts could do this by using the geometry of the reflected waves -- in essence, depending on the distance from the target sub, from a given sonar signal one could deduce the depth depending on which surface vessels picked up a return signal.
3. Material. The Japanese lacked HFDF -- a means by which Allied escorts could triangulate on surfaced submarines operating within tactical distances if the submarine sent a radio signal. On the whole, moreover, depth charges were a lousy tool for busting subs. One the charge goes off, there is a wall of bubbles and noise that makes detection very difficult for an interval of about 15 minutes. Allied escorts added side-throwing depth charges (Y and K "guns"). These were important because standard submarine foiling efforts involved a hard turn as the escort closed on its depth charge run. The side throwing guns gave Allied vessels a better shot at turning submarines. As far as I know (might be wrong) few or none of the Japanese escorts were fitted with side-throwing dcs.
The Japanese never developed a "low noise" attack tool. The Allies, however, had mousetrap and hedgehog... devices that only exploded (thus creating noise that made detecting the sub difficult) if they HIT the submarine. Since one hit was usually enough to at least send a submarine to the surface, almost every "bang" was followed by a kill. Finally, the US developed acoustically homing air-dropped torpedoes. Late in the war, the worst thing a Japanese (or German) submarine could do was the instinctive thing... DIVE DIVE. Because as soon as the sub goes underwater the torpedo has a target on which it may home. In 1944, to dive in front of a closing TBF usually meant a 1-way ticket to the bottom.
4. Strategic. By mid 1943 the US could often crack signals as fast as they were sent, including operational orders for submarines. It helps alot to know where the submarine is going to be when you set out to kill it.
I do not see any realistic way that the Japanese could have substantially changed the circumstances to make their escorts much more effective. Never comparable to Allied ASW. Even with the use of closer escort and convoy tactics, they could expect one-sided drubbings akin to the worst (from the Allied pov) of the big convoy battles of the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Mike Scholl wrote:I'd say that you hit the nail on the head. Japanese ASW equipment was inferior
to US or British, but it wasn't totally ineffective. Likewise, their subs were
somewhat clumsy, but their torpedoes at least worked.
In the game, the Japanese player should have the option to use their assets
as intelligently as they can. If they can find enough excorting vessels to use
convoys, then they should certainly be able to. Though one thing you need
to remember is that a convoy is not an anti-submarine weapon. It's a tactic
designed to bring submarines into contact with the excort's ASW---you put
all the targets together and you force the subs to come into range of the
escorts. Of course if the excorts are weak or incapable, Convoys just make
the subs job easier. So it's a two-edged sword for the Japanese because most
of their escorts weren't that good at ASW---if they can't use reasonable num-
bers of escorts for a convoy they may be better off not using them. US ships
were better equipped to start with, and when they learned the tactics to use
their equipment, more effective. Later in the war, when they were equipped
with the latest British equipment, they were really dangerous. The DE England
went through a whole flotilla of Japese Subs like a threshing machine in 1944,
proving just how good they had become. The Japanese never had the tech-
nology to be that good, but they could still be useful when there were several
available or they had some air support.
On the other hand, Japanese subs should be MORE effective offensively during
the first half of the war because they did have effective torpedoes. Using them
against US Merchant Shipping could be an excellent tactic for two reasons. One
is in sinking some cargo..., but perhaps more importantly in forcing the US to
detach escorts to cover them. Even the Americans didn't have enough Escorts
before 1943, so stretching them makes the US job more difficult. It should be
a valid game tactic for a Japanese player.
true. Invariable the IJN player (if he chooses too) will be bound to do better than the Japanese historically did because that player is all too aware of how vulnerable his supply lines proved to be. Japanese ASW will never match that of the Allies (once they gain EXP and training......in early 42 USN ASW was not much better than the Japanese) mainly because of technology. (little radar, no Huff Duff etc) but using high exp units and generous application of air assets for patroling, they should be able to at least blunt US attacks on their shipping. However by 43, it will be a downhill battle given the #'s of subs, introduction of radar on them and the fixing of the torpedo problem. Same thing for Japanese subs...as time goes by it'll be harder and harder to obtain favorable "gains" in heavy ASW environments with subs as US escorts and air assets increase.
Biggest problem for the Japan player will be simply trying to find the escorts and aircraft. The more assets devoted to escort, the less available for combat (or for warship construction) Same for aircraft.
On the flip side, the Allied player may be able to counter the Japanese player's efforts by also learning from history and better deploying his or her subs in an immediate effort at commerce war. The two checks here will be availability of "Fleet" class boats, the torpedo issue, and the training issues.
Should be fun. My biggest hope/concern will be to see just how much the war affects the Japanese economy. It was non existant for the most part in PacWar from my playing experiences.
This subject of the PacWar is ripe for a player option, one i suggested long ago, in which would be a toggle to increase IJN ASW efficiency and a 'standard' option (seen in most Grigsby games in the form of "help Allies/help Axis etc) for increased Japanese production to make the fight more even and interesting.
mdiehl wrote:Twiddling with tactics would not have improved Japanese ASW performance. There were doctrinal, tactical, material and strategic differences that made Allied ASW substantially more effective:
1. Doctrinal. Escorts were trained from the get go to coordinate attacks and to operate with convoys. Japanese escorts were not in general substantially trained in the effort, although they seem to have improved at this as the war progressed.
2. Tactical. For the most part, Japanese escorts were not heavily drilled in teamwork against submerged submarines. Owing to the nature of sonar/asdic it was very difficult to estimate the depth of a submarine. VERY VERY VERY heavily trained Allied escorts could do this by using the geometry of the reflected waves -- in essence, depending on the distance from the target sub, from a given sonar signal one could deduce the depth depending on which surface vessels picked up a return signal.
3. Material. The Japanese lacked HFDF -- a means by which Allied escorts could triangulate on surfaced submarines operating within tactical distances if the submarine sent a radio signal. On the whole, moreover, depth charges were a lousy tool for busting subs. One the charge goes off, there is a wall of bubbles and noise that makes detection very difficult for an interval of about 15 minutes. Allied escorts added side-throwing depth charges (Y and K "guns"). These were important because standard submarine foiling efforts involved a hard turn as the escort closed on its depth charge run. The side throwing guns gave Allied vessels a better shot at turning submarines. As far as I know (might be wrong) few or none of the Japanese escorts were fitted with side-throwing dcs.
The Japanese never developed a "low noise" attack tool. The Allies, however, had mousetrap and hedgehog... devices that only exploded (thus creating noise that made detecting the sub difficult) if they HIT the submarine. Since one hit was usually enough to at least send a submarine to the surface, almost every "bang" was followed by a kill. Finally, the US developed acoustically homing air-dropped torpedoes. Late in the war, the worst thing a Japanese (or German) submarine could do was the instinctive thing... DIVE DIVE. Because as soon as the sub goes underwater the torpedo has a target on which it may home. In 1944, to dive in front of a closing TBF usually meant a 1-way ticket to the bottom.
4. Strategic. By mid 1943 the US could often crack signals as fast as they were sent, including operational orders for submarines. It helps alot to know where the submarine is going to be when you set out to kill it.
I do not see any realistic way that the Japanese could have substantially changed the circumstances to make their escorts much more effective. Never comparable to Allied ASW. Even with the use of closer escort and convoy tactics, they could expect one-sided drubbings akin to the worst (from the Allied pov) of the big convoy battles of the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942.
I sometimes wonder if you actually READ things through before you reply. I
say this because you reply with a tone of dissagreement even when we've
said substantially the same things. I thought I'd made it pretty plain that
the Japanese weren't able to compete technologically with the West in ASW.
My point was that in terms of the game, where the players have some say in
tactics (will they form convoys and use whatever they can scrape up as
escorts, or won't they). In this sense, the Japanese side could benefit from
using better tactics because historically they used NO tactics at all to start
with. Aside from their "invasion convoys" merchant shipping was "on it's own".
Just having some escorts would be an improvement. They might not sink
many US subs, but they could hold them down a while. And while the Japs
ASW doctrine wasn't very good, you must also remember that when the war
began US Sub doctrine wasn't that hot either---and far too many US skippers
were found to be "unaggressive" and inefectual.
Every point you made was "on the mark". They were also beside the point,
which was that the Japanese player has some decisions to make if he wants
to change tactics and try to escort merchant convoys from the war's start.
If he can find and strip enough excort-type vessels from other tasks to use
convoys, his merchant shipping will benefit from it. I didn't say he was going
to suddenly have the mid-war capabilities of the West, just that his merchant
ships would benefit. But he would also get hurt in that the only place to get
that number of escorts is to take them away from the fleet. Building more at
the expense of other things should be a game option, but not one that will help
much until 1943. And the Japs are short of EVERYTHING, so it's a "rob Peter to
pay Paul" situation in the long run.
You almost always make valid and well-thought out/researched points. It just
seems to me that sometimes you leap in to make them in odd places. I don't
think you mean to say that ALL Japanese ASW efforts are totally worthless (a
Springfield .58 is not nearly the weapon that an M1 Garand is---but it would
still kill people if the chance arose). And I know I didn't say that Japanese ASW
was ever going to be anywhere close to the levels reached by the West. So
what was the argument? I'm sure we both think that players should have at
least the opportunity to try and improve on historical efforts and tactics---as
long as the technological realities are observed.
Errrr.., ummmm, errrrr... Mike, I was responding to Quark's post, not yours.
That said: Japanese subs DID engage in merchant interdiction. They just weren't particularly good at it. Either because of want of targets or because most of the time they were not on merchant interdiction orders. Wolfpacking the Japanese subs should be not allowed. Either a lower limit on sub density per hex or else a "cooperation bonus" to Allied subs operating in the same hex.
In 1942 American ASW training was far more extensive than Japanese. If there is only one EXP rating for a vessel in the game then the generally higher exp ratings accorded Japanese vessels may inappropriately affect the relative sub hunting abilities. IMO the sim should have separate ratings for ASW EXP and Surface Combat EXP. Sure some captains were replaced. Wonder how many Japanese captains were replaced for being unaggressive in attacking subs. From the US submariners' pov it sure seems like I've read a lot of accounts where the Japanese escorts did not stick around very long. Maybe their doctrine was "drive the sub under long enough for the escorted vessels to escape."
Obviously Japanese ASW was not totally ineffective, since the US lost 52 subs. But I'd rate Allied ASW as an order of magnitude more effective than Japanese ASW.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Nickadeamus had quoted me right above your response, and I thought you were
part of the same. My error, mea culpa. We are in basic agreement (at least
about this.)
Although captains and crews started with a single set of experience values in Uncommon Valor, in one of the patches we modified this value for anti-submarine attacks, based on year and nationality. This has been mistakenly reported as a 50% reduction of ASW Japanese weapons. The modified value is not displayed on the task force orders screen, but amounts to a significant reduction for the Japanese, lessening as time goes by.
You should try the game...
Michael Wood
mdiehl wrote:...IMO the sim should have separate ratings for ASW EXP and Surface Combat EXP...
A few posts ago it was said that "Wolfpacking of Japanese subs should not be allowed" Why not? I'm in command now not Yamamoto. I should be able to use that strategy if I chose to. Once the game begins, historical accuracy in terms of mission objectives and methods to accomplish them, will go out the window. Unless we are mandated to follow a historical script step by step. So lets see what we , as commanders, can accomplish with the same assests.
If you want to make GOD laugh, tell him your future plans
You should not be allowed to get the same results as wolfpacking US or, say (talking theory here) German submarines. That is because it is a fundamental break from historic Japanese doctrine and training and because there is a lot more to wolfpacking than simply putting a bunch of submarines in close proximity.
Wanting to wolfpack Japanese subs and deploy them effectively against merchant ships is as much of an ahistorical stretch as wanting the USN ships to start the game with its own oxy-catalyst torpedoes with reliable detonators.
I suppose that if there was one of those "Japanese select this ahistorical option so the Allies get to select from among these ahistorical options or else a bundle of VP credits" it would make for a good alt "what if" game.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Hi, I think the I-boats sank over 900,000 tons of merchants. If the Japanese player continues to deploy them in Allied shipping lanes they will continue to sink merchant ships.
The Japanese located their subs in areas they felt enemy warships would transit. They also used them in advance of their own aircombat and surface TF's. When used this way they will sink fewer merchants and be exposed to more ASW but they will also hit more enemy warships.
I don't think the Japanese player needs to use wolf packs or change anything other then where he deploys his subs.
If he begins sinking increased numbers of merchants the allies will deploy more ASW assets with his convoys. This will help lower the number of merchants he loses. The CVE is the best ASW platform for preventing enemy subs from attacking and SC and DE ships once they are trained will kill many I-boats found along merchant routes.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
The rule that causes diminishing returns for having too many subs stacked in the same hex has not been lifted, meerely relaxed a bit to allow for the greater scale.
Neither the US nor Japanese navies had much success in "wolfpacking" but then again "wolfpacking" itself is a bit overrated in effectiveness. The germans achieved their greatest successes while NOT using the tactic ironically and even for the Germans the tactic proved much harder to implement than was thought pre-war. In the end the US didn't need "wolfpacking" to enjoy success in the Pacific for reasons too numerous to go into here.
That said, there is nothing wrong with changing grand strategy and asking one's subs to do a different mission from which their earlier "doctorine" stressed. Ironically the US and IJN sub doctorines prewar were virtually identical. The difference was that by the end of 42 with the results of a failed sub campaign on the table, the US higher ups adjusted their game plans and began to emphasis merchant warfare over "Fleet ops" while Combined Fleet continued business as usual and kept saddling the Sixth with fleet picket duty and worse, saddling them with more and more supply runs.
Players are free to divert from history here as they see fit. Thats what the game is all about....you are the commander, you are in control However two critical aspects remain unmovable and have to be factored into the players plans if he wants or expects success
1) Japan
As time goes by and US/Allied ASW assets and proficiancy increase, your returns are going to drop (i.e. what you sank vs Iboats lost or damaged). There is little to nothing that can be done about this....save to do what Doneitz and company did.....shift ops to other areas where ASW is less organized and intense. Decisions will also have to be made on deployment. The US West coast and Hawaii are juicy and attractive targets but are very far away. Unless you want a one shot deal, you'll have to relay your subs to keep the pressure up and given the distance this will require alot of boats that will then not be available for other areas/operations. Some players will probably prefer the Japanese model and keep their subs close to their operating areas in the hopes of repeating their wartime successes against key Allied warships.
2) USA
As time goes by your effectiveness against merchant types will increase as EXP rises and Mk-14 torp problems begin to disapear. In 42 though be prepared for small gains for large efforts.
Does that mean that you now support the idea that the Allied player should be allowed to alter grand strategy and tactics by simply instructing his light-surface TFs (DDs and CAs) to always launch torpedoes first until it is apparent that the American TF is detected (as for example evidence by Japanese gunfire, or torpedoes striking the Allied battle line) and that the US should be just as likely to launch such an attack as the Japanese?
If not, why not?
If it boils down to some kind of doctrinal thing, such that the Japanese are deemed more likely to attempt such an attack, does it not follow that areas in which the Japanese had no doctrinal effort should result in lower success rates for the Japanese? Even if one allows the Japanese to attempt to alter the grand strategy and tactics?
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Hi, I'm not sure what that last post means.
It is not a change of doctrine to deploy Japanese subs in manners they were deployed historically. At the start they hunted everything (They were deployed around Hawaii and between Hawaii and West Coast)
Then they began to operate closely with Japanese Navy
And finally they became supply transports.
All the while I-boats continued in all the old missions but to a lesser extent.
If Allied light units had possessed a torpedo with the range of the long lance they would have also had a new doctrine for using them. But I'm not suggesting any change in doctrine or any mission for I-boats that I-boats did not actually conduct.
The speed and range of the types of I-boat dictate their use. The RO-class boats can only do coast defense.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
On Turn 2 of Sc#1 especially there are a HUGE # of subs that the Allied player can deploy and creating all those single sub TF's can be a pain. Little trick i started using was to create one massive sub TF (20+ subs!), send it to a general area i wish to deploy and then start breaking them up into little 2 or 3 sub TF's to cover likely "Hot spots" Dont consider them "Wolf packs" as much as i consider them being 2 subs in one TF, each patroling half of a 60 mile square area of ocean. Basically i'm duplicating the old land defense using subs strategy that proved so futile in real life but does bag me a couple merchants usually.
However two critical aspects remain unmovable and have to be factored into the players plans if he wants or expects success