Who was better: Patton or Rommel

[Riun T]

Thanks Duke for puttingmy same opinion so eliquintly.
I also think your point on the allied air power has merrit, to have their tanks anywhere but the beaches would have needed the trians and between the french underground and Allied air power,France was pretty well demobalized.

[freeboy]

On balance, I think Rommel called it right, but he didn't have the resources to play it as well as he wanted to. I think Rundstedt's strategy would have failed. It's possible it might have kept the campaign for France alive as long as Rommel's did, but it offered little or no chance for success in the long run. Rommel's strategy offered a slim hope depending on what happened on the beaches.
above from id

I definately agree with id here.. had Rommel a free hand in Normandy. Pas d'Calias (sp?)
it would have been a tougher go for the Allies.
Patton gets both praised and faulted for his daring plans, but since he too was hamstrung by his supperiors, or not depending on your view of reality.. no offense to either side on that one.... I have to say that Monty raites a second in my book to each, especially
Rommel... give each equal supplies and air and reletive forces, but this is seldom the case..


Any examples of an overwhelmingly outguned and supplied force fighting of and "winning"?????
Well, not to be pointed but before those stupid Hitler order conter attacks in Normandy tthe Allies were being somewhat bottled up....

I come back to the origonal ?... no real answer... too much differnces in the situations between US and Germany to aduquately say "better"
How about Pieper verses Patton? or Rommel? Could either have lead there men as well? and remember ultimately he "lost" too????????

[Pippin]

I have to agree that Patton is over-rated. However, I will give him some good credit in my books for a few things. One of them, was he would speak his mind and call things exactly the way he saw it. Unfortunately he got shit-canned by his own american comrades because he did not partake in their political BS and coverups at the time..

Oh.. and the whole cold war thing... he kept warning them... but no one would listen.... Ironicaly, his predictions seemed to come true, yet he was **** (insert political correct term here) for it.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Pippin

I have to agree that Patton is over-rated. However, I will give him some good credit in my books for a few things. One of them, was he would speak his mind and call things exactly the way he saw it. Unfortunately he got shit-canned by his own american comrades because he did not partake in their political BS and coverups at the time..

Oh.. and the whole cold war thing... he kept warning them... but no one would listen.... Ironicaly, his predictions seemed to come true, yet he was **** (insert political correct term here) for it.

I'd only take this so far. I think he had some candid comments in his diaries about what he thought of the campaign and his peers (Monty went into print with his opinion, so Patton wasn't alone in this). However, after Hammelburg, he instigated what looks very much like a cover up all of his own. He may have had little time for the politics that governed Allied strategy to some degree (neither did Monty) but he played the game with the rest of them. If he didn't like the politics, it was largely because he felt the politics didn't always suit him. In this, he was being like every other General after a piece of the action but not getting what he wants because the strategy demands someone else get the leading role. I don't assign any particular noble motives to him on this.

Re the cold war, ultimately, the west won the economic battle, and defeated communism in the factory and the laboratory. Therefore, I don't see anything appealing in retrospect in his desire to go after them militarily in 1945. The best of the Allied equipment matched what the Russians had, and individually Allied troops were more skilled. However, with British manpower declining, and the Americans hamstrung by fighting a two front war with only 89 divisions, I doubt whether anything would have been achieved in 1945 had we taken them on. You may well have been able to persuade Churchill to go along, but probably not the heart of the British (or even US) Army. I just don't think anybody having to do the fighting would have been up for it having just beaten the Germans, and with the Japanese still fighting in the Pacific.

The A-Bomb provides a good what if, but I don't think I like the idea of a war in which progress is achieved once a month by a fresh atomic explosion over central europe. We'd also never have invaded the Soviet union had we forced them out of Eastern Europe, and we'd have been guaranteed a further war in the fifties or sixties when they would have had a nuclear unbrella of their own, and they'ed have expanded westwards.

All in all, we got in and out of the cold war about as well as we could possibly have dreamed bearing in mind what could have happened.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: freeboy

On balance, I think Rommel called it right, but he didn't have the resources to play it as well as he wanted to. I think Rundstedt's strategy would have failed. It's possible it might have kept the campaign for France alive as long as Rommel's did, but it offered little or no chance for success in the long run. Rommel's strategy offered a slim hope depending on what happened on the beaches.
above from id

I definately agree with id here.. had Rommel a free hand in Normandy. Pas d'Calias (sp?)
it would have been a tougher go for the Allies.
Patton gets both praised and faulted for his daring plans, but since he too was hamstrung by his supperiors, or not depending on your view of reality.. no offense to either side on that one.... I have to say that Monty raites a second in my biook to each, especially
Rommel... give each equal supplies and air and reletive forces, but this is seldom the case..


Any examples of an overwhelmingly outguned and supplied force fighting of and "winning"?????
Well, not to be pointed but before those stupid Hitler order conter attacks in Normandy tthe Allies were being somewhat bottled up....

I come back to the origonal quote... no real answer... too much differnces in the situations between US and Germany to aduquately say "better"
How about Pieper verses Patton? or Rommel? Could either have lead there men as well? and remember ultimately he "lost" too????????

The what if conerning the troops in the pas de calais is interesting as well. I don't think the rail network (even without Allied air interdiction and the bombing that was undertaken of marshalling yards etc) would have supported a quick build up in Normandy. However, I can certainly see the battle stretching several weeks or months longer, had the Germans had infantry formations to relieve the Panzer Divisions early on.

The Allies were never overwhelming in their numbers in Normandy. I don't have the troop levels to hand but I doubt they could have built up sufficiently in the bridgehead to gain the 3:1 usually said to be required had the Germans concentrated in Normandy. I think they might eventually have broken out only by staging the subsidiary landings in Southern France etc, and outflanking.

Peiper is an interesting figure, but essentially only reached the rank of Regimental Commander. It's difficult to equate him with Patton or others because of this. He was less concerned with operational matters, and more with the sharp end.

Regards,
Ironduke

[Kevinugly]

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly



Back to Rommel, in France he was only a divisional commander who happened to be at the spearhead of the assault. Any credit for that campaign has to go to the likes of Manstein and Guderian. In North Africa he rode his luck against the hapless British and Commonwealth armies who practically gifted him victories at the likes of Bir Hacheim and Gazala. To give him credit, he was one of the first commanders to recognise the anti-tank capabilities of the 88mm Flak guns and make good tactical use of them. He also was an inspiring commander to serve under who preferred to 'lead from the front'. Regrettably his skills as a defensive general were barely tested, had he been allowed to deploy the panzer divisions close to the invasion beaches in 1944 then 'Overlord' may have produced a different result. However, one can only judge a commander by what actually happened rather than what might have been.

I have to protest there Kevin. Rommel was NOT untried as a defensive commander - albeit he also showed that only in that little intermezzo called North Africa. Without Rommel's actions, the DAK would probably had been completely annihilated in the weeks immediately following El Alamein. Rommel's problems in Normandy were more due to conflicts in authority, and that was his weakness. He wanted to believe in Hitler's re-assurances. (For me, I believe the greatest 'disaster' on that part was Rommel "allowing" the entire DAK get caught in Tripoli. 200,000 veteran troops. Imagine what a headache they would have been in Normandy. To compare with Manstein or Guderian, I doubt they would have settled with the Fuehrer's promises)

The pursuit across Egypt and Libya of Rommel by Monty's Eighth Army was pretty leisurely. As Iron Duke has alluded to, Patton would have been in his element harrying the DAK all the way back to Tunisia, something which would have tested Rommel to his limit. Rommel fought a reasonable defensive campaign until relieved by Von Arnim so I'm not sure how far he can be blamed for the surrender (and I'm not convinced over how many of those Axis troops captured would qualify as 'veteran', especially the Germans. I was under the impression that a majority were evacuated prior to the surrender). For whatever reasons, Rommel was always relieved of his command before the critical breakthroughs/collapses occured. Even prior to Alamein he was sick leaving his supporters with an easier job to explain away his failures. Don't get me wrong, I think both Patton and Rommel were amongst the better generals of the war but neither really deserve the legendary status they have come to be regarded in.

[Kevinugly]

ORIGINAL: Pippin

Oh.. and the whole cold war thing... he kept warning them... but no one would listen.... Ironicaly, his predictions seemed to come true, yet he was **** (insert political correct term here) for it.

The 'Cold War' was a self-fulfilling prophecy given the mutual suspician between the 'Big Three'. It would be a thread all of its own if we started discussing how it started, why it started, who started it. Yes Patton was right, but probably not for the right reasons.

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

The Allies were never overwhelming in their numbers in Normandy. I don't have the troop levels to hand but I doubt they could have built up sufficiently in the bridgehead to gain the 3:1 usually said to be required had the Germans concentrated in Normandy. I think they might eventually have broken out only by staging the subsidiary landings in Southern France etc, and outflanking.

Regards,
Ironduke

I think it is safe to say they were overwhelming in the air. Same goes for the naval numbers. I believe the allies were overwhelming on ground as well. It is difficult to find numbers for both allied and german powers reffering to the same date, but in general the number of allied division were just slighty more numerouse that the german division. However, taking into account the massive number of independent battalions the allied had, one can say that a allied division had about 3 times as many men as the germans (40-50 000 men/div).

The error of just comparing number of divisions that many do (not necesseraly you Duke) is obvious considering that the americans at 25. july -44 had 13 inf. div + 5 Arm div in Normandie (totalling 247.340 men), while adding the independent they totalled to 735 000.

In addition to this comes the many poorly equiped, poorly trained german divisions (consisting of old men and POW's), the fact that the german losses was unlikely to be replaced (at least within reasonable time) whereas the allied forces was well supplied in any regard compared to the german forces (losses were quicly replaced), and that it was always trained soldiers.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

Well, anyone who read the Patton thread knows Patton has been hugely overrated by american fanatics, and that Rommel would outclass him 10 of 9 times [:D]

You mean vs British fanatics and German fanatics?

I suppose now you have become a "Rommel fanatic".

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Sarge

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

Well, anyone who read the Patton thread knows Patton has been hugely overrated by american fanatics, and that Rommel would outclass him 10 of 9 times [:D]

As I agree with you totally on the fact that Patton is HUGELY overrated. Everyone here knows my point of view oF Patton and his charge to Bastogne to save the 101st. But Rommel outclass Patton is a little bit of a stretch. OMG I got sucked in agian

Actually, Patton was ordered to take Bastogne.

Patton never considered Bastogne to be the main objective in the Bulge. He argued with Allied High Command that the OBJECTIVE was to close the salient behind the Germans and trap all of them.

He lost the argument, and was ORDERED to relieve Bastogne instead. So the blame rests with Ike and Bradley, not Patton. . .

Even so, 101st Airborne was low on supplies and needed their wounded to be looked after.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

The British Army can disagree all they want, but the war in North Africa was a total sideshow which had little or no effect on the outcome of the war. This is not to denigrate any soldier who fought in the campaigns but when I read Churchill talking about El Alamein as 'The Hinge of Fate' it really frustrates me.

Back to Rommel, in France he was only a divisional commander who happened to be at the spearhead of the assault. Any credit for that campaign has to go to the likes of Manstein and Guderian. In North Africa he rode his luck against the hapless British and Commonwealth armies who practically gifted him victories at the likes of Bir Hacheim and Gazala. To give him credit, he was one of the first commanders to recognise the anti-tank capabilities of the 88mm Flak guns and make good tactical use of them. He also was an inspiring commander to serve under who preferred to 'lead from the front'. Regrettably his skills as a defensive general were barely tested, had he been allowed to deploy the panzer divisions close to the invasion beaches in 1944 then 'Overlord' may have produced a different result. However, one can only judge a commander by what actually happened rather than what might have been.

I have to protest there Kevin. Rommel was NOT untried as a defensive commander - albeit he also showed that only in that little intermezzo called North Africa. Without Rommel's actions, the DAK would probably had been completely annihilated in the weeks immediately following El Alamein. Rommel's problems in Normandy were more due to conflicts in authority, and that was his weakness. He wanted to believe in Hitler's re-assurances. (For me, I believe the greatest 'disaster' on that part was Rommel "allowing" the entire DAK get caught in Tripoli. 200,000 veteran troops. Imagine what a headache they would have been in Normandy. To compare with Manstein or Guderian, I doubt they would have settled with the Fuehrer's promises)

Rommel was quite good on defense. Just look at the state of his forces vs the Allies at Al Alamein, and his fighting withdrawl. . .

Rommel's main problems were due to supply issues and the fact that there were officers close to Hitler who wanted to see Rommel fail. Similar things can be said about Patton's situation.

In Tripoli, Rommel had no choice - Hitler had over 200,000 troops sent there only to surrender. Rommel argued against this move, preferring those 200,000 troops be stationed in Sicily and Italy.

I agree that Rommel was indispensable for the DAK. He turned them into elite soldiers.

[Von Rom]

Ironduke:

As for Rommel versus Patton. Rommel was a more rounded Commander, and I think he possessed (usually) a purpose to his manouevre which Patton lacked.

Give me one example of Patton's lacking purpose in maneuvre.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Pippin

I have to agree that Patton is over-rated. However, I will give him some good credit in my books for a few things. One of them, was he would speak his mind and call things exactly the way he saw it. Unfortunately he got shit-canned by his own american comrades because he did not partake in their political BS and coverups at the time..

Oh.. and the whole cold war thing... he kept warning them... but no one would listen.... Ironicaly, his predictions seemed to come true, yet he was **** (insert political correct term here) for it.

I'd only take this so far. I think he had some candid comments in his diaries about what he thought of the campaign and his peers (Monty went into print with his opinion, so Patton wasn't alone in this). However, after Hammelburg, he instigated what looks very much like a cover up all of his own. He may have had little time for the politics that governed Allied strategy to some degree (neither did Monty) but he played the game with the rest of them. If he didn't like the politics, it was largely because he felt the politics didn't always suit him. In this, he was being like every other General after a piece of the action but not getting what he wants because the strategy demands someone else get the leading role. I don't assign any particular noble motives to him on this.

Re the cold war, ultimately, the west won the economic battle, and defeated communism in the factory and the laboratory. Therefore, I don't see anything appealing in retrospect in his desire to go after them militarily in 1945. The best of the Allied equipment matched what the Russians had, and individually Allied troops were more skilled. However, with British manpower declining, and the Americans hamstrung by fighting a two front war with only 89 divisions, I doubt whether anything would have been achieved in 1945 had we taken them on. You may well have been able to persuade Churchill to go along, but probably not the heart of the British (or even US) Army. I just don't think anybody having to do the fighting would have been up for it having just beaten the Germans, and with the Japanese still fighting in the Pacific.

The A-Bomb provides a good what if, but I don't think I like the idea of a war in which progress is achieved once a month by a fresh atomic explosion over central europe. We'd also never have invaded the Soviet union had we forced them out of Eastern Europe, and we'd have been guaranteed a further war in the fifties or sixties when they would have had a nuclear unbrella of their own, and they'ed have expanded westwards.

All in all, we got in and out of the cold war about as well as we could possibly have dreamed bearing in mind what could have happened.

Regards,
IronDuke

However, after Hammelburg, he instigated what looks very much like a cover up all of his own.

Where's your proof regarding this statement?

ultimately, the west won the economic battle, and defeated communism in the factory and the laboratory. Therefore, I don't see anything appealing in retrospect in his desire to go after them militarily in 1945.

Yes, the west won by 1991 (when USSR collapsed).

Yet, you seem to have overlooked:

1) Communist insurgency in post-war Greece

2) The Korean War

3) The Vietnam War

4) The Cuban Missile Crisis

5) Massive funds that went into the Arms Build-up

6) All the Third world nations that suffered through proxy wars.

7) Now we have to deal with Chinese sabre-rattling over Taiwan. . .

Patton was right. . .

But that is when "politics" took over.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: freeboy

On balance, I think Rommel called it right, but he didn't have the resources to play it as well as he wanted to. I think Rundstedt's strategy would have failed. It's possible it might have kept the campaign for France alive as long as Rommel's did, but it offered little or no chance for success in the long run. Rommel's strategy offered a slim hope depending on what happened on the beaches.
above from id

I definately agree with id here.. had Rommel a free hand in Normandy. Pas d'Calias (sp?)
it would have been a tougher go for the Allies.
Patton gets both praised and faulted for his daring plans, but since he too was hamstrung by his supperiors, or not depending on your view of reality.. no offense to either side on that one.... I have to say that Monty raites a second in my biook to each, especially
Rommel... give each equal supplies and air and reletive forces, but this is seldom the case..


Any examples of an overwhelmingly outguned and supplied force fighting of and "winning"?????
Well, not to be pointed but before those stupid Hitler order conter attacks in Normandy tthe Allies were being somewhat bottled up....

I come back to the origonal quote... no real answer... too much differnces in the situations between US and Germany to aduquately say "better"
How about Pieper verses Patton? or Rommel? Could either have lead there men as well? and remember ultimately he "lost" too????????

The what if conerning the troops in the pas de calais is interesting as well. I don't think the rail network (even without Allied air interdiction and the bombing that was undertaken of marshalling yards etc) would have supported a quick build up in Normandy. However, I can certainly see the battle stretching several weeks or months longer, had the Germans had infantry formations to relieve the Panzer Divisions early on.

The Allies were never overwhelming in their numbers in Normandy. I don't have the troop levels to hand but I doubt they could have built up sufficiently in the bridgehead to gain the 3:1 usually said to be required had the Germans concentrated in Normandy. I think they might eventually have broken out only by staging the subsidiary landings in Southern France etc, and outflanking.

Peiper is an interesting figure, but essentially only reached the rank of Regimental Commander. It's difficult to equate him with Patton or others because of this. He was less concerned with operational matters, and more with the sharp end.

Regards,
Ironduke

I think there was a lot written about the fact that the Allies needed even more men, and that not enough troops were allotted for the campaign in Normandy.

If memory serves me right, I believe the Allies had planned to have 90 divisions in France. This turned out to be less than sufficient considering Ike's Broad Front strategy.

I also have a feeling that Rommel's strategy of attacking the Allied Beachead had merit, especially considering how tough the Americans had it on Omaha Beach.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

The Allies were never overwhelming in their numbers in Normandy. I don't have the troop levels to hand but I doubt they could have built up sufficiently in the bridgehead to gain the 3:1 usually said to be required had the Germans concentrated in Normandy. I think they might eventually have broken out only by staging the subsidiary landings in Southern France etc, and outflanking.

Regards,
Ironduke

I think it is safe to say they were overwhelming in the air. Same goes for the naval numbers. I believe the allies were overwhelming on ground as well. It is difficult to find numbers for both allied and german powers reffering to the same date, but in general the number of allied division were just slighty more numerouse that the german division. However, taking into account the massive number of independent battalions the allied had, one can say that a allied division had about 3 times as many men as the germans (40-50 000 men/div).

The error of just comparing number of divisions that many do (not necesseraly you Duke) is obvious considering that the americans at 25. july -44 had 13 inf. div + 5 Arm div in Normandie (totalling 247.340 men), while adding the independent they totalled to 735 000.

In addition to this comes the many poorly equiped, poorly trained german divisions (consisting of old men and POW's), the fact that the german losses was unlikely to be replaced (at least within reasonable time) whereas the allied forces was well supplied in any regard compared to the german forces (losses were quicly replaced), and that it was always trained soldiers.

However, taking into account the massive number of independent battalions the allied had, one can say that a allied division had about 3 times as many men as the germans (40-50 000 men/div).

"Independent battalions"?

Where did you get this from?

Average US division was roughly 15,000 to 20,000 men.

The error of just comparing number of divisions that many do (not necesseraly you Duke) is obvious considering that the americans at 25. july -44 had 13 inf. div + 5 Arm div in Normandie (totalling 247.340 men), while adding the independent they totalled to 735 000.

What is your source for these numbers of "Independent forces"??

In addition to this comes the many poorly equiped, poorly trained german divisions (consisting of old men and POW's),

Please. . .

Here is the initial German opposition the Allies ran into:

OMAHA BEACH: One of the biggest problems was not only the restricted terrain and the dug in pillboxes, but the fact that allied intelligence had overlooked the 352nd Infantry Division, right behind the beaches. This unit, like the others in Normandy, was spread out but was an experienced unit that had served in Russia. It more than doubled the effectiveness of the coastal defences, thus resulting in excessive U.S. losses. This unit was attached to the 84th German Corps, which had responsibility for the entire Normandy region. In addition, elements of the 3rd Sturm-Flak Korps were spread out from Carentan to Bayeux. They contributed a large number of 20, 37 and 88mm guns to the defense, but the unit was badly disrupted by the pre-invasion air attack.

GOLD BEACH: Most of the opposition here consisted of "Ost" troops, Russian and Polish conscripts/prisoners fighting in the German Army, and men from the 716th Infantry Division, a second rate static unit with a large frontage (Caen Bayeux).

JUNO BEACH: The Canadians faced the same troops as were positioned behind GOLD, plus the 440th 0st Battalion dug-in at Courselles-sur-Mer. Later in the day they faced elements of 2lst Panzer and l2th SS Panzer Division, both deployed too far in the rear to hinder the actual landings.

SWORD BEACH: The 3rd (British) Infantry Division faced, as the other beaches, well dug-in but overextended elements of 716th Infantry Division. The British also faced counter-attacks from l2th SS and 21st Panzer later in the day and into the night.


And these were just the initial German forces. Plus, they were fighting in heavy bocage country which aided the defense.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

The Allies were never overwhelming in their numbers in Normandy. I don't have the troop levels to hand but I doubt they could have built up sufficiently in the bridgehead to gain the 3:1 usually said to be required had the Germans concentrated in Normandy. I think they might eventually have broken out only by staging the subsidiary landings in Southern France etc, and outflanking.

Regards,
Ironduke

I think it is safe to say they were overwhelming in the air. Same goes for the naval numbers. I believe the allies were overwhelming on ground as well. It is difficult to find numbers for both allied and german powers reffering to the same date, but in general the number of allied division were just slighty more numerouse that the german division. However, taking into account the massive number of independent battalions the allied had, one can say that a allied division had about 3 times as many men as the germans (40-50 000 men/div).

The error of just comparing number of divisions that many do (not necesseraly you Duke) is obvious considering that the americans at 25. july -44 had 13 inf. div + 5 Arm div in Normandie (totalling 247.340 men), while adding the independent they totalled to 735 000.

In addition to this comes the many poorly equiped, poorly trained german divisions (consisting of old men and POW's), the fact that the german losses was unlikely to be replaced (at least within reasonable time) whereas the allied forces was well supplied in any regard compared to the german forces (losses were quicly replaced), and that it was always trained soldiers.

There's certainly a lot in what you say I would agree with, but I think numbers are important in this instance, because the Allies eventually ground out victory in Normandy. Patton poured through a hole created by Hodges that was created because the Germans had run out of men. If you look at some of the casualty rates inflicted on Allied forces (both US and UK, albeit for differing reasons) An extra 6-8 German infantry divisions would have exacted a heavy toll. By the end of the campaign in Europe the UK was folding infantry units in order to bring others up to strength and (IIRC) the Americans were having some problems of their own keeping up a steady stream of quality replacements.

A lot of the extra Allied troops would have been rear area formations as well, I'd guess. The Allied tail was far larger than the German tail, and the fact that average divisional sizes may have been larger in certain Allied formations doesn't necessarily mean they had more rifles at the sharp end. That said, the tail had other benefits in combat that should not be overlooked, but the extra Allied bodies would not all have been fighting men.

Regards,
John.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

The Allies were never overwhelming in their numbers in Normandy. I don't have the troop levels to hand but I doubt they could have built up sufficiently in the bridgehead to gain the 3:1 usually said to be required had the Germans concentrated in Normandy. I think they might eventually have broken out only by staging the subsidiary landings in Southern France etc, and outflanking.

Regards,
Ironduke

I think it is safe to say they were overwhelming in the air. Same goes for the naval numbers. I believe the allies were overwhelming on ground as well. It is difficult to find numbers for both allied and german powers reffering to the same date, but in general the number of allied division were just slighty more numerouse that the german division. However, taking into account the massive number of independent battalions the allied had, one can say that a allied division had about 3 times as many men as the germans (40-50 000 men/div).

The error of just comparing number of divisions that many do (not necesseraly you Duke) is obvious considering that the americans at 25. july -44 had 13 inf. div + 5 Arm div in Normandie (totalling 247.340 men), while adding the independent they totalled to 735 000.

In addition to this comes the many poorly equiped, poorly trained german divisions (consisting of old men and POW's), the fact that the german losses was unlikely to be replaced (at least within reasonable time) whereas the allied forces was well supplied in any regard compared to the german forces (losses were quicly replaced), and that it was always trained soldiers.

There's certainly a lot in what you say I would agree with, but I think numbers are important in this instance, because the Allies eventually ground out victory in Normandy. Patton poured through a hole created by Hodges that was created because the Germans had run out of men. If you look at some of the casualty rates inflicted on Allied forces (both US and UK, albeit for differing reasons) An extra 6-8 German infantry divisions would have exacted a heavy toll. By the end of the campaign in Europe the UK was folding infantry units in order to bring others up to strength and (IIRC) the Americans were having some problems of their own keeping up a steady stream of quality replacements.

A lot of the extra Allied troops would have been rear area formations as well, I'd guess. The Allied tail was far larger than the German tail, and the fact that average divisional sizes may have been larger in certain Allied formations doesn't necessarily mean they had more rifles at the sharp end. That said, the tail had other benefits in combat that should not be overlooked, but the extra Allied bodies would not all have been fighting men.

Regards,
John.

Patton poured through a hole created by Hodges that was created because the Germans had run out of men.

Not quite so.

The hole was created because 2,000 heavy bombers created it.

Then First Army infantry divisions were used to push the hole wider, thus allowing Patton's forces to breakout. . .

In the Falaise Pocket, the Germans had tens of thousands of soldiers ready to fight, which Patton was in the process of encircling.

Hitler then made a stupid mistake of ordering a German counterattack at Mortain. . .

When the Germans realized what Patton was doing, they made a mad scramble to flee the Pocket. . .

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Ironduke:

As for Rommel versus Patton. Rommel was a more rounded Commander, and I think he possessed (usually) a purpose to his manouevre which Patton lacked.

Give me one example of Patton's lacking purpose in maneuvre.

Von Rom,
I am prepared to reply to this, but if my points are ignored, or rejected without evidence to the contrary, or buried beneath long passages of questionable relevance, I reserve the right to just talk to the others. I'm not getting into another Patton thread situation.

In addition to General McNair's comments after watching Patton's manouevres (in Louisiana if memory serves) in 1941 "This is no way to fight a war".; you could also cite the right turn with sizeable forces into Brittany after the breakout; indeed the entire attack into Brittany. On the 3rd August, Bradley (an Army Group Commander at this point) was at Middleton's HQ (A Corp Commander) concerned at the spread out dispositions of the troops, was ordering some of Patton's divisions about to cover the flanks. He was interfering in Patton's command because he felt the advance was everywhere at once and not tactically sound.

To quote Farago:

"...he (Patton) usually confined his piecemeal operations to skirmishes with stragglers, instead of interfering strategically with the enemy's communication zone. While he did succeed in places and in parts in preventing the enemy from forming a front, he did not destroy enough of his units to make more than a dent in his strength".

If you don't like Farago, try Weigley:

"He did not ruinously disrupt the enemy's communication's zone. His traps failed too often to close on the enemy's main forces. Principally, he occupied ground rather than destroying armies."

Ultimately, it lacked purpose because it was an advance for advancing's sake. Rommel manouevred in order to outflank, encircle and defeat all manner of defences. You can see the purpose of his manouevres through the desert campaign.

The final example would be Sicily. An offensive considered insane by his senior Corp Commander, and which was considered a glory drive by his senior Divisional Commander. Perhaps I am wrong to say it had no purpose, I should have said it had the wrong purpose.

Regards,
Ironduke

[Von Rom]

Rommel vs Patton:

I would rate them almost equal in ability, perhaps giving Patton the edge.

It is amazing how closely there are similarities between the two:

1) both were hampered from above by High Command

2) rival jealousies from above interfered in their conduct of the war

3) there was a shortage of supplies at critical times (through no fault of their own)

4) both died under questionable circumstances

etc, etc. . .

[IronDuke_slith]

IronDuke

However, after Hammelburg, he instigated what looks very much like a cover up all of his own.

Von Rom

Where's your proof regarding this statement?

Patton's letter to his Wife three days before the raid says:

"We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved".

After the raid, to quote Professor d'Este:

"Patton perpetuated the fiction of Hammelburg at a press conference, in which he baldly deceived the correspondents by waiving his personal and official diaries in the air and claiming he had known nothing of Water's presence in Hammelburg until nine days after the raid. "

In other words, he didn't tell the truth. His letter to his wife clearly indicates he (at the very least) strongly suspected he was there.

So, when someone says something about an embarrassing event that isn't true, and is designed to deflect criticism over the event and conceal the real reasons behind it, it's a cover up.


IronDuke

ultimately, the west won the economic battle, and defeated communism in the factory and the laboratory. Therefore, I don't see anything appealing in retrospect in his desire to go after them militarily in 1945.

Von Rom

Yes, the west won by 1991 (when USSR collapsed).

Yet, you seem to have overlooked:

1) Communist insurgency in post-war Greece

2) The Korean War

3) The Vietnam War

4) The Cuban Missile Crisis

5) Massive funds that went into the Arms Build-up

6) All the Third world nations that suffered through proxy wars.

7) Now we have to deal with Chinese sabre-rattling over Taiwan. . .

Patton was right. . .

But that is when "politics" took over.

I don't believe that any of this would have been avoided by taking two war weary nations into a third world war ten minutes after finishing the second one. A war with an erstwhile Ally, who had done more than anyone to defeat the NAZIs, and who currently had 5-6 million men in the field. American casualties in Vietnam would have been dwarfed by American casualties in Central Europe fighting the Russians in 1945.

Also, whilst the Russians backed the Korean War, the main impetus came from China, so this would hardly have been prevented by fighting the Russians.

Regards,
Ironduke