WITP Strategy

[dtravel]

ORIGINAL: dereck

Maybe I didn't make my question clear but it sounded like he said you could change an HQ, such as the Australian Command, from a restricted HQ to an unrestricted HQ and if that was what he meant then my question is 'How?'

Do you assign the Australian Command to an unrestricted HQ or what? Please clarify for me.

Thanks.

Three variations here:

1) Change the Australia Command theatre to be an unrestricted command. I.E., all units that report to Australia Command would no longer suffer the restrictions of not being able to load, limits on where based, etc. This cannot be done.

2) Change the HQ unit 'Australia Command' so that it reports to another command (i.e. Southwest Pacific). Probably, haven't tried that myself, but there is no real point to it. All that would do is allow you to move the on-map HQ unit outside its own command area.

3) Change all the units reporting to Australia Command to report to other, unrestricted, commands. Physically possible, but you have to go to each unit individually and do so. Unlikely to happen early in the game due to Political Point limitations.

Hopefully one of those answers your question. [:)]

[Andy Mac]

OK I have only played the allies but I have 5 PBEM's on the go and I have tried a different strategy in each of them.

As the allies my main generic strategy point would be TIME TIME TIME.

Holding on is the main key to winning.

Anything that holds up the enemy is good.

The only area not already covered above that I can add some new points on is India.

Principals.

1. India must be kept secure. The easiest temptation for an allied player to succumb to is to over reinforce Burma. (Something I was in danger of doing against Sveint)

Even if you get out of the Rangoon deathtrap its a long time to get those units back onto the Indian rail net.

I would never commit 7th Ard/ 18th UK or 2nd UK to Burma as they are required for the defence of India.

2. Dont send cadres of saved units Malayan units to Australia (the two Aus Bdes and the USMC Rgt from Phillipines get good replacements and will get brought back to strength very quickly therefore these are the priority units to save from Singapore /DEI/ Phillipines)

If an Indian Bgde gets mauled at Singapore its not worth savoing as Indian replacements are so slow. CW replacements are better so If I am saving full units I would save Indian then Commonwealth then Phillipines then Aus/USMC

If I am only saving cadres I would start with Aus/ USMC then CW or Philipines I would tend not to bother with cadres of Indian Bdes as the lack of replacements make them worthless except for rear area security)

Use at least 2 of the understrenght ind divisions in Bn sized gps to ensure that no coastal port is ungarrisoned and use your 3 strong forces as reaction forces.

Dutch Infantry is rarely worth saving due the lack of late war upgrades Dutch engineers are a priority but should be spread to India/Aus and other exposed parts.

3. Of Vital importance is that you make sure that Northern India has at all times at least one strong formation and all coastal bases garrisoned by at least Bn sized forces if you dont a light raid could cause mayhem.

2. In my game with Sveint (DELETED DUE TO CLASSIFIED NATURE)

Andy

[tanker4145]

One thing I've been doing as the US is using small surface TF's, usually just one DD, sometimes a CL or CL and DD, just depends to attack his undefended transports in the DEI and PNG. If nothing else, it forces him to respond with more escorts or a surface TF to get you off his back. I haven't been caught by air with these small task forces many times. Yes, it's cost me a few DDs, but it seems to be working better than using larger surface TFs and has produced some good results. CL Perth alone sank two MLs and a Jap CL, with only minor damage in PNG. Not to mention if the ships you hit are loaded you kill some of the troops on board even if you don't sink them.

I also used the POW and Repulse to hit a bombardment group. I timed it right and hit a CA Bombardment group and not his battleships. Now he mainly uses larger bombardment TF's to defend against this, which means he can't be in as many places at once.

Like all the tips fellas, please keep them coming.

[sveint]

Are the IJN carriers better used sinking old battleships at Pearl, or blitzing through PI, DEI; sinking ships, blasting airdromes, and putting a crimp in any Allied effort to evacuate forces or extract oil/resource/supply/fuel?

Instinctively it seems like DEI is the better choice - it will speed up your conquest and allow you to sink alot of shipping. On the other hand, battleships is the one resource the Allies are short on, and they are immensly useful for bombardment.

Personally I'm leaning towards Pearl Harbor followed by immediate redeployment to DEI.

[sveint]

On another note, it seems Java is a much harder nut to crack than it was historically. Any tips for either side here? Should Japan rush for Java early or leave it for later?

[tanker4145]

No personal experience from the Jap side, but I agree, Java does seem a hard nut to crack at first. I think taking bases in Borneo, Sumatra, and Kendari is key. This allows you to isolate it by air and make it very hard for the Allies to support. Bring enough air power to bear against any airbases on Java and they should be shut down, or at least have most of their planes destroyed and this will make it easier. When I do take a crack at the Jap side, I don't plan on going for Java till I have it well isolated. Just my 2 cents.

[SaintEx]

Excellent thread, interesting remarks.

I've only messed around a little with the allies so far, and I think their strategic options are pretty well covered in the thread. The only thing I would add is a potentially contentious observation...

The Pacific war was a war of attrition, eventualy won by the ability of the Allies to absorb more damage than Japan was able to absorb. As such, it makes sense to engage wherever possible, particularly in terms of ground troops. This suggests that the allies should immediately put on pressure once Japan starts to slow after her initial conquests, meaning perhaps aggressive stances in China and Southeast Asia, as well as early counterattacks just about anyplace possible. I think that by mid-42 it becomes easy for the Allied player to sit around with powerful ground units unengaged for some months, which is a waste. In my game against the ridiculously stupid AI, for instance, I've transferred the two powerful Australian divisions received in '42 to Southeast Asia simply because I want them in contact with the enemy and there were no good places for them to fight around Australia.

Again, I know the AI is stupid, but I have a feeling that any allied strategy whatsoever will be better served by making sure that units aren't sitting idle, with the exception of vulnerable carriers in '42. Of course, prudence is key as well, but given the nature of the war, within the boundaries of prudence, the allied player might consider a more active response than his historical counterparts. This is reinforced by the fact that Japan benefits from interior lines of communication in an essentially naval war, allowing for relatively rapid redistribution of force. The obvious counter-strategy given the preponderance of allied resources is to engage in multiple operations at diametrically opposed points. What's more, if the japanese player follows Sveint's excellent advice, and digs in for the long years to come, then the allied player must ensure that he doesn't have much time to dig in, unless those years become long indeed and he's reduced to, at best, a marginal victory. Reacting in mid-'43 will already be too late.

Any opinions?

[Dereck]

You have to remember one thing about the real command structure in the Pacific War.

Until around the time of the Okinawa invasion in mid 1945 there was NO supreme American commander in the Pacific. That meant you had MacArthur with his Southwest Pacific thrust and Nimitz with his Central Pacific thrust. Even though both attacks were successful they still were a divided offensive.

Many history books I've read have cited the lack of a unified American command structure as potentially lengthening the war. Their point is if all the forces had been concentrated in one thrust, instead of the two there was, the Americans could have applied overwhelming force anywhere they desired and simply overpowered whatever the Japanese had to commit.

Don't know how true that is/was, but it may be something to possibly consider.

[SaintEx]

That's certainly a valid point, and one that has often been raised. However, playing this simulation, as well as others (my favorite covering the theatre is still the old "Pacific War" board game by Monarch Avalon) has led me to question that received wisdom. While it's true that a coordinated thrust would have allowed the allies to stomp over everything, that's pretty much what they did anyway as of late '43. In terms of the game, think of all those wonderful divisions...the three australians, the USMC divisions, the Americal, not to mention all the other army divisions and the RCT's, on top of the forces in southeast Asia, and the Chinese. What possible single operation could employ them all; and what single operation could draw enough Japanese aircraft into it to allow the air attrition? Furthermore, I'd just as soon keep the Japanese running around, burning up fuel and fatigue, than allow them to concentrate their defense in one place.

On the whole, I've reached the conclusion that while the allied strategy was developed for the wrong reasons (lack of coordination) it wasn't necessarily a bad strategy in itself. If anything, I'd suggest that it should have been taken further, with even more hrusts (e.g. a northern thrust down the kuriles) and a flexible response, seeing which worked best. Admittedly, the fractured command structure would have made it difficult in real life to adjust resources to take advantage of opportunities.

In summary, one deep thrust would have gained them more ground faster, but ground was less of a factor in the Pacific than in the ETO...if they had captured Iwo or Okinawa six or twelve months earlier, but left more ground, air and naval forces intact I'm not at all convinced that it would have been a worthwhile trade-off.

I've actually thought about this recently, how a simulation can help to give a different point of view on history...but then that's one of the principle reasons I've played them for so many years. Anyway, I freely admit that I might be wrong about this, but that's the conclusion I've reached, and I look forward to testing it out against a good PBEM player in a few months.

[Halsey]

There are also a few political implications that are not inherint in this game.
Sure, the allies can ignore the southern theatre. Too bad it wasn't feasable considering the political climate. The Australians needed supplies and support, and we were the only ones in a position to do that. I know a few Aussies dislike "Big Mac". Sure he had an ego the size of Texas. I don't dispute that.

One thing he did understand was what the politcal climate was going to be like after the war was over. It was the correct decision to go back to the Phillipines and kick the Japanese out out. The Americans owed them that. His military thrust from the south helped to link up the Asian theatre to the effort going on in the Central Pacific.

The Americans have enough resources available to do both. A bum rush strategy straight across the Pacific is a possibility. The question is, do you want to win? Or, do you want to play the game? Both can be accomplished. There are enough resources to make it happen.

Open up as many fronts, that you can support, against the Japanese. It will force them to spread themselves thin. It will allow an approach to the Japanese mainland from more than one direction. Giving you more flexibility for deployment, and forcing the Japanese to defend against every possibility of approach. Every victory, or defeat, bleeds the Japanese of the forces that they are going to need to stop or delay the final push. Plan your strategy before you deploy tactical assets. Decide what is important and what isn't.

[SaintEx]

What he said.

One little thing, though...if Macarthur had (and has, for those who still remember) few friends in Australia, it's also partly because he primarily relegated Australian troops to what he tended to call "mopping up" in New Guinea, and what the australians tended to call "three years of viscious fighting". My impression is that he never fully credited the Australians for the effort and for the sacrifices they made.

[Halsey]

What did they say about the Americans? "Overpaid, oversexed, and over here!"
"Big Mac" rarely gave anyone credit for their accomplishments. After all it was "his" idea, wasn't it?[;)]

[tanker4145]

I agree with you Halsey that you can choose to win or play the game. For me, it's more enjoyable to play the game. I never considered making just one big thrust as the Allies. To me it's more fun to have multiple thrusts so that's what I'll do. The two thrusts may come together at points, but that depends. In general, I like to go to where the Japs are. I don't mean take on their well prepared bases directly. But rather work to isolate them and make them as good as dead to the Japanese by bypassing and cutting them off.

Putting all my eggs in one basket for one big push doens't seem to make sense either because then the Japanese can do the same. If instead they are being pushed in Burma, PNG/Solomon, and around Tarawa, then he has to split his forces as well. This way, hopefully, when I go to invade one of his bases, I may only face a carrier division and a handful of cruisers and battleships. Rather, if he can concetrate, then I could find my invasion facing a large number of carriers and battleships, and lady luck will play a much larger part in that.

As for history, even with hindsight, I think they Allies did a dang good job. Yes they had a lot of stuff, but it's still tough to order men to their possible deaths. They did a good job of fighting where they had to and bypassing what they didn't. It still impresses me to this day what they accomplished. The thing that really amazes me, is the Doolittle raid. Imagine how tough that decision was to make. Talk about steel cahoneys! No, it's not repeatable per se in the game, and I could care less about seeing it since I don't need to increase the Allies homefront morale like they did in real life.

[SaintEx]

I've thought about that one. In AH's "Pacific War", the Hornet came equipped with a "Doolittle Raid" counter. If you managed to launch it against Tokyo then you got a few benefits, notably an increase in "initiative" (an important concept in that game) and a bettering of intelligence.

The Doolittle raid proved to be a boon to American intelligence efforts as the code traffic that followed it provided enormous input to the effort of cracking the Japanese codes. I suppose you could have some kind of rule that gives you a bunch of political points plus an amelioration in Allied sigint if you manage to launch a raid with at least mediums against Tokyo before '43. Of course, you'd have to allow a raid to take off from one place and land in another (or, more historically, just disappear). It would be kind of fun, though - although of course the fact that the Japanese player would know about the possibility would skew things.

[Halsey]

Thanks, I think most gamers try to approach wargaming this way. If you want to pick a game just to win, you should probably look someplace else.

The bum rush strategy in wargaming works occasionally. A finesse strategy is more enjoyable to play. If you screw up you still have troops and equipment around to make another go at it.[:D] The bum rush player will usually quit the game after his forces get tromped. That's one of the hazards of putting your eggs in one basket.[:@]

Dolittle was an amazing man. I got to shake his hand at an Indy 500 race back in the early 60's when he was the Grand Marshall. It will always be a moment I will never forget.[:)]

[DrewMatrix]

The bum rush player will usually quit the game after his forces get tromped.

That is why he is called a "bum" [:D]

[Dereck]

One thing to remember if you want to "think" realistic is that most military/naval leaders are by their very nature rather conservative.

This is not to say they won't exploit an opportunity or do something dashing, i.e. Doolittle's Raid. But overall they will tend to be consersative and not prone to taking chances if they don't have to. Unlike us, if they lose they could end up being dead or causing the loss of their troops.

For example, I remember reading somewhere, that in the Pacific the American planners had a simple formula of something like 3:1 when determining how many troops would be needed to invade an island/atoll. They also conducted bombardments to tilt the odds even further in their advantage (Iwo Jima had a 72-day air bombardment and a 3 day naval bombardment prior to the invasion).

Remember, the real generals and admirals realized that in war there was no second place.

[Feinder]

I think part of the challenge to finding "appropriate" PBEM opponents, is to find somebody who is compatable with your style (I liked the analogy of "bum rush" vs. "conservative (realistic)" approach.

In all fairness to "bum rushers" of WitP... Let's face it, nobody is going to ever finish a campaign game via PBEM. That being the case, an intense, all-or-nothing game can be exciting for both players, provided that suits both of their styles. If you know you're not going to finish, and you're really only planning on a month-long game or whatever, then why not play hard and agressive (beyond reason). Again, this intensity can make the game interesting in it's own right.

I'm a bit more of a conservative player (esp since I'm currently Allies in my own PBEM game). I'm in no rush to complete our game, and if we're still playing it after a year (and only in April of 42), then so be it. I want to see the clever tricks. I want to see the disasters. But I'm in no rush make them happen. My mindset is that, in real life, I have all the time I want to finish the game; and in game, I have all the time I want to finish the game (as Allies). If I was playing vs. an all-or-nothing person (who knows, maybe there's an invasion of Seattle on it's way, it's only 12-14-41), I'd probably roll my eyes. But then I'd be compelled to adapt my strategy or simply resign.

I think there's a point to both the intense-all-or-nothing game, and the conservative-realistic game. Both can be rewarding, depending on what you're looking for. And it can certainly be frustrating if the two expectations don't match.

Gawd. It sounds like I'm talking about relationships.

Then again, considering the length of WitP, maybe I am... :^P

-F-

[Halsey]

I think that's a very good way to put it. Communicate with your opponent before starting a game of this length. See if your gamesmanship is compatable. If it's not try to find someone who approaches the game in the same light. Historical, semi-historical, and way out there by Pluto.[:D]

[Dereck]

I'm sure this belief will spark comments but I'll go ahead anyway ...

I firmly believe that no matter what strategy the Japanese employ - whether the "bum rush" or "conservative" strategy if the game turns into a long campaign the Allies will ultimately end up the winner.

I'm not sure the Japanese can achieve a clear knock-out victory over the Allies unless the Allied side tries to meet them head-on early in the game. The Japanese just lack the industrial infrastructure to sustain a prolonged offensive over so many fronts. Not being interested in playing the Japanese I admittedly lack potential strategies in this regard (and expect comments in this area).

About the best the Japanese can do is take advantage of the 6 month period when they control the initiative and expand and then consolidate their gains to force the Allied player to start taking territory back. As long as they don't make the historical mistakes that Yamamoto did in trying to EXPAND the defensive perimeter they should be able to force a protracted campaign by the Allies. Once the Japanese deviated from the original war plan they began to run into problems. The Port Moresby invasion ran into difficulties and was indefinitely postponed and abandoned even though the Japanese tactically won the Battle of the Coral Sea. Psychologically they just were not able to handle the setback which resulted in the strategic victory for the Americans. Then the Battle of Midway, which resulted from a knee-jerk Japanese response to the Doolittle raid, resulted in a major loss to their carrier air arm of their fleet.

As for the Allied player ... as long as they don't get sucked into a major fight during those first six months and can build up the men and material that will eventually arrive I don't think they can help but win.

I don't think the Japanese player can expect to militarily defeat the Allied player per se. I believe the Japanese measure of victory will be how long they can keep the Allied player from achieving a victory much like the actual Japanese expectations. Remember, Admiral Yamamoto himself didn't believe he could defeat the Americans outright. All he had expectations of was winning for the first 18 months and then making it so hard for the Americans to take back territory that they would negotiate for peace on terms favorable to the Japanese. Unfortunately for Yamamoto, Pearl Harbor angered America like nothing before or since and nothing but absolute victory would suffice for America.