Given historical production levels, how does Japan ever win?

[Dereck]

The first "decisive battle" was Guadalcanal ... then it was the next battle and then the next. They never had a "decisive battle" other than a defeat.

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: dereck

Despite this at Midway the US was very lucky, a normalish result might have been preventing the invasion for the loss of 2 carriers each which would have extended the war by a further 6-12 months. With a worse result the US might have settled for a treaty (which was what the Japanese aimed for) since their main aim at that time was in Europe

"Officially" it was Germany first. But the simple fact of the matter was at the end of 1942 the US had around 400,000 troops in Europe but 500,000 in the Pacific. As far as the Navy goes they had 75% of their forces in the Pacific. Britain was worried about Germany and tried to get America to devote their attention to Europe and just hold the line in the Pacific while America was convinced they could fight offensively on both fronts at the same time.

It wasn't until the European war was over and Britain wanted to horn in on the American victory in the Pacific that they changed their tune and found out that the Americans didn't want them horning in on the victory after trying to keep America from fighting there in the first place.

I wouldn't call it "horning in". I'd call it honoring their commitment to us. Britain had very little to gain in the area postwar. They may have been able to hold burma for a while but they had already forseen the post-war loss/transfer of power in India. They certainly had no need to send a strong task force to cooperate w/ the USN and suffer more casualties in a war that had lasted for them, almost 6 years.

[Dereck]

This is the gist of what is in The Pacific Campaign: The US-Japanese Naval War 1941-1945:

No it was horning in. All during the war Churchill wanted more for Europe and didn't want the US to commit much to the Pacific.

Then when the US had all but won the war Churchill wanted to horn in so he could salvage what was left of the British Empire. Admirals like King realized this and didn't go along with it until Roosevelt ordered it for political reasons. When the Royal Navy did show up it ended up as a small task force in the United States Navy.

If it had been up to Churchill everything would have gone to Europe and nothing against Japan until after Germany was defeated.

[Twotribes]

Japan kept her Emperor because the US wanted her too. Not because they wouldnt surrender otherwise. The Emperor lost all power with our win. He is nothing but a figure head.

Though there is real doubt he ever had any power anyway, the Military pretty much did what they wanted.

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: dereck

This is the gist of what is in The Pacific Campaign: The US-Japanese Naval War 1941-1945:

No it was horning in. All during the war Churchill wanted more for Europe and didn't want the US to commit much to the Pacific.

Second part is true.

Then when the US had all but won the war Churchill wanted to horn in so he could salvage what was left of the British Empire. Admirals like King realized this and didn't go along with it until Roosevelt ordered it for political reasons. When the Royal Navy did show up it ended up as a small task force in the United States Navy.

Salvage what? India? They already had possession of it and had forseen their postwar loss of that colony (Burma as well) during the war. Burma? They had already retaken it with little help from us, 'cept transport aircraft. Singapore and Malaya? Who would they have gone to post war if not the UK?

The other stuff i don't understand. How did Roosevelt order that it was okay for the UK to "horn in"? What were the political reasons that you stated? What did the UK get out of the peace settlement that they wouldn't have gotten already? If they hadn't sent the RN to cooperate with the USN would they have received less? I don't see that they received anything out of the peace settlement that they wouldn't have received even if they said "sod off mates, it's your war now" after VE day. The fact is, they didn't have to send that "small task force" at all. They were just living up to their commitment.

If it had been up to Churchill everything would have gone to Europe and nothing against Japan until after Germany was defeated.

True. But it's irrelevant if it had been up to Churchill, it wasn't; however, that is the strictest construction of Germany first. Anyway, if salvaging the empire was such a priority why would Churchill have wanted everything to go to europe?

[Dereck]

Quoted from "The Pacific Campaign: The US-Japanese Naval War 1941-1945", pages 343-346:

"Having settled their internal differences about the future course of the Pacific Campaign in the usual way -- a fudge which once again deferred the decision on unity of command -- the American chiefs of staff accompanied the president to the second Anglo-American Quebec conference, code-named 'Octagon', which lasted from September 11 to 16. There was another serious row between Churchill and King about the British plan to return to the Pacific. A year earlier the Americans had been pressing for more British involvement in the war against Japan (they lent Nimitz's command the new fleet carrier HMS Victorious in May 1943, when the US Navy was very short of such ships, a useful but hardly decisive contribution). Mountbatten had not been able to do much in the Indian Ocean region, and the planned offensive in Burma was repeatedly postponed. But what would have been welcome in 1943 was decidedly unwanted late in 1944, when Japan was manifestly on the way to defeat and the war with Germany might well end by Christmas (or so it seemed at the time). A brief British flirtation with the idea of a new Anglo-Australian command in the Pacific came to nothing. The British had very powerful political reasons for wishing to be in at the death: they wanted to reclaim their Empire on the basis of participation in the final victory, even if the enemy was all but beaten already. The Americans did not want to be seen helping the Europeans recover their colonial empires and needed no help now from the Royal navy, thank you very much...

King took the view that the British, having spent three years objecting to the scale of American operations in the Pacific, were now trying to muscle in on an American triumph (which of course they were). He pointed out that the British had no bases of their own nearer to the scene than Australia and had no fleet train; the US Navy was not about to start carrying passengers. Churchill pressed the matter, and King said it would be considered. The prime minister seethed. He had offered the British Fleet, no less, and challenged the Americans to reject it. Once again Roosevelt had to step in with a soothing word, overruling his fleet commander for political rather than strategic reasons.

...

Thus is came to pass that the mightiest concentration of firepower ever assembled at sea by the United Kingdon -- four fleet carriers escorted by two modern battleships, five cruisers, and fifteen destroyers -- became Task Force 57 of the United States Pacific Fleet ... As far as MacArthur (and most other American leaders) were concerned, this was a private fight, and nobody else was going to join in."

I should also point out that the author, Dan van der Vat appears to be British so this isn't impartial American ramblings.

[Sharkosaurus rex]

Indian participation in the war to Dec 1941 was limited. But once the Japs came close to India he promised them independence five years after the war for their greater commitment. Indian efforts increased greatly at an important time. Britain made good its promise in 1949.

[irishman]

Unbelievable that you actually think that the granting of Indian Independence was related to a wartime promise!!!!!!!
The Brits only allowed Indian freedom when they realised that 600 million uppity subjects inspired by Mahatma Ghandi weren't going to take NO for an answer and that they didn't have enough bullets to subdue an entire continent .

[worr]

Does anyone think the Imperial Japanese player can win without an automatic victory?

It is less likely that a bone head mistake will be made by the allied player late in the war than early.

[anarchyintheuk]

Quoted from "The Pacific Campaign: The US-Japanese Naval War 1941-1945", pages 343-346:

"Having settled their internal differences about the future course of the Pacific Campaign in the usual way -- a fudge which once again deferred the decision on unity of command -- the American chiefs of staff accompanied the president to the second Anglo-American Quebec conference, code-named 'Octagon', which lasted from September 11 to 16. There was another serious row between Churchill and King about the British plan to return to the Pacific. A year earlier the Americans had been pressing for more British involvement in the war against Japan (they lent Nimitz's command the new fleet carrier HMS Victorious in May 1943, when the US Navy was very short of such ships, a useful but hardly decisive contribution). Mountbatten had not been able to do much in the Indian Ocean region, and the planned offensive in Burma was repeatedly postponed. But what would have been welcome in 1943 was decidedly unwanted late in 1944, when Japan was manifestly on the way to defeat and the war with Germany might well end by Christmas (or so it seemed at the time). A brief British flirtation with the idea of a new Anglo-Australian command in the Pacific came to nothing. The British had very powerful political reasons for wishing to be in at the death: they wanted to reclaim their Empire on the basis of participation in the final victory, even if the enemy was all but beaten already. The Americans did not want to be seen helping the Europeans recover their colonial empires and needed no help now from the Royal navy, thank you very much...

I think I've read the book. Sounds familiar anyway.

Churchill and King disagreeing isn't news. King, as a whole, disliked the British. That Britain's help in the Pacific in '43 was wanted by the USN (including King) and Britain's help in '44 wasn't has little to do with them. Commitments to the Med in '43 and Overlord in '44 prevented the transfer of most fleet units to the Pacific until later. The help was given when it was available not just when it was convenient or wanted by King and the USN. The lending of the Victorious may not have meant much to the USN but it certainly meant a lot to the RN. It's not like they had excess carrier capacity in '43.

Mountbatten wasn't able to do much in Burma in 1943 because of a lack of logistical support and manpower, both of which were tied up in commitments to Europe. The author takes great pains to show that Britain took the actions that it did in order to reclaim her empire. If this was so important why wouldn't have Britain diverted the immense amount of troops, aircraft and shipping used in the Med to retake Burma in '43 and Malaya thereafter (other than Churchill's soft underbelly theory, which I think shows his desire to defeat Germany first, not reclaim the empire first)?

IMO the author's wrong about "reclaiming the Empire" for the reasons i stated previously, as in there was no part of her Pacific empire that Britain did not already have control over, had reconquered or had a right to expect its return. Again, I think the author is dead wrong about Britain wanting to reclaim their Empire on the basis of participating in final victory. They were already participating in final victory, just the same way they had contributed when the allies were getting the shite kicked out of them in early '42. Their Empire in Asia consisted of India, Burma, Singapore and Malaya. They never lost control of India, even though they knew they would eventually lose it post-war. They lost and reconquered Burma with very little of our help. What does the author think was going to happen to Singapore and Malaya? Ignoring the wishes of those populations for the moment (we certainly didn't argue on their behalf), the UK had a right to expect their return. What empire did they have to reclaim? While I don't think it was our intent, the US was seen as helping the europeans recover their colonial empires even if that help was primarily through the successful prosecution of the war.

King took the view that the British, having spent three years objecting to the scale of American operations in the Pacific, were now trying to muscle in on an American triumph (which of course they were). He pointed out that the British had no bases of their own nearer to the scene than Australia and had no fleet train; the US Navy was not about to start carrying passengers. Churchill pressed the matter, and King said it would be considered. The prime minister seethed. He had offered the British Fleet, no less, and challenged the Americans to reject it. Once again Roosevelt had to step in with a soothing word, overruling his fleet commander for political rather than strategic reasons

King's view is King's view. It doesn't necessarily make it true. Churchill's objection to the scale of American commitment to the Pacific was based on his idea of what Germany first meant. Like the author, I'll speculate on someone else's thought process. I imagine his objections (in '43 and '44) were based upon the diversion of the one fundamental limiting factor in all of the allied operations . . . shipping. As to pointing out that Australia was Britain's closest base and that the RN didn't have a fleet train, I'd hope that someone lower ranked than King could have figured that out. If King and the author thought Britain was "muscling in" that's their opinion. The author states that Roosevelt overruled his fleet commander for political rather than strategic reasons. He doesn't mention what strategic reasons there were for not allowing the British to form a task force under USN control. I can't think of any myself.

Thus is came to pass that the mightiest concentration of firepower ever assembled at sea by the United Kingdon -- four fleet carriers escorted by two modern battleships, five cruisers, and fifteen destroyers -- became Task Force 57 of the United States Pacific Fleet ... As far as MacArthur (and most other American leaders) were concerned, this was a private fight, and nobody else was going to join in."

I believe it came to pass because those fleet elements were available and Britain was honoring their commitment. Britain also had naval assets committed to the Pacific other than what would become Task Force 57. Whatever MacArthur and those other leaders thought about the Pacific theatre being a private fight is irrelevant. Other countries had been attacked by Japan.

I should also point out that the author, Dan van der Vat appears to be British so this isn't impartial American ramblings.

Whether van der Vat has some sort of bias doesn't really matter. I will state that I'm definitely a biased american. I just don't think the author has proved his point. I'm not saying that Britain did what it did in the Pacific theatre for idealistic reasons, she wanted her empire back . . . the author just fails to note that except for malaya she already did.

[erstad]

ORIGINAL: worr

Does anyone think the Imperial Japanese player can win without an automatic victory?

It is less likely that a bone head mistake will be made by the allied player late in the war than early.

I've been meaning to do an analysis of that, but haven't had time. There are thousands of posts about how to win the war, but very few about how to win the game. (Rough paraphrase of a Frag comment from a much earlier thread: "Where are the spreadsheets with the victory points?")

Seems like with a day's work one could get a handle on this. Assume the Allies only use a couple a-bombs to avoid the victory shift. To get a Japanese marginal (at least) the Japanese need to run out the clock in March 1946 keeping the Allied score less than 1.74 times their score (which also keeps out of the Allied auto victory scenario)

Using previous games as an example, you could estimate the Japanese victory points due to Allied losses, and the Allied victory points due to Japanese losses. Using a spreadsheet with the base VPs, and making assumptions about how built up they are (in general, the Alliies should build everything to the max since they have beaucoup supply and engineers by the end of the war) you could play with some different assumptions about who owns what at the end and define what are the scenarios under which Japan wins, and then you could assess how reasonable those are. Note that ownership of 80% of the bases is probably pretty predictable; the big swingers are going to be the higher VP bases in China and the CP (DEI, while strategically important for Japan, doesn't have all that many VPs). Oh, and you need to figure how many points you are likely to lose for strategic bombing.

My guess is that you'd find that any scenarios where Japan wins would seem unlikely, not having done the analysis I'm guessing that they would have to hold the high VP islands in the CP (both for the VPs and to cut down the strategic bombing points) as well as a good chunk of china (again, keep the bombers out of Japanese air space), and while I don't have the same experience as many of you folks that doesn't seem very realistic.

But you never know. The results might be surprising. And even having the analysis would set some goals. (Hmm, to have a hope I need to get at least another 1000 points of Allied shipping losses so I have another 1750 point buffer for territorial loss/strategic bombing).

Of course, there will probably be very few PBEM games that make it to that point anyway.

[Knavey]

Anyone want to venture a guess at the number of people who marched down to the enlistment office on December 8th, 1941?

My grandfather was one of them.

Anyone want to venture a guess at the number of people who marched down to the enlistment office on September 12th, 2001?

I would bet the numbers are FAR different. Different generation, different attitude. The Japs had NO chance of ever winning the war. An entire generation like my grandfather would have assured that no matter the cost. Sure, some of it has to do with the media, but overall, that generation suffered as a whole. Fuel rations, clothing rations, blackouts, etc. They were in it together; stateside did not mean that life was a beatiful thing.

What happened to the people here as a whole after the next big attack on US soil? Back to the MTV, burger flipping, and air conditioning.

Again...different attitude from a different generation. I submit that Japan NEVER would have achieved a victory short of thier own unconditional surrender. THAT'S why we balance the game with victory points.

[Dereck]

He doesn't mention what strategic reasons there were for not allowing the British to form a task force under USN control. I can't think of any myself.

LOGISTICS - the US and British Navies used different weapons and ammunition hence the "fleet train" mentioned before. The Americans HAD one in the Pacific and the British - regardless of your ideas DIDN'T because they were not IN the Pacific.

[anarchyintheuk]

An AE or two of 5.25", 2-pdr ammo and whatever the destroyers attached to the task force fired (I'm sure there are other weapon differences, just can't think of any others right now) and a few AKs full of liquor and kippers aren't much logistically speaking. I'm exaggerating but it's not like their BBs or CAs were going to use their main armament much or that their ships used different kinds of fuel. Anything unique to British ship-building tech that couldn't be fixed at Ulithi or the USN's next advanced base was probably going to be sent home, if it could make it, or have whatever it needed shipped there. I didn't look (or didn't notice) when reading about the Pacific theatre to see if was a difficulty for the fleet train to keep the different needs of Task Force 57 adequately supplied. I'll see if i can find something about it.

[Dereck]

I'm not saying I AGREE with what they [King and other American field and flag officers] said but that was their reasoning. They did consider the Pacific war an American war. King didn't dislike the English people as a whole but didn't like their aristocracy (having something to do with his WWI experience with the British Navy).

There WAS a major concern when planning for the actual invasion of Japan in which British troops were to participate I believe. The problem there was that the American and British armies DID use different calibre of ammunition in their guns which meant a logistics "concern" of having to deliver both types to the right place.