Skip Mac and Monty. Where are McClellan's Fanboys?

[von Murrin]

Well, if you want to go all the way back to times before it was normal for general officers to be products of military academies and war colleges, you can find plenty of irredeemable characters.[:D]

[DrewMatrix]

you can find plenty of irredeemable characters

Or you can just look at the coterie on posting at this forum.

[von Murrin]

Boo! Hiss![:D]

[captskillet]

I think Robert E Lee was the charter member of the McClellan Fanboy club, that nitwit coulda ended the War in 1862 at Sharpsburg! [8|]

[Tom Hunter]

There is no question that Lee was a member of the Little Mac fanclub. He said as much when he compared Mac to Grant later in the war.

Mogami its true that it was very difficult to destroy and enemy army in the American Civil War but Grant did it 3 times.

I think that is a record for an American general. Washington destroyed 2 British armies and its arguable MacArthur destroyed 2 one Japanese (in the Philipines) and one Korean. Any other contenders?

[jnier]

I have to agree with Mogami here...McClellan was an average general, not "worst general I can think of" type of guy. Generals who qualify for the "worst of all time" get their armies destroyed and, in the process, lose the war. McClellan preserved his army, and inflicted a fair number of casualties against a fairly competant enemy. He was no military genius, but he was not a complete incompetant either.

[mogami]

Hi, Exactly. The Union could have left Mac in command for the entire war and still won.
The war was not won in the East. All the AOP had to do was tie up Southern manpower.
It might win the war but not likely.

I know all about how the AOP with it's number advantage was supposed to be able to destroy the ANV. But it never really had that kind of numbers advantage.

I'm not saying he was a great general. Just that he did't hurt as much as people say.
He assumed command when the Union Army required organizing and training.
Union Cav required almost 3 years just to train up and become more or less equal to Southern Cav (rthe repeaters helped)

While Mac did not destroy Lee he kept him busy.

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: jnier

I have to agree with Mogami here...McClellan was average general, not "worst general I can think of" type of guy. Generals who qualify for the "worst of all time" get their armies destroyed and, in the process, lose the war.

I had this debate on the Guns of August forum...

My candidate for the most miserable general of all is from WW1, Hunter-Weston, who commanded at Gallipoli.
From what I understand the likes of Haig did actually care about their men though it didn't always seem that way, but Hunter-Weston seemed to revel in getting them slaughtered.

[Ol_Dog]

Sounds just like Rev General Polk in Braggs Army

[m10bob]

Gen McClellan..................
Excellent commisary officer,great motivator and trainer of civilian rabble,turning them into soldiers.
Self-inflicted REMF of the first order..
IIRC,Lincoln sent him a message,along the lines of "If you are not going to use your army this week-end,may I borrow it?".
Possibly Gen McClellan was an inspiration for "The Peter Principle"....?

[EUBanana]

*Prepare to be bored with tales of donkeyism, move along if Gallipoli doesn't float your boat*

Some prize quotes I can find on the man... After all, hardly anybody has ever heard of him to my knowledge. Even the Aussies who hold Gallipoli dear can't really talk, as he commanded the Cape Helles front not the ANZAC front.

The landing at Cape Helles on the peninsula's southern tip, which was badly mismanaged by Aylmer Hunter-Weston, was at five locations ('Y', 'X', 'W', 'V' and 'S' Beaches) and consisted of 35,000 men. 15km further along the Aegean coast the Australian and New Zealand Corps - Anzacs - comprising 17,000 largely untried men were landed at Ari Burnu ('Z Beach'), 1.5km north of Gaba Tepe (where the landing was actually intended). William Birdwood's management of the Anzac's landing was markedly better than Hunter-Weston.

For all that the Turkish defending force was relatively weak, it performed remarkably well in holding back Hunter-Weston's force of 35,000 at Cape Helles. Of the five landing sites two ('W' and 'V' Beaches) came under heavy Turkish machine gun fire. The remaining three sites were quickly secured, yet inexplicably Hunter-Weston chose not to press forward and attack the remainder of the defence force, seemingly content with his initial gains.

A Marine battalion then took his place and were ordered to take it again suffering the same fate. He declared that none of Hunter Weston's orders were ever intelligible and always had to be changed or modified, or ignored. He could never give a definite objective for an attack but would end up every order with 'Go as far as you can and then entrench'. He described the battle of June 4th as a cold blooded massacre. The Naval Division for instance were ordered to attack a line a thousand yards wide with about the same number of men in the firing line after a totally inadequate artillery preparation. They advanced and were massacred with machine guns. The Collingwood battalion being wiped out. They had never previously been in action and were hurried up into the firing line without experience of trench warfare or any local knowledge of the ground. He criticised with equally severity the fate of the wounded many hundreds of whom he declares have perished simply from inadequate treatment. His opinions of the Headquarters Staff were really priceless. It is now definitely confirmed that Hunter Weston has fled the Peninsula. His departure is variously ascribed to enteric dysentery or sunstroke but it is certain he will never return having proved himself from the very start to be a perfectly incompetent commander. I realised that after my first conversations with him. He seemed to me not to have the smallest knowledge of war and to throw away many lives in the most wicked and reckless manner without having any clear idea in his mind of any objective. He was detested by his troops. I never in fact heard anyone say a good word for him. He was known as the Giggling Butcher.

He claimed he was "blooding the pups" when he made the inexperienced 156th Brigade of the British 52nd (Lowland) Division attack without artillery support during the Battle of Gully Ravine. Half the brigade became casualties of which over a third were killed.

I think the errors of General Gamelin, or pretty much any other general you care to name, pale into insignificance compared to what that retard did at Gallipoli.

[TSCofield]

I actually disagree with that. Had MacClellen remained in charge I don't doubt that the Union would have lost, or at least not fought, the battle of Gettysburg. Lincoln's whole political future, plus the future of the war entirely, hinged upon him winning the re-election. The Union did have the advantage in weapons, men, and supplies but wars are also won by the will of the masses. The Confederates had their base secured as far as fighting the war, the Union cause was not as secure, especially after all the losses (and perceived poor showing) of the Union armies.

Had the Union failed to win, and decisevely, at Gettysburg I don't doubt that the British (and maybe French) would have recognized the Confederate States. Having done that, and decided to send shipping to Southern ports the US Navy would have been in a very precarious situation-sink European shipping and risk an all out war with Europe or allow supplies into the South.

A Democrat elected in 1864 would have probably stopped all Union forces in the South and would have tried to negotiate a peace settlement with the confederates. I doubt that the South would have gone along with anything short of complete independence. They viewed this as a second revolutionary war with the Union as the Redcoats. In the end I think the result would have been an independent South, possibly with Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland added for good measure.

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: Beezle

There is one person who will say something complimentary about "Little Mac" (McClellan)!

I would disagree with the 'never chased off the field' comment. He was so scared he spent his whole military career "avoiding" if not exactly "running". He did retreat to Malvern Hill, too.

That is not "scared" in the physical courage sense. It is "scared" in the lack of moral courage to roll the dice. What General Bonaparte called "Two O'Clock in the Morning Courage". (Hooker was good at failure of nerve in the same way, although phycically brave and willing to be where bullets were flying).

The Union actually "won" the battle of Malvern Hill and, for that matter they won "Beaver Dam Creek" a few days earlier, but McClellan was convinced he was outnumbered by Lee, when he, in fact, had a numerical advantage of some 20,000 [8|]

So what did he do? He packed up the camping trip and gave up the Peninsular Campaign after so much sacrifice. Lee had defeated a numerically superior force possesing generous artilllery assets and unlimited supplies and sent them packing by taking chances and relentlessly attacking, while McClellan had imagined Rebs behind every elm tree. Lee deserves the credit, McClellan deserves some blame. In his defence, McClellan did oversee a very orderly retreat. I think they even got out most of the 20,000 beef cattle they brough twith them [:)]

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: SimHq Tom CofieldHad the Union failed to win, and decisevely, at Gettysburg I don't doubt that the British (and maybe French) would have recognized the Confederate States. Having done that, and decided to send shipping to Southern ports the US Navy would have been in a very precarious situation-sink European shipping and risk an all out war with Europe or allow supplies into the South.

I read an interesting book a while back on the subject of Confederate diplomacy in Europe, and the conclusion was that the CSA had precisely nil support from the Common Man in England, being a slave state at a time when the Brits were just at the tail end of a crusade against it and doing militant things about slavery, like pressuring Brazil.
And that Prime Minister Palmerston had no intention of getting involved in a, from the British perspective, pointless North American entanglement.

The CSA thought that British reliance on American cotton would sway British policy, but all that happened was the British colonies ramped up cotton production which undermined the CSA's position as leader (interestingly, even if the CSA won, this probably would have meant that their economic future as a separate agricultural state was going to be pretty dim).

There was some hassling over things like those ironclads the Brits wanted to sell, but it was fairly minor really.

In short I think the CSA didnt have a prayer once the Union made up its mind to do something about secession.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, Maybe so but he did care about his troops. Whatever they did after he was gone they did in a large part because of how he trained them.
He only lost one battle. He was never chased off the field and he inflicted greater loss on the enemy then he ever suffered.
He just didn't live in reality when it came to what the enemy was capable of or how many of them there were.
He would have been a decent division and then Corps commander and had he been these before commanding the Army he might have done better.

MOG. Your first sentence covers almost all of MacClellan's failings. He was a great
organizer, and he made the Army of the Patomic into a competent fighting machine.
His troops idolized him, at least until Antietam, because they knew he cared about
them. Unfortunately, that was how he got thousands of them killed. He had a Napoleon
Sized ego, but no b-lls.

Lee totally "flumixed" him at 7 days. The Union had the numbers and the material,
but Mac was so wrapped up in his "change of base" manuever he seemed to forget
there was a fight going on. Even after Lee punched him in the boot with his teeth at
Malvern Hill, Mac was still running away. The Army of the Potomac wasn't beaten, but
MacClellan was.

At Sharpsburg he again lost his nerve. After announcing he had a piece of paper with
which "if he couldn't whip Bobby Lee, he would go home." he proceeded to get another
case of "the slows" on the drive to and through the passes. Then he stood around the
whole of the 16th with his thumb up his butt as if waiting for the Rebs to march in from
all directions. Finally on the 17th, when he was given the best chance of the entire
war to end it in a single day, and all he had to do was have his entire Army attack
at dawn to simply overwhelm the Rebs, he tried to get "cute" again. Though he had
Lee outnumbered 2 to 1, he pushed in one Corps at a time and allowed each to be
beaten in detail by Rebs running from one crisis to another.

He was chased off several fields in the Seven Days, and eventually off the whole Pen-
ninsula. His losses were much higher at Sharpsburg than Lee's. His MAJOR problem
is that he just didn't want to believe that War involved fighting. He was forever saying
that he would "outmanuever" his opponant and they would have no re-course but to
retreat or surrender. Unfortunately for him, Robert Lee wasn't big on either option
and kept attacking him. Which in Mac's mind could only mean that Lee had superior
numbers. Never in the war did a single individual have more or better chances to
ACTUALLY BE the "hero" and "winner" that Mac wanted to be and thought he was. And
he failed miserably every time through moral cowardice. And then blamed anyone and
everyone else for his own failings. He was a total disaster.

[Hornblower]

Little Mac was a great organizer, which is what the union needed in ’61; he was adored by his men. And I truly believe that he cared for there well being, and didn’t want them to be squandered needlessly. There was no 2nd bull run, or Chancellorsville under his watch, and most certainly he wouldn’t have charged Marye’s Heights a dozen times like that a$$ Burnside. With hindsight being 20/20, yes he could have crushed bobby lee at Antietam had he committed the 5th Corp and the 3 divisions of the 6th. But he was too carefull. He wouldn’t loose the big battle, but nor would he win one.

[EUBanana]

Incidentally, given Picketts Charge seems to be frankly insane - and Lee was even warned by a clearer mind - whats the verdict on that?

A lapse of judgment in Lee?

or was Lee just lucky to be fighting incompetent Union generals most of the time? If Sickles wasn't about Gettysburg would have been even more clearcut it would seem.

[DrewMatrix]

My personal view of the reasoning behind Pickett's Charge (having never actually discussed it with Lee)

1) He was a fighter. He was reluctant to just walk away from the Union army even though they were in a good position

2) He was overconfident (or overly unconfident of the Union troops). They or more properly their command had yipped so many times in the past he just was used to trying ridiculous long-odds attacks and having them work.

If he hadn't had both those qualities he would likely _already_ have lost the army of N. Virginia but it the luck didn't always go his way.

[Tom Hunter]

The question "why did Lee launch Picketts charge" has been under discussion a long time.

In fact I bet the discussion started between Union officers before the charge even started.

I don't know why Lee did it either. I can make informed guesses but that is all they are. We all make bad decisions and have bad days and if your Robert E. Lee in July 1863 everyone in the world gets to know about them and wonder at them.

The charge might have worked on MacClellan. [;)]

[Hornblower]

I'm of the opinion that Lee thought that this was his best, and perhaps last chance to defeat the AoP, one more push would do it- and end the war. And, he overestimated the abilty of his troops to take the position.