Leaders
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
M-T, your remark "Unfortunately if we were to ignire every possible scenario that didn't happen we would be restricted to having a game that would only be able to follow the historical process" seems like a non-sequitur. It is certainly not a logical implication of anything that *I* have suggested in this forum.
By the way, IIRC His Majesty did offer to lend CVs to the USN for use in the South Pacific immediately following the Battle of Santa Cruz Isl. At the time it was judged that the IJN, having lost so much CV strength, was no threat in the Indian Ocean. So possibly removing CVs from the Bay of Bengal should be a risk that is better judged by the player than something with hardcoded penalties in the game mechanics.
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 20, 2001).]
By the way, IIRC His Majesty did offer to lend CVs to the USN for use in the South Pacific immediately following the Battle of Santa Cruz Isl. At the time it was judged that the IJN, having lost so much CV strength, was no threat in the Indian Ocean. So possibly removing CVs from the Bay of Bengal should be a risk that is better judged by the player than something with hardcoded penalties in the game mechanics.
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 20, 2001).]
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
mdiehl,
If you look on pages 331-335 of HP Wilmott's _The Barrier and the Javelin_ you will find a pretty comprehensive analysis of the British position on sending carriers to the Pacific. Politics, in essence, forbade (even though the idea had been a British idea to begin with).
The British COS essentially concluded that the risk was simply too great, for reasons that in part are outside the game and outside the control of any possible role the players could have in such a game. Thus, a hardcoded decision to delete this option is perfectly reasonable.
You do not want TOO much "realism" in this game, lest you find halfway through the game "your transport airplane has just crashed and you are dead. Game over." You want enough of the politics to get the right feel without getting bogged down in details. Ditto for leaders. I would rather have just a few leaders who would really make a difference represented. then, you can decide what commands really need the leadership and assign those leaders accordingly. Having to choose from a laundry list of leaders who are rated in a dozen skills each is the most boring possible use of my playing time, IMO.
The key to the game is restricting the player to decisions that are interesting and meaningful, and using the computer to handle the others. Personally, I think even the level of leadership representation in PacWar is too much.
If you look on pages 331-335 of HP Wilmott's _The Barrier and the Javelin_ you will find a pretty comprehensive analysis of the British position on sending carriers to the Pacific. Politics, in essence, forbade (even though the idea had been a British idea to begin with).
The British COS essentially concluded that the risk was simply too great, for reasons that in part are outside the game and outside the control of any possible role the players could have in such a game. Thus, a hardcoded decision to delete this option is perfectly reasonable.
You do not want TOO much "realism" in this game, lest you find halfway through the game "your transport airplane has just crashed and you are dead. Game over." You want enough of the politics to get the right feel without getting bogged down in details. Ditto for leaders. I would rather have just a few leaders who would really make a difference represented. then, you can decide what commands really need the leadership and assign those leaders accordingly. Having to choose from a laundry list of leaders who are rated in a dozen skills each is the most boring possible use of my playing time, IMO.
The key to the game is restricting the player to decisions that are interesting and meaningful, and using the computer to handle the others. Personally, I think even the level of leadership representation in PacWar is too much.
I am not sold on the idea of needing every leader O6 and above rated in the game. I do think some additional categories would add some depth to the gaming experience. Surely not as many as a dozen, but things like fatigue or maybe confidence would give some additional flavor. In PacWar, I tend to leave Wavell in as my top British commander for the length of the war since by mid '43 he tends to have 9's in the Air and Land leadership categories. Historically, he didn't last the war there due to a number of reasons. In game terms, Tanaka should always command the IJN fleet that is going to get into surface tiffs with the Allies, but he was relieved too. For the Japanese, "face" was important and if a leader "lost face", he had to go. A good leader with a high face rating would be extremely valuable to the IJN, someone who could "make good decisions" (per the AI) and still retain the job if he encounters a couple of reverses. Yamamoto would have an extreme "face" value, to go along with his other high ratings. Just an example, but hopefully it illuminates how an additional rating category fleshes out the game.
We don't need thousands of leaders, IMO. Having them add more "personality" to the game would in my mind add to the experience.
We don't need thousands of leaders, IMO. Having them add more "personality" to the game would in my mind add to the experience.
"As God is my witness, I thought that turkeys could fly"
I don't want to make this personal, but, since you have insisted, this is one of the reasons why War in the Pacific won't be "my design". Your arguments on just about everything appear not only to be pro-American, but anti-Japanese. Every criticism or suggestion you make is always to increase the Allied standing in the game, or to fight off something you see as helping the Japanese. You state using comparisons with a few cardboard games that Politics CANNOT be modeled, while ignoring other cardboard games and computer games that actually do model Politics, and quite effectively (Master of Orion series, Civilization II, among other empire building scenarios & Wargames).Originally posted by mdiehl:
M-T, your entire response was a non-sequitur built around a red herring. Very glib. Didn't address the point. Do what you will. It's your design.
By the way, IIRC His Majesty did offer to lend CVs to the USN for use in the South Pacific immediately following the Battle of Santa Cruz Isl. At the time it was judged that the IJN, having lost so much CV strength, was no threat in the Indian Ocean. So possibly removing CVs from the Bay of Bengal should be a risk that is better judged by the player than something with hardcoded penalties in the game mechanics.
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 15, 2001).]
Did I say that Politics SHOULD ALWAYS TOTALLY RESTRICT THE PLAYERS TO FOLLOW HISTORI EXACTLY!!?!?!? No, I said it should be a guideline, not a forced corridor, but you keep on ignoring it. You also ignore the proposals that Politics will affec the Japanese as much as the Allies. You said many times that this is only done to create a false situation where the Japanese can win. What I say, without politics, a false situation of the Allies during the first few months allow them to behave better than they possibly could have.
I looked at your revised OBC regarding improving aircraft manuverability with regards to speed, and the only things you changed were Allied planes, and VERY disproportionately. For example, the P-40E (24 Man) was compared with both the A6M2 (22 Man) and the Ki-61 (23 Man) as being totally superior. HOWEVER, the A6M2 was vastly more manuverable, and not that much slower than the P-40E. The Ki-61 is FASTER, has better climb rates, and it is more manuverable than the P-40E. Your changes only represented possible relations in manuverability with Allied aircraft, you did nothing to represent speed for Japanese aircraft. You once accused me and others for being 'Japanese-Sympathetic' or doing things just to benefit the Japanese, I propose you are doing the same for the Americans, if anyone is indeed doing anything of the sort.
Frankly, I am through with these stupid debates, with one person nagging that certain stats are too good for the Axis, and another whining that they are too poor for the Axis, or vice versa for the Allies. Speculation that politics is impossible is based on NOTHING, except your inability to change your position. Before you condemn the Matrix Games, how about you give them some credit. Before you insult anyone thinking contrary to you, maybe you should make sure that what you are saying is at or remotley close to the truth.
I have had my fill in debating with you. Your debates get to the point where if they don't agree with you, they are wrong. We are in hypothetical realms here, nobody is 100% wrong, nor 100% right. The only thing regarding any Pacific War game that I will ever do is to respond to reasonable bugs and historical modifications to the Pacific War OBC files. If people propose things that are totally inconsistant with accepted research or visible trends without sufficent support to back it up it, or act like a child when their proposals aren't accepted by the majority, it will not be included. I don't really care how you take it, because frankly I have had it with whiny people whose sole contribution is criticism and unconstructive demands.
Oh, and regarding British Carriers, there weren't any in the Indian Ocean during the Battle for Santa Cruz. After the Japanese incusion in April 1942 they were soon withdrawn for operations in the Medeterranean/Atlantic. It wasn't until 1943-44 until Carriers were in the Indian Ocean again. The HMS Victorious was lent, but, only for an insignificant period, and it wasn't up to the US Commander or British Commander in the Pacific, but, the British Command in London, not respresented in Pacific War or War in the Pacific.
Sure M-T, the only planes that I had changed were the Allied ones. *I told you that when you asked for the file, and specifically mentioned that I was still working on the IJN/IJA ones.* Those were the conditions on which I released the file to you. Very gentlemanly of you ignore that and to slam them here, though.
In addition, as to material facts, the Ki-61's top speed was 368 mph at 15945 feet. This compares to 362 mph for the P40E at 15,000 feet. These are of course ideal speeds with well-maintained a/c. Unfortunately the Ki-61 in-line (the HA-40 and the upgraded HA-140 a lightweight knock-off of the Daimler in-line used in the ME109) was very unreliable. "Chronically unreliable" is the phrase used by Stewart Wilson (Aircraft of WWII, Aerospace Publications, Fishwyck, Australia, 1998:104) but you can find similar comments in almost any text about the Ki-61. Under battle conditions, where IJA maintenance was notoriously bad, it probably performed comparably or worse than the P-40E. It was a competent middle-of-the-road aircraft, slightly behind the times in terms of performance when compared with other a/c designed in or before 1941 by other powers, but a decent enough plane for 1943. For example, the P-38 (designed from the XP38 in 1939) offered 389 mph at 20000 feet in the first production variant (the "D" variant). In my view teh Ki61 would rate somewhat better than the F4F and dead equal to the P40E (which could still outmaneuver the Ki-61 at high speeds).
Note also that the Mitsubishi A6M2's top speed was 328 MPH, which is why I rate the P40E as a better aircraft.
As to the rest... I agree that further conversation with you will be unproductive.
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 27, 2001).]
In addition, as to material facts, the Ki-61's top speed was 368 mph at 15945 feet. This compares to 362 mph for the P40E at 15,000 feet. These are of course ideal speeds with well-maintained a/c. Unfortunately the Ki-61 in-line (the HA-40 and the upgraded HA-140 a lightweight knock-off of the Daimler in-line used in the ME109) was very unreliable. "Chronically unreliable" is the phrase used by Stewart Wilson (Aircraft of WWII, Aerospace Publications, Fishwyck, Australia, 1998:104) but you can find similar comments in almost any text about the Ki-61. Under battle conditions, where IJA maintenance was notoriously bad, it probably performed comparably or worse than the P-40E. It was a competent middle-of-the-road aircraft, slightly behind the times in terms of performance when compared with other a/c designed in or before 1941 by other powers, but a decent enough plane for 1943. For example, the P-38 (designed from the XP38 in 1939) offered 389 mph at 20000 feet in the first production variant (the "D" variant). In my view teh Ki61 would rate somewhat better than the F4F and dead equal to the P40E (which could still outmaneuver the Ki-61 at high speeds).
Note also that the Mitsubishi A6M2's top speed was 328 MPH, which is why I rate the P40E as a better aircraft.
As to the rest... I agree that further conversation with you will be unproductive.
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 27, 2001).]
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
We appear to have gotten off the topic of leaders, no?
mdiehl, I don't understand why you appear to assume that M-T is acting on some hidden agenda. He is just trying his best, like the rest of us. Insulting him gets us nowhere. "non-sequiter built around a red herring"? Was that intended to communictae an idea or just throw in an insult? Quite frankly, it was opaque to me. Can you use the language to actually communicate an idea in the future?
I don't think M-T or anyone else is getting rich off this project. If people here want to argue historical points (like which aircraft really had what capability), then fine. If you disagree with someone, then that is okay, too. Just avoid the insults (of course, this is easier for me to say than to do, but I try and I do know how to apologize as opposed to simply saying "I give up trying to communicate with you.")
Ratchet down the pride, and ratchet up the interest in honest debate, and we can all have fun and enjoy this.
mdiehl, I don't understand why you appear to assume that M-T is acting on some hidden agenda. He is just trying his best, like the rest of us. Insulting him gets us nowhere. "non-sequiter built around a red herring"? Was that intended to communictae an idea or just throw in an insult? Quite frankly, it was opaque to me. Can you use the language to actually communicate an idea in the future?
I don't think M-T or anyone else is getting rich off this project. If people here want to argue historical points (like which aircraft really had what capability), then fine. If you disagree with someone, then that is okay, too. Just avoid the insults (of course, this is easier for me to say than to do, but I try and I do know how to apologize as opposed to simply saying "I give up trying to communicate with you.")
Ratchet down the pride, and ratchet up the interest in honest debate, and we can all have fun and enjoy this.
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Ed Cogburn
- Posts: 1641
- Joined: Mon Jul 24, 2000 8:00 am
- Location: Greeneville, Tennessee - GO VOLS!
- Contact:
Originally posted by grumbler:
We appear to have gotten off the topic of leaders, no?
Yep, so back to leaders. There's a discussion going on in the UV forum about Task Force sizes, and about breaking up TFs into "Task Groups". Now assume for the moment that a TF is composed of multiple TGs of different types (air combat, surface combat, transport, etc, etc). If your TF is attacked by a surface combat group, your surface combat TGs are the ones that defend the whole TF. If this is close to how they do things, then wouldn't we want the TGs to have their own leaders, like putting Halsey in charge of the whole TF, Mitschner for the air combat TGs, and Scott for the surface combat TGs. Leader skill would also decide the maximum size of the TGs and TFs.
This may require more available leaders, but I think it would be very useful, and a major improvement over PAC, but it means handling as many as say 6 leaders for a TF and its TGs (6 = TF commander plus leaders of 5 TGs). Too much? Not worth it?
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Andy Brown
- Posts: 177
- Joined: Tue Feb 20, 2001 10:00 am
Just a quick comment on Chanman's observation about the relationship between Chinese and British leaders.
The Chinese fought for Stillwell because he was American and the Americans had all the goodies Chiang Kai Shek needed to defeat both the Japanese and the communists and to reestablish dominance over China.
Even today, the British are far better at dealing with other nationals than the Americans. This is admittedly due to experience gained through 300 years of colonial exploitation but that's the way it goes.
Anyway, I wanted to quote the following passage from "Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion" by Ian Lyall Grant and Kazuo Tamayama. It deals with the fighting for the Yenangyaung oil fields.
"The Chinese commander, Lieutenant-General Sun Li Jen, was one of the bright young officers whom Chiang Kai Shek had sent to get their military education abroad. He had been educated at the Virginia Military Academy in America and spoke English well. General Slim was much impressed by his personality and character. As the Chinese had no tanks or artillery, Slim offered to put one squadron of tanks and E Troop RHA under his command for a proposed attack the next day. This offer, which was accepted ... greatly enhanced General Sun's prestige with his division".
The Chinese fought for Stillwell because he was American and the Americans had all the goodies Chiang Kai Shek needed to defeat both the Japanese and the communists and to reestablish dominance over China.
Even today, the British are far better at dealing with other nationals than the Americans. This is admittedly due to experience gained through 300 years of colonial exploitation but that's the way it goes.
Anyway, I wanted to quote the following passage from "Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion" by Ian Lyall Grant and Kazuo Tamayama. It deals with the fighting for the Yenangyaung oil fields.
"The Chinese commander, Lieutenant-General Sun Li Jen, was one of the bright young officers whom Chiang Kai Shek had sent to get their military education abroad. He had been educated at the Virginia Military Academy in America and spoke English well. General Slim was much impressed by his personality and character. As the Chinese had no tanks or artillery, Slim offered to put one squadron of tanks and E Troop RHA under his command for a proposed attack the next day. This offer, which was accepted ... greatly enhanced General Sun's prestige with his division".
Thr crux of the problem, with respect to design, will be the extent to which one confidently views the small number of cases that we have as anecdotal evidence as proof of the need for a systemic rule.
Chinese-American and Chinese-British relations provide a case in point. One view seems to be, based on some posts on this forum, that the relations between the higher level diplomats (Churchill-Chiang, or, I guess prior to 1944, Roosevelt-Chiang) would have affected the performance of junior officers and units in the field, if and when they were called upon to fight. It is one thing to say Chiang reserved the bulk of his army for the coming war with the Communists. It is another thing entirely to say that, as an extension of Chiang's reticence, Colonel so-and-so would, if attacked, fight better for an American commander than a British one.
Then too, if it is true that higher level relations affected lower level performance, would Chinese units really have fought more effectively for Stillwell, given the acrimonious relationship between Stillwell and Chiang, and between Stillwell and Chennault?
How does one model this? An acrimony rating when general x interacts with general y, or a more general rule (all units of nationality x fight poorly for a general of nationality y)? Maybe an overall acrimony rating for Chiang with a random probability that upon assigning an American or British commander in the theater, Chiang will be a pest?
Chinese-American and Chinese-British relations provide a case in point. One view seems to be, based on some posts on this forum, that the relations between the higher level diplomats (Churchill-Chiang, or, I guess prior to 1944, Roosevelt-Chiang) would have affected the performance of junior officers and units in the field, if and when they were called upon to fight. It is one thing to say Chiang reserved the bulk of his army for the coming war with the Communists. It is another thing entirely to say that, as an extension of Chiang's reticence, Colonel so-and-so would, if attacked, fight better for an American commander than a British one.
Then too, if it is true that higher level relations affected lower level performance, would Chinese units really have fought more effectively for Stillwell, given the acrimonious relationship between Stillwell and Chiang, and between Stillwell and Chennault?
How does one model this? An acrimony rating when general x interacts with general y, or a more general rule (all units of nationality x fight poorly for a general of nationality y)? Maybe an overall acrimony rating for Chiang with a random probability that upon assigning an American or British commander in the theater, Chiang will be a pest?
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Hi Andy and mdiehl, I guess what I am after is a bit more depth to the leaders than just Air, Land, Sea and Agressiveness. During the war, the various commanders had to make some hard decisions as to who to place in various commands. Their decisions were based on more factors than just their absolute skill values. Again, I am not suggesting anything that would force the player down a specific path, but would provide more factors for them to consider when selecting the commander. I used the CBI for most of my examples since that arena tends to illustrate so well. Incredible problems coupled with some of the strongest personalities (Chiang Kai Shek, Stillwell, Chennault, Mountbatten, for example) in command positions.
[This message has been edited by chanman (edited February 20, 2001).]
[This message has been edited by chanman (edited February 20, 2001).]
"As God is my witness, I thought that turkeys could fly"
How about this:
Each HQ or LCU/ACU has its readiness affected by factors governing the relationships in the chain of command and possibly also affected by international politics.
IMO *not* a covering rule that prevents or limits the players' abilities to deploy any units anywhere (because a simulation that allows departure from history must allow departure from history, and because I trust the players to be the best judge of strategic and operatonal decisions), but rather one that makes such deployments tricky.
Also, IMO, not something like an irritation rating assigned to each leader, since that would probably be too subjective.
Instead, reduce the rate of HQ preparation point gain, or reduce acu/lcu readiness gain, or possibly both if (provisional list, add candidates as you like):
1. The higher HQ is ABDA.
2. A HQ or base commander of nationality X commands subordinate ACU/LCU of nationality Y. (I'd exempt SWPAC and ANZAC from this penalty).
3. A TF commander of X commands a multinat. TF. (I'd exempt US/Aus/NZ TFs if the TF included only US, Aus, or NZ ships).
4. The higher HQ is any Allied HQ in China.
5. Any IJN HQ with subordinate IJA ACU, LCU, or base commanders (cumulative for each unit).
6. Any IJA HQ with subordinate IJN ACU, LCU or base commanders (cumulative..).
7. Any IJA HQ has the same objective as an IJN HQ.
8. Any IJA airbase has the same target as an IJN airbase.
For the RN/USN reverse-lend-lease possibility, so that such is not utterly prevented, the US could bid a number of turns of a/c production (or a number of months of delayed-entry of couple of USAF acus) as compensation for, say, the loan of a CV or two. The game engine makes a random determination as to whether the bid is successful, based on the VP-kill value of the desired ship, and the production-cost value of the bid a/c or the tactical strength of the loaned USAF acu. The bid succeeds or not. If it fails the player can attempt to renegotiate in the following week.
Each HQ or LCU/ACU has its readiness affected by factors governing the relationships in the chain of command and possibly also affected by international politics.
IMO *not* a covering rule that prevents or limits the players' abilities to deploy any units anywhere (because a simulation that allows departure from history must allow departure from history, and because I trust the players to be the best judge of strategic and operatonal decisions), but rather one that makes such deployments tricky.
Also, IMO, not something like an irritation rating assigned to each leader, since that would probably be too subjective.
Instead, reduce the rate of HQ preparation point gain, or reduce acu/lcu readiness gain, or possibly both if (provisional list, add candidates as you like):
1. The higher HQ is ABDA.
2. A HQ or base commander of nationality X commands subordinate ACU/LCU of nationality Y. (I'd exempt SWPAC and ANZAC from this penalty).
3. A TF commander of X commands a multinat. TF. (I'd exempt US/Aus/NZ TFs if the TF included only US, Aus, or NZ ships).
4. The higher HQ is any Allied HQ in China.
5. Any IJN HQ with subordinate IJA ACU, LCU, or base commanders (cumulative for each unit).
6. Any IJA HQ with subordinate IJN ACU, LCU or base commanders (cumulative..).
7. Any IJA HQ has the same objective as an IJN HQ.
8. Any IJA airbase has the same target as an IJN airbase.
For the RN/USN reverse-lend-lease possibility, so that such is not utterly prevented, the US could bid a number of turns of a/c production (or a number of months of delayed-entry of couple of USAF acus) as compensation for, say, the loan of a CV or two. The game engine makes a random determination as to whether the bid is successful, based on the VP-kill value of the desired ship, and the production-cost value of the bid a/c or the tactical strength of the loaned USAF acu. The bid succeeds or not. If it fails the player can attempt to renegotiate in the following week.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
I wouldn't want (or need) subjective abilities like congenialty/abrasiveness. Leaders should have concrete ratings for commanding subordinates, air skill, sea skill, and ground combat.
Also, I don't want to have three hundred leaders to keep track of... I want leaders to be an integral part of the game, BUT don't wanna run an employment personnel agency.
Also, I don't want to have three hundred leaders to keep track of... I want leaders to be an integral part of the game, BUT don't wanna run an employment personnel agency.
Hello...
The leader characteristics include: general competence, administration, naval actions, air operations, ground combat and inspiration and aggressiveness. In Uncommon Valor, we currently have about 2400 leaders. We will have a much greater number in War in the Pacific.
The player will not have to replace or juggle these leaders at all. They are already assigned to the units, groups and ships. He may, if he chooses, juggle them, however. He may also assign commanders to task forces that he creates.
We also have over 1000 historical pilots assigned to the air groups in Uncommon Valor, but we are not done researching them, yet.
The value of these leaders is historical accuracy. If the player never reassigns any of the leaders, the game will play just fine. If, however, the player wants to create a Black Sheep type of squadron, he can, by selecting the squadron leader and pilots.
It will be fun and easy to play.
Bye...
Michael Wood
Lead Programmer,
Matrix Games
[This message has been edited by Mike Wood (edited February 22, 2001).]
The leader characteristics include: general competence, administration, naval actions, air operations, ground combat and inspiration and aggressiveness. In Uncommon Valor, we currently have about 2400 leaders. We will have a much greater number in War in the Pacific.
Every unit, ship or air group has a leader. So, the leaders run from 2nd Lt. all the way up to admiral or general.Originally posted by Elvis1965:
I wouldn't want (or need) subjective abilities like congenialty/abrasiveness. Leaders should have concrete ratings for commanding subordinates, air skill, sea skill, and ground combat.
Also, I don't want to have three hundred leaders to keep track of... I want leaders to be an integral part of the game, BUT don't wanna run an employment personnel agency.
The player will not have to replace or juggle these leaders at all. They are already assigned to the units, groups and ships. He may, if he chooses, juggle them, however. He may also assign commanders to task forces that he creates.
We also have over 1000 historical pilots assigned to the air groups in Uncommon Valor, but we are not done researching them, yet.
The value of these leaders is historical accuracy. If the player never reassigns any of the leaders, the game will play just fine. If, however, the player wants to create a Black Sheep type of squadron, he can, by selecting the squadron leader and pilots.
It will be fun and easy to play.
Bye...
Michael Wood
Lead Programmer,
Matrix Games
[This message has been edited by Mike Wood (edited February 22, 2001).]
Mike Wood wrote:
The leader characteristics include: general competence, administration, naval actions, air operations, ground combat and inspiration and aggressiveness. In Uncommon Valor, we currently have about 2400 leaders. We will have a much greater number in War in the Pacific.
...
The value of these leaders is historical accuracy
You are aware that these are mutually contradictory statements, aren't you? You cannot accuractely determine any of these charactoristics about any single leader, let alone multiples of 2400 of them.
What this does is increase detail while leaving accuracy unchanged. Since 2400 leaders times 7 charactoristics per leader leaves you with 16,800 varaibles to assign (several times this with WitP, I understand) the errors you will inevitably make guessing what the values of these variables will all cancel each other out, leaving you where you started.
In AI games, presumably these leaders can be safely ignored. In PBEM games, however, the availability of such micromanagement will surely mean that some players will seek to be personnel officers in hopes of gaining any slight advantage. That means that other players will feel forced to do the same "in self defense."
I would urge you to reconsider adding this meaningless level of detail. Only a few key officers need to be represented in a game where the players represent strategic level leaders. The idea that Nimitz's boss and MacArthur's boss concerned themselves with the assignment of 2nd lieutenants of the line is pretty far-fetched.
The more I hear on this subject the more I am convinced this game will not be one I want to buy.
The leader characteristics include: general competence, administration, naval actions, air operations, ground combat and inspiration and aggressiveness. In Uncommon Valor, we currently have about 2400 leaders. We will have a much greater number in War in the Pacific.
...
The value of these leaders is historical accuracy
You are aware that these are mutually contradictory statements, aren't you? You cannot accuractely determine any of these charactoristics about any single leader, let alone multiples of 2400 of them.
What this does is increase detail while leaving accuracy unchanged. Since 2400 leaders times 7 charactoristics per leader leaves you with 16,800 varaibles to assign (several times this with WitP, I understand) the errors you will inevitably make guessing what the values of these variables will all cancel each other out, leaving you where you started.
In AI games, presumably these leaders can be safely ignored. In PBEM games, however, the availability of such micromanagement will surely mean that some players will seek to be personnel officers in hopes of gaining any slight advantage. That means that other players will feel forced to do the same "in self defense."
I would urge you to reconsider adding this meaningless level of detail. Only a few key officers need to be represented in a game where the players represent strategic level leaders. The idea that Nimitz's boss and MacArthur's boss concerned themselves with the assignment of 2nd lieutenants of the line is pretty far-fetched.
The more I hear on this subject the more I am convinced this game will not be one I want to buy.
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Ed Cogburn
- Posts: 1641
- Joined: Mon Jul 24, 2000 8:00 am
- Location: Greeneville, Tennessee - GO VOLS!
- Contact:
Originally posted by grumbler:
The more I hear on this subject the more I am convinced this game will not be one I want to buy.
I'll still buy it, but 2400 leaders is sheer overkill. The only thing I want to see is "hidden characteristics". Some extra officers would be great but not 2400 of them, and going down to air group commanders. With hidden skills, you can play a game with this feature off, and you get the historical leaders, but there is an option for some randomization of the skills that aren't displayed at first to the player. After some time using that leader the player starts to see some of the characteristics. The player has to use these leaders awhile before finding out if they are good or not.
Maybe we should have leaders just for the following:
Task Forces
Task Groups (sub-units of a Task Force)
LCUs
Airfields
Naval HQs (primary and air officer)
Army HQs (primary and air officer)
What else do we REALLY need?
Since it looks like UV won't have "bases" like PacWar, we won't need a "base commander", at least that's my uneducated guess.
Grumbler, if they put that many leaders in the game, just agree with your opponent not to change leaders for the lower levels, like air groups, individual ships, etc.
[This message has been edited by Ed Cogburn (edited February 24, 2001).]
Hello...
The option to allow leader changes can be locked for PBEM games.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:
...Grumbler, if they put that many leaders in the game, just agree with your opponent not to change leaders for the lower levels, like air groups, individual ships, etc.
Thanks for your input...
Michael Wood
[This message has been edited by Mike Wood (edited February 24, 2001).]
The option to allow leader changes can be locked for PBEM games.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:
...Grumbler, if they put that many leaders in the game, just agree with your opponent not to change leaders for the lower levels, like air groups, individual ships, etc.
Thanks for your input...
Michael Wood
[This message has been edited by Mike Wood (edited February 24, 2001).]
That many leaders, huh? Ok.... I tend to like the characteristics listed, though I still think some sort of prestige rating, especially for the Japanese, would add some detail. Not a stopper, the listed ratings look playable to me.
I do have a couple of questions, though.
1 - Are we going to have any influence over promotions?
2 - Will the leaders have a history? I realize that this would add to what seems like an already immense amount of data, but if the leader's ratings are "obscured", knowing the track record of each leader would be the only way to make decisions for subsequent commands.
After reviewing the list of ratings, I think that an interesting option would be to have the initial ratings randomized (or randomly modified). One of the things I note from my PW playing is that leaders like Fletcher are quickly relegated to the backwaters when such a decision wasn't such a no-brainer to Nimitz. Just a thought.
I do have a couple of questions, though.
1 - Are we going to have any influence over promotions?
2 - Will the leaders have a history? I realize that this would add to what seems like an already immense amount of data, but if the leader's ratings are "obscured", knowing the track record of each leader would be the only way to make decisions for subsequent commands.
After reviewing the list of ratings, I think that an interesting option would be to have the initial ratings randomized (or randomly modified). One of the things I note from my PW playing is that leaders like Fletcher are quickly relegated to the backwaters when such a decision wasn't such a no-brainer to Nimitz. Just a thought.
"As God is my witness, I thought that turkeys could fly"
Hello...
Most of the leaders are in the game because they were in the war. The lower grade officers will have a lot of "??" listed for characteristics. In time, these will be revealed. Most of the upper grade officers had reputations before the war started and can be counted on to have about the same beginning characteristics each time you play. An important thing to remember is that most of the characteristics are rather fluid and will change for the better or the worse with the fortunes of war. Aggressiveness and inspiration will take a hit if a commander is removed from a command too quickly. These too characteristics are also strongly influenced by what happens to the leaders command. Halsey may not be so aggressive after he has a couple carriers shot out from underneath him and if Gormsley actually wins a few battles, he might become less conservative.
Most leaders in the game are ships captains, regimental commanders or air group commanders. There is generally not a lot of use in switching them around. They are just there to look at, if you like detail. Even if you find a really hot regimental commander, the rules do not allow you to place a Colonel in charge of SOPAC.
The game is an operational level game, in which you play a theatre commander. However, if you look at the units, you will be able to account for every 37mm anti-tank gun or 81mm mortar on the front and see how many are broken down. You can tell every carrier captain how many percent of his fighters to fly CAP and how many dive bombers should fly anti-submarine patrol. You can even fly in supply with PBYs.
The game even lets you sweat out the repair time for a 57mm gun on a DMS sweeping mines in the forward area, if you care. Not only do ships at sea accrue damage each day, but they also have critical operational breakdowns.
In other words, for those who wish to play an enjoyable operational level game, this one works pretty well.
And, for those who wish to optimize front line forces with the best leaders they can find or mini-max the effectiveness of a minor harbor by using a fast seaplane tender or sneak troops in by submarine or take a new destroyer on a shake down cruise to break in the new crew, the detail is in the game.
I really like hat the game is becoming and feel that many of you, gentle readers, will as well.
Got to go code...
Michael Wood
[This message has been edited by Mike Wood (edited February 24, 2001).]
Most of the leaders are in the game because they were in the war. The lower grade officers will have a lot of "??" listed for characteristics. In time, these will be revealed. Most of the upper grade officers had reputations before the war started and can be counted on to have about the same beginning characteristics each time you play. An important thing to remember is that most of the characteristics are rather fluid and will change for the better or the worse with the fortunes of war. Aggressiveness and inspiration will take a hit if a commander is removed from a command too quickly. These too characteristics are also strongly influenced by what happens to the leaders command. Halsey may not be so aggressive after he has a couple carriers shot out from underneath him and if Gormsley actually wins a few battles, he might become less conservative.
Most leaders in the game are ships captains, regimental commanders or air group commanders. There is generally not a lot of use in switching them around. They are just there to look at, if you like detail. Even if you find a really hot regimental commander, the rules do not allow you to place a Colonel in charge of SOPAC.
The game is an operational level game, in which you play a theatre commander. However, if you look at the units, you will be able to account for every 37mm anti-tank gun or 81mm mortar on the front and see how many are broken down. You can tell every carrier captain how many percent of his fighters to fly CAP and how many dive bombers should fly anti-submarine patrol. You can even fly in supply with PBYs.
The game even lets you sweat out the repair time for a 57mm gun on a DMS sweeping mines in the forward area, if you care. Not only do ships at sea accrue damage each day, but they also have critical operational breakdowns.
In other words, for those who wish to play an enjoyable operational level game, this one works pretty well.
And, for those who wish to optimize front line forces with the best leaders they can find or mini-max the effectiveness of a minor harbor by using a fast seaplane tender or sneak troops in by submarine or take a new destroyer on a shake down cruise to break in the new crew, the detail is in the game.
I really like hat the game is becoming and feel that many of you, gentle readers, will as well.
Got to go code...
Michael Wood
[This message has been edited by Mike Wood (edited February 24, 2001).]
If one can "lock out" some things in PBEM, that is good.
I guess my question still remains "why"?
It is true that the leaders were there in history. So were the PFCs and BM1s. Why exclude them? Would it be "more historical" to include them?
Again, the issue is not so much what the player can see as what the programmer must do to make all of these unknowns work. Nimitz (a theater commander) didn't decide when to relieve ship's captains or squadron commanders. He had subordinates who did that. Ditto for Halsey, on a smaller scale. Halsey may have had a say in who commanded Task Forces or who his COMAIRSOPAC was, but he didn't know, nor care, who lead the 2nd battalion of the 5th Marines. If the 2/5 screwed up, Halsey blamed/relieved COMMARFORSOPAC, not the battalion commander.
Perhaps I am looking for a different game than Matrix is intending to produce. I want a game that has interesting decisions at a level appropriate for the player's "perspective." Having too much control is as conducive to a bad game as having too little control, IMO. Worse, it delays the game while thousands of bugs produced by the interaction of that massive detail are resolved.
I guess my question still remains "why"?
It is true that the leaders were there in history. So were the PFCs and BM1s. Why exclude them? Would it be "more historical" to include them?
Again, the issue is not so much what the player can see as what the programmer must do to make all of these unknowns work. Nimitz (a theater commander) didn't decide when to relieve ship's captains or squadron commanders. He had subordinates who did that. Ditto for Halsey, on a smaller scale. Halsey may have had a say in who commanded Task Forces or who his COMAIRSOPAC was, but he didn't know, nor care, who lead the 2nd battalion of the 5th Marines. If the 2/5 screwed up, Halsey blamed/relieved COMMARFORSOPAC, not the battalion commander.
Perhaps I am looking for a different game than Matrix is intending to produce. I want a game that has interesting decisions at a level appropriate for the player's "perspective." Having too much control is as conducive to a bad game as having too little control, IMO. Worse, it delays the game while thousands of bugs produced by the interaction of that massive detail are resolved.
