Why not free production?

[Sentinel Six]

As much as I would like to see player controlled production (properly modelled, with resource allocation, manpower etc) I understand that to do this in a proper manner would require a lot of work and the game designers have made a conscious decision not to implement some unrealistic half measure.
 
However I do think that a game of this scope and detail should really include Karelia and the Kola Peninsular. I know the designers have said that it would major addition to the map, but all the arguments about historical accuracy go out of the window if a major portion of the front is missing.

[Skanvak]

ah? there is not the northern part of the front?

On this point I will agree with Sentinel Six that is lacking (but adding it will need historical research...)

[Helpless]

However I do think that a game of this scope and detail should really include Karelia and the Kola Peninsular. I know the designers have said that it would major addition to the map, but all the arguments about historical accuracy go out of the window if a major portion of the front is missing.

I'm away from my sources, but iirc the size of Karelian Front was ~200K men. Which would be ~5% of active part of RKKA. German presence was even smaller. Besides historically it was very silent comparing to all other places. So I'd not qualify it as major.

Yes, I would like to see Karelia and Kola in WITE, but to add these 5 percent would require HUGE additional work which right now would hurt much the rest 95%.

[Cavalry Corp]

So that could be in an expansion MOD later ??

It all looks great but I can live without it - but would prefer it in.

[Sentinel Six]

ORIGINAL: Helpless

However I do think that a game of this scope and detail should really include Karelia and the Kola Peninsular. I know the designers have said that it would major addition to the map, but all the arguments about historical accuracy go out of the window if a major portion of the front is missing.

I'm away from my sources, but iirc the size of Karelian Front was ~200K men. Which would be ~5% of active part of RKKA. German presence was even smaller. Besides historically it was very silent comparing to all other places. So I'd not qualify it as major.

Yes, I would like to see Karelia and Kola in WITE, but to add these 5 percent would require HUGE additional work which right now would hurt much the rest 95%.

This is true but the region was strategically and politically important to the Germans. If the Germans had taken Leningrad in 41 the Finns would probably have been more willing to play an active part further north causing the Soviets to react.

I understand the reason for not including it (map etc) but it is a significant section of front that should be included at some stage if possible.

[freeboy]

again another reason why we need an editor, Those who want a historical straightjacket are happy as is, those who wish to explore more rational, than the historical counterparts, can play with the numbers of troops etc
 

[PyleDriver]

Were really tring to keep this a simulation, not a manipulation. We have what your asking for, an I would love to see this issue die. It really is old now, And ain''t going to happen, so please, lets save everyones time...

[Capt Cliff]

ORIGINAL: PyleDriver

Were really tring to keep this a simulation, not a manipulation. We have what your asking for, an I would love to see this issue die. It really is old now, And ain''t going to happen, so please, lets save everyones time...

I totally agree ... I couldn't find a picture of a dead horse sooooo *place here*

[joliverlay]

The number of tanks per panzer division discreased dramatically during the war because there were NOT enought tanks to keep the TOE up. The claims that there were plenty of tanks but not enough spare parts are just wrong. There may have been a shortage of spare parts as well but there were NOT enought tanks.

The conversion of motorized divisions to panzer was one problem, losses was another, but lack of production was the big one.

The tank shortage was so severe that tank batallions were removed from the panzer divisons wholesale and later some of the remaining ones were replaced with assult guns because they were cheaper to produce. Not as effective for offensive operations, but better than nothing. It is pretty clear that the Germans would have benefited from streamlined production and keeping the TOE at a reasonable level. They might have done as well or better to have produced just the Mark IV in very large numbers.

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: joliverlay

The number of tanks per panzer division discreased dramatically during the war because there were NOT enought tanks to keep the TOE up. The claims that there were plenty of tanks but not enough spare parts are just wrong. There may have been a shortage of spare parts as well but there were NOT enought tanks.

The conversion of motorized divisions to panzer was one problem, losses was another, but lack of production was the big one.

The tank shortage was so severe that tank batallions were removed from the panzer divisons wholesale and later some of the remaining ones were replaced with assult guns because they were cheaper to produce. Not as effective for offensive operations, but better than nothing. It is pretty clear that the Germans would have benefited from streamlined production and keeping the TOE at a reasonable level. They might have done as well or better to have produced just the Mark IV in very large numbers.

It's hard to keep all the myths straight when it comes to German Production before and during WWII. I've just been reading Adam Tooze's book The Wages of Destruction...it discusses quite a number of myths. Perhaps the spare-parts myth is a mythical echo of the actual subcomponent crisis that followed the attacks of Bomber Command on the Ruhr in 1943.

As for cases of "might have done better"...these are so numerous as to make the idea of a rational German production system seem even more mythical than all the other myths. To give one example, "they might have done better" not to have starved the 3 million Russian POWs captured in 1941, but instead to have used them to work in the agricultural sector which was in trouble from 1940 on.

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: ram300

ORIGINAL: itsjustme
The German economy wasn't put on a war footing until late 42/early 43.

I think Adam Tooze does a very good job of dispelling that notion in the Wages of Destruction.

Exactly. Thanks to Tooze, we now know that if anything Germany mobilized and standardized a bit too early to the extent that the rail system was
deteriorating by 1939 and the 109 had to remain as a frontline fighter for the whole war.

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: SnowBlue88

Meh, seems like most players who want free production only consider the German side of the situation and want a system where they can only do historically better. No one really seems to care how complex such a system has to be or provide an idea that wont screw what was historically possible. Keep in mind that a Soviet player will also have similar options and in the end you are going to end up in situations that would seem atrocious from a historical point of view, like Panther equipped division fighting JSIII and T-44 Tank Corps. Anyways to truly affect production as the 3rd Reich certain drastic changes would have to be made that would seem even more unhistorical, like mobilizing women. 

Some people might want these options but I think having that much change would just seem odd. Why not also include the whole political aspect and allow the Nazi's to recognize Ukraine and the Soviets to abolish commissars right from the beginning?

On the political front, the Germans would have the most to gain. If they had, say blown up Hitler and company instead of Todt in Dec 1941, they might have offerred better deals in Eastern Europe in general (they could have had a program of getting Slavs and Jews on their side instead of planning to exterminate most of Eastern Europe. See Tooze The Wages of Destruction for details.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: MengCiao



It's hard to keep all the myths straight when it comes to German Production before and during WWII. I've just been reading Adam Tooze's book The Wages of Destruction...it discusses quite a number of myths. Perhaps the spare-parts myth is a mythical echo of the actual subcomponent crisis that followed the attacks of Bomber Command on the Ruhr in 1943.

What is the spare parts myth...?

"Even more important was the problem of field maintenance. In order to be effective, vehicles require a steady supply of spare parts. This was a requirement that German industry completely failed to meet. Burkhart Muller Hildebrand blamed this situation on "some armament production officials". Albert Speer took the more standard course of blaming Adolf Hitler. Whatever the case, the German Army faced an almost continuous shortage of spare parts, a situation made even worse by the profusion of models, which made the ditribution of those spare parts that were produced even more difficult. At times, Army Groups received spare parts for tank models they did not even have."

R L DiNardo "Germany's Panzer Arm in WWII".

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: MengCiao



It's hard to keep all the myths straight when it comes to German Production before and during WWII. I've just been reading Adam Tooze's book The Wages of Destruction...it discusses quite a number of myths. Perhaps the spare-parts myth is a mythical echo of the actual subcomponent crisis that followed the attacks of Bomber Command on the Ruhr in 1943.

What is the spare parts myth...?

"Even more important was the problem of field maintenance. In order to be effective, vehicles require a steady supply of spare parts. This was a requirement that German industry completely failed to meet. Burkhart Muller Hildebrand blamed this situation on "some armament production officials". Albert Speer took the more standard course of blaming Adolf Hitler. Whatever the case, the German Army faced an almost continuous shortage of spare parts, a situation made even worse by the profusion of models, which made the ditribution of those spare parts that were produced even more difficult. At times, Army Groups received spare parts for tank models they did not even have."

R L DiNardo "Germany's Panzer Arm in WWII".

The myth would be that somehow a lack of spare parts uniquely explains something or other about what the Germans could have done wrong or right.
Note that nobody (certainly not Speer) in the tale of the spare parts has any real idea why there is a spare parts problem. Is it the transport priority assigned to spare parts? Is it a lack of transport in general? Is it a lack of planning? Or is it just one of 9000 other things that go wrong when your economy was never adequate for a major war?

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: MengCiao

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: MengCiao



It's hard to keep all the myths straight when it comes to German Production before and during WWII. I've just been reading Adam Tooze's book The Wages of Destruction...it discusses quite a number of myths. Perhaps the spare-parts myth is a mythical echo of the actual subcomponent crisis that followed the attacks of Bomber Command on the Ruhr in 1943.

What is the spare parts myth...?

"Even more important was the problem of field maintenance. In order to be effective, vehicles require a steady supply of spare parts. This was a requirement that German industry completely failed to meet. Burkhart Muller Hildebrand blamed this situation on "some armament production officials". Albert Speer took the more standard course of blaming Adolf Hitler. Whatever the case, the German Army faced an almost continuous shortage of spare parts, a situation made even worse by the profusion of models, which made the ditribution of those spare parts that were produced even more difficult. At times, Army Groups received spare parts for tank models they did not even have."

R L DiNardo "Germany's Panzer Arm in WWII".

The myth would be that somehow a lack of spare parts uniquely explains something or other about what the Germans could have done wrong or right.
Note that nobody (certainly not Speer) in the tale of the spare parts has any real idea why there is a spare parts problem. Is it the transport priority assigned to spare parts? Is it a lack of transport in general? Is it a lack of planning? Or is it just one of 9000 other things that go wrong when your economy was never adequate for a major war?

But the supposition was that there was a fundamental failure to provide spare parts to keep the Panzer Arm running in the field. This in part exacerbated production issues because the Germans couldn't maintain the tank park they did have, never mind one several thousand machines larger.

You can't describe it as a myth and then say "note that nobody...has any idea why there is a spare parts problem."

It also isn't a myth if you are the first one to describe it as such. The spare parts issue was fairly straightforward. They didn't produce enough.

Regards,
IronDuke

[PyleDriver]

That part is built into the game with the sheer numbers of vehicles and armor that go into repair as time and distance wears on...

[Sigurd Jorsalfare]

I have no problem with a fixed production. I`ll rather see efforts being placed in other aspects of the game. [8D]

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: MengCiao

ORIGINAL: IronDuke




What is the spare parts myth...?

"Even more important was the problem of field maintenance. In order to be effective, vehicles require a steady supply of spare parts. This was a requirement that German industry completely failed to meet. Burkhart Muller Hildebrand blamed this situation on "some armament production officials". Albert Speer took the more standard course of blaming Adolf Hitler. Whatever the case, the German Army faced an almost continuous shortage of spare parts, a situation made even worse by the profusion of models, which made the ditribution of those spare parts that were produced even more difficult. At times, Army Groups received spare parts for tank models they did not even have."

R L DiNardo "Germany's Panzer Arm in WWII".

The myth would be that somehow a lack of spare parts uniquely explains something or other about what the Germans could have done wrong or right.
Note that nobody (certainly not Speer) in the tale of the spare parts has any real idea why there is a spare parts problem. Is it the transport priority assigned to spare parts? Is it a lack of transport in general? Is it a lack of planning? Or is it just one of 9000 other things that go wrong when your economy was never adequate for a major war?

But the supposition was that there was a fundamental failure to provide spare parts to keep the Panzer Arm running in the field. This in part exacerbated production issues because the Germans couldn't maintain the tank park they did have, never mind one several thousand machines larger.

You can't describe it as a myth and then say "note that nobody...has any idea why there is a spare parts problem."

It also isn't a myth if you are the first one to describe it as such. The spare parts issue was fairly straightforward. They didn't produce enough.

Regards,
IronDuke

The mythic part would be that this was an isolated problem or that "produce enough" is a simple matter. For example, if you expect most of your tanks to be destroyed pretty quickly, why make any
spare parts at all? Or if there isn't enough fuel for them to go very far, why produce spare parts at all? Or if fuel and ammunition is all you are going to transport, why produce spare parts at all?
Other possiblities are: if spare parts are prioritized the same as all other subcomponents and there is a cascading subcomponent problem due to bombing then spare parts are
part of an entirely different problem. I suspect that the spare part problem is part of one of the strange overproduction problems: too many tanks were produced in relation to the
actual ability of the economy to support tanks. Production problems could go the other way as in 1939-1940 when there was an overproduction of artillery ammo.

[freeboy]

OK, so you guys are argueing about the issue, but in terms of the game there is an issue for how the game models real life, and the potential that truly existed for things to be very very much worse, or better. I guess you shouls look at the red armys huge problems with supplies... moving supplies with the advances etc. Hopefully the editor will allow us to model different OFF BOARD issues creating a number of WHAT IFS.. good luck guys

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: freeboy

OK, so you guys are argueing about the issue, but in terms of the game there is an issue for how the game models real life, and the potential that truly existed for things to be very very much worse, or better. I guess you shouls look at the red armys huge problems with supplies... moving supplies with the advances etc. Hopefully the editor will allow us to model different OFF BOARD issues creating a number of WHAT IFS.. good luck guys

There's a lot of interesting what-ifs...unfortunately for the way people have tended to game the war in Russia, they tend to make things
go even worse for the Axis and their allies. For example, the Germans built up their armor as fast as they could up til 1941. What if the
Russians with the same kind of foreknowledge did the same thing with better tank designs that were easier to produce? What if the Russians
quit supplying 70% of Germany's raw materials and food imports? What if the Russians doubled their investment in weapons (which they easily
could have done since they were running at 17% GDP into weapons and the Germans were running at 40%).

What if Stalin hadn't purged the Red Army?

In a game where the Russians are 5-6 times as strong in armor and commanders in 1941, the map would have to cover all of Germany since there would be a good chance that the Russians would attack first.

In a realistic range of what-ifs the game could only answer the question: could the Third Reich have survived to the end of 1942?