The Great Patriotic War (loki100 vs SigUp) ... SigUp welcome to read
Moderators: Joel Billings, Sabre21
RE: T37 (26 Feb - 4 March)
The germans are in good shape with strong territorial gains.
You will have an heavy task!
As german player I would attack in the South. The goal is the destruction of the red army and it's the best place to achieve it.
You will have an heavy task!
As german player I would attack in the South. The goal is the destruction of the red army and it's the best place to achieve it.
GHC 9-0-3
SHC 10-0-4
SHC 10-0-4
RE: T37 (26 Feb - 4 March)
ORIGINAL: STEF78
The germans are in good shape with strong territorial gains.
You will have an heavy task!
As german player I would attack in the South. The goal is the destruction of the red army and it's the best place to achieve it.
I tend to agree with you, I think SigUp is in a good position as I scarcely took back anything of value in the winter offensive.
I'm very grateful though to you and Frogmarc for the warning about the ability of a German player to just chop the Red Army up in the South to the point where it subsequently collapses. If I have a plan, it seriously involves not getting anywhere too near sharp knives or the chopping board [8D]
T38 (5 - 11 March)
T38 5 – 11 March 1942 "That dismal cry rose slowly"
The start of March saw the Germans launch an offensive that broke into the outer forts guarding Sevastopol, led by their 1 and 20 Infantry Corps.
More seriously, the Orel-Kursk sector saw a major offensive that struck the junction between Bryansk and SW Fronts. Briefly SW Front's 5 Army was threatened by encirclement but was able to pull back in good order to prepared positions on the Olym.

The offensive was led by 2 Panzer armies consisting of 5 separate Panzer Corps (24 and 47 on the southern axis, 3, 14 and 46 to the north) and supported by elements of 6 infantry corps (12, 13, 35 to the south, 17, 18, 40 to the north).
Of more interest than the renewal of the German offensive was the intelligence provided as to the deployment of the German armoured forces. Continued low level fighting around Moscow identified another Panzer Army and Soviet overflights.spotted what appeared to be a large build up in the Kharkov sector.
For the moment, Stavka was content to fall back rather than risk encirclement. Prepared positions along the Olyn, Sosna and Mecha rivers provided security and the mobile units of both SW and Bryansk Fronts moved up to prevent any deeper incursions.
Equally, now the Germans had moved out into the open, they fell prey to the powerful VVS forces on this sector. Numerous sorties were flown both in support of the defensive operation and to strike at the German advanced guards.[1]

(Soviet bombers in action south of Orel)
For most of the front, Stavka kept to a defensive stance. However, a German attempt to retake Klin was overwhelmed by 55 and 52 Armies. To the north of Vishny Volochek, 3 Shock kept up its offensive even as 4 Shock was pulled back into Stavka reserve.

OOB
For both sides, there was little significant changes to their overall numbers. Both the Germans and the Soviets added more artillery (2,000 for the Soviets, 200 for the Germans) and the Red Army commenced re-organising on the 1942a rifle division.

[1] - very noticeable increase in both the proportion of aircraft that actually make an attack and the losses inflicted.
The start of March saw the Germans launch an offensive that broke into the outer forts guarding Sevastopol, led by their 1 and 20 Infantry Corps.
More seriously, the Orel-Kursk sector saw a major offensive that struck the junction between Bryansk and SW Fronts. Briefly SW Front's 5 Army was threatened by encirclement but was able to pull back in good order to prepared positions on the Olym.

The offensive was led by 2 Panzer armies consisting of 5 separate Panzer Corps (24 and 47 on the southern axis, 3, 14 and 46 to the north) and supported by elements of 6 infantry corps (12, 13, 35 to the south, 17, 18, 40 to the north).
Of more interest than the renewal of the German offensive was the intelligence provided as to the deployment of the German armoured forces. Continued low level fighting around Moscow identified another Panzer Army and Soviet overflights.spotted what appeared to be a large build up in the Kharkov sector.
For the moment, Stavka was content to fall back rather than risk encirclement. Prepared positions along the Olyn, Sosna and Mecha rivers provided security and the mobile units of both SW and Bryansk Fronts moved up to prevent any deeper incursions.
Equally, now the Germans had moved out into the open, they fell prey to the powerful VVS forces on this sector. Numerous sorties were flown both in support of the defensive operation and to strike at the German advanced guards.[1]

(Soviet bombers in action south of Orel)
For most of the front, Stavka kept to a defensive stance. However, a German attempt to retake Klin was overwhelmed by 55 and 52 Armies. To the north of Vishny Volochek, 3 Shock kept up its offensive even as 4 Shock was pulled back into Stavka reserve.

OOB
For both sides, there was little significant changes to their overall numbers. Both the Germans and the Soviets added more artillery (2,000 for the Soviets, 200 for the Germans) and the Red Army commenced re-organising on the 1942a rifle division.

[1] - very noticeable increase in both the proportion of aircraft that actually make an attack and the losses inflicted.
T39: 12 – 18 March 1942
T39: 12 – 18 March 1942: 'Too sullied for Hell'
By mid-March, for the first time since October 1941, Stavka's focus was on the emerging crisis in the Ukraine. The front north of Tula lay quiet apart from a localised failed attack by the Kalinin Front. 3 and 4 Shock armies were pulled back from their Valdai offensive as Stavka sought to create a defense in depth south of Moscow.
In the Crimea, the German 1 and 20 Infantry Corps eliminated all the outer forts at Sevastopol.

According to intercepted messages [1], both had spent the winter enjoying the ease of Berlin while their colleagues in 9, 4 and 2 Armies had borne the brunt of the Soviet offensive [2]. However, the outer defenses held long enough for Stavka to rush fresh divisions from the Caucasus in order to improve the defense of the city itself [3].

The other major crisis was the fast developing Voronezh-Yelets offensive. Now into its second week, the northern prong gained 30 miles on the north side of the Sosna while supporting infantry tried to secure the flanks. In the south, gains were more limited as SW Front's resistance solidified but the Germans pushed 20 miles closer to Voronezh reaching the outskirts of Khokol and outflanking the Olym defenses.

(hasty Soviet positions near Khozkol)
To add to Stavka's unease, intensive air and partisan recconnaisance revealed that the build up detected at Kharkov was most likely a defensive belt prepared by the Germans over the winter. While it was clear that at least one Panzer Army was still deployed west of Moscow, it was equally clear that another Panzer Army had effectively disappeared. Whether this was in the rear recovering from the winter battles or preparing to support the German offensive was not clear.
Stavka's response was threefold.
First a major partisan assault on the rail lines supply the German offensive was ordered.

(partisan operation near Orel)
Second, a limited attack by 34 Army was ordered on the infantry on the flanks of the German armoured spearheads. South of Ismailkovo, the Germans were driven back. In the meantime, supported by SW Front's 26 Army, the rear of the southern German pincer was attacked and the rail junction at Marmyzhi was recaptured.

Finally, in order to disrupt the German build up, South Front and elements of the Transcaucus Front went over to the offensive for the first time since January. A series of attacks drove in exposed German infantry divisions.

In order to block any move north towards Tula, 2nd Shock was released from reserve and took up positions around Efremov, while the bulk of the mobile reserve of Bryansk and SW Fronts were held back to check any German attempt at converting their two spearheads into a single pocket.
In addition to the ground operations both sides committed substantial portions of their airforce to the battle. The VVS caught an unescorted attempt to resupply the German offensive, inflicting heavy losses on the Ju-52s. Overall 52 German and 245 Soviet aircraft were lost in the sustained air combat as Stavka moved some of its best fighter squadrons from Moscow to support the Il-2s and Pe-2s that constantly intervened in the ground fighting.

(Yak-1 refueling near Voronezh)
[1] ie an email discussion between us
[2] a major theme in Soviet propaganda leaflets circulated to the tired and exhausted German troops at Moscow.
[3] In part, I'm very impressed at the planning that has gone into this attack. To keep 6 elite infantry divisions out of the way all winter takes a lot of determination. On the other hand, this is also my own fault. I hadn't really realised how few replacements were reaching the formations in the Crimea so hadn't been rotating them in and out. In consequence I'd badly weakened my defenses. Hopefully 3 fresh divisions in a level 5 fort have some chance of holding out.
By mid-March, for the first time since October 1941, Stavka's focus was on the emerging crisis in the Ukraine. The front north of Tula lay quiet apart from a localised failed attack by the Kalinin Front. 3 and 4 Shock armies were pulled back from their Valdai offensive as Stavka sought to create a defense in depth south of Moscow.
In the Crimea, the German 1 and 20 Infantry Corps eliminated all the outer forts at Sevastopol.

According to intercepted messages [1], both had spent the winter enjoying the ease of Berlin while their colleagues in 9, 4 and 2 Armies had borne the brunt of the Soviet offensive [2]. However, the outer defenses held long enough for Stavka to rush fresh divisions from the Caucasus in order to improve the defense of the city itself [3].

The other major crisis was the fast developing Voronezh-Yelets offensive. Now into its second week, the northern prong gained 30 miles on the north side of the Sosna while supporting infantry tried to secure the flanks. In the south, gains were more limited as SW Front's resistance solidified but the Germans pushed 20 miles closer to Voronezh reaching the outskirts of Khokol and outflanking the Olym defenses.

(hasty Soviet positions near Khozkol)
To add to Stavka's unease, intensive air and partisan recconnaisance revealed that the build up detected at Kharkov was most likely a defensive belt prepared by the Germans over the winter. While it was clear that at least one Panzer Army was still deployed west of Moscow, it was equally clear that another Panzer Army had effectively disappeared. Whether this was in the rear recovering from the winter battles or preparing to support the German offensive was not clear.
Stavka's response was threefold.
First a major partisan assault on the rail lines supply the German offensive was ordered.

(partisan operation near Orel)
Second, a limited attack by 34 Army was ordered on the infantry on the flanks of the German armoured spearheads. South of Ismailkovo, the Germans were driven back. In the meantime, supported by SW Front's 26 Army, the rear of the southern German pincer was attacked and the rail junction at Marmyzhi was recaptured.

Finally, in order to disrupt the German build up, South Front and elements of the Transcaucus Front went over to the offensive for the first time since January. A series of attacks drove in exposed German infantry divisions.

In order to block any move north towards Tula, 2nd Shock was released from reserve and took up positions around Efremov, while the bulk of the mobile reserve of Bryansk and SW Fronts were held back to check any German attempt at converting their two spearheads into a single pocket.
In addition to the ground operations both sides committed substantial portions of their airforce to the battle. The VVS caught an unescorted attempt to resupply the German offensive, inflicting heavy losses on the Ju-52s. Overall 52 German and 245 Soviet aircraft were lost in the sustained air combat as Stavka moved some of its best fighter squadrons from Moscow to support the Il-2s and Pe-2s that constantly intervened in the ground fighting.

(Yak-1 refueling near Voronezh)
[1] ie an email discussion between us
[2] a major theme in Soviet propaganda leaflets circulated to the tired and exhausted German troops at Moscow.
[3] In part, I'm very impressed at the planning that has gone into this attack. To keep 6 elite infantry divisions out of the way all winter takes a lot of determination. On the other hand, this is also my own fault. I hadn't really realised how few replacements were reaching the formations in the Crimea so hadn't been rotating them in and out. In consequence I'd badly weakened my defenses. Hopefully 3 fresh divisions in a level 5 fort have some chance of holding out.
RE: T39: 12 – 18 March 1942
Heh, I like your "intercepted message" from the email.
I would guess that wherever the Panzers are now, they can be in far different places after the spring mud. That is, the offensive operations you're seeing near Voronezh may or may not correspond with large scale German plans for the summer.
Finally, the thought of attacking 3 fresh divisions in a level 5 fort that cannot be cut from supply is ... not encouraging. It's hard to see how that attack could succeed. I wonder how that compares with actual Soviet strength facing Manstein during May and June of 1942.
I would guess that wherever the Panzers are now, they can be in far different places after the spring mud. That is, the offensive operations you're seeing near Voronezh may or may not correspond with large scale German plans for the summer.
Finally, the thought of attacking 3 fresh divisions in a level 5 fort that cannot be cut from supply is ... not encouraging. It's hard to see how that attack could succeed. I wonder how that compares with actual Soviet strength facing Manstein during May and June of 1942.
RE: T39: 12 – 18 March 1942
So far this reminds me very much of the historical German 42 offensive. First clearing the Crimea and driving towards Voronezh. Does he still hold Rostov? He is definitely ahead of schedule. I think this going to be a very interesting and balanced 42 campaign.
RE: T39: 12 – 18 March 1942
ORIGINAL: jwolf
Heh, I like your "intercepted message" from the email.
I would guess that wherever the Panzers are now, they can be in far different places after the spring mud. That is, the offensive operations you're seeing near Voronezh may or may not correspond with large scale German plans for the summer.
Finally, the thought of attacking 3 fresh divisions in a level 5 fort that cannot be cut from supply is ... not encouraging. It's hard to see how that attack could succeed. I wonder how that compares with actual Soviet strength facing Manstein during May and June of 1942.
at the moment he has a lot of choice over 1942, I suspect he'll take Stef78s view and hit the south and try to badly weaken my army so either he wins in 42 or badly limits my scope for recovery in 43. The key at the moment is his inf divs are mostly around 8-9 cv and even the Pzrs are not much better - I can't hit his spearheads at Voronezh simply because they are double/treble stacked, if they were spread out then my cavalry corps could do some serious damage. I think this is why he is being cautious at converting an offensive that is driving me back to trying for a pocket.
But that means at Moscow where my defensive stacks are 15-20, he's going to really have to concentrate to make inroads.
Of course, come June (or the good weather turns in May), this will be different, not least he'll have more MPs.
At Sevastopol, I've just managed to get a defensive cv of 66 and his two attacking stacks seem to have 55-60. But he'll have numbers (say 66,000 - 30,000) and artillery on his side (I've extracted the HQ). I guess he'll also reduce the fort, even with failed attacks.

So its going to come down to luck. I think he'll have one shot before the April mud, and then 4 in May. If I can hang it to convert to corps then 2 corps plus a HQ will keep Sevastopol for me.
Apart from the VP, I don't really care. But he needs it more than me. Come June, that will be a real thorn in his side and will need German units to screen, so for a low diversion of my forces, it will tie down quite a lot.
ORIGINAL: Oshawott
So far this reminds me very much of the historical German 42 offensive. First clearing the Crimea and driving towards Voronezh. Does he still hold Rostov? He is definitely ahead of schedule. I think this going to be a very interesting and balanced 42 campaign.
I think it is balanced, in that from emails neither of us is exactly sure of our chances. My worry is he is a critical bit ahead of schedule, I think his Voronezh offensive will mean he jumps off for the Summer offensive already at the city, and he occupies not just Rostov but also the south bank of the lower Don.
So, at the least, that will help his logistics in the summer as he can build up his rails quite far east by the start of May.
On the other hand, I'll have an army of 7 million by the end of March, and enough formations in the rear to replace significant losses. Also even a few rifle corps in June give me either stopping power on a key sector or the ability to unlock a strong defensive line.
The weather gods could be quite important, we're on random weather so he'll have the advantage of being able to use clear turns in May and early June to make some gains, but most of the front is well into the 'north' sector, so it depends on just how much mud there is.
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T40 19 - 25 March 1942
T40: 19 – 25 March 1942: 'He threw a Menace at the Earth'
By mid march, around Moscow the weather changed dramatically as winter eased, and the frozen ground facilitated faster movement.

The result was a series of localised German attacks on the Tula-Kaluga sector. None threatened a major breakthrough but each made gains into the outer belt of the Soviet defences.
[1]

Keen to ensure no more ground was lost before the spring mud locked the front solid, Stavka released some reserves to strengthen the front and hopefully bring the German offensive to a halt.
More seriously, the improved conditions allowed the German Panzers to encircle the bulk of 26 Army dug in on the Olym.

[2]
Stavka initially ordered Masleninikov to commit the bulk of Bryansk Front's cavalry to break the encirclement. However, after limited reconaisance it became clear that the German concentration of armour was too strong and that any offensive would simply invite encirclement of the few mobile formations available to the Soviets.
With the bulk of the Soviet armour in the deep rear re-organising, and with the Spring thaw due in a few weeks, Stavka opted to preserve strength and pull back SW and S Fronts closer to the Don and place Bryansk Front on a defensive footing.

Despite this defensive stance in the centre, Soviet forces continued to probe at German deployments in the Don bend, driving in some exposed elements. In the north, 3 and 4 Shock Armies returned to the offensive. Catching 2 Infantry Corps off guard, Soviet forces split apart the Finnish units to the north from the German units to the south and made gains towards the rail junction at Podborovye.

Despite heavy losses in the last 2 weeks, slowly the Soviet army grew in size to over 7 million men, almost 80,000 guns, over 5,000 tanks and 5,000 aircraft deployed to the forward airfields.

Of the tanks, 2000 were light tanks (350 were obsolete T-26 and T-50s), 2000 medium tanks (80% T-34s, the balance Valentines and Matildas) and 1000 heavy tanks (almost all KV-1s apart from 1 brigade equipped with the few remaining KV-2s).

Losses for both sides in the last week were relatively heavy given the limited range of the fighting. The Red Army lost 33,000 men (many in the futile attempt of 26 Army to break out of encirclement) [3] compared to 13,000 Germans. However, the Germans lost 79 tanks in forcing the Olym while the Soviets only lost 18.
The air battles continued at high intensity. In the three weeks of the Voronezh offensive, the VVS lost 770 aircraft (mostly fighters) and the Germans 150. However, the VVS inflicted significant attrition on the German transports and level bombers. In addition, the German reconaisance effort was limited due to previous losses and the intensity of the VVS' commitment.

(Pe-2s and Yak-1s in action near Khozkol)
As the Soviet forces steadily increased in numbers, Stavka started to address the question of building up the quality of some formations.

Another regiment of Il-2s was promoted to Guards status in recognition of its contribution during the Voronezh battles as was 55 Army's 21 Rifle Division. Drawn from the Siberian reserve, and already experienced against the Japanese, it had been at the centre of all the vicious battles on the Klim-Povoravo sector. At the moment, it was probably the elite formation in the entire Red Army.
[4]
Equally, slowly, a number of armies were distinguishing themselves. The best commanders, and the bulk of the new artillery was allocated to to these formations rather than spread across the bulk of the Red Army.

[5]
[1] I think this answers the question as to where the missing Panzer Army is. It seems to be around Kaluga, this,plus the Voronezh offensive may indicate that Tula and the line of the Oka is the main target for the summer ... or may indicate that is simply where they are at the moment.
[2] The insert is from the end of my turn but it shows the relative strength of the encirclement. Now the good bit is that each stack has 3 units, mostly 2 Pzr and 1 Motorised and the average strength is around 6 cv (with the motorised formations around 4-5cv). In addition, the supporting infantry are mostly 3-5 cv but well stacked.
[3] I now take the view if I can't extract them, they may as well do some damage. In a series of fairly low odds attacks, I think I managed to knock out 7-10 German tanks, but since my units are doomed, I can only regard this as a minor gain.
[4] I'm really looking for chances to ease most of these units up to 8 victories. At that point, with luck on the random element, they will flip to Guards status. My problem is that at the moment 55 Army is holding my gains around Klim (till I can raise the forts to #2/3) but I'd like to pull it into reserve and let it attack a weak sector. With some care 5 or 6 of the divisions can be eased to Guards status by June.
[5] Ok none are going to reach the threshold of 75 victories soon but this starts to give me a framework to build the historic division of the Soviet forces into a small elite army and the bulk of the Red Army.
By mid march, around Moscow the weather changed dramatically as winter eased, and the frozen ground facilitated faster movement.

The result was a series of localised German attacks on the Tula-Kaluga sector. None threatened a major breakthrough but each made gains into the outer belt of the Soviet defences.
[1]

Keen to ensure no more ground was lost before the spring mud locked the front solid, Stavka released some reserves to strengthen the front and hopefully bring the German offensive to a halt.
More seriously, the improved conditions allowed the German Panzers to encircle the bulk of 26 Army dug in on the Olym.

[2]
Stavka initially ordered Masleninikov to commit the bulk of Bryansk Front's cavalry to break the encirclement. However, after limited reconaisance it became clear that the German concentration of armour was too strong and that any offensive would simply invite encirclement of the few mobile formations available to the Soviets.
With the bulk of the Soviet armour in the deep rear re-organising, and with the Spring thaw due in a few weeks, Stavka opted to preserve strength and pull back SW and S Fronts closer to the Don and place Bryansk Front on a defensive footing.

Despite this defensive stance in the centre, Soviet forces continued to probe at German deployments in the Don bend, driving in some exposed elements. In the north, 3 and 4 Shock Armies returned to the offensive. Catching 2 Infantry Corps off guard, Soviet forces split apart the Finnish units to the north from the German units to the south and made gains towards the rail junction at Podborovye.

Despite heavy losses in the last 2 weeks, slowly the Soviet army grew in size to over 7 million men, almost 80,000 guns, over 5,000 tanks and 5,000 aircraft deployed to the forward airfields.

Of the tanks, 2000 were light tanks (350 were obsolete T-26 and T-50s), 2000 medium tanks (80% T-34s, the balance Valentines and Matildas) and 1000 heavy tanks (almost all KV-1s apart from 1 brigade equipped with the few remaining KV-2s).

Losses for both sides in the last week were relatively heavy given the limited range of the fighting. The Red Army lost 33,000 men (many in the futile attempt of 26 Army to break out of encirclement) [3] compared to 13,000 Germans. However, the Germans lost 79 tanks in forcing the Olym while the Soviets only lost 18.
The air battles continued at high intensity. In the three weeks of the Voronezh offensive, the VVS lost 770 aircraft (mostly fighters) and the Germans 150. However, the VVS inflicted significant attrition on the German transports and level bombers. In addition, the German reconaisance effort was limited due to previous losses and the intensity of the VVS' commitment.

(Pe-2s and Yak-1s in action near Khozkol)
As the Soviet forces steadily increased in numbers, Stavka started to address the question of building up the quality of some formations.

Another regiment of Il-2s was promoted to Guards status in recognition of its contribution during the Voronezh battles as was 55 Army's 21 Rifle Division. Drawn from the Siberian reserve, and already experienced against the Japanese, it had been at the centre of all the vicious battles on the Klim-Povoravo sector. At the moment, it was probably the elite formation in the entire Red Army.
[4]
Equally, slowly, a number of armies were distinguishing themselves. The best commanders, and the bulk of the new artillery was allocated to to these formations rather than spread across the bulk of the Red Army.

[5]
[1] I think this answers the question as to where the missing Panzer Army is. It seems to be around Kaluga, this,plus the Voronezh offensive may indicate that Tula and the line of the Oka is the main target for the summer ... or may indicate that is simply where they are at the moment.
[2] The insert is from the end of my turn but it shows the relative strength of the encirclement. Now the good bit is that each stack has 3 units, mostly 2 Pzr and 1 Motorised and the average strength is around 6 cv (with the motorised formations around 4-5cv). In addition, the supporting infantry are mostly 3-5 cv but well stacked.
[3] I now take the view if I can't extract them, they may as well do some damage. In a series of fairly low odds attacks, I think I managed to knock out 7-10 German tanks, but since my units are doomed, I can only regard this as a minor gain.
[4] I'm really looking for chances to ease most of these units up to 8 victories. At that point, with luck on the random element, they will flip to Guards status. My problem is that at the moment 55 Army is holding my gains around Klim (till I can raise the forts to #2/3) but I'd like to pull it into reserve and let it attack a weak sector. With some care 5 or 6 of the divisions can be eased to Guards status by June.
[5] Ok none are going to reach the threshold of 75 victories soon but this starts to give me a framework to build the historic division of the Soviet forces into a small elite army and the bulk of the Red Army.
RE: T40 19 - 25 March 1942
Any news on this one? I've enjoyed following it.
RE: T40 19 - 25 March 1942
ORIGINAL: M60A3TTS
Any news on this one? I've enjoyed following it.
its not dead, but SigUp has very variable working patterns, so there are huge gaps in turns.
Its a problem (& frustrating) as I keep on losing the plot as to what I was trying to do, especially with all my rear area units. If the game wasn't potentially well balanced for 1942 (I think he has a chance at a clean win), then I think it would end, but playing out that phase is too intriguing to easily give up on
RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
Turn 41: 26 March – 1 April 1942: 'The Interdicted Land'
The final week of March saw the effective completion of the two major German offensives of the month. In the south, Sevastopol fell [1]:

The trapped units of 26 Army were destroyed at Livny while on the Moscow sector, the Germans continued their recent approach of localised attacks clearly designed to prepare for a later offensive [2]

In response, Stavka continued the offensive by 3 and 4 Shock Armies in the north against the German 2 Infantry Corps with the intent of deepening the breach between the German and Finnish sectors of the front.

Overall losses were light, the Germans had just over 8,000 casualties and the Soviets lost 88,000 (64,000 taken prisoner). The final desperate actions around Livny also saw another 31 German tanks destroyed. Air losses were light (29 axis and 67 Soviet).
Both sides, conducted their operations in the expectation that the spring thaw would soon set in, effectively ending major combat operations across the Front. On the Soviet side, elements of NW Front sought to occupy what had become a no-mans land in the Kalinin sector so as to construct a small bridgehead over the Tveritsa.
Overall Stavka was struggling to interpret both the implications of the German Voronezh offensive and their strategic intentions for the summer of 1942. For now, the bulk of the Red Army was ordered over to the defense. Major river lines were well fortified, but, to ensure some operational flexibility, well defended fortified bridgeheads were maintained. Once the focus of the German offensive became clear, Stavka intended to have the capacity to launch localised counterattacks if it could.

Despite the loss of the bulk of 26 Army, the Soviets had an army of 7 million men, nearly 80,000 guns, and 5,400 tanks. Given its sustained contribution over the winter battles, many front line VVS squadrons were drawn back into reserve to rest and re-organise. The result was that only 4,000 planes (mostly fighter bombers) were deployed at forward airbases [3].
Overall the Red Army had 385 Infantry Divisions (with an average of 10,000 men and 150 guns each), 184 Infantry Brigades (3,500 men and 50 guns each), 94 tank brigades (1,000 men and 47 tanks each), 16 Cavalry Corps (10,000 men, 160 guns each) and 13 Mountain Divisions (11,000 men, 150 guns).
3 rifle divisions [4] and 1 Cavalry Corps had been awarded Guards status.

My suspicion is that April will see little action, but there is a chance of snow as we are using random weather. If so, I'll not bother with turn by turn updates, so there maybe a bit of a gap before the next update.
[1] - this was the bad news, while I had no expectation of holding till June (and the creation of corps), this allows 2 powerful German corps to redeploy as SigUp wishes. If the fighting had lasted into May, that may have been a useful distraction.
[2] ... or not?
[3] – I have 5 airbases that were created in the winter, these have not been used (I'll probably give them to 15 Air Army when that arrives in June).
[4] – I'll supplement this by converting some of the paratroop brigades
The final week of March saw the effective completion of the two major German offensives of the month. In the south, Sevastopol fell [1]:

The trapped units of 26 Army were destroyed at Livny while on the Moscow sector, the Germans continued their recent approach of localised attacks clearly designed to prepare for a later offensive [2]

In response, Stavka continued the offensive by 3 and 4 Shock Armies in the north against the German 2 Infantry Corps with the intent of deepening the breach between the German and Finnish sectors of the front.

Overall losses were light, the Germans had just over 8,000 casualties and the Soviets lost 88,000 (64,000 taken prisoner). The final desperate actions around Livny also saw another 31 German tanks destroyed. Air losses were light (29 axis and 67 Soviet).
Both sides, conducted their operations in the expectation that the spring thaw would soon set in, effectively ending major combat operations across the Front. On the Soviet side, elements of NW Front sought to occupy what had become a no-mans land in the Kalinin sector so as to construct a small bridgehead over the Tveritsa.
Overall Stavka was struggling to interpret both the implications of the German Voronezh offensive and their strategic intentions for the summer of 1942. For now, the bulk of the Red Army was ordered over to the defense. Major river lines were well fortified, but, to ensure some operational flexibility, well defended fortified bridgeheads were maintained. Once the focus of the German offensive became clear, Stavka intended to have the capacity to launch localised counterattacks if it could.

Despite the loss of the bulk of 26 Army, the Soviets had an army of 7 million men, nearly 80,000 guns, and 5,400 tanks. Given its sustained contribution over the winter battles, many front line VVS squadrons were drawn back into reserve to rest and re-organise. The result was that only 4,000 planes (mostly fighter bombers) were deployed at forward airbases [3].
Overall the Red Army had 385 Infantry Divisions (with an average of 10,000 men and 150 guns each), 184 Infantry Brigades (3,500 men and 50 guns each), 94 tank brigades (1,000 men and 47 tanks each), 16 Cavalry Corps (10,000 men, 160 guns each) and 13 Mountain Divisions (11,000 men, 150 guns).
3 rifle divisions [4] and 1 Cavalry Corps had been awarded Guards status.

My suspicion is that April will see little action, but there is a chance of snow as we are using random weather. If so, I'll not bother with turn by turn updates, so there maybe a bit of a gap before the next update.
[1] - this was the bad news, while I had no expectation of holding till June (and the creation of corps), this allows 2 powerful German corps to redeploy as SigUp wishes. If the fighting had lasted into May, that may have been a useful distraction.
[2] ... or not?
[3] – I have 5 airbases that were created in the winter, these have not been used (I'll probably give them to 15 Air Army when that arrives in June).
[4] – I'll supplement this by converting some of the paratroop brigades
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RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
The map is very nice and it's interesting to see STAVKA's view of possible German offensives later in the year. It will be interesting to see how SigUp's actual operations compare.
April and May are tricky because you can't really count on either good or bad weather (which makes the game much better IMHO). It may be nervewracking for the players but it's great for us spectators!
Good luck as the spring continues.
April and May are tricky because you can't really count on either good or bad weather (which makes the game much better IMHO). It may be nervewracking for the players but it's great for us spectators!
Good luck as the spring continues.
RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
Why is it that one of the rifle divisions in Sevastopol surrendered? That's what happened in my game too. Shouldn't the all rout?
RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
ORIGINAL: jwolf
The map is very nice and it's interesting to see STAVKA's view of possible German offensives later in the year. It will be interesting to see how SigUp's actual operations compare.
April and May are tricky because you can't really count on either good or bad weather (which makes the game much better IMHO). It may be nervewracking for the players but it's great for us spectators!
Good luck as the spring continues.
Aye, I think this is the phase when random weather really spices up a game. You can obviously expect mud in April but there can be single turn gaps. This is *fun* as it makes every turn matter. My safety net is clearly SigUp can't risk wasting APs on HQBUs so any attack will be to push into my outer defences rather than a deep attempt at encirclement.
Its clear his I and XX Infantry Corps are well optimised so where they go matters as much as where the Pzrs are. My feeling from the recent battles on the Voronezh sector is the bulk of the German infantry is now quite weak (3-5 cv), given that most of mine are 1.5-2 (so often 10-14 defensive cv for a stack), then he can't use those to break the line (at best they are to guard the flanks).
In the recent fighting I think he used the Pzrs to break the front (deliberate attacks and thus loss of MPs), but those two infantry corps give him the tool to break through using infantry, thus making the Pzrs more dangerous.
As to what/where, its clear he still has the strategic initiative, so its his choice. What I have no feel for, is how robust is his advantage. We've seen a couple of AARs where the opening German attack has stalled and not been repeated, but we've seen others where they gain momentum as 1942 progresses.
If I was him, even if I was going for a 'lets eat the red army' strategy, I'd still risk a battle for Tula. While a well defended Oka gives me strong flank protection, it also means if the tide turns and I can attack it becomes a barrier to me in turn. Thats one reason why I've selected a number of sectors in the South where I've set up to try and defend the west bank of the major rivers rather than just pulling back behind say the central sector of the Don.
I also think if he swings south and leaves Tula in my hands,the type of build up I have there, plus the terrain, means he is risking powerful blows to a less protected rear (which feeds back into my analysis of the weakness of his infantry divisions).
Equally a frontal battle for Moscow (while I think he can gain a lot of terrain) runs into two risks. First it becomes a race against time for my formation of rifle corps (& since mud to mid June is likely its unlikely he'll win this race), also it again leaves my Tula build up needing to be screened.
So thats my guess, he has to go for Tula first, at least take the terrain and hopefully come out of it with some of my best formations trashed. The alternatives are too risky. I could be very very wrong [:@]
ORIGINAL: Oshawott
Why is it that one of the rifle divisions in Sevastopol surrendered? That's what happened in my game too. Shouldn't the all rout?
I was surprised. I wonder if its a port capacity thing? So two divisions could 'exit' via the port but not the third? Looking back there were all much the same for morale (42-44), so its not a case of single very weak unit falling apart.
RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
as you i would think of transport or port capacity
that was well thought anyway !
that was well thought anyway !
RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
I was surprised. I wonder if its a port capacity thing? So two divisions could 'exit' via the port but not the third? Looking back there were all much the same for morale (42-44), so its not a case of single very weak unit falling apart.
It might have to do with distance to port. Kind of like the problem saper222 had. Are you still holding Kerch? I believe this is the only port available for routing because it's below 20 hexes. Did the units route to Kerch?
RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
ORIGINAL: cpt flam
as you i would think of transport or port capacity
that was well thought anyway !
I think its capacity out of Sevastopol
ORIGINAL: Oshawott
I was surprised. I wonder if its a port capacity thing? So two divisions could 'exit' via the port but not the third? Looking back there were all much the same for morale (42-44), so its not a case of single very weak unit falling apart.
It might have to do with distance to port. Kind of like the problem saper222 had. Are you still holding Kerch? I believe this is the only port available for routing because it's below 20 hexes. Did the units route to Kerch?
I've had 7 units rout from that defeat in the Crimea over recent turns and they've turned up in various places, some at Novossoriysk but others at nearby non=port hexes. So I don't think its the issue that caught Sapper out, which really makes me suspicious its an exit port capacity limit (or total transport capacity in the Black Sea)?
RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
While honestly regretting the loss of your men, I would like to hear a reasonable explanation how on earth the Red Army should be able to extract three divisions inclusive all their guns and trucks in the moment the festung has fallen...? This is not Dunkirk and the RN, but an attack with 1oo1 heavy guns and air superiority by the Luftwaffe.
Take them as the brave rearguard blabla, but imho really nobody should have escaped, otoh the Germans should have taken more casualities storming one of the most fortified strongpoints in the world.
edit:
[8D][:)]
Take them as the brave rearguard blabla, but imho really nobody should have escaped, otoh the Germans should have taken more casualities storming one of the most fortified strongpoints in the world.
edit:
[8D][:)]
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charlie0311
- Posts: 940
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RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
Hey Wuf, I'll take a crack at it.
1) the Red navy may have been present for AA support.
2) the equipment could have been abandoned.
3) the evacuation could have been planned for.
4) Doesn't take that many ships if they're just packed with soldiers.
5) the game turn is a week, not the last moment.
1) the Red navy may have been present for AA support.
2) the equipment could have been abandoned.
3) the evacuation could have been planned for.
4) Doesn't take that many ships if they're just packed with soldiers.
5) the game turn is a week, not the last moment.
RE: T41 26 March - 1 April 1942
6)the port is in range of german siege arty and under attack
thx god I'm not a eyewitness of sevastopol's fall. ok, let it be, no need to elaborate this stuff further, at least not in Loki's fine AAR just now, as the tension rises to a maximum
(still sceptical, not that it matter, as we neither won't change the engine nor the results of the historicans in Berlin later, with their interpretation depending if it's the capital of greater Germania or the GDR, which is obviously a far more important question just now than yesterday's lost battles:) when & where will the German strike next?
thx god I'm not a eyewitness of sevastopol's fall. ok, let it be, no need to elaborate this stuff further, at least not in Loki's fine AAR just now, as the tension rises to a maximum
(still sceptical, not that it matter, as we neither won't change the engine nor the results of the historicans in Berlin later, with their interpretation depending if it's the capital of greater Germania or the GDR, which is obviously a far more important question just now than yesterday's lost battles:) when & where will the German strike next?


