warspite1ORIGINAL: philabos
Gamelin said the French could not go on the offensive until 1941, almost 2 years after the start of the war. He had been in charge of the army since 1933.
But apparently, according to some, less than 12 months before, this same man would have been full of the offensive spirit that was total absent during the Saar Offensive, where the French had approx 2:1 superiority in divisions (and more in front line divisions), a huge superiority in artillery and no German tanks to oppose hundreds of French.
Yes, if the Czechs had held off the Germans, then the French might have been willing to cross into Germany, but given what we know happened, it is more likely that they would have turned tail at the first sign of Czech reverse - no matter how minor - and that assumes they would have launched an offensive in the first place.
The chances that a British and German declaration of war in September 1938 would have ended in a similar stalemate to the actual war ranks pretty highly in my opinion - and as said, with the added problems that:
- World opinion would have been more sympathetic to Germany
- Britain and France would have been the aggressor states
- The Dominions had already made clear they did not support this move
- Public opinion in Britain and France not fully behind the decision for war
- The military - of either country - even less prepared for war than they were 12 months later
- The financial position of both countries not strong
- The position of the US more uncertain thanks to the British and French being the aggressor nations.
- In all likelihood the Polish and Hungarians would have fought over the Czech carcass.
- Soviet horror at French inertia would have been similar to their reaction to Munich and a Nazi-Soviet pact very likely to protect the Soviet position
