one inherent problem with this system

[Drex]

Originally posted by mdiehl
I'm not sure the surviving Marines' opinion is worth much unless they know alot about carrier ops. It remains the case that Fletcher was concerned about the potential for enemy CVs and submarines. Given the repeated torpedoing of Saratgoa in the same area, the loss of Wasp to subs, and the general consequences that befell overtasked CVs when enemy CVs were in strike range, there is no doubt to me that Fletcher made the right move.

The Transports' withdrawal that so greatly vexxed the USMC was primarily a result of the Savo Isl debacle. One can hardly fault Fletcher for expecting the CAs to do their job.

Morrison also implies that the Savo Island outcome might have been different had Fletcher stuck around. Mikawa's force was finally sighted and Fletcher's senior officers felt the Japanese would soon appear. At this time no Japanese CVs had been sighted nor did they have any proof that the American CVs had been spotted.

[mdiehl]

DadMan

Saratoga was torpedoed in January 1942 along the HI/Noumea line of supply, and pretty rattling submarine warnings in the Santa Cruz/Eastern Solomons/Solomons areas were issued during the 1st raid on Rabaul and again during the Coral Sea campaigns. Given the dearth of US CVs, it had been in these warnings repeatedly stressed that the loss of a US CV to submarine attack in these waters was unacceptable.

Drex

One can always guess that the CVs might have been able to get in a strike against Mikawa during the daylight hours. I'll have to look again at the position charts. IIRC, Mikawa could not have been intercepted until after dark anyhow. The bottom line with Savo is that the Allied crews were exhausted after 24 hours at general quarters, and the mission was complex (guarding two distinct landing groups). As a result the Allied defense was split, and the Allied skippers did not have a clear picture of where the northern and southern covering forces patrols would begin, end and the timing of the movements.

Change any one of three things: 1. fatigue level, 2. simplified landing ops (leave the secondary landings until the second day), or 3. better communication and the Allied TF would have turned in a better performance. Even so, Fletcher can't be blamed for thinking that 7 8"-armed treaty cruisers and their escorts should do a reasonabley good job of protecting their transports and putting the hurt into any enemy TF moving in the area.

Japanese CVs were thought to be in the area owing to intel warnings. It's not the "spotted" enemy CV that worries a CV skipper. It's the one you don't know about. The Japanese learned that the hard way at Midway. The USN did not need to learn that lesson. They knew it before the war began and they proved it at Midway.

[Admiral DadMan]

Originally posted by mdiehl
DadMan

Saratoga was torpedoed in January 1942 along the HI/Noumea line of supply, and pretty rattling submarine warnings in the Santa Cruz/Eastern Solomons/Solomons areas were issued during the 1st raid on Rabaul and again during the Coral Sea campaigns. Given the dearth of US CVs, it had been in these warnings repeatedly stressed that the loss of a US CV to submarine attack in these waters was unacceptable.

Yes the first time she was nailed was somewhere around Johnston Is. IIRC. I wouldn't imagine that a CV Admiral would take losing his primary striking weapon lightly.

[Drex]

The point is moot. Fletcher left, Savo happened and the Marines hung on to win Guadalcanal. My respect for Morrison has not been diminished. He was a Navy man and had the right to criticize his own. My own opinion about Fletcher is non-judgemental. there have been earlier threads that were not so kind about Fletcher.