New ideas on A2A in the next patch

[spence]

BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA - ATTACKS ON SHOHO

THE JAPANESE ADMIT TO 6 OR 7 TORPEDO HITS. THE NUMBER OF HITS CLAIMED BY BOTH THE YORKTOWN AND LEXINGTON AIR GROUPS, WHICH ATTACKED SEPARATELY, WOULD HAVE SUNK NORTH AMERICA. SO EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED HERE IS BEST EXPRESSED BY "SCRATCH ONE FLATTOP".

HOWEVER:

INITIAL TARGET SPEED = 20+ KTS
CAP STRENGTH = MAX OF 6 A5M AND 6 A6M (PRETTY WEAK0
FLAK STRENGTH = 288

6-7 TORPEDO HITS OUT OF 22 LAUNCHES BY TBDS = 29 TO 32%

[ChezDaJez]

Sure if you mine the data for facts that support you case and ingonre the ones that don't your conclusion might be supportable.

How about some specifics here. Exactly what Dec 41-Apr 42 data am I ignoring? This is the period that I am speaking of, not post-Coral Sea and Midway. Your attmpt to use US carrier performance from late-war periods doesn't cut it.

Tactically, the Japanese won 2 of the 1942 four carrier battles (Coral Sea and Santa Cruz), lost one (Midway) and drew one (Eastern Solomons). Only Midway was a decisive victory for the US and much of the credit goes to the US Navy's superior intelligence gathering abilities. In none of these battles did the US show any great superiority in fighter direction or in strike coordination, despite having the advantages of radar.

Your belief that the Japanese could not win a carrier battle during this early timeframe is substantiated by what? The only way you can propagate an American victory during this time is if YOU ignore the data from this period, which you have shown the innate ability to do on numerous occasions.

Chez

[spence]

BATTLE OF CORAL SEA

ATTACKS ON SHOKAKU - TWO SEPARATE GROUPS WITH TOTAL OF 21 TORPEDO LAUNCHES AND NO HITS (OF TORPEDOS THAT IS) (DONT HAVE ENOUGH EXPERIENCE WITH STATS TO KNOW IF IT MAKES A DIFFERENCE BUT THE RAIDS INCLUDED 12 AND 9 TORPEDO BOMBERS SO TWO ATTACKS OF 12 AND 9 OR ONE ATTACK OF 21 WHATEVER= 0 TORPEDO HITS)

INITIAL TF SPEED = 20+ KTS
CAP STRENGTH = HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO FIND THIS BUT THERE WAS SOME
FLAK STRENGTH = 744 (JUST SHOKAKU AND PLANE GUARD DD

0 HITS = 0 % HITS

[Drongo]

ORIGINAL: spence

BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA

12-14 BETTYS ATTACK ADMIRAL CRACE'S CRUISER/DESTROYER FORCE WITH TORPEDOS

INITIAL SPEED = 20+ KTS
CAP STRENGTH = NONE
FLAK STRENGTH = 1078 WitP combined

0 HITS = 0%

NOTE: THE RAID WAS LARGER AND SPLIT BETWEEN HIGH LEVEL AND TORPEDO BOMBERS, MUCH LIKE THE ATTACK ON FORCE Z. I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DETERMINE HOW MANY OF THE BOMBERS WERE HIGH LEVEL AND HOW MANY WERE TORPEDO BOMBERS. I USED THE NUMBERS 12-14 BECAUSE BRADY POSTED THAT AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN ATTACK THAT I HAD NOT MADE A POST ABOUT.

Australian official records list a total of 8 torpedo drops being made from an initial group of 12 torpedo bombers (G3Ms), followed soon after by a high level bombing attack by 9 Japanese bombers and then shortly after that came the mistaken attack by Allied level bombers.

I not sure whether these posts are aimed at establishing a comparison between the aerial torpedo delivery abilities of the two historical sides or are for the purposes of comparing each sides historical performance vs what they can achieve in WitP but I think you need to also include the target(s) ability to undertake take evasive manuevers at the time the attack was made.

"INITIAL SPEED" or best speed made during the attack is no real guide to how difficult a target is to hit with a torpedo unless we also know whether or not a ship was using that speed in conjunction with evasive manuevers at the point the torpedo attack was begun.

As an example for WitP modelling purposes, the Hiei could be given a speed of say 10 knots and have its manuever heavily reduced to represent its historical abilities on the day it was attacked and finally sunk. That way, you would start to get a relevent comparison between history and the game for running tests to establish torpedo hit rates.

Just as a last point, in terms of CAP I think rather than simply rating the targets CAP level overall, wouldn't it be more relevent to first establish whether or not the torpedo bombers were engaged or even directly threatened by enemy fighters during the period of the attack on the target? In the case of the two seperate torpedo attacks (VT-2 and VT-5) on the Shoho for example, in all accounts I've seen the TBDs were able to make their attacks without any enemy CAP presence (although VT-5 was briefly attacked by enemy fighters while enroute back to the Yorktown).

I'm only suggesting things like this because the amount of creative interpretation that goes on when only minimal facts are presented is probably one of the reasons why these debates drag out and then repeat some time later. I'd also suggest that maybe the torpedo facts and figures stuff could be moved to it's own thread?

Cheers

[spence]

Just as a last point, in terms of CAP I think rather than simply rating the targets CAP level overall, wouldn't it be more relevent to first establish whether or not the torpedo bombers were engaged or even directly threatened by enemy fighters during the period of the attack on the target? In the case of the two seperate torpedo attacks (VT-2 and VT-5) on the Shoho for example, in all accounts I've seen the TBDs were able to make their attacks without any enemy CAP presence (although VT-5 was briefly attacked by enemy fighters while enroute back to the Yorktown).

 
 
RE CAP:  From reading the ONI accounts of the different battles and from other sources it really seems that CAP seriously affected only the US torpedo attacks on 4 June 42.  Pretty much seems that the torpedo bombers of whatever side were not seriously disrupted or reduced by anybody's CAP other than on that day; prior to conducting their attacks, in any case.  Loss of  IJN torpedo bombers other than in those 6/04 attacks were principally to flak.  The torpedo attack on Yorktown did suffer some attrition to CAP but only 1 or 2  Kates were downed before launching .  Tomonaga and one of his wingmen were shot down by F4Fs chasing them through the flak but both launched first (and missed).  Another wingman jettsioned his torpedo then apparently tried to crash into Yorktown.   The other Chutai composed of 4 Hiryu Kates and one from either Kaga or Akagi managed to gain launch position without loss to either CAP or flak.  Only 4 launched though because the torpedo hung up on its mounting for the Akagi/Kaga plane.  2 of the 4 hit. 
 
The IJN CAP had dealt with 5 torpedo attacks on 4 June.

6 TBFs vs 28 A6Ms (5 TBFs shot down, 1 CAP shot down) - 2 launches/no hits
4 B-26 vs same 28  (2 B-26 shot down, 2 written off after return, 1 CAP shot down) - 2 launches/no hits
15 TBD (VT-8) vs 18 CAP initially with some launched during attack (oddly the weakest it was all morning other than at like 5 AM) all shot down - 1 launch maybe 2 - no hits
14 TBD (VT-6) vs 28 CAP but some out of cannon ammo - 10 shot down by CAP, one lost returning - 5 launches/no hits
12 TBD plus 6 F4F escort vs 42 CAP (strongest all morning plus one launched during attack) - 10 TBD and 2 F4Fs shot down, 6-7 Zeros shot down -  3 launches/no hits
 
The ONI reports aren't too bad if one doesn't pay any attention to the number of hits claimed.  Seem pretty accurate recounting loss of US planes and how they died...doesn't seem like IJN CAP did much at Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz to effect the torpedo attacks.   The TBDs/TBFs got to launch but missed.   The USN CAP didn't do much to the Kates at Coral Sea or Santa Cruz...in both cases the torpedo attacks on one carrier succeeded in scoring hits, against the other with a similar number of launches the Kates missed.    

[Ursa MAior]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: Ursa MAior

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker




Oh, please...it is a well known fact that Shermans needed a 4-1 edge to defeat anything mildly better. What does your comment have to do with established historical fact regarding the 4 CV battles of '42? Aside from trying to belittle the arguement in favour of maintaining unwarranted design driven advantages perhaps. Remember, history is not what we've been used to playing in GG designed games...he has a whack of personal and unwarranted assumptions/bias based on what I'd suspect is a youthful interest in the Pacific War that should have been eliminated over twenty years of gaming evolution and further study but have not. Frustrating but true.

I was cynical Ron. It was either spence or mdiehl who shared this "fact" with us in either the zero bonus or in the f4f vs zero thread.

Apologies for being the resident whipping boy who simply wants a decent historical game as advertised. So...you with the guys who want reasonable (historical) limits or what? You sound like you do. I'm no AFB or JFB or what have you.

 
Yep. To qoute Belinda Carlisle "We want the same thing". I am for historical limits. Although I am classed as an JFB (mostly by spence and his fruitcakes in crime) and sometimes have referred to myself as one, I dont want IJN kicking everyones' a$$ till 7/43 and then all of a sudden the roles are exchanged. BTW I play IJN because more people wants to play USN. Fro me it does not really matter.

[Ursa MAior]

mdiehl
I often loose my temper IRL, as well as in online forums. You and and your alikes keep me coming back, with your outrageous claims, which stink from imperial arrogance. Even though I was warned by many forum members, not to get into ANY kind of discussions with the fruitcakes in crime, I just cant stand to pass them by. Your narowsighted argumentations are so ridiculous, that in many cases I loose myself control. Wont happen again. Ignore is on.
 
BTW just because you use latin expressions, it does NOT make you an intelligent person.

[Don Bowen]

Gentlemen

I am a moderator of this forum and I will not tolerate personal insults.  Express your opinions and disagree as required, but posts with personal attacks will disappear as quickly as I find them.  If necessary the posters can disappear too.

Not kidding here.

[Ursa MAior]

Sorry, got carried away.

[Drongo]

ORIGINAL: spence

Just as a last point, in terms of CAP I think rather than simply rating the targets CAP level overall, wouldn't it be more relevent to first establish whether or not the torpedo bombers were engaged or even directly threatened by enemy fighters during the period of the attack on the target? In the case of the two seperate torpedo attacks (VT-2 and VT-5) on the Shoho for example, in all accounts I've seen the TBDs were able to make their attacks without any enemy CAP presence (although VT-5 was briefly attacked by enemy fighters while enroute back to the Yorktown).

 
 
RE CAP:  From reading the ONI accounts of the different battles and from other sources it really seems that CAP seriously affected only the US torpedo attacks on 4 June 42.  Pretty much seems that the torpedo bombers of whatever side were not seriously disrupted or reduced by anybody's CAP other than on that day; prior to conducting their attacks, in any case.  Loss of  IJN torpedo bombers other than in those 6/04 attacks were principally to flak.  The torpedo attack on Yorktown did suffer some attrition to CAP but only 1 or 2  Kates were downed before launching .  Tomonaga and one of his wingmen were shot down by F4Fs chasing them through the flak but both launched first (and missed).  Another wingman jettsioned his torpedo then apparently tried to crash into Yorktown.   The other Chutai composed of 4 Hiryu Kates and one from either Kaga or Akagi managed to gain launch position without loss to either CAP or flak.  Only 4 launched though because the torpedo hung up on its mounting for the Akagi/Kaga plane.  2 of the 4 hit. 
 
The IJN CAP had dealt with 5 torpedo attacks on 4 June.

6 TBFs vs 28 A6Ms (5 TBFs shot down, 1 CAP shot down) - 2 launches/no hits
4 B-26 vs same 28  (2 B-26 shot down, 2 written off after return, 1 CAP shot down) - 2 launches/no hits
15 TBD (VT-8) vs 18 CAP initially with some launched during attack (oddly the weakest it was all morning other than at like 5 AM) all shot down - 1 launch maybe 2 - no hits
14 TBD (VT-6) vs 28 CAP but some out of cannon ammo - 10 shot down by CAP, one lost returning - 5 launches/no hits
12 TBD plus 6 F4F escort vs 42 CAP (strongest all morning plus one launched during attack) - 10 TBD and 2 F4Fs shot down, 6-7 Zeros shot down -  3 launches/no hits
 
The ONI reports aren't too bad if one doesn't pay any attention to the number of hits claimed.  Seem pretty accurate recounting loss of US planes and how they died...doesn't seem like IJN CAP did much at Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz to effect the torpedo attacks.   The TBDs/TBFs got to launch but missed.   The USN CAP didn't do much to the Kates at Coral Sea or Santa Cruz...in both cases the torpedo attacks on one carrier succeeded in scoring hits, against the other with a similar number of launches the Kates missed.    

I agree with you that against torpedo bombers, AA probably created bigger difficulties than CAP for torpedo bombers in the majority of the '42 battles, certainly for the Japanese torpedo bombers. The obvious exception would be fighter wall that the majority of the US torpedo planes had to make their approach through at Midway.
 
That said though, I'd not rate the effectiveness of CAP in relation to torp bombers entirely on how many aircraft it could shoot down (nor AA for that matter) prior to them reaching their drop point. The interception by CAP of torpedo planes on their approach (or even the threat of it due to enemy fighter presence) could disrupt an attack due to the need to change plans, take evasive action, deal with the sudden loss of an attack leader or having to continue the attack in a damaged aircraft.
 
For example, you mentioned that the USN CAP didn't do much at Santa Cruz. Despite the poor fighter direction during the battle, from memory both the first and second strike Japanese torpedo bombers were engaged by USN CAP prior to reaching drop point. The first strike (target Hornet) split into two groups, one escorted by Zeros, one not. The latter group were engaged by a few F4Fs as they made their approach. Several Kates were hit, including that of the strike leader. This group scored no torpedo hits. The escort of the other group managed to effectively tie up the defending F4Fs that were encountered. This group scored the two torp hits on the Hornet. The second strike (against Enterprise) suffered worse at the hands of the USN CAP (particularly from one USN fighter pilot IIRC). Up to a third of the torpedo bombers were shot down or badly damaged by fighters prior to making their attack runs through the inner screen against the Enterprise. They failed to get any torpedo hits.
 
At Coral Sea, the majority of the Japanese torpedo bombers were able get past the CAP and make their attack runs without being engaged by fighters but this doesn't appear to be the case at Santa Cruz. It may well be that that more torpedo hits would have been achieved on USN CVs at Santa Cruz if not for the impact of the CAP intercepts on the Japanese torp bombers.
 
ONI - A ripping good read. I use it too as a place to find additional detail of the US side of things.
 
Cheers

[mdiehl]

Exactly what Dec 41-Apr 42 data am I ignoring? This is the period that I am speaking of, not post-Coral Sea and Midway. Your attmpt to use US carrier performance from late-war periods doesn't cut it.

The data I use are from Dec 1941 through June 1942. US CV performance during the "early war" period is mixed, as is the Japanese performance. During the Marshalls raid USN CAP was not substantial yet it was good enough to destroy Japanese efforts to get at USN CVs. Ditto for the February 1942 raid on Rabaul, in which USN CAP downed 16 of 17 attacking Betties.

In any case Spence seems to be posting some of the relevant data with some help from Drongo, despite the fear in some sectors in making this about data.

In the early New Guinea raids, Yorktown and Lexington launched what people would generally call "coordinated air strikes" against Japanese shipping in the Bismarck Sea. That was March 1942. In the opening stages of the Coral Sea engagement, Yorktown launched single ship coordinated strikes against Tulagi. In the actual CV vs CV part of the battle, both Yorktown and Lexington launched well coordinated strikes (unfortunately against Shoho). Their performance against Shokaku and Zuikaku was not as well coordinated. I think there is a "modeling" lesson there as well -- that once any CV (IJN or USN) has launched a strike, once the engagement gets really friskey, coordination of CAP, landing previous strikes, and launching counterstrikes becomes a really complex suite of operations that are inherently prone to inefficiency.

Basically the only engagements through Midway where people can point to really uncoordinated USN strikes is Midway itself. And there we may also see, courtesy of Parshall and Tulley's book, that Yorktown's strike was rather well coordinated as was Hornet's (but Ring, the strike leader of Hornet's group, simply decided to fly a westerly course rather than a southwesterly course).

Tactically, the Japanese won 2 of the 1942 four carrier battles (Coral Sea and Santa Cruz), lost one (Midway) and drew one (Eastern Solomons). Only Midway was a decisive victory for the US and much of the credit goes to the US Navy's superior intelligence gathering abilities. In none of these battles did the US show any great superiority in fighter direction or in strike coordination, despite having the advantages of radar.

I disagree. Both sides had a flaw in fighter coverage amounting to inadequate CAP. This substantially accounts for USN CAP not downing enough IJN torpedo bombers at Coral sea. An escorted torpedo bomber strike is much more likely to penetrate a weak CAP. An unescorted one is much less likely to penetrate a weak CAP, as the Rabaul raid by Yorktown more than adequately demonstrates.

That said, most scholars who have investigated it and written about it indicate that USN CAP control was superior to Japanese CAP control. I think part of the problem here and maybe this has affected your point of view, is that from the USN side there are plenty of documents from Halsey, Thach and others from the late 1942 period that frankly and realistically criticise USN CAP c.a.c. But "we can do better than this" does not equate with "therefore the Japanese were better at it during the early war." Japanese CAP c.a.c. at Midway was poor, and it was not especially good at Coral Sea in the defense of Shokaku and Zuikaku. On the American side, USN CAP during the Marshalls raids was *highly* successful. 

Your belief that the Japanese could not win a carrier battle during this early timeframe is substantiated by what?

It is a convenient straw man argument for you to assert that I believe that. I do not. I have claimed that using 4 Japanese CVs in the Midway operation was likely to result in a substantial IJN defeat in the face of Midway itself and any 2 USN CVs. Parshall and Tulley have substantially demonstrated the same. If you put any 4 IJN CVs in close proximity to any substantial US land base in the time frame of Dec 1941-end of war, out of range of Japanese supporting land based air, with inadequate recon, an absurd timetable for operations, and three heretofore unsuspected USN CVs on their flank, I submit that the Japanese would have lost *every* such encounter for substantially the same reasons that they lost at Midway, as documented by Parshall and Tulley.

For the record, if such a 4 on 3 encountered in the open sea, outside the range of either's land based air, any time from Dec 1941 to December 1942, I give a slight consistent tactical victory to the Japanese. But I wouldn't bet on either side escaping with all their CVs or sinking all the opposition's CVs. Likewise, were it the USN 3 CVs attacking a Japanese held Midway with four Japanese CVs hanging out on the flank I'd bet on a substantial Japanese victory.

The only way you can propagate an American victory during this time is if YOU ignore the data from this period, which you have shown the innate ability to do on numerous occasions.

You are as usual wholly incorrect. Not only have I not ignored any data, I am, indeed, of the two of us (you and I) the only person who has brought any data or logic to the conversation. 

[tsimmonds]

Looks like a good place for me to repeat my opinion on the subject, originally posted on 2/28/05:

The coordination penalty for strikes can be argued endlessly. There should probably be a benefit to a CVTF that is launching their first strike following replenishing in port. Or maybe instead the bonus should go only to strikes against bases. This would give a sop to those who feel that IJN needs to be given a bonus to re-create certain historical results (PH). After this first strike, things should deteriorate rapidly. I have studied the carrier battles in some detail, and I can see no evidence that either side had much success in coordinating strikes from more than a single carrier in 1942 at all. Point to one strike by either side in any battle in 1942 that featured planes from more than one CV simultaneously attacking the same enemy TF (except by pure good luck). USN developed considerable expertise here during their 1943 raids in the Central and Southwest Pacific. The IJN strikes at the Turkey Shoot, while futile, were not badly coordinated.

Where there ought to be a coordination penalty is for CAP. Throughout 1942, CAP from both sides was notorious in its inability to effectively come to grips with incoming strikes. Radars were still primitive, fighter direction was in its infancy, radio nets were overloaded (or non-existant!) and totally lacking in discipline; the inevitable result was that while CAP was very effective in shooting down the VT and VB that were intercepted, a feature common to every CV battle in 1942 is that many inbound strike elements on both sides were simply not engaged by CAP at all, and a large portion of CAP never engaged incoming strikes at all. This is where the present model fails IMHO.....
 
Whatever their practice and intentions might have been, as far as I can find, IJ never managed to organize a single multi-carrier strike against a US CVTF (until it was too late, at the Turkey Shoot). They came close at Santa Cruz, but elements of the first strike from Zuiho, Shokaku, and Zuikaku seem to have attacked separately in close succession, not together. They did all fly to towards the US fleet more or less together however. This one attack is why I suggested that if there is a chance for a coordinated strike, it should only be for the first strike following replenishment. Not that replanishment per se has anything to do with anything, but if all CVs are at 100%, that indicates that they have at least had some time to spend on planning for whatever it is that they are about to do..... 

Here is the entire thread....

[Knavey]

ORIGINAL: Charles_22


The kamikazes hit rate might had been worse, but they stopped Operation Olympic.

 
[&:]
 
What is the basis for this statement?  If you are referring to Operation Downfall (of which Operation Olympic was one of the 2 operations making up Downfall) then I would have to disagree that it was stopped because of kamikazes. 
 
I would submit that Operation Downfall was only stopped because Japan surrendered.  It would have happened had Japan not decided to accept the surrender terms.

[ChezDaJez]

The data I use are from Dec 1941 through June 1942. US CV performance during the "early war" period is mixed, as is the Japanese performance. During the Marshalls raid USN CAP was not substantial yet it was good enough to destroy Japanese efforts to get at USN CVs. Ditto for the February 1942 raid on Rabaul, in which USN CAP downed 16 of 17 attacking Betties.

 
How do you figure that the USN CAP was "good enough to destroy Japanese efforts to get at USN CVs?" The Japanese launched two raids against Enterprise with Nells. 5 attacked in the first group and were able to penetrate the fleet defenses, drop their bombs and leave the area with only 1 Nell damaged by combined CAP/AA fire. The Enterprise was lucky to escape with only a near miss and some gasoline spilled on her decks from the damged bomber when it tried to kamikaze her. Of the 7 Wilcats on CAP, only two managed to intercept and the attack was ineffectual due to multiple jammed guns.
 
The second raid consisted of just 2 Nells. The 9 F4Fs on CAP failed to intercept even they were detected 25 miles out. AA managed to damage one but they both dropped their bombs achieving near misses. McClusky and 2 others finally managed to attack the undamaged Nell and had to make several firing passes before bringing it down 9 miles from the task force. The other Nell returned safely to base. So 7 Nells attacked: 1 damaged and 1 downed by fighters.
 
Enterprise also lost 3 SDBs to fighters even though they were escorted. The Japanese had a CAP of 10 Claudes (A5Ms) at Roi and 10 at Toroa. Only 1 Claude was lost from Toroa and 1 damaged. 7 Wildcats were damaged by Japanese Claudes as were 4 SBDs.
 
9 Nells and 9 Claudes had also attacked USS Chester and her escorts, scoring one bomb hit. CAP failed completely to intercept them at all.
 
The only bright spot was Yorktown's CAP did manage to down 3 Mavis' without loss.
 
This could hardly be termed a successful performance by Enterprise both in protecting the ship and protecting the bombers. Several antiquated Claudes shot down several US aircraft for the loss on only one of their own.
 
As far as the Bismarck Sea raid, it was an attack against a target that had no air support. Again US carriers launched their strikes separately due to Lexington having to first launch her escort fighters and have them circle overhead. Then she launched her strike force and sent them on their way. She then had to land the fighters to refuel them and launch them again so they could catch up with the strike! Hardly sounds like an efficient way of doing things.
 
The damage they inflicted at Lae was disappointing considering the was no air opposition beyond 1 Pete and the 16 ships in port were anchored or docked. They only managed to sink 3 anchored transports, cause medium damage to 1 transport and one AV and strafe 1 CL, 2 DDs and 1 ML.This out of a strike force of 18 fighters and 86 bombers!. Considering this was a surprise raid and the Japanese were unable to respond, the results were very poor.
 
And what about the Rabaul raid? 18 F4Fs intercept 17 unescorted Bettys armed with only bombs. Yeah, CAP and AA shotdown 13 of the 17 but 5 still got through the fleet defence to drop their bombs against Lexington. The US lost 2 fighters to the bombers. 4 bombers returned where two were scrapped and 2 required major repairs. While the end result is impressive, the allowing 5 large, slow bombers through to actually drop their bombs certainly doesn't bode well.
 
As far as Midway is concerned, the US lost one fleet carrier to a very small but determined Hiryu attack. The Japanese never got the opportunity to launch a full strike against the US fleet. If they had, the US would certainly have suffered additional losses as they had not shown an ability to adequately defend their carriers against even small raids. The raids such as those in the Marshalls, at Rabaul and at Midway showed that the Japanese could penetrate US fleet defences and launch their weapons.  
 
No, the historical record is clear. The US did not possess any superiority in fighter direction and/or fleet defence in late 41/early 42. In the one battle where the odds were even, that is Zuikaku and Shokaku versus Lexington and Yorktown on the second day of Coral Sea, the US came off second best. Their only "stellar" performance was on the first day when 2 US CVs launched a full strike against little Shoho and her 5 fighters.
 
The only part that you and I agree on is that neither side would come away unscathed in any early CV battle. But my moeny would be on the Japanese.
 
Chez

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: Knavey

ORIGINAL: Charles_22


The kamikazes hit rate might had been worse, but they stopped Operation Olympic.

[&:]

What is the basis for this statement?  If you are referring to Operation Downfall (of which Operation Olympic was one of the 2 operations making up Downfall) then I would have to disagree that it was stopped because of kamikazes. 

I would submit that Operation Downfall was only stopped because Japan surrendered.  It would have happened had Japan not decided to accept the surrender terms.

Nope, according to the PBS American Experience documentary I saw recently the commander was all for the invasion before he saw the horrific losses. I don't know if he sensed Japan had that large reserve of planes for it or not, but after that he backed dropping the bomb instead. I can't be positive the "he" changing his mind made a whole lot of difference in what they decided, but for what was the primary backer of the invasion to want to back out, it at least had that effect. If they had any doubts as to invade rather than to drop, for him to want to back out couldn't have been a very good sign.
 
IIRC they said that he wanted invasion without the bomb, but once he saw the Okinawa losses he decided he would rather they drop the bomb and hold off the invasion for a while. That's not technically backing out, but at that time they were saying that he backed out his support for an invasion, which in that context doesn't necessarily mean he didn't want to do it at all. I wish I had recorded it so I would know for sure buy I just listened and at first it seemed they were saying he wanted nothing to do with it anymore, but then I've thought it over and I do believe that the amount of his 'backing out' just had to with whether it was the bomb or invasion that they should do at that time. It's so difficult to really know what they were saying when all I got was a first impression and don't have the script. 

[el cid again]

Chez - If a plane does something - it can do it.  If it does so with multiple witnesses, you need to go back to analysis school:

Ignoring the data in your conclusions is not a way to make factual conclusions.
 
On top of which, you must have a very low opinion of my willingness to say something that isn't true.  But since you found the plane, go talk to her pilot.  Surely he will tell you about the early spotting of the whales - because he said he could use that as a basis to drum up another form of business.  Better still - go up with him.

[mdiehl]

How do you figure that the USN CAP was "good enough to destroy Japanese efforts to get at USN CVs?" The Japanese launched two raids against Enterprise with Nells. 5 attacked in the first group and were able to penetrate the fleet defenses, drop their bombs and leave the area with only 1 Nell damaged by combined CAP/AA fire. The Enterprise was lucky to escape with only a near miss and some gasoline spilled on her decks from the damged bomber when it tried to kamikaze her. Of the 7 Wilcats on CAP, only two managed to intercept and the attack was ineffectual due to multiple jammed guns.

Yes, the Enterprise Marshalls raid saw most of the Nells making their drops. At about the same time, a similar raid by Lexington on Rabaul saw the attacking Japanese strike utterly and completely devastated.

Vis Enterprise raid, yes, but similar things happened to Kido Butai in the Indian ocean. Their CAP failed to intercept a UK LBA raid that, fortunately for the Japanese, resulted in the UK aircraft simply missing. IIRC the attack was with Blenheims but its been a while since I read in detail about the Indian Ocean raids. Likewise, Japanese CV strikes against defended targets were pretty much nonexistant throughout the early war period, so your claim that somehow the Japanese were better at CAP control is not supported by data -- if that is your claim that is -- it seems to be but I would not want to be accused of attributing something to you that you did not intend.

The problem for BOTH the USN and the IJN at the time was that tiny CAPs were commonplace. Seven F4Fs attempting to intercept nells were unable to do so. In another combat, 5 intercepting 16 or 17 betties shot down all but 4 of the betties, with some help from flak (best evidence makes it 3 lost to flak, 10 to the USN CAP).

Now compare that to Japanese performance. At Midway, larger Japanese CAPs were simply unable (or unwilling) to go after the US B-17s (which they should have -- at the time people still thought of B-17s as dangerous to ships), and the Japanese CAP was generally unable to stop US B26s.

The difference between the USN and the IJN CAP maintenance at the time came down to the fact that the USN was much faster at refueling, rearming, spotting and launching CAP, and that was owing to the USN *doctrine* of flight deck rearmament (qua Japanese doctrine of hangar deck rearmament) and USN CV design (one big hangar deck under the flight deck as opposed to two, stacked hangar decks one below the other on IJN CVs). The USN was also somewhat better at vectoring, in part because the Japanese had no CAP vectoring system to speak of at all. It was literally, as Parshall and Tulley note: "CAP will fly in the direction indictaed by gunfire and escorts making smoke."

Enterprise also lost 3 SDBs to fighters even though they were escorted. The Japanese had a CAP of 10 Claudes (A5Ms) at Roi and 10 at Toroa. Only 1 Claude was lost from Toroa and 1 damaged. 7 Wildcats were damaged by Japanese Claudes as were 4 SBDs.

These numbers are simply incorrect. At Roi the Japanese lost 3 fighters shot down for the loss of two USN SBDs. Two other USN aircraft were lost to ground based AAA. Another error here is in attributing all the USN aircraft damage to enemy aircraft.. a claim that is refuted by the Enterprise's own AAR.

The total loss in the Marshalls raid was 5 SBDs, two to enemy fighters and two AAA, and one "missing, presumed lost." No F4Fs were lost to enemy fighters or AAA in the raid. One F4F was lost operationally in an engine or wing stall on take-off. One SBD was damaged in deck operations.

Total Japanese losses are very difficult to verify. USN pilots were "awarded" (which is spotty data) 13 aerial victories. Where we have matching records for USN and Japanese accounts of any given battle USN "claim accuracy" varies from "near perfect" by "off by a factor of 4." For the Marshalls raid the 3 Mavis were known destroyed and probably (given the typical US error in estimation of enemy losses) another 3 Japanese interceptors in the air.

This could hardly be termed a successful performance by Enterprise both in protecting the ship and protecting the bombers. Several antiquated Claudes shot down several US aircraft for the loss on only one of their own.

It indeed would not make Enterprise look good if your claims were accurate. But they are not. Here is Enterprise's official AAR:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-CN-Raids/USN-CN-Raids-1.html

And here is the tabular summary of Enterprise's losses:

Planes lost or damaged:


Lost
Damaged


Fighting squadron
0
7


Torpedo squadron
0
3


Bombing squadron
1[size=-1]*[/size]
11


Scouting squadron
4[size=-1]*[/size]
12
* Shot down or missing.
In addition one fighter plane crashed on take-off and was lost. One scout bomber was damaged on deck. One Salt Lake City reconnaissance plane was damaged during recovery, and was abandoned and sunk.

You say:

As far as Midway is concerned, the US lost one fleet carrier to a very small but determined Hiryu attack. The Japanese never got the opportunity to launch a full strike against the US fleet.

One very damaged USN CV unable to conduct flight ops was not fully defended against an incoming Japanese strike because her CAP, which was provided by another CV 18 miles distant, was ill coordinated to deal with the strike. As a study of the effectiveness of "Long Range CAP" this incident has some value for game design. As a case study of the effectiveness of USN CAP in general the value of this incident is pretty low. It is clearly atypical.

You further allege that had the Japanese launched some sort of coordinated strike it would have swept the seas of enemy ships. Not only is this not true at Midway  but at Coral Sea where the USN CVs mounted a highly successful defense, devastating Zuikaku's complement of strike aircraft.

To repeat. The data don't support your claims when you actually look at the data.

Hardly sounds like an efficient way of doing things.

 

They arrived at target well coordinated, which I take to be the point salient to your apparent assertion that the USN could not achieve a coordinated strike.

The damage they inflicted at Lae was disappointing considering the was no air opposition beyond 1 Pete and the 16 ships in port were anchored or docked. They only managed to sink 3 anchored transports, cause medium damage to 1 transport and one AV and strafe 1 CL, 2 DDs and 1 ML.This out of a strike force of 18 fighters and 86 bombers!. Considering this was a surprise raid and the Japanese were unable to respond, the results were very poor.

These results are not substantially different, with respect to force deployed and status of defense (surprised) than the results achieved by Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu against Darwin, Australia. 188 aircraft launched, including 36 A6Ms and 152 strike a.c. 8 ships at anchor (5 merchantmen, one US AK, one US 4stacker DD, and one Australian patrol-gunbot), sunk.

And what about the Rabaul raid? 18 F4Fs intercept 17 unescorted Bettys armed with only bombs.

Armed with torpedoes, which is why the photgraphs from the action are of betties at sea-surface altitude with no bomb bay doors (the japanese had to remove betty bomb bay doors when arming them with torps). Downing 10 of 15 inbound aircraft with a small CAP strikes me as good CAP c.a.c. It is certainly as good as anything accomplished by Kido Butai at Midway, given the much larger CAP flown by the FOUR japanese CVs there vs the 1 US CV engaged at Rabaul. 

Yeah, CAP and AA shotdown 13 of the 17 but 5 still got through the fleet defence

One betty made a drop. Four of the others ditched their armament and ran because they were rather distracted by the fact that they were being shot down.

The US lost 2 fighters to the bombers.

True. Now consider how many Zeroes the Japanese lost to enemy bombers defending the fleet at Midway and you may begin to see why your analysis strikes me as an example of the use of shifting standards -- that the US CAP defenses must have achieved perfection in order for you not to consider them "poorly coordinated" strikes me as markedly at odds with your assumption that the Japanese CV defenses can somehow be construed as superior. Neither side put up a "perfect" defense at any time in 1942, but on the whole USN CAPs were better handled (although still inadequate in number) than Japanese CAPs.

While the end result is impressive, the allowing 5 large, slow bombers through to actually drop their bombs certainly doesn't bode well.

As attack aircraft went in 1942, no one ought to call the betty a "slow" aircraft. It was considerably faster (about 90 knots) than, say, the TBD, and more than one TBD managed to launch torps at Kido Butai CVs at Midway despite there being far more Zeros aloft at Midway than F4Fs aloft during Lex's Rabaul raid.

As far as Midway is concerned, the US lost one fleet carrier to a very small but determined Hiryu attack.

I'll complete the scene for you. The Japanese lost three CVs to two very small but determined USN CV attacks. The USN lost one CV to a combination of two successful raids (the second one on a damaged USN ship being assited by CAP operated remotely) and a japanese submarine. In the end, but for that submarine, Yorktown would have escaped.

The Japanese never got the opportunity to launch a full strike against the US fleet. If they had, the US would certainly have suffered additional losses as they had not shown an ability to adequately defend their carriers against even small raids.

Had they launched at what they knew about they would have maybe found Yorktown. That's it. The reason why they never succeeded in launching a full strike was that the USN hit them first with a series of rather small strikes with which the Japanese badly handled CAP was unable to cope. Your analysis that alleges substantial asymmetrical losses inflicted on the USN is at odds with *EVERY* known WW2 Carrier battle. If your position held any water, the Japanese ought to have swept the field at Coral Sea. And yet, they did not. They barely eked out a face saving "tactical win" courtesy of a damage control technician on Lexington.

The raids such as those in the Marshalls, at Rabaul and at Midway showed that the Japanese could penetrate US fleet defences and launch their weapons.

So what? Again, no one has said USN defenses were "impenetrable" other than you. If "impenetrable" is your definition of adequate, then Japanese fleet defenses were even more inadequate. Both sides had problems with CAP. Both sides flew inadequate numbers of a.c. in CAP, and both sides had problems retaining control over CAP once things got hot. The Japanese had considerably more trouble coordinating CAP, as the Coral Sea, Midway, and all subsequent actions demonstrate.

No, the historical record is clear. The US did not possess any superiority in fighter direction and/or fleet defence in late 41/early 42. In the one battle where the odds were even, that is Zuikaku and Shokaku versus Lexington and Yorktown on the second day of Coral Sea, the US came off second best.

Marginally second best, and only because Lexington was destroyed by a damage control error. Interestingly, one of the Japanese ships was also almost lost to error (Shokaku it was as I recall). But I guarantee that had Shokaku foundered, you would (and I think rightly so) attribute her loss to something other than direct enemy action. When you really examine the data, what you find is that until the Santa Cruz battle, no American CV was sunk by Japanese aviation. The Japanese always had some sort of post-battle assist --- damage control error in Lexington's case, and IJN SS I-126 in Yorktown's case. But for the submarine, Yorktown would have escaped. You can't say that for any Japanese CV at Midway, because follow on recon and strikes that eventually claimed Mikuma would instead have located and sunk the dead-in-the-water, burning, abandoned Japanese CVs.

CV wise the odds were "even" at Midway. You just have consitently ignored that part of the battle where 4 Japanese CVs CAP c.a.c. failed. For what it's worth lets continue with that analysis of Hiryu's attack and defense. She did not, once alerted to the presence of enemy aircraft, mount any better air defense than did the remote CAP flown over Yorktown. Hiryu too was eliminated by a small enemy strike. 

Their only "stellar" performance was on the first day when 2 US CVs launched a full strike against little Shoho and her 5 fighters.

The only relevant (to this discussion) points to be taken from Shoho's loss are that the USN identified an enemy CV, rapidly responded to the threat, hit it with a well coordinated strike, and sank it. Had it been Shokaku and Zuikaku in Shoho's place, the Japanese would have lost 2 fleet class CVs on the spot, as they subsequently did (plus one more fleet class CV) at Midway.

[Knavey]

http://www.odci.gov/csi/monograph/4253605299/csi9810001.html
 
CIA document on Operation Downfall for everyones perusal.

[ChezDaJez]

  These numbers are simply incorrect. At Roi the Japanese lost 3 fighters shot down for the loss of two USN SBDs. Two other USN aircraft were lost to ground based AAA. Another error here is in attributing all the USN aircraft damage to enemy aircraft.. a claim that is refuted by the Enterprise's own AAR.

 
You should know better than to take an after action report as gospel when considering enemy losses.
 
At Roi, Enterprise's VS-6 lost 4 SBDs over Roi, 3 to fighters, 1 to flak. And there is no VS-6 AAR for this period.
 
This is from the CV-6 Association website.
 

  
In a steep, gliding run, LCDR Halstead L. Hopping led his division of six SBDs through increasing anti-aircraft fire, releasing his bombs over the enemy's airfield, where even as the attack begin, fighters were scrambling into the air. As the lead plane, Hopping's SBD drew much of the defenders' fire and plunged into the sea after releasing its bomb: Hopping and his gunner, RM 1/c Harold Thomas, were lost. Scouting Six continued the attack, with Earl Gallaher and C. E. Dickinson each leading six SBDs into the fray. The bombers pummeled the airfield - destroying an ammunition dump, two hangars, and a radio station - and swung back around to strafe the base and parked planes on the ground. Enemy fighters and anti-aircraft fire claimed three more SBDs, but Enterprise[/i]'s airmen put on a spirited defense and claimed three "Claudes" in exchange.

 
Lundstrom in "The First Team" states that Hopping and 2 SBDs were shot down by fighters. Another SBD was shot down by flak. No Claudes were lost at Roi. Indeed, none were even moderately damaged.
 
You are probably confusing VF-6 and VB-6 reports claiming a total of 6 Claudes shot down. Only 1 was actually shotdown and one damaged at Taroa. Lt Rawie shot down LT Kurakane and then collided with PO3 Atake's Claude. Rawie wasn't severely damaged but Atake had to land immediately which he did. LT Gray attacked as he was landing but failed to bring him down. One note, as Atake taxied to the ramp, one of his ailerons fell off. Lt Gray was lucky to get back as his aircraft ended up with over 40 bullet holes in it from a later fight with fighters as he headed back. 4 bullets had struck the ad hoc armor he had installed the day before.
 

  One very damaged USN CV unable to conduct flight ops was not fully defended against an incoming Japanese strike because her CAP, which was provided by another CV 18 miles distant, was ill coordinated to deal with the strike. As a study of the effectiveness of "Long Range CAP" this incident has some value for game design. As a case study of the effectiveness of USN CAP in general the value of this incident is pretty low. It is clearly atypical.

 
And just who was it that made Yorktown incapable of flight ops? Was it not Hiryu's strike, the one by the 2nd Chutai (Hashimoto)?
 

  You further allege that had the Japanese launched some sort of coordinated strike it would have swept the seas of enemy ships. Not only is this not true at Midway  but at Coral Sea where the USN CVs mounted a highly successful defense, devastating Zuikaku's complement of strike aircraft.

 
I don't believe I have ever stated that Japanese strikes were coordinated to any great degree.  I was primarily refuting your claims as to the invinciblilty of US fleet defense. What I did say was that had the Japanese been able to launch a full strike (meaning the majority of their aircraft) it is highly probably that the US would have had more carriers sunk or damaged. Probably wouldn't have changed the outcome of the battle because of their faulty strategic planning but the US would have been a lot more hurt than it was.
 
And at Coral Sea, the Japanese did launch a fairly coordinated strike. Certainly as coordinated as anything the US had ever launched and that attack saw Yorktown moderately damaged and Lexington so severely damaged that DC crews were unable to prevent the explosions that sank her.
 

They arrived at target well coordinated, which I take to be the point salient to your apparent assertion that the USN could not achieve a coordinated strike. As a study of the effectiveness of "Long Range CAP" this incident has some value for game design.

 
Are you meaning at Midway?!? You have a funny way of using the word coordinated. The US strike was anything but coordinated. The word means to attack together, as in with a plan. Nowehere did the US plan to send the Devasters in alone. Their strike was to have been coordinated with the dive bombers. It certainly was not and cost many good men their lives. The only good part about their sacrfice was that it took the Zeros out of position, allowing the SBD time to do their job. The torpedo squadrons went in piecemeal and several paid heavily for it. And Hornet's airgroup missed the battle altogether! Some coordination!
 
And your viewpoint concerning the game design is hardly relevant, considering that you only borrowed it from a friend for a short time.
 

These results are not substantially different, with respect to force deployed and status of defense (surprised) than the results achieved by Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu against Darwin, Australia. 188 aircraft launched, including 36 A6Ms and 152 strike a.c. 8 ships at anchor (5 merchantmen, one US AK, one US 4stacker DD, and one Australian patrol-gunbot), sunk.

 
According to your count: 8 ships at anchor in Darwin, 8 ships sunk. The US struck at 29 ships at anchor at Lae and managed to sink 3.
From http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-battles/ww2/darwin.htm
 

  Virtually unopposed, the attackers left Darwin almost completely destroyed. The airfield was a shambles with a large number of RAAF and USAAF aircraft wrecked. In the harbour, Australian troopships had been sunk along with the American destroyer USS Peary and a number of cargo vessels. The death toll stood at 243, more than half of whom had been on the ships in the harbour with 350 wounded.

 
Care to run that by me again as to why these actions are similar in result?
 

  Armed with torpedoes, which is why the photgraphs from the action are of betties at sea-surface altitude with no bomb bay doors (the japanese had to remove betty bomb bay doors when arming them with torps). Downing 10 of 15 inbound aircraft with a small CAP strikes me as good CAP c.a.c. It is certainly as good as anything accomplished by Kido Butai at Midway, given the much larger CAP flown by the FOUR japanese CVs there vs the 1 US CV engaged at Rabaul. 

 
If you had studied Japanese aircraft a little better, you would know that Bettys normally only flew with bombbay doors installed when making long range searches or transits. The Betty had no mechanism to open or close the bombbay doors in flight so they were removed for combat missions with ORDNANCE installed. The 4th Air Group's 1st and 2nd Chutai were loaded with 2-250kg bombs as torpedoes had not yet been delivered to their base at Vunakanau. Fighters downed 4 of the 2nd Chutai's aircraft but 4 dropped their bombs and the last one, damaged, attempted to crash into the Lex. It missed by 75 yards. The 1st Chutai's attack was spoiled by Butch O'hare but 4 of them also managed to drop their bombs. LCDR Ito, CO of the 1st Chutai nearly crashed his plane into the Lex. He dumped his bombs in an effort to stay airborne long enough to hit the Lex. It was his Betty that was photographed. These are probably the pictures that you refer to. All bombs missed.
 

  I'll complete the scene for you. The Japanese lost three CVs to two very small but determined USN CV attacks. The USN lost one CV to a combination of two successful raids (the second one on a damaged USN ship being assited by CAP operated remotely) and a japanese submarine. In the end, but for that submarine, Yorktown would have escaped.

 
Please provide your source for that last statement. I don't know what history books you've been reading or what substance you are smoking but I think you are a bit confused here. First, I would hardly call 2 VT squadrons, 2 SBD squadrons plus fighters as a very small raid. It was their largest raid yet, even thougb uncoordinated. You need to certainly learn a little more about the Hiryu's action against Yorktown. Th first strike (Tominaga's) was unsuccessful. The second (Hasimoto's) was successful. At no time was Yorktown attacked without an operable flight deck and CAP overhead.
 
The bottom line is that the US's fleet defense needed a lot of work and was incapable of stopping even small raids from scoring hits. Obviously the Japanese fleet defense was equally porous... no has said it wasn't but it certainly was not "clearly inferior" during this period as you claim. Even the US advantage in radar in early 42 was barely so. They were still using A-scopes which meant that every single pip had to manually plotted. PPI scopes didn't come till later. Plus the US habit of launching individual carrier strikes as they did at Midway certainly did not make for well-planned or coordinated attacks. The one clear advantage that the US did have was in our use of 2-fighter team tactics.
 
Anyways, reply if you wish. Don't care. I'm finished with the topic for now.
 
Chez
 
 

[Demosthenes]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

..... and that attack saw Yorktown moderately damaged and Lexington so severely damaged that DC crews were unable to prevent the explosions that sank her.

 
Sorry Chez, but that is an interpretation that dosen't hold water.
The Lexington's damage was enough to bring her to a temporary halt and start fires - so far so good.
 
BUT, within one hour Lexington had her fires extinguished, was making 20 knots, and was operating her air group again - hardly a ship so badly damaged that her damage control crews were UNABLE to prevent the explosion that led to her sinking.
 
The only reason she was lost was because of crew Ignorance.
 
That was a lesson well learned and was never repeated again during the entire war. It was also an event that almost overtook Shokaku after the battle.
 
Demo