Manila or Pearl-new paradigm?

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

I bet the "flying boats" at pearl kill more ships that the subs at Manilla with their crappy torps. [8D]

I bet you're wrong by at least two base 10 logs. [:)]

[Ken Estes]

To extend the concept whole hog, the IJ player could have the option in a future AE mod to not attack any US territory/possession and thus keep the US out of the war before a die roll or violation of its territory provides a causus belli [sort of like the present USSR entry into the war, but well modified, qualified]. That would represent the Japanese strategic dilemma prior to mid-1941 most succinctly. One could even introduce gaming of the IJ options with a die roll or three regarding the preeminence of the war or peace factions, or even north vs. south options if the JA overcomes IJN in internal politics.

It would then become more problematic that the Japanese necessarily have to win before early 1943 or face inevitable defeat.

Even more bizarre, a defeat of the USSR plus IJN seizure of Aden by a certain time could introduce part of the Kriegsmarine into the OOB..... [ducking]

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

I bet the "flying boats" at pearl kill more ships that the subs at Manilla with their crappy torps. [8D]

CB is making a "inside joke" reference to an earlier PBEM we played in the 1000 mile war, in which a squadron of Emilys in a thunder storm torpedo'ed two old battleships and sank one. The dice rolls were incredible. And left me in shock for a while. [:D]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Ken Estes

To extend the concept whole hog, the IJ player could have the option in a future AE mod to not attack any US territory/possession and thus keep the US out of the war before a die roll or violation of its territory provides a causus belli [sort of like the present USSR entry into the war, but well modified, qualified]. That would represent the Japanese strategic dilemma prior to mid-1941 most succinctly. One could even introduce gaming of the IJ options with a die roll or three regarding the preeminence of the war or peace factions, or even north vs. south options if the JA overcomes IJN in internal politics.

It would then become more problematic that the Japanese necessarily have to win before early 1943 or face inevitable defeat.

Even more bizarre, a defeat of the USSR plus IJN seizure of Aden by a certain time could introduce part of the Kriegsmarine into the OOB..... [ducking]

Navy intel had prepositioned a (very) small warship to get in the way during the Japanese landings in Malaya. Its mission, simply put, was to create a casus belli. The Asiatic Fleet was in the process of joining Force Z at Singapore when the war broke out. (Ever wonder why those destroyers and AD were off Borneo?) The Navy Department sent out its war alerts prior to Pearl Harbor. What we didn't expect was Japan flipping the bozo bit, p*ssing off the American People, and setting off total war.

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Ken Estes

To extend the concept whole hog, the IJ player could have the option in a future AE mod to not attack any US territory/possession and thus keep the US out of the war before a die roll or violation of its territory provides a causus belli [sort of like the present USSR entry into the war, but well modified, qualified]. That would represent the Japanese strategic dilemma prior to mid-1941 most succinctly. One could even introduce gaming of the IJ options with a die roll or three regarding the preeminence of the war or peace factions, or even north vs. south options if the JA overcomes IJN in internal politics.

It would then become more problematic that the Japanese necessarily have to win before early 1943 or face inevitable defeat.

Even more bizarre, a defeat of the USSR plus IJN seizure of Aden by a certain time could introduce part of the Kriegsmarine into the OOB..... [ducking]

Navy intel had prepositioned a (very) small warship to get in the way during the Japanese landings in Malaya. Its mission, simply put, was to create a casus belli. The Asiatic Fleet was in the process of joining Force Z at Singapore when the war broke out. (Ever wonder why those destroyers and AD were off Borneo?) The Navy Department sent out its war alerts prior to Pearl Harbor. What we didn't expect was Japan flipping the bozo bit, p*ssing off the American People, and setting off total war.

ADM Kemp Tolley describes this in his "Cruise of the Lanikai" . He was to command one of the "Bait boats" .

[xj900uk]

Everyone in the US knew that the Japanese were about to do something. HOwever their main projections were confined to the Philipines as most likely, with a predictable push into Malaysia and the DEI (for the oil) + also the PI which had been the subject of many a verment Orange-type discussion. However they were unsure as to the precise date, timing and direction of the main thrust. And an aerial assault on PH was never even considered (in fact the defences were more worried about sabotage from the islands itenirent Japanese population) simply because it was so well defended and fortified.

[henri51]

Very interesting discussion, and I personally don't have any strong opinion on the question, but...

No one seems to have considered what the Japanese would have done if they had known that they would not get any carriers in the PH attack? As I recall,the main objective WAS the destruction of the US carriers, and they did not get a single one.

Is it plausible that they would have considered some alternative plan if they had known that the US carriers were not in port? They already had plans to attack Malaya, Batan, Borneo, Bangkok and Hong Kong on Dec 8, and they carried out air attacks on the Philippines with an invasion planned for Dec. 10, so if they had abandoned the historical PH attack, what would they have done with their 6 carriers?

Henri

[xj900uk]

Agreed, the main idea of hte plan was to take out the US carriers at PH, which Yamamoto and his planning staff wisely knew would be the capital ships of any Pacific war.
Actually Nagumo onboard the KB was told on the evneing of the 6th of Dec that the US carriers were not present, and he did have the option to abort the mission if this was in fact the case. However after some discussion amongst his staff officers he decided to press on, on the grounds that to retreat now would result in considerable 'loss of face' and morale amongst his men.

So, the chances are that he would just have turned round and sailed straight back home without launching a single plane, however all the other attacks in Malaysia and PI would no doubt have gone ahead as planned. One wonders what hte US would have done and also what it might have thought if it had caught a glimpse of the KB sailing away quite majestically from PH without attacking...

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: henri51

Very interesting discussion, and I personally don't have any strong opinion on the question, but...

No one seems to have considered what the Japanese would have done if they had known that they would not get any carriers in the PH attack? As I recall,the main objective WAS the destruction of the US carriers, and they did not get a single one.

Is it plausible that they would have considered some alternative plan if they had known that the US carriers were not in port? They already had plans to attack Malaya, Batan, Borneo, Bangkok and Hong Kong on Dec 8, and they carried out air attacks on the Philippines with an invasion planned for Dec. 10, so if they had abandoned the historical PH attack, what would they have done with their 6 carriers?

Henri

(That's three CVTFs and a SAG.)

Hit Manila from the east, then swing back to the Eastern Mandates and take out the US Battle Fleet at sea. Or raid into the South Seas and make a move to cut off Australia. Lots of options there. My opponent has tried to traverse the Java Sea twice and met Force Z each time for a night surface engagement. This time, he switched into the South China Sea and is supporting a delayed Mersing Gambit. With the Combined Fleet and the KB off Mersing, and the Malay Barrier mined, I have a free hand in the Sulu Sea and in the Mandates. I really can't decide--I have so many good things I could do. [;)]

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Agreed, the main idea of hte plan was to take out the US carriers at PH, which Yamamoto and his planning staff wisely knew would be the capital ships of any Pacific war.

I'd have to disagree with this notion. Recalling my Evans/Peattie with a supporting word from Parshalls/Tully, Yamamotto displayed consistant evidence of being battleship-centric through most of 1942 despite KB's ministrations during 41 and the first half of 42. Naturally the carrier men considered their vessels and their opposite numbers to be the most vital targets but this was only to be expected. At the time the BB and the heavy gun was still considered to be the final arbiter and carrier aviation was a means to faciliate this though that would change in the course of the war...the USN by necessity, the IJN more slowly as events unfolded. The purpose of the PH strike was to KO the US Pacific Fleet, not KO the carriers exclusively. This way the 1st and 2nd Operational plans could unfold without undue fear of major US interference.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: bklooste

I bet the "flying boats" at pearl kill more ships that the subs at Manilla with their crappy torps. [8D]

I bet you're wrong by at least two base 10 logs. [:)]

I was exaguratng on the boats ( due to a game im playing where they put a torpedo into a BB) but the 70 boats are worth a lot they do kill ships but thats not as valuable as the search..

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Agreed, the main idea of hte plan was to take out the US carriers at PH, which Yamamoto and his planning staff wisely knew would be the capital ships of any Pacific war.
Actually Nagumo onboard the KB was told on the evneing of the 6th of Dec that the US carriers were not present, and he did have the option to abort the mission if this was in fact the case. However after some discussion amongst his staff officers he decided to press on, on the grounds that to retreat now would result in considerable 'loss of face' and morale amongst his men.

So, the chances are that he would just have turned round and sailed straight back home without launching a single plane, however all the other attacks in Malaysia and PI would no doubt have gone ahead as planned. One wonders what hte US would have done and also what it might have thought if it had caught a glimpse of the KB sailing away quite majestically from PH without attacking...

No this is modern invention the goal was to take out the Pacific fleet ( mainly BBs) the Cvs were a bonus , most nations ( includign Japan) did not think the Cvs were that great - in fact they expected to kill a few BBs and the rest to chase KB which is why the Japanese BB fleet is sailing for the Bonins on Dec 8 . .

[xj900uk]

I agree that Yamamoto was a 'big gun man' but he had a lot of very good staff officers (including the eccentric Genda, who survived the war to write a very good account of the planning and preparation leading up to the outbreak) which pursuaded Yamamoto to listen to them - for example they increased the amount of carriers present to six (originally it was to have been 4, presumabely the other 2 would have helped out in the PI or Malaysia) and also put the US carriers high up on the agenda. THey also included amongst the list of vital targets the machine shops, dry docks and oil-farms on Hawaii which were supposed to have been included in the 3rd wave (cancelled by Nagumo) in order to knockc out PH as a functioning base for months on end.
THis is why Nagumo had been given the 'abort if no US carriers at PH' option, which he chose not to use. But many of Yamamoto's top staff officers had now seen the rise of Naval air power as the way forward and were now regarding the battleships as simply protection for their prize assets, the carriers

[Nikademus]

Yamamotto was unique in that he was open and positive about airpower despite being a Black Shoe Admiral, but that didn't change his overall view, nor that of the Naval Staff in general that the Decisive Battle would be decided by traditional arms. (aka the "big gun"). The abort option had more to do with the fear that Nagumo's carrier force might get ambushed rather than the carriers being the primary goal of the PH raid. The Pacific Fleet was the concern of the IJN, not just it's carriers.

[AcePylut]

If those 27 Manila boats sink, on average, 1 ship every 2 days... that's (Jan 42-Dec 45) 730 ships.

Anyone think those BB's at Pearl will be that effective?  Assume you lose 4 BB's at Pearl (which seems to be a little liberal on the Japanese side).  Anyoen think those 4 BB's at pearl will be that effective?  Or the crappy planes you have at Pearl?  Or the fuel/supplies lost?

[Nikademus]

I've yet to ever be that successful with my Manila. Keep in mind too that players tend to be far more aggressive with their battleships than their RL counterparts. Having all of those heavies intact encourages player 2 to be that much more aggressive early on.

[AcePylut]

In my current PBEM, I'm getting about 2-3 enemy ships hit (with detonations) per day from those manila subs.  In mid Feb '42, I've sunk the CA Kako, put torps into the Hiryu and a couple of BB's, sunk numerous AK's. 
 
I would partly say this is because of my opponent, who has moved very quickly (Mersing Gambit on Dec 7th, landing in Oz in mid Jan '42).  The advance through the DEI and it's assorted choke-points has lead to many juicy targets and attacks. 
 
I've been keeping my subs in the suspected movement lanes and straights (i.e. the straights around Balikpapan, Ambon, Ternate, etc.) and simply waiting for the ships to run over them.  So far so good.  But now that he's wrapping up the DEI and moving towards more open ocean, I suspect that the intercepts will go down... but not by much I think.  I've got a great idea of his lines of supply.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: AcePylut

If those 27 Manila boats sink, on average, 1 ship every 2 days... that's (Jan 42-Dec 45) 730 ships.

Anyone think those BB's at Pearl will be that effective?  Assume you lose 4 BB's at Pearl (which seems to be a little liberal on the Japanese side).  Anyoen think those 4 BB's at pearl will be that effective?  Or the crappy planes you have at Pearl?  Or the fuel/supplies lost?

You are lucky to get 1 / 7 days with those boats ( which is about 200 ships).. They have low accuracy torpedos the entire war .... 1 of the later US boats is IMHO woth 3 -4 of those at Manilla. So your really sinking about 8 modern subs... The subs do do allow the Japanese ASW to train up better though

Those BBs CAN be effective as i mentioned Nemo took the Marshals with them...

Ben

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Yamamotto was unique in that he was open and positive about airpower despite being a Black Shoe Admiral, but that didn't change his overall view, nor that of the Naval Staff in general that the Decisive Battle would be decided by traditional arms. (aka the "big gun"). The abort option had more to do with the fear that Nagumo's carrier force might get ambushed rather than the carriers being the primary goal of the PH raid. The Pacific Fleet was the concern of the IJN, not just it's carriers.

Agree he listened, Genda was a nobody .. The reason for the abort of the 3 rd wave was Nagumo was satisfied of teh damage done ( ie the BBs) and to a lesser extent fear for his carriers and 2 BB from a US CV strike while his planes were over PH.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: AcePylut

In my current PBEM, I'm getting about 2-3 enemy ships hit (with detonations) per day from those manila subs.  In mid Feb '42, I've sunk the CA Kako, put torps into the Hiryu and a couple of BB's, sunk numerous AK's. 

I would partly say this is because of my opponent, who has moved very quickly (Mersing Gambit on Dec 7th, landing in Oz in mid Jan '42).  The advance through the DEI and it's assorted choke-points has lead to many juicy targets and attacks. 

I've been keeping my subs in the suspected movement lanes and straights (i.e. the straights around Balikpapan, Ambon, Ternate, etc.) and simply waiting for the ships to run over them.  So far so good.  But now that he's wrapping up the DEI and moving towards more open ocean, I suspect that the intercepts will go down... but not by much I think.  I've got a great idea of his lines of supply.

Are you sure these are from Manilla ? They certainly cant get to Mersing in time.. Also where is your oponents ASW /and changing convoy routes ? You are right that it is easier now once he gets Air Search and some ASW up your subs will get much less effective.