Pearl Harbour question for WitP designers (Matrix/2By3) and BETA testers...

[mogami]

Hi, I find sending 3 BB to each landing (I'm landing in 2 places not the historical one.) and having the CV provide air cover while the LBA attack airfields to be the safest method. All the components get training and combat experiance without too much risk. (They simply overpower any possible allied response)

There are very few operations that allow for this much training at so little risk.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by MikeKraemer
In two test now I've had Force Z get through to the transports before being sunk by a swarm of A/C, it really slows down the Malaysia campaign.

Im curious, if you are testing the historical scenerio. Where is the Kondo's southern covering force? Two Kongo BBs, 7 CAs, some CLs and lots of DDs. Seems a little too easy to get to the transports if you ask me. Are they set to retirement allowed?

Personally I dont think worth risking two capital ships just to slow down the Malaya campaign, but then again if you can really slow it down substantially. By that I mean enough to allow what should be substantial reinforcements to arrive. It may be worth it.

[Bulldog61]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Im curious, if you are testing the historical scenerio. Where is the Kondo's southern covering force? Two Kongo BBs, 7 CAs, some CLs and lots of DDs. Seems a little too easy to get to the transports if you ask me. Are they set to retirement allowed?

Personally I dont think worth risking two capital ships just to slow down the Malaya campaign, but then again if you can really slow it down substantially. By that I mean enough to allow what should be substantial reinforcements to arrive. It may be worth it.

Remember this is still an early Alpha, but I'm impress with the Japanese AI. I'm not sure exactly where they were on those two ocasions that Force Z got thru. I think they were on a bombardment mission. But Force Z sunk a number of transports and light escorts. It gutted the 18th Infantry Division. The next day the LBA found Force Z and attacked with over 90 Betties and Nells. I've also gone thru about a dozen starts where Force Z was sunk attemptng to get to Khota Baru

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by MikeKraemer
Remember this is still an early Alpha, but I'm impress with the Japanese AI. I'm not sure exactly where they were on those two ocasions that Force Z got thru. I think they were on a bombardment mission. But Force Z sunk a number of transports and light escorts. It gutted the 18th Infantry Division. The next day the LBA found Force Z and attacked with over 90 Betties and Nells. I've also gone thru about a dozen starts where Force Z was sunk attemptng to get to Khota Baru

Thanks for the clarification. Thats seems much more reasonable. Of course there should be a chance Force Z gets thru for any number of reasons. It just seemed to me from your post that it was happening everytime. I could see it getting thru more frequently if the IJN were invading farther down the coast than historical, but Khota Baru should be unreachable in one impulse from Singapore.

If you gutted the 18th Division it was well worth the price. You might even be able to hold Malaya now or at least hold on to the NEI for much longer than historical.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, I find sending 3 BB to each landing (I'm landing in 2 places not the historical one.) and having the CV provide air cover while the LBA attack airfields to be the safest method. All the components get training and combat experiance without too much risk. (They simply overpower any possible allied response)

There are very few operations that allow for this much training at so little risk.

Not that I am against the Japanese getting some "free deployment" options, but doesn't using their Battleships to
cover landings in Malaya violate their key strategy of holding
back their main assets for the "decisive battle"? I don't think that historically any of these 6 Battleships or the Yamato when it
became available left "home waters" until June. Just wondering
if your usage here represented the "historical Start" of the game,
or some totally free deployment option.

[mogami]

Hi, The player is in way contrained by historical strategy. (What would be the point?)

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, The player is in way contrained by historical strategy. (What would be the point?)

Please clarify that statement.I dont understand

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, The player is in way contrained by historical strategy. (What would be the point?)

I'm going to assume that this was meant to say:

"The player is in NO way constrained by the historical strategy"

Which is OK by me, but brings up some problems. The 6 BB's
you use to cover the landings must have moved to Saigon before
the war started. Do the British (especially Force Z) get any
opportunity to counter-move pre-war? Kido Butai was able to
approach PH unobserved across the winter-swept wastes of the
Northern Pacific---but this wouldn't apply to deploying it to the
South in more frequented waters. Too many commercial ships,
fishermen, aircraft, etc So what happens if the Japanese decide
to start all or part of it off the Phillippines or in the South China
Sea? Are there any Allied options that then become available?
What I'm asking is: How FREE is "free deployment"---and are
there any consequenses if the Japanese Player wants to get
"wild and crazy"?

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
I'm going to assume that this was meant to say:

"The player is in NO way constrained by the historical strategy"

Which is OK by me, but brings up some problems. The 6 BB's
you use to cover the landings must have moved to Saigon before
the war started. Do the British (especially Force Z) get any
opportunity to counter-move pre-war? Kido Butai was able to
approach PH unobserved across the winter-swept wastes of the
Northern Pacific---but this wouldn't apply to deploying it to the
South in more frequented waters. Too many commercial ships,
fishermen, aircraft, etc So what happens if the Japanese decide
to start all or part of it off the Phillippines or in the South China
Sea? Are there any Allied options that then become available?
What I'm asking is: How FREE is "free deployment"---and are
there any consequenses if the Japanese Player wants to get
"wild and crazy"?

Mike

Mogami is conducting a non-historical test with variable deployment, which presupposes no PH and no US immediate DOW. I agree even in this scenerio the IJN would likely keep the battlefleet close to Japan in case of the eventuality of a US DOW, but I do not see any reason why Mogami should not be able to employ his strategy. It is not as though its inconcievable that they would take the risk in the hopes that overwhelming force and consequently quick end to the campaign would allow the combine fleet to be quickly redeployed to meet a US threat.

BTW, historically the quite sizable southern covering force that included BBs managed to sail south unobserved.

Again this is a non-historical/variable deployment test.

[mogami]

Hi, There are several severe problems. The game assumes Japan is at war with all countries except Russia. When I capture Kendari I cannot send long range bombers because they will target US ships in PI. So far I do not see any benefit. (I am able to accelerate the move to the South Pacific even while 14th Army attacks PI. 16th Army does not change. (25th Army is the real beneficiary but it is not sufficient to warrant any real gain.)
In the mean time Japan loses around 500 vp (lost PH strike and shipping escaping from battle zone) PI readiness goes up. USN subs given chance to position them selves while IJN subs lose all their early targets.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Mike

Mogami is conducting a non-historical test with variable deployment, which presupposes no PH and no US immediate DOW. I agree even in this scenerio the IJN would likely keep the battlefleet close to Japan in case of the eventuality of a US DOW, but I do not see any reason why Mogami should not be able to employ his strategy. It is not as though its inconcievable that they would take the risk in the hopes that overwhelming force and consequently quick end to the campaign would allow the combine fleet to be quickly redeployed to meet a US threat.

BTW, historically the quite sizable southern covering force that included BBs managed to sail south unobserved.

Again this is a non-historical/variable deployment test.

So MOGAMI's just "kicking the limits of reality around" to see
what will happen? OK..., that makes some sense. Might even
be fun to watch. I just wanted to be sure that if the Japanese
actually WERE allowed by the game to do a massive re-deployment of their initial forces there would be some realistic
constraints on what they could do that didn't give the Allies a
chance of reacting in the pre-war deployment as well.

That being said, "Hey Mogami!..., have you tried a Pearl
Harbor attack with EVERY sub the Japanese own stationed off
Ohau for 10 days after the attack? Ought to have a good shot
at nailing at least one of the missing CV's, and might make a return visit by Kido Butai (after re-fueling) a worthwhile effort."

BTW, the Allies DID know about the 2 BC's and the 4 CA's
that the Japanese had brought into Southern Waters to support
the Malayan Landings...

[mogami]

Hi, over 20 IJN subs begin the game deployed around PH (one of the problems with the no DOW is getting all the subs moved to areas no USN ships are located. On average the air units at PH sink 1 IJN sub per day.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, over 20 IJN subs begin the game deployed around PH (one of the problems with the no DOW is getting all the subs moved to areas no USN ships are located. On average the air units at PH sink 1 IJN sub per day.

What air units? You were supposed to "trash" 180+ planes
during the PH raid! Did you miss them? Or did you send your
whole strike after the shipping? Historically you should do a
pretty good job on both.

[mogami]

Hi, Even after "trashing" 180 aircraft PH has a formidable number of aircraft. (Float planes) It only gets worse as they repair the damaged ones and fix the airfields.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, There are several severe problems. The game assumes Japan is at war with all countries except Russia. When I capture Kendari I cannot send long range bombers because they will target US ships in PI. So far I do not see any benefit. (I am able to accelerate the move to the South Pacific even while 14th Army attacks PI. 16th Army does not change. (25th Army is the real beneficiary but it is not sufficient to warrant any real gain.)
In the mean time Japan loses around 500 vp (lost PH strike and shipping escaping from battle zone) PI readiness goes up. USN subs given chance to position them selves while IJN subs lose all their early targets.

Yes, I figured this was going to be a problem. I think I alluded to as much, earlier in the thread. The system of the AI selecting naval targets will preclude their use in naval attack anywhere in the area of the south china sea and north NEIs. Owing to the weak allied naval forces you probably dont need aircraft to be set to naval attack in these areas though.

But you lost me a little. Why is the 14th Army now attacking the PI? Did those LBA attacks on Manilla from Kendari bring the US into the war?:D

To get any benefits you need to send the 16th army immediately to the NEI at the outbreak of the war. The objective should be to secure the oil fields of Borneo/Sumatra, the AF of Celebes/Ambon and Java by the end of Jan 42. I liked your original plan of useing elements of the 14th to secure bases in the SOPAC early. Useing regimental size units you should be able to secure all the important bases (Rabaul,PM,GC, ect..) in a few weeks. The PI will then be in a very precarious position. All you have to do is to secure Guam if and when the US enters into the war, to completely cut it off.

But since your bombers have already attacked the USN, may I suggest a side test to see what whould happen if the US entered the war ( a historical Japanese fear ) while the bulk of the IJN were committed to operations in the south. It would be interesting to see what counter moves the US could have done and how the IJN might react to such a situation. Personally I think the Japanese fear of the USN attack on its flanks were a bit overstated. Even if the whole PacFleet sailed to attack Japan ( it could not ) what real harm can it do? It would be too over extended and could not stay very long before being forced to withdraw. All the while being subject to attritional attacks by LBA, subs and light surface forces.

[norsemanjs]

Losing on average a sub a day off HI at this early stage of the war seems unrealistic. In Uncommon Valor I've sat half a dozen subs off of Noumea or Brisbane and never had losses even close to one a day.

I've done the same with US subs around Rabaul or Truk. Had some losses but never anything like 1 a day.

Historical Japanese sub losses were not that high. Although I'm not sure how long they stayed on station in HI area.

[mogami]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Yes, I figured this was going to be a problem. I think I alluded to as much, earlier in the thread. The system of the AI selecting naval targets will preclude their use in naval attack anywhere in the area of the south china sea and north NEIs. Owing to the weak allied naval forces you probably dont need aircraft to be set to naval attack in these areas though.

But you lost me a little. Why is the 14th Army now attacking the PI? Did those LBA attacks on Manilla from Kendari bring the US into the war?:D

To get any benefits you need to send the 16th army immediately to the NEI at the outbreak of the war. The objective should be to secure the oil fields of Borneo/Sumatra, the AF of Celebes/Ambon and Java by the end of Jan 42. I liked your original plan of useing elements of the 14th to secure bases in the SOPAC early. Useing regimental size units you should be able to secure all the important bases (Rabaul,PM,GC, ect..) in a few weeks. The PI will then be in a very precarious position. All you have to do is to secure Guam if and when the US enters into the war, to completely cut it off.

But since your bombers have already attacked the USN, may I suggest a side test to see what whould happen if the US entered the war ( a historical Japanese fear ) while the bulk of the IJN were committed to operations in the south. It would be interesting to see what counter moves the US could have done and how the IJN might react to such a situation. Personally I think the Japanese fear of the USN attack on its flanks were a bit overstated. Even if the whole PacFleet sailed to attack Japan ( it could not ) what real harm can it do? It would be too over extended and could not stay very long before being forced to withdraw. All the while being subject to attritional attacks by LBA, subs and light surface forces.

Hi, No I mean in reference to other games where I simply fight all the allies from the outset. Japan does not need the bulk of the navy in the South (There are only a few CA and CL down there to oppose them. I send the 4 fast BB and a few CA.

Even when 14th Army attacks PI 16th Army captures Balikapapan and Kendari on the 3rd or 4th day of the war. (Transports begin unloading night of Dec 7th) In games where no escorts given the Dutch reach Balikapapan on night of Dec 9th and attack transports (but it is already too late to prevent capture of base. IJN can of course assign a covering TF. It is the USN units in the area. CA several CL a dozen DD and PT boats (and around 30 subs) I don't like allowing this force time to arrange a defense. Manila can be attacked on Dec 7th to great effect. Not doing so allows a great number of USN/merchant ships to escape or deploy. I have yet to see any tangible benefit of ignoring USN on Dec 7th.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl

BTW, the Allies DID know about the 2 BC's and the 4 CA's
that the Japanese had brought into Southern Waters to support
the Malayan Landings...

Well BBs - BCs is a matter of opinion, but I believe it was closer to 7 CAs total. The Malaya landings had their own supporting CAs. Also I do believe it was the landing force that was discovered heading south not the Covering Force. Regardless since the IJN frequently conducted exercises in the south china sea their siteing wouldnt and historically didnt constitute a cassus beli. As I recall when the invasion force was sited heading south the Brits and US could not determine if A) It was reinforcement convoy heading for indo-china or B) A possible Japanese ploy to prevolk the Brits into a premature reaction and hand the Japanese a provocaion of war. In this situation ie; the Brits attack first. It would be even less likely that FDR could get a DOW.

[mogami]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Well BBs - BCs is a matter of opinion, but I believe it was closer to 7 CAs total. The Malaya landings had their own supporting CAs. Also I do believe it was the landing force that was discovered heading south not the Covering Force. Regardless since the IJN frequently conducted exercises in the south china sea their siteing wouldnt and historically didnt constitute a cassus beli. As I recall when the invasion force was sited heading south the Brits and US could not determine if A) It was reinforcement convoy heading for indo-china or B) A possible Japanese ploy to prevolk the Brits into a premature reaction and hand the Japanese a provocaion of war. In this situation ie; the Brits attack first. It would be even less likely that FDR could get a DOW.

Hi, I will have to dig up my referance but I believe both FDR and Churchill had agreed that any Jap movement south of a certain line would be considered war. When the Japanese were sighted moving they were still north of this line. The messages sent to Kimmel and Short (and Mac) were based on this movement.
No telling what the US response would have been if the combat had not been directed at them.

There are only 3 valid reasons I can think of for Japan not DOW on USA on Dec 7th.

A. (best of lot) Japan never intends on fighting USA period.

B. Japan feels it can use the assets else where to better effect. (I do not concurr. I think Japans best use of assets if they intend on fighting USA is to hit USA assets when ever and where ever Japan can field an advantage.

C. Japan does not want USA interference early on. (Again I think hitting the US assets is the best method of insuring they do not interfer. Japan can handle all comers in Dec waiting only makes it harder)

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mogami
It is the USN units in the area. CA several CL a dozen DD and PT boats (and around 30 subs) I don't like allowing this force time to arrange a defense. Manila can be attacked on Dec 7th to great effect. Not doing so allows a great number of USN/merchant ships to escape or deploy. I have yet to see any tangible benefit of ignoring USN on Dec 7th.

I wouldnt worry too much about the USN subs they can be nusuance, but are simply not decisive at this time of the war. Besides they will not be able to operate long from the PI once it is cut off from supply. The CA, 2 CLs and DDs are a non factor IMHO. What possible "significant" harm can they do?

Regarding shipping. Historically a little over dozen merchants ships where captured/destroyed around the PI. Most of it was able to escape south. Since It is my understanding that actual ship capture will not be modeled I dont see the escape of this shipping to be significant disadvantage. Since again historically most of it did escape anyway.

The real benefit depends how long the US stays out. Earlier capture of the oil fields means more production later and more time to prepositon oil reserves at various key bases like Truk, Rabual, ect... Making it substantially easier for the IJN to operate along its defensive ring and counter USN eventual moves.

I agree the game system as is, doesnt really model well the scenerio you are attempting to test.