Pearl Harbor is not a good location to interdict the Japanese SLOCs to Coal Harbor.
1. Japanese resupply convoys can hug the Aleutian and Alaskan coastlines which is both a fuel saver for them and a fuel hog for Allied fleets operating out of Pearl Harbor.
2. Steaming along coastal waters means LBA will be available. The only Allied air cover is that provided by Allied CVs. Which CVs are way off in no mans land doing nothing useful, and more importantly nothing relevant regarding the potential existential threat to North America.
3. With a string of land bases along the route, the north Pacific will become a Japanese lake, crisscrossed by search planes. An Allied fleet operating out of Pearl Harbor will be largely blind.
4. It doesn't cost Japan much, provided he moves vigorously during the winter period whilst also enjoying the amphibious bonus. The only non winter zone bases which will require a small Japanese effort are Alliford Bay and Coal Harbor. Neither is stoutly defended and there is precious little available to be sent there at this stage. Particularly as Canoerebel has already stated he has sent units towards CapeTown.
5. Coal Harbor can be built up to a level 6 airfield. It's port is a problem, but Alliford Bay can be built up to a level 8 airfield thereby obviating most air unit replacement/upgrade issues, and it can have a usuable port. Many of the target Allied bases start off with small airfields which will need substantial building to allow B-17 operations. Then again the first half of 1942 does not see a huge surplus of engineer units (even if none have been sent to CapeTown) for construction work and if so deployed, they aren't available for overseas work.
6. Japan benefits from a great economy of scale. It can operate offensively in theatre without pinching any units from its SRA offensive. Once the latter has been accomplished those units can be directed onto another target without weakening the North American offensive. In fact they will find it easier as American units are kept back to deal with the West Coast dagger.
7. Japan does not have to sustain it until 1945/46. Because of the economy of scale it enjoys and the disproportionate amount of damage it can inflict, it does not have to worry about saving any units it allocates to the operation. The tip of the spear (that being Coal Harbor) might be regained by the Allies in the second half of 1942 but a substantial amount of damage may have already been inflicted by, not to mention the delay it would have caused to launching Allied operations elsewhere, but the core of the Japanese bases in the north will not have been reclaimed prior to the onset of the 42/43 winter. Most of the 1943 northern campaign season would be spent wrestling back those bases. The entire Japanese offensive is a very cheap way of closing the back door to the Kuriles before March 1944, let alone the Home Islands.
8. Nemo has written extensively in the past how a Japanese player can proceed. Those posts are available for anyone to see so there is no need for Nemo to be currently giving advice for his comments to assist any Japanese player. In fact the studious Japanese player can also dig up my own old comments on the subject but I rather doubt PH has done so whereas I do very much suspect he has looked up Nemo's old posts as the two of them have played each other.
9. I would also suggest that it is unfair to credit Nemo "sage advise" with breaking GreyJoy's game. Firstly we don't know exactly what assistance Nemo provided. Secondly, I'm fairly certain that GreyJoy did not fully adopt and implement whatever Nemo said. Thirdly it was GreyJoy's own decisions, egged on by the usual suspects, which created the situation.
10. And finally, I have not disclosed all the options available to Japan. One is presuming too much in proceeding on the basis that Pearl Harbor would be a viable Allied base.[8D]
As to what is the Allied player doing in the interim. The answer is not much which is relevant.
(a) The Mersing Gambit has been employed. That brings forward the timetable for clearing out Singapore, thereby releasing early troops for Burma
(b) Oosthaven and Merak have already fallen so there isn't going to be a Festung Palembang in this game.
(c) Two Allied CVs operating in the vicinity of Timor in the period Jan-Feb 1942 are just dead meat to the Nellies. There is absolutely no need for the KB to be brought to the DEI to achieve its timely conquest. Japanese LBA is sufficient. Besides which, where is the fuel coming from to sustain their operations in the area. Soon the closest bases to restock on air sorties will be Sydney, not a particularly close by base nor one reached without transiting the dangerous Torres Strait.
(d) The two American CVs in the DEI have a long distance to transit back to any really useful location. It will take them a lot longer to get back than it took them to get to the DEI. Travelling to the DEI they could transit the shortest lines where Japanese search patrols did not exist. The return trip will see those search holes filled up with the full KB waiting to pounce upon them. That leaves coming back by a long circuitous route.
(e) In the interim there are American units travelling to CapeTown. By the time they get there they may well find there is little strategic justification for their intended use so additional time will be lost sending them to a useful location.
Alfred
War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
Than the game is as good as over.
I've seen that assumed before.
I've seen that assumed before.
Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
No, the game is not as good as over for to every plan there is always a counter. What it does require is a counter relevant to this plan, not to the previous plan. It also depends on how well Japan has structured its operations and what exactly are its ambitions.
Almost every Japanese player aims at conquering real estate in the south Pacific allegedly to cut the America-Australia SLOC. Consistently I advise against it because it does not cut the SLOC. So if PH is aiming to undertake offensive operations in both the north and south Pacific, then he is weakening unnecessarily the northern offensive which does have the real potential of stopping the SLOC (because of the higher priority in maintaining forces in America to deal with the existential threat).
The simple fact is that the respective forces are very asymmetrical throughout the entire war. The gap is most noticeable at the very start of the war. One of the best areas to realise the asymmetrical benefits is the northern Pacific during the winter of 41/42 and whilst the Japanese enjoy the amphibious benefit. Invariably Japanese players do not avail themselves of this advantage because of the myths which surround the strategic environment.
What is a potential Allied counter? One is an early land offensive into the Marshalls. That depends on where the KB is and exactly which Japanese air units are moved into the north Pacific. But it is an option using the Allied CVs correctly ie operating in blue water against minimum enemy LBA. A two CV division operating in congested waters, surrounded enemy bases loaded with Nellies, where even if the specific mission is succesful it will result in only a defensive victory (= a delaying action) is not a good ROI compared to an offensive victory in the Marshalls which opens up the Marianas early and thence the Philippines.
Another is a good submarine campaign against Japanese convoys returning from the DEI. Not a campaign against the Japanese SLOCs to Coal Harbor because frankly, that will not be a target rich environment. But the sealanes either side of the Phillipines is a target rich environment. So far I haven't seen any evidence that the trade off for good American torpedoes, which BTW I'm very dubious was a good deal, is being properly used.
Whilst we are looking at the early stage of things, I'm not convinced that the situation in China will turn out well for the Chinese. I really don't think Canoerebel has thought through the issues involved in allowing strategic bombing in that theatre. His usual moves may achieve some temporary success there but by the middle of 1942 everything could be overturned.
1. By dropping paras early to block the Burma Road, Japan has tipped its hand early that it intends to quickly start to starve the Chinese forces. How long before another paradrop occurs on a base on the Burma Road to drop that daily 500 supply points? And as soon as that cockroach has been dealt with, another paradrop.
2. Canoerebel striking at individual Japanese divisions in the open doesn't do anything to stop enemy bombing of his supply centres. Has anyone thought that his opponent might be baiting Canoerebel into expending supply by attacking his individual divisions, the better to more quickly exhaust Chinese supply. In short, trading a few early tactical defeats for a medium term strategic victory.
3. An early Chinese supply shortage will inhibit constructing forts.
4. A few days ago there was some musings as to whether Japan could sustain an offensive into China from Burma. The answer is most definitely yes. Up to Lashio it is transported on rail lines. From Lashio to Paoshan it is only 4 hexes of secondary road. A further 4 hexes of secondary road between Paoshan and Tsuyung. That means it is only a 20% supply tax getting to each of those two Chinese bases. From Tsuyung it is either 2 railraod hexes to Kunming or 10 secondary road hexes to Chengtu. Sure the supply tax between Tsuyung and Chengtu is substantial, but not to the point it totally dismisses it as an invasion route and the potential benefit is of breaking into the central plain against very weak Chinese opposition and striking at the heart of Chinese industry located at Chungking. All whilst large Chinese 4000 AV stacks are striking at individual Japanese divisions far away from Chungking.
Again, there are counters to this Japanese plan. First being is it actually being entertained by Japan. But what I see is largely a rerun of battles and strategy from earlier games.
Alfred
Almost every Japanese player aims at conquering real estate in the south Pacific allegedly to cut the America-Australia SLOC. Consistently I advise against it because it does not cut the SLOC. So if PH is aiming to undertake offensive operations in both the north and south Pacific, then he is weakening unnecessarily the northern offensive which does have the real potential of stopping the SLOC (because of the higher priority in maintaining forces in America to deal with the existential threat).
The simple fact is that the respective forces are very asymmetrical throughout the entire war. The gap is most noticeable at the very start of the war. One of the best areas to realise the asymmetrical benefits is the northern Pacific during the winter of 41/42 and whilst the Japanese enjoy the amphibious benefit. Invariably Japanese players do not avail themselves of this advantage because of the myths which surround the strategic environment.
What is a potential Allied counter? One is an early land offensive into the Marshalls. That depends on where the KB is and exactly which Japanese air units are moved into the north Pacific. But it is an option using the Allied CVs correctly ie operating in blue water against minimum enemy LBA. A two CV division operating in congested waters, surrounded enemy bases loaded with Nellies, where even if the specific mission is succesful it will result in only a defensive victory (= a delaying action) is not a good ROI compared to an offensive victory in the Marshalls which opens up the Marianas early and thence the Philippines.
Another is a good submarine campaign against Japanese convoys returning from the DEI. Not a campaign against the Japanese SLOCs to Coal Harbor because frankly, that will not be a target rich environment. But the sealanes either side of the Phillipines is a target rich environment. So far I haven't seen any evidence that the trade off for good American torpedoes, which BTW I'm very dubious was a good deal, is being properly used.
Whilst we are looking at the early stage of things, I'm not convinced that the situation in China will turn out well for the Chinese. I really don't think Canoerebel has thought through the issues involved in allowing strategic bombing in that theatre. His usual moves may achieve some temporary success there but by the middle of 1942 everything could be overturned.
1. By dropping paras early to block the Burma Road, Japan has tipped its hand early that it intends to quickly start to starve the Chinese forces. How long before another paradrop occurs on a base on the Burma Road to drop that daily 500 supply points? And as soon as that cockroach has been dealt with, another paradrop.
2. Canoerebel striking at individual Japanese divisions in the open doesn't do anything to stop enemy bombing of his supply centres. Has anyone thought that his opponent might be baiting Canoerebel into expending supply by attacking his individual divisions, the better to more quickly exhaust Chinese supply. In short, trading a few early tactical defeats for a medium term strategic victory.
3. An early Chinese supply shortage will inhibit constructing forts.
4. A few days ago there was some musings as to whether Japan could sustain an offensive into China from Burma. The answer is most definitely yes. Up to Lashio it is transported on rail lines. From Lashio to Paoshan it is only 4 hexes of secondary road. A further 4 hexes of secondary road between Paoshan and Tsuyung. That means it is only a 20% supply tax getting to each of those two Chinese bases. From Tsuyung it is either 2 railraod hexes to Kunming or 10 secondary road hexes to Chengtu. Sure the supply tax between Tsuyung and Chengtu is substantial, but not to the point it totally dismisses it as an invasion route and the potential benefit is of breaking into the central plain against very weak Chinese opposition and striking at the heart of Chinese industry located at Chungking. All whilst large Chinese 4000 AV stacks are striking at individual Japanese divisions far away from Chungking.
Again, there are counters to this Japanese plan. First being is it actually being entertained by Japan. But what I see is largely a rerun of battles and strategy from earlier games.
Alfred
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
Alfred, great great analysis IMHO you're the second best right after H.P. Willmott! Just like JeffK my first reaction was "the game is over" but it's nice to learn that it isn't. You didn't mention defensive measures that Allied players could take along West Coast itself. Any ideas?
Many thanks and... I don't know what's your job in RL but I'd be happy if you could work for the Itailan Navy!
Many thanks and... I don't know what's your job in RL but I'd be happy if you could work for the Itailan Navy!
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
The game is rarely even close to 'over' for the Allies. Most of what Alfred is laying out implies that the Allies might have to think differently and effectively counter this kind of an unusual operation. It also presumes these players care at all about victory points. I know points are useful as a factor to determine where players are in game, and CR has said he likes them as a tool to push both players to have to really fight when pushed against a wall of auto-victory. The supply drain on rebuilding could really hurt.
I can't see any bombing strategy working very well here. CR would surely take care to get enough to the north if it looked like a bombing campaign was imminent. Zeros are good at this point, but not against double their number at long range and from one or two bases at most. Plus it would take a good while for the Japanese engineers to build this stuff up to 4-6 fields to be more useful. If I were CR I would fear the KB dropping by to clear the CAP, and then the bombers coming in. But this would be hard to use for any long enough period to take out a good portion of the industry Alfred mentioned.
About China. Jocke? I'm sure you have some comments to add to those above and just here below.
If the IJAAF bombers are used exclusively in China they will take out all supply even without strategic bombing, unless the Allies can find a way to get supply and support in to oppose them on a regular basis. With bombing of Chungking and Chengtu industry, China will not hold.
The route up to Kunming is very feasible. I took Kunming with 2 divisions, 2 tank Rgts ,and 1 HQ. The real benefit of this is not necessarily an attack into the central plain, although that's a threat that must be defended of course, but that it shuts the door for Chinese escape should the defense collapse completely. There would be no retreat into the mountains and wait for the Allies to break a hole in the Burma line.
I can't see any bombing strategy working very well here. CR would surely take care to get enough to the north if it looked like a bombing campaign was imminent. Zeros are good at this point, but not against double their number at long range and from one or two bases at most. Plus it would take a good while for the Japanese engineers to build this stuff up to 4-6 fields to be more useful. If I were CR I would fear the KB dropping by to clear the CAP, and then the bombers coming in. But this would be hard to use for any long enough period to take out a good portion of the industry Alfred mentioned.
About China. Jocke? I'm sure you have some comments to add to those above and just here below.
If the IJAAF bombers are used exclusively in China they will take out all supply even without strategic bombing, unless the Allies can find a way to get supply and support in to oppose them on a regular basis. With bombing of Chungking and Chengtu industry, China will not hold.
4. A few days ago there was some musings as to whether Japan could sustain an offensive into China from Burma. The answer is most definitely yes. Up to Lashio it is transported on rail lines. From Lashio to Paoshan it is only 4 hexes of secondary road. A further 4 hexes of secondary road between Paoshan and Tsuyung. That means it is only a 20% supply tax getting to each of those two Chinese bases. From Tsuyung it is either 2 railraod hexes to Kunming or 10 secondary road hexes to Chengtu. Sure the supply tax between Tsuyung and Chengtu is substantial, but not to the point it totally dismisses it as an invasion route and the potential benefit is of breaking into the central plain against very weak Chinese opposition and striking at the heart of Chinese industry located at Chungking. All whilst large Chinese 4000 AV stacks are striking at individual Japanese divisions far away from Chungking.
The route up to Kunming is very feasible. I took Kunming with 2 divisions, 2 tank Rgts ,and 1 HQ. The real benefit of this is not necessarily an attack into the central plain, although that's a threat that must be defended of course, but that it shuts the door for Chinese escape should the defense collapse completely. There would be no retreat into the mountains and wait for the Allies to break a hole in the Burma line.
"Success is the ability to go from one failure to another with no loss of enthusiasm." - Winston Churchill
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
Most of what Alfred is laying out implies that the Allies might have to think differently and effectively counter this kind of an unusual operation
Hi Obvert,
this is exactly why I like so much his analysis. Furthermore I have some sort of respect for so in-deep studies and people that share them.
Obviously, I would like to try this strategy on my own. At a first glance I guess the bombing strategy would work at his best just against an under-the-average Allied player. But it could be interesting and funny, wouldn't be?
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
Alfred stated:
I can say in scenario #1 with the KB simply occupied by raiding things ...such a strategy worked early in '42 and in January '43 I am cleaning out the Marshall's .. actually once the Gilberts are secure and LBA established I found I could put up enough LBA LRCAP/ CV CAP to wipe the Nellies clean .. also once established with interlocking patrol zones enough warning to counter any KB moves ...
One thing I am begining to see is the Philippines as a better choice from the Marshalls than Formosa ...
Nice discussion Alfred of indirect action to achieve direct results ..
What is a potential Allied counter? One is an early land offensive into the Marshalls. That depends on where the KB is and exactly which Japanese air units are moved into the north Pacific. But it is an option using the Allied CVs correctly ie operating in blue water against minimum enemy LBA. A two CV division operating in congested waters, surrounded enemy bases loaded with Nellies, where even if the specific mission is succesful it will result in only a defensive victory (= a delaying action) is not a good ROI compared to an offensive victory in the Marshalls which opens up the Marianas early and thence the Philippines.
I can say in scenario #1 with the KB simply occupied by raiding things ...such a strategy worked early in '42 and in January '43 I am cleaning out the Marshall's .. actually once the Gilberts are secure and LBA established I found I could put up enough LBA LRCAP/ CV CAP to wipe the Nellies clean .. also once established with interlocking patrol zones enough warning to counter any KB moves ...
One thing I am begining to see is the Philippines as a better choice from the Marshalls than Formosa ...
Nice discussion Alfred of indirect action to achieve direct results ..
"What gets us into trouble is not what we don't know. It's what we know for sure that just ain't so"
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Canoerebel
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RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
I began reading these posts and stopped. I need to think some things through before going further. A few thoughts:
1. I am generally aware of the possibilities involved in a Japanese strategic air campaign against the continental USA. Obviously, though, the depth of my knowledge is shallow compared to the specifics that are being discussed here.
2. The reason I stopped reading was that the input given is so detailed and so well-thought-out that it threatens to tansform the game away from me vs. PH to something else. I am aware that PH is probably benefiting from Nemo's advice (either present or from prior posts), as I've stated earlier. I can't control that and I don't really mind it. But I don't want to get in the position where I fundamentally change my understanding and approach to the game in ways beyond my skill level and understanding of the situation. I'd rather take my lumps, learn, and play my game for better or for worse.
3. What struck me as I began reading the posts was the immediate idea (in my own mind) that I should turn 27th Div. around and send her to Coal Harbor. That idea isn't a product of my analysis of where she's needed, so it's totally "not me." I was the one who came up with the idea that she could best be used in Oz based upon my prior experiences in the game and my evaluation of my concerns as to where the threats lie. So turning her around would be 100% from outside input.
4. I even hesitate to post this because it may inevitably come across as ungracious to a player who has my utmost respect and who I really appreciate going to such lengths to share and teach. My stopping reading was only meant to give me time to think things through before I go too far down this road of "learning while under fire."
5. A good commander solicits and listens to good advice and acts on it. I need to weigh that against whatever instinctual reluctance I am feeling against doing so.
1. I am generally aware of the possibilities involved in a Japanese strategic air campaign against the continental USA. Obviously, though, the depth of my knowledge is shallow compared to the specifics that are being discussed here.
2. The reason I stopped reading was that the input given is so detailed and so well-thought-out that it threatens to tansform the game away from me vs. PH to something else. I am aware that PH is probably benefiting from Nemo's advice (either present or from prior posts), as I've stated earlier. I can't control that and I don't really mind it. But I don't want to get in the position where I fundamentally change my understanding and approach to the game in ways beyond my skill level and understanding of the situation. I'd rather take my lumps, learn, and play my game for better or for worse.
3. What struck me as I began reading the posts was the immediate idea (in my own mind) that I should turn 27th Div. around and send her to Coal Harbor. That idea isn't a product of my analysis of where she's needed, so it's totally "not me." I was the one who came up with the idea that she could best be used in Oz based upon my prior experiences in the game and my evaluation of my concerns as to where the threats lie. So turning her around would be 100% from outside input.
4. I even hesitate to post this because it may inevitably come across as ungracious to a player who has my utmost respect and who I really appreciate going to such lengths to share and teach. My stopping reading was only meant to give me time to think things through before I go too far down this road of "learning while under fire."
5. A good commander solicits and listens to good advice and acts on it. I need to weigh that against whatever instinctual reluctance I am feeling against doing so.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
It is a well known and accepted AE premise that the Allied Player cannot win the War in 1942 but he/she can lose it. Considering this is a Scen 2 game against a VERY capable Japan player, it is not unexpected that we are seeing some bold opening moves. My point being is that this is no time to panic. If CR remains cautious and thoughtful in his moves, he will be fine. This game likely will be the antithesis of his game vs Chez but, I think that game is about to lose its "fun". Don't forget, our fine Southern gentlemen has been down this road before in his WitP game vs John3.
I would offer some points of advice:
1. If it were me, I would get my CVs out of the DEI. Even if you were able to succesfully knock off an invasion force or two, the risk of losing those hulls is not worth the potential benefits. While it will be a long time before you reach carrier parity, you can get close to it by mid 1942. Every CV you lose will have a force multiplier effect on KB's ability to hit where it hurts. (Right now the advantage is 2 to 1 in CVs. You lose one and it becomes 3 to 1. You lose two and it becomes 6 to1!)
2. The one advantage you have is working torpedoes. IJN ASW will suck for a long time. As Alfred said, PH's commitment to the NoPac means some force has to have been diverted away from the SRA. You need to start interdicting the flow of fuel/oil out of there as soon as possible.
3. I doubt any sort of Strategic Bombing campaign can be mounted on the WCUSA. Most of the centers are grouped around Southern CA and Seattle. You just need to protect those areas (one of which has distance as its primary defense)
4. You might need to consider hoarding some PPs. Would be really bad if you start losing fighter sq on the WCUSA due to withdraw right in the middle of an IJAAF bombing campaign. You need a buffer so you can hold some squadrons on map if times are desperate.
5. Please take this next comment as coming from some one who admires your play and has a lot of respect for your prowess: STOP TRYING TO BE CUTE! Sending the US CVTF to the DEI while the enemy is at the gates is probably not the smartest move. While little forays like that have served you well in the past, I don't think they will help you in a game like this one. Don't give your opponent freebies just so you can say you are doing something. I may be wrong but I beleive some of the tactics that have served you well in the past may end up backfiring if used against PH.
I would offer some points of advice:
1. If it were me, I would get my CVs out of the DEI. Even if you were able to succesfully knock off an invasion force or two, the risk of losing those hulls is not worth the potential benefits. While it will be a long time before you reach carrier parity, you can get close to it by mid 1942. Every CV you lose will have a force multiplier effect on KB's ability to hit where it hurts. (Right now the advantage is 2 to 1 in CVs. You lose one and it becomes 3 to 1. You lose two and it becomes 6 to1!)
2. The one advantage you have is working torpedoes. IJN ASW will suck for a long time. As Alfred said, PH's commitment to the NoPac means some force has to have been diverted away from the SRA. You need to start interdicting the flow of fuel/oil out of there as soon as possible.
3. I doubt any sort of Strategic Bombing campaign can be mounted on the WCUSA. Most of the centers are grouped around Southern CA and Seattle. You just need to protect those areas (one of which has distance as its primary defense)
4. You might need to consider hoarding some PPs. Would be really bad if you start losing fighter sq on the WCUSA due to withdraw right in the middle of an IJAAF bombing campaign. You need a buffer so you can hold some squadrons on map if times are desperate.
5. Please take this next comment as coming from some one who admires your play and has a lot of respect for your prowess: STOP TRYING TO BE CUTE! Sending the US CVTF to the DEI while the enemy is at the gates is probably not the smartest move. While little forays like that have served you well in the past, I don't think they will help you in a game like this one. Don't give your opponent freebies just so you can say you are doing something. I may be wrong but I beleive some of the tactics that have served you well in the past may end up backfiring if used against PH.
"We have met the enemy and they are ours" - Commodore O.H. Perry
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Canoerebel
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RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
I sent Ent and Lex to the DEI at the opening of the war, quite some time before I realized that Steve was committing a major force to Alaska. Doing so wasn't meant to be "cute." It's the only way I could come up with to stop Steve's vey aggressive early moves there. Steamrolling the DEI early is a viable way for Japan to open the gates to a major move on India or Oz, so I'm satisfied with the merits of the move.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
"West Coast: A sub puts a TT into Queen Elizabeth as she departs Los Angeles. She was escorted by a destroyer, so this came as an unpleasant surprise. Damage is light and she'll continue her journey south. If she develops bad damage control problems, I'll divert her to Pearl Harbor."
Having a destroyer the QE is a mistake. A DD has a cruising speed of 15, the QE has a cruising speed of 28. Just as in real life, I think you are better letting the fast xAPs run solo to avoid subs.
Having a destroyer the QE is a mistake. A DD has a cruising speed of 15, the QE has a cruising speed of 28. Just as in real life, I think you are better letting the fast xAPs run solo to avoid subs.
Old School Midway Fanboy
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
I sent Ent and Lex to the DEI at the opening of the war, quite some time before I realized that Steve was committing a major force to Alaska. Doing so wasn't meant to be "cute." It's the only way I could come up with to stop Steve's vey aggressive early moves there. Steamrolling the DEI early is a viable way for Japan to open the gates to a major move on India or Oz, so I'm satisfied with the merits of the move.
I wanted to elaborate on my point but had to get back to work from lunch. By "cute" I did not mean silly. I meant bold maybe even rash moves that could reap big rewards but just as likely might end up badly for you. I guess I am saying high risk/potentially high reward operations might not be the best route against PH. I am suggesting you may want to consider a new paradigm. You and others have pointed out that PH may have studied your play style (and may be getting advice from Nemo). Perhaps you need to self evaluate or better yet have some one evaluate you playing style so as to have a better handle on where you need to break tendencies.
But it's your game, go for it. It is said, "My candle burns at both ends, but what a wonderulf flame it makes as it is consumed."
"We have met the enemy and they are ours" - Commodore O.H. Perry
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
ORIGINAL: Keifer
"West Coast: A sub puts a TT into Queen Elizabeth as she departs Los Angeles. She was escorted by a destroyer, so this came as an unpleasant surprise. Damage is light and she'll continue her journey south. If she develops bad damage control problems, I'll divert her to Pearl Harbor."
Having a destroyer the QE is a mistake. A DD has a cruising speed of 15, the QE has a cruising speed of 28. Just as in real life, I think you are better letting the fast xAPs run solo to avoid subs.
In RL She usually sailing out of convoys without any escort or sometimes with escort of fast destroyers or cruisers. She and her sister where borne to speed.
I think you should send her unescorted and give escort only when he is close to dangerous waters but use full speed , like WC waters, near PH or on places where Japanese subs hunt. On deep ocean he will be safe without escort.
"Only the Dead Have Seen the End of War"
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Canoerebel
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RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
I always send QE unescorted except for the turn required to depart LA or San Diego when enemy subs are present. Sometimes I'll also arrange for escort into Sydney or Melbourne.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
I began reading these posts and stopped. I need to think some things through before going further. A few thoughts:
1. I am generally aware of the possibilities involved in a Japanese strategic air campaign against the continental USA. Obviously, though, the depth of my knowledge is shallow compared to the specifics that are being discussed here.
2. The reason I stopped reading was that the input given is so detailed and so well-thought-out that it threatens to tansform the game away from me vs. PH to something else. I am aware that PH is probably benefiting from Nemo's advice (either present or from prior posts), as I've stated earlier. I can't control that and I don't really mind it. But I don't want to get in the position where I fundamentally change my understanding and approach to the game in ways beyond my skill level and understanding of the situation. I'd rather take my lumps, learn, and play my game for better or for worse.
3. What struck me as I began reading the posts was the immediate idea (in my own mind) that I should turn 27th Div. around and send her to Coal Harbor. That idea isn't a product of my analysis of where she's needed, so it's totally "not me." I was the one who came up with the idea that she could best be used in Oz based upon my prior experiences in the game and my evaluation of my concerns as to where the threats lie. So turning her around would be 100% from outside input.
4. I even hesitate to post this because it may inevitably come across as ungracious to a player who has my utmost respect and who I really appreciate going to such lengths to share and teach. My stopping reading was only meant to give me time to think things through before I go too far down this road of "learning while under fire."
5. A good commander solicits and listens to good advice and acts on it. I need to weigh that against whatever instinctual reluctance I am feeling against doing so.
Assuming you meant me, I'm actually not at all offended that you stopped reading.[:)]
I have on several occasions in the past stated that a player is far better off implementing a second best plan for which they fully understand all the nuances, than trying to implement the objectively best plan which they however do not know all the nuances. Of course the second best plan must still be relevant to the situation in hand.[:)]
Sending the 27th infantry division off to Australia is IMHO premature. But I am certainly not infallible and it may turn out that Australia needs the 27th. It is just too early to know exactly what PH has in mind. Conversely, reversing the 27th's movement orders midstream to send it to Cold Harbor may also be premature.
Essentially what I would say is that the correct approach regarding the 27th is to maintain the most flexible position until the overall strategic situation is made clearer. That means having it in position to move either to Australia or to counter cheap Japanese conquests off the North American coast. Having the necessary sealift in position to send it quickly to wherever it needs to go. As it currently stands you have gambled that your opponent is focussed primarily on Australia, not the West Coast. You may be right but it is a toss of the coin not supported by any strategic information disclosed to date by your opponent.
Another point to be constantly borne in mind is that no matter how detailed an AAR is, third parties are never fully appraised of all the relevant nuances of a situation. Those who are actually engaged in the match are most fully appraised of all the relevant facts. In short, provided they don't prejudge situations, the players have the best pulse on the game. What I always endeavour to do is provide a timely reminder of the old Portuguese sailors cry "albrohos". For as I say, there is always a counter to every plan. What is important is to identify what is occuring and properly analyse it.
As to the potential impact of Nemo's views, you are perfectly correct. There is nothing you can do about it and there is certainly nothing wrong with your opponent accessing old, or for that matter new, posts of Nemo. My only point in raising it is to remind people to not fall into superficial analysis. For it would be generally held that Nemo is the best strategical AE analyst and therefore one should not assume that any particular course of action by the enemy has not been deeply thought through. Of course, as PH is not Nemo, we might not be seeing the optimum Japanese play. But that complacent attitude is always very dangerous. Far better to assume, until evidence to the contrary is presented, that one is confronted with optimum play perfectly executed.
Alfred
Alfred
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
With working USN torpedoes, won't a concentration of Allied subs in NorPac make it very hard to resupply those Japanese bases?
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
ORIGINAL: Encircled
With working USN torpedoes, won't a concentration of Allied subs in NorPac make it very hard to resupply those Japanese bases?
Not as much as you think.
1. It will not be a target rich environment for the Allied subs to operate in.
2. There will be no Allied search planes to locate enemy TFs. You can't shoot at something unless you know it is there.
3. Until the subs get radar, they are very much in thrall to plane sightings to discover enemy TFs.
4. Enemy LBA tasked with ASW missions can greatly curtail submarine operations.
Compared to the north Pacific, the sealanes back to the Home Islands from the DEI present not only a much richer target environment, where the odds of enemy merchantmen simply sailing on top of the subs is much greater, but also various choke points. I have suggested either side of the Philippines but one should not forget that Bullwinkle also suggested operating directly off the Home Island ports in the period when Japanese ASW capability is quite weak.
Alfred
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
Nemo is not the opponent here and some reading this may fail to give PH his due as a skilled opponent as a result of all the "Nemo" talk.
Nemo has not commented on PH's thread and is not receiving PM's as his box is full.
This game is PH's baby. As for finding past information in old threads - everyone is free to do that. If you have ever tried to implement someone else's plan (as Alfred so elegantly related), it is harder than one thinks.
For those feeling that PH "knows" CR's tendencies because he has read CR's old AAR's (CR you magnificent bastard. I read your book!) they need to take a second look. CR has fought several different opponents (Miller, John III, Chez, Q-Ball, PH) who all employed different war plans using different tactics, not one of CR's responses was the same. Miller - CR took the China to the Homeland Route, John III - Invasion Hokkaido, Q-Ball - modified Sir Robin with a Sumatra Invasion, Chez - Fortress P, and now PH.
Nemo has not commented on PH's thread and is not receiving PM's as his box is full.
This game is PH's baby. As for finding past information in old threads - everyone is free to do that. If you have ever tried to implement someone else's plan (as Alfred so elegantly related), it is harder than one thinks.
For those feeling that PH "knows" CR's tendencies because he has read CR's old AAR's (CR you magnificent bastard. I read your book!) they need to take a second look. CR has fought several different opponents (Miller, John III, Chez, Q-Ball, PH) who all employed different war plans using different tactics, not one of CR's responses was the same. Miller - CR took the China to the Homeland Route, John III - Invasion Hokkaido, Q-Ball - modified Sir Robin with a Sumatra Invasion, Chez - Fortress P, and now PH.
RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
Right! We need a Fortress PR [Prince Rupert] strategy! Just ship all those Mountie detatchments there, and don't forget the hay for the horses!ORIGINAL: desicat
Nemo is not the opponent here and some reading this may fail to give PH his due as a skilled opponent as a result of all the "Nemo" talk.
Nemo has not commented on PH's thread and is not receiving PM's as his box is full.
This game is PH's baby. As for finding past information in old threads - everyone is free to do that. If you have ever tried to implement someone else's plan (as Alfred so elegantly related), it is harder than one thinks.
For those feeling that PH "knows" CR's tendencies because he has read CR's old AAR's (CR you magnificent bastard. I read your book!) they need to take a second look. CR has fought several different opponents (Miller, John III, Chez, Q-Ball, PH) who all employed different war plans using different tactics, not one of CR's responses was the same. Miller - CR took the China to the Homeland Route, John III - Invasion Hokkaido, Q-Ball - modified Sir Robin with a Sumatra Invasion, Chez - Fortress P, and now PH.
No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth
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Canoerebel
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RE: War and Peas - Hortlund (J) vs. Canoe (A)
12/28/42
I hope you guys will continue posting your thoughts, insights and suggestions. It will be very helpful to the community at large. For the moment, I may pick and choose what I read carefully, simply to avoid "playing by proxy." Until I sort through my thoughts on this, I want to guard my "virginity."
NoPac: Let me begin by saying several turns ago I ordered a variety of troops to posts in the northwestern USA and Canada. This was designed to prevent paratroop attacks from taking bases with strategic resources, though I think such a move into the USA is unlikely. Some Candian bases - Edmonton for instance - are different matters.
In reading some of the posts made in the past 24 hours, I picked up on the gist of the concerns as articulated by Alfred. I do have a decent number of fighters in my West Coast bases. In checking through the reinforcement queue, I noticed that at least 75 P-40Es and 25 P-39s arrive in the next few weeks. That will give the USA a fairly stout number of decent fighters - P-40, P-39, P-38 and F3F. My experience has been that these planes perform capably in defensive roles over home fields.
I also detailed the two AKV that start the game at Balboa to make for Hawaii. In the event of a full-scale strategic bombing campaign agains the USA, I will transfer some of the Hawaii fighters.
The transports carrying the CD unit that turned back from the Aluetians will turn around once again (the TF had reached San Fran) and may make for Coal Harbor. The Allies will also try to shoe-horn in a USA battalion, a Canadian battalion, and a small USA combat engineering detachment before things get too hot. I don't know how much time I have.
I am not turning around 27th USA Div. The first battalion will continue south for Australia, though I can divert her to Pearl Harbor if things begin to look really bad.
CenPac/SoPac: Several combat TFs are spreading out, with oilers following. I'm going to try to shoot some gaps and raid deep.
Eastern DEI: A Mini KB is south of Ceram. It is unlikely that Steve would push it much further south and risk a clash with Ent and York. I feel certain he is as least leery of the possibilty that they could be around. I disagree with various assessment that the Allies cannot fight a good delaying action here. While Steve does have Kendari and Ambon, he Netties won't be effective at long-range. The Allied airfield at Koepang plus the presence of the American carriers should prevent (or seriously slow) Steve in moving on Timor and some of the adjacent bases. The Allies may be able to buy some good time that benefits India or Oz, should those be Steve's actual target or targets.
Burma: The Allies have clear out the last IJ paratroop infestation (Taung Gyi). The Burma Road is open again. I've also turned around the two Brit brigades that were heading for Bombay. I'm debating how to use them - Burma? Oz? Java (unlikely)? Tmor (unlikely)?
China: I'm still gathering my Chinese troops, but I think I'm going to get a crack at attack an isolated IJA division or two.
I hope you guys will continue posting your thoughts, insights and suggestions. It will be very helpful to the community at large. For the moment, I may pick and choose what I read carefully, simply to avoid "playing by proxy." Until I sort through my thoughts on this, I want to guard my "virginity."
NoPac: Let me begin by saying several turns ago I ordered a variety of troops to posts in the northwestern USA and Canada. This was designed to prevent paratroop attacks from taking bases with strategic resources, though I think such a move into the USA is unlikely. Some Candian bases - Edmonton for instance - are different matters.
In reading some of the posts made in the past 24 hours, I picked up on the gist of the concerns as articulated by Alfred. I do have a decent number of fighters in my West Coast bases. In checking through the reinforcement queue, I noticed that at least 75 P-40Es and 25 P-39s arrive in the next few weeks. That will give the USA a fairly stout number of decent fighters - P-40, P-39, P-38 and F3F. My experience has been that these planes perform capably in defensive roles over home fields.
I also detailed the two AKV that start the game at Balboa to make for Hawaii. In the event of a full-scale strategic bombing campaign agains the USA, I will transfer some of the Hawaii fighters.
The transports carrying the CD unit that turned back from the Aluetians will turn around once again (the TF had reached San Fran) and may make for Coal Harbor. The Allies will also try to shoe-horn in a USA battalion, a Canadian battalion, and a small USA combat engineering detachment before things get too hot. I don't know how much time I have.
I am not turning around 27th USA Div. The first battalion will continue south for Australia, though I can divert her to Pearl Harbor if things begin to look really bad.
CenPac/SoPac: Several combat TFs are spreading out, with oilers following. I'm going to try to shoot some gaps and raid deep.
Eastern DEI: A Mini KB is south of Ceram. It is unlikely that Steve would push it much further south and risk a clash with Ent and York. I feel certain he is as least leery of the possibilty that they could be around. I disagree with various assessment that the Allies cannot fight a good delaying action here. While Steve does have Kendari and Ambon, he Netties won't be effective at long-range. The Allied airfield at Koepang plus the presence of the American carriers should prevent (or seriously slow) Steve in moving on Timor and some of the adjacent bases. The Allies may be able to buy some good time that benefits India or Oz, should those be Steve's actual target or targets.
Burma: The Allies have clear out the last IJ paratroop infestation (Taung Gyi). The Burma Road is open again. I've also turned around the two Brit brigades that were heading for Bombay. I'm debating how to use them - Burma? Oz? Java (unlikely)? Tmor (unlikely)?
China: I'm still gathering my Chinese troops, but I think I'm going to get a crack at attack an isolated IJA division or two.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.