A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[TulliusDetritus]

NO, the British did what they did in December 1941. But this scenario envisaged here is not December 1941. What was proposed was that the Dutch and British (and possibly the PI) would be left while the Japanese make an all out effort for the HI.

The British are still waging a mortal war against the Germans, I can't see what resources could be diverted. The Dutch, well, I won't repeat myself.

I would like to remind everyone that the Americans of this scenario are not the post ´45 juggernaut. I see 3 phases in US evolution. Phase I: 1900, along with Germany they attain industrial supremacy (iron, coal, steel). Phase II or post WWI, you can add financial supremacy (main creditors of the UK, France, Italy etc). But only after 1945 the political and military supremacy are grabbed.

So I'd suggest you to remember Lemay's scenario takes place in phase II. And looks like some people are looking from a phase III tower

[TulliusDetritus]

In terms of reinforcements, the Commonwealth may have had the Australian 6th and 7th divisions available, as well as some units that were slated for Burma.

John Curtin says hello...

[warspite1]

NO, the British did what they did in December 1941. But this scenario envisaged here is not December 1941. What was proposed was that the Dutch and British (and possibly the PI) would be left while the Japanese make an all out effort for the HI.

The British are still waging a mortal war against the Germans, I can't see what resources could be diverted. The Dutch, well, I won't repeat myself.

I would like to remind everyone that the Americans of this scenario are not the post ´45 juggernaut. I see 3 phases in US evolution. Phase I: 1900, along with Germany they attain industrial supremacy (iron, coal, steel). Phase II or post WWI, you can add financial supremacy (main creditors of the UK, France, Italy etc). But only after 1945 the political and military supremacy are grabbed.

So I'd suggest you to remember Lemay's scenario takes place in phase II. And looks like some people are looking from a phase III tower

warspite1

I assume you've got confused TD. The responses this morning are in response to Orm's question which is a different scenario to that Curtis Lemay proposed in one key respect. In this scenario the Japanese have gone all out for HI and left the British and Dutch (and possibly PI) to later.

You say you can't see what reinforcements are available to the British and yet named the 18th Division yourself. Please look at the woeful tale of Malaya and Singapore again. Look at what happened. Given the Japanese position regarding their supply situation, it does not need much - a division more troops, a few more aircraft, and better preparation - to see a different outcome (and certainly a very delayed outcome).

How many ways can it be said? The Japanese simply can't afford delay in securing the NEI oil.

[TulliusDetritus]

Given the Japanese position regarding their supply situation, it does not need much - a division more troops, a few more aircraft, and better preparation - to see a different outcome (and certainly a very delayed outcome).

How many ways can it be said? The Japanese simply can't afford delay in securing the NEI oil.

You may see a miracle (I mean Singapore, you're right about the low supplies thing) I see a much more decisive factor here: demoralisation. More troops won't make a difference.

The best example of "demoralisation" is precisely France in 1939-40.

re the oil: is this true? (july 1941)

"Japan's oil reserves were only sufficient to last three years, and only half that time if it went to war and consumed fuel at a more frenzied pace"

12 months then? They can ignore these vital (yes) outposts some months. PH in Japanese hands (and there goes the main foe), the oil isn't going anywhere. And if they fail to grab PH, perfect, they surrender much sooner.

[warspite1]

Given the Japanese position regarding their supply situation, it does not need much - a division more troops, a few more aircraft, and better preparation - to see a different outcome (and certainly a very delayed outcome).

How many ways can it be said? The Japanese simply can't afford delay in securing the NEI oil.

You may see a miracle (I mean Singapore, you're right about the low supplies thing) I see a much more decisive factor here: demoralisation. More troops won't make a difference.

The best example of "demoralisation" is precisely France in 1939-40.

re the oil: is this true? (july 1941)

"Japan's oil reserves were only sufficient to last three years, and only half that time if it went to war and consumed fuel at a more frenzied pace"

12 months then? They can ignore these vital (yes) outposts some months. PH in Japanese hands (and there goes the main foe), the oil isn't going anywhere. And if they fail to grab PH, perfect, they surrender much sooner.

warspite1

France is a good example that nothing can ever be taken for granted in war. But battles/campaigns can turn on certain key events - Gamelin extending the defence to include Holland. Why? It meant the reserves that would otherwise have been available to plug the Meuse breakthrough were on their way to the Netherlands.... The lack of troops in Malaya (divisions under-strength) meant that those that were there could be out-flanked.

Momentum in warfare is vital. Once momentum builds for one side, it needs to be arrested or panic and defeatism can set in. Malaya/Singapore - like France - didn't need much to alter for a different outcome.

I am not suggesting a miracle in Malaya/Singapore. But there doesn't need to be one. Japan face a double whammy here - increased oil usage trying to take the HI in the east and delaying attacking in the west, and even less oil because they haven't concentrated on getting the NEI as quickly as possible.

[Curtis Lemay]

I'd rather not play the imaginary changes to ships game. I know what the actual Mutsuki "conversion" was. It was not something the Japanese would have just decided one day would be a great addition to the class capabilities. It first took an unfavorable change in the fortunes of war during 1942.

The historical changes were a wartime emergency. Cargo was stored in drums and dumped in the sea as the ships sailed past. (less than half was even recovered). That's how jerry-rigged it was. In peace time they have the oportunity to get it right. The example APD shows what was possible. The operation I'm talking about would clearly call for APDs.

IMO, something like the historical Mutsuki conversion wouldn't fix your problem but if you need it for your scenario you should be aware that the 37 knot speed is only the original destroyer design speed. I've seen several sources (Mark Stille's "Imperial Japanese Navy" being one) stating this class failed to reach that design speed and could only make 33 knots when built in the 1920's.

And then it got old. Which is probably why I've not seen mention of them doing more than 30 knots in Japanese accounts from the Solomons campaign.

As I've said, plenty of slack in the figures. At 33 knots they still make 460 miles in 12 hours.

[Curtis Lemay]

Dock space with cranes for conversion work on a Japanese warship in 1941 still meant either one of the five Naval Yards (ie Sasebo Naval Yard) or one of the larger civilian yards. Which is also where the IJN warships were being sent for the other "non-construction" work I mentioned earlier.

Hope that clears things up.

Any place with dock and cranes would work.

I wonder why the IJN never thought of that.

You don't seem to be able to provide any reason. By the way....how do you know they never thought of that?

[Curtis Lemay]

Any place with dock and cranes would work.

I wonder why the IJN never thought of that.

warspite1

Well maybe one of many reasons is that for some reason there isn’t a plethora of ‘spaces’ that take ships of destroyer size and happen to have the required heavy duty cranes that could cope with this type of work.... oh and that have the required skilled work force at a time when the naval and civilian yards are massively in demand.... oh and this assumes the resources are available at a time when the IJN has numerous more important projects upon which to divide its finite resources.

Cargo vessels are bigger than destroyers and cranes are needed to load/unload them (cranes large enough to load/unload a tank, by the way). What specialists are required besides welders and carpenters? Those would not only be all over any port, but in the ship's crew as well.

[Curtis Lemay]

It' seems pretty clear now that when Curtis Lemay stated the discussion was about what the Japanese could have done with his plan, he actually meant what they could have done if they weren't the historical Japanese with all their limited resources, annoying administrative systems, rigid command hierarchies, restrictive operational practices and a limited understanding of their own warship potential.

I would say the Japanese went on a pretty wild romp all over the Pacific. Not the acts of the timid or the constrained. If the case for a need can be made they could adopt a plan for it. Remember that they designed special fins for torpedoes, just for Pearl. They used naval gun shells as bombs at Pearl.

If they just tumble to the fact that the carriers might not be in port on 12/7, and the port facilities may not get damaged, everything else can flow from that.

[Curtis Lemay]

Japan face a double whammy here - increased oil usage trying to take the HI in the east and delaying attacking in the west, and even less oil because they haven't concentrated on getting the NEI as quickly as possible.

The DEI operation is not changed - relative to Pearl - in my version. Only Luzon is postponed.

[warspite1]

Japan face a double whammy here - increased oil usage trying to take the HI in the east and delaying attacking in the west, and even less oil because they haven't concentrated on getting the NEI as quickly as possible.

The DEI operation is not changed - relative to Pearl - in my version. Only Luzon is postponed.

warspite1

My post had nothing to do with your 'plan'.

[warspite1]

I wonder why the IJN never thought of that.

warspite1

Well maybe one of many reasons is that for some reason there isn’t a plethora of ‘spaces’ that take ships of destroyer size and happen to have the required heavy duty cranes that could cope with this type of work.... oh and that have the required skilled work force at a time when the naval and civilian yards are massively in demand.... oh and this assumes the resources are available at a time when the IJN has numerous more important projects upon which to divide its finite resources.

Cargo vessels are bigger than destroyers and cranes are needed to load/unload them (cranes large enough to load/unload a tank, by the way). What specialists are required besides welders and carpenters? Those would not only be all over any port, but in the ship's crew as well.

warspite1

I think we are deep into "you couldn't make it up" territory here.

So what are you saying exactly? A couple of flotillas of destroyers take over commercial wharves with sufficient sized cranes, and get their crews to do 'Do-it-yourself conversion jobs'?

[Buckrock]

It' seems pretty clear now that when Curtis Lemay stated the discussion was about what the Japanese could have done with his plan, he actually meant what they could have done if they weren't the historical Japanese with all their limited resources, annoying administrative systems, rigid command hierarchies, restrictive operational practices and a limited understanding of their own warship potential.

I would say the Japanese went on a pretty wild romp all over the Pacific. Not the acts of the timid or the constrained. If the case for a need can be made they could adopt a plan for it. Remember that they designed special fins for torpedoes, just for Pearl. They used naval gun shells as bombs at Pearl.

Doesn't mean they can therefore do anything you imagine.

No one's suggesting the Japanese were timid, just that you have them conducting operations and utilizing their ships in ways that would require them to throw out the procedures and practices they had in place at the start of the war. And that's assuming the ships were even capable of what you require. If you will just lay out the times, distances, positions etc for the Japanese in the 24 hours before the attack, it might be possible to see why you believe the Japanese could do it. Right now though I'm seeing nothing but a bit of spitballing.

[Aurelian]

I have been pondering on something. What if the Japanese, in a grandeur of over-confidence in their own ability and a total disregard for any future recourse and oil shortages, decided to delay attacking the CW countries, and instead follow up the attack on Pearl Harbour with a priority to capture Hawaii, and surrounding islands. Making this their priority for the first few months of the war. Maybe an attack on the Philippines at the same time.

I've been pondering on:
- How such a Japanese plan to attack HI first would have looked.
- How the US reaction to it would have been.
- What would be the reaction from the CW countries.
- And how long the Japanese have before they run out of fuel...

I get stuck creating a plan for Japan because I assume that the lack of suitable bases between Japan, and HI, is a killer. Capturing islands needed should go fast, but making them into decent bases to be used operationally to support an invasion of the main HI islands seems to be a time-killer that will getting Japan stuck in a mire of endless trouble.

Repost:

In Jan 42, the Naval General Staff studied invading, taking, and sustaining a garrison there.

3,000,000 tons of cargo required to feed the population over a year, pus 30 ships a month for military equipment. A 9kt freighter would 36 days to get there and back, not counting load/unload time, ship maintenance, and waiting for escorts.
Already, in Japan, food shortages were a serious topic.

The study concluded that their already overstressed merchant marine couldn't do it.

The study concluded that they couldn't supply the civilian population. My question is what the plan would look like to go after Hawaii in December 1941. All other Japanese considerations secondary.

They would't be able to supply the large garrison either. The poblem with how the Japanese dealt with logistics was "It will work out somehow."

[RangerJoe]

The Japanese could have hired the British shipyards at Hong Kong and Singapore to convert their destroyers as well as the underworked US shipyards which did not have enough work that they were working on British ships. Not to mention any Soviet shipyards as well.

BTW. the cargoes that Curtis Lemay referenced to as far as the DE => APD conversions, carried six 1/4 ton trucks (aka, Jeeps) and two 1 ton trucks (aka, weapons carriers / pickups) with four ammo carts (trailers) and four pack howitzers which would be 75mm or even smaller. It could also carry 162 men.

A much better solution would be using AMCs disguised as the passenger liners that they had been before their conversion. Nothing out of the ordinary to see those moving across the Pacific Ocean.

[warspite1]

The Japanese could have hired the British shipyards at Hong Kong and Singapore to convert their destroyers as well as the underworked US shipyards which did not have enough work that they were working on British ships. Not to mention any Soviet shipyards as well.

warspite1

What period of time are you thinking this could happen in?

[Orm]

The Japanese could have hired the British shipyards at Hong Kong and Singapore to convert their destroyers as well as the underworked US shipyards which did not have enough work that they were working on British ships. Not to mention any Soviet shipyards as well.

warspite1

What period of time are you thinking this could happen in?

Any time at all up until they are to be used. The Allies will be oblivious, of course. They were surprised historically, so therefore they can not be anything other than surprised no matter what the Japanese do. Suggesting anything else makes you to a ridiculous chauvinistic USA USA USA.

[TulliusDetritus]

They would't be able to supply the large garrison either. The poblem with how the Japanese dealt with logistics was "It will work out somehow."

Can't you see the unavoidable problem with this? These "planners" are saying the Japanese co-prosperity stuff is *impossible*. They are doomed, they cannot hope to leave the five main islands. "You can discuss it with Mr Logistics"

Ergo these "planners" are saying reality is impossible... ergo this reasoning is really weird.

[TulliusDetritus]

Enter Herr Paulus and his huge surrounded horde at Stalingrad: let's round out, 300.000 men.

Paulus affirms he needs minimum 500 tons every day. With this his men can more or less fight = this huge horde needs 15.000 tons per month then. 750 tons per day would be even better? Ok, 22.500 tons per month.

This is a very efficient war machine (the Wehrmacht) and they are fighting for their lives. The Red Army or white shark has smelled the blood

Hawaii garrison. 50.000 men? Ok. Fighting à la Stalingrad? Ridiculous. Partisans? Maybe. This force is 1/6 Paulus' force. So we have 2.500 tons per month (or 84 per day) or 3750 per month (or 125 per day). But these are numbers for a force that is fighting. Half these numbers might be enough then?

If you have better numbers connected to reality aka something that actually happened, I am all ears.

re the population, as Lemay correctly pointed out, come on! We are dealing with nasty psychos...

[TulliusDetritus]

They were surprised historically, so therefore they can not be anything other than surprised no matter what the Japanese do. Suggesting anything else makes you to a ridiculous chauvinistic USA USA USA.

Except I never said this Hawaii stuff would 100% work. In fact I said that personally I think it would fail. All I'm saying is I don't believe the "100% impossible" brigade.

PS the Dutch are still a dwarf though, this does not change XD