My definition of "operational defeat" is not to base an operational plan on an understanding of the enemy's intentions when this is not supported by intelligence.
It is certainly unwise to base a plan on an assessment of the enemy's intentions, rather than on his capabilities. But to speak of an "operational defeat" will inevitably cause confusion in the minds of one's readers, as the word "defeat" is usually associated with a negative outcome, rather than with an assessment of a plan made before the operation has even begun.
To put a major amphibious force and supporting forces at risk of strikes from no less than nine aircraft carriers is a very foolish move
The Saipan landings (which by the way is what I am referring to in this case when I use the word "operation") were certainly a calculated risk. Part of this calculation included the estimate that should the landings be opposed by the enemy's fleet, it would be met in battle and defeated. As far as I am aware, the operational plan did not try to anticipate what form the enemy's response might take. It did however deploy our main striking forces in between the enemy's bases and the landing force, from which position it could and did very effectively protect the amphibious force. This plan also deployed an extensive submarine screen to cover likely approach routes. But one thing no plan could do was provide for land based aerial reconnaissance of any significant portion of the area in which the enemy would operate. Submarines, although they performed admirably in the event, are no substitute for air recon; the information provided by submarine spotting reports can never be considered to be complete. And Spruance, well aware of this deficiency, understood that it meant that he would be unlikely to be able to develop a good picture of the enemy dispositions at the start of a prospective battle.
Given the existance of the enemy carriers, what alternatives are there to putting the amphibious and covering forces at risk of strikes, other than not carrying out the amphibious operation at all?
In an operational sense we were surprised.
Again, I am having difficulty making sense out of this. In terms of the operation, the Saipan invasion, we expected that the enemy might send his fleet and our fleet was deployed to intercept it. Preventing the enemy fleet from striking against our invasion force was TF 58's main mission. It certainly was no surprise that the enemy did do so. Perhaps when you use the word "operation" you are referring to the Battle of the Philippine Sea? Again, U.S. forces were not surprised, as they were fully aware that the enemy was approaching, and that he was capable of attacking at a time of his choosing, and with the advantage of knowing where our forces could be found. Spruance's choice was to stay close to the vulnerable landing forces lest unspotted (and potentially powerful) enemy forces evade his and get in among the invasion force.
This was qualitatively different from Leyte - the enemy plan there was a very strange one no rational person could have forseen - and even if someone had no rational commander would have believed it.
Your definition of operational defeat is "bas[ing] an operational plan on an understanding of the enemy's intentions when this is not supported by intelligence." Yet you excuse Third Fleet of precisely this error by claiming the enemy's plan was unforseeable or unbelievable -- this describes trying to divine enemy intent. Enemy
capabilities on the other hand were either misunderstood by Third Fleet, or else were not sufficiently considered.
The enemy went to some trouble to achieve a deception plan which, in the event, worked fairly well - making Halsey look a bit of a fool. But the idea that carriers would be at sea as a deception for a surface attack that late in the war is pretty radical.
On the contrary, from my reading I believe that such a gambit was widely expected.
I am much more forgiving of the commanders at Leyte than the commander at the Turkey Shoot - although in both cases we did indeed win - and in both cases we could have been hurt worse than we were.
I wonder whether the families of the 2,800 dead bluejackets and aviators from the Leyte Gulf battle were equally forgiving.
I do not see any reason we should not have risked allowing a major enemy carrier force in range of launching all its deckloads - much less do so from a position undetected by us. We had what should have been overwhelming reconnaissance capabilities and we did not elect to take the situation as seriously as was warranted.
What overwhelming reconnaissance capabilities? U.S. forces had no LBA, and 5th Fleet's aircraft had considerably shorter range than did the Japanese. Spruance was unwilling to go charging off to where it appeared that the enemy's main force
might be, lest the forces spotted turn out to be decoys. Decoys and secondary forces had featured in every Japanese operation of the war thus far, and Spruance was correct to account for them in his battle plan. Where uncertainty of the enemy's dispositions complicated planning, he returned to his mission: cover the landings. But let's suppose for a minute that he had acted differently, and had jumped at the submarine sightings, and had managed to place TF58 in the most perfect setup possible for launching strikes the morning of June 19. The most likely result would be the launching of simultaneous strikes by the opposing forces. And while it is pointless to speculate about the outcome of such strikes, there is one fact that is indisputable: any strikes sent out by TF 58 would have been appropriately escorted, with the corollary that available CAP (which in the actual event consisted of virtually every fighter in TF58's TOE) would have been considerably reduced. This battle would likely have been bloodier than the one which actually took place, and while it seems that this is what Spruance's critics believe would have been preferable, there is no certainty that all or even most of the additional blood spilled would have been Japanese.
That failure led directly to the operational failure- allowing 450 enemy carrier planes their shot.
Actually, the four strike waves launched against TF58 consisted of a total of around 320 aircraft. And again, you are confusing things by characterizing an incident of battle as an "operational failure".
We are lucky indeed few of them delivered ordnance - and it never happened that way on any other occasion before or after. Consider the fate of US carriers in other battles when you say it is acceptable to allow hundreds of them in range of ours in this one.
Perhaps the most significant factor leading to the small volume of ordnance delivered was the fact that the CAP over TF 58 outnumbered the attackers by a significant margin. Add to this the American technological (radar, proximity fuses) and doctrinal (fighter direction) advantages, and the conclusion must be that TF 58, concentrated geographically into mutually-supporting groups and not distracted by the requirements of managing, arming, launching, escorting, and recovering offensive strikes, was uniquely suited to fighting a defensive battle in support of its defensive mission, protecting the invasion force from the Japanese fleet. Philippine Sea is a textbook example of a successful defensive battle fought with little loss of friendly force and sealing the success of the operation of which its forces were a part.
