Modeling of Carrier Battles

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

There is no inherant reason this is impossible in code - if reaction means one hex it is very reasonable as well -
and it would be cool chrome. But it isn't up to us. The mere existence of this would encourage Japanese players NOT to put all their warships in the Carrier TF.

Three hex reaction (three out, engagement, three back, during the night phase) was what the CVTF commanders had to worry about.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker


This is why I advocated the design addition of a mobile home port for TFs, basically a larger formation than a TF which TFs could operated from...ie, return to, keep station on (ie, 1 hex in the van or the rear) etc. Any chance of this be looked into? It would improve the game immeasurably.

Ask Don as I think this is a slightly different concept than the organisation question you asked in the AE thread...

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: spence

It appears that no one finds it interesting that the model "predicts" that the IJN can walk into an ambush where they are outnumbered 2 to 1 in fleet carriers and still come off with an even exchange (of carriers) more often than not.

I do also, but how much of that is due to the pilot skill stats, the plane stats, etc. things beyond just the number of carriers? They've said that pilot skill is changing a lot, the Orbat is getting worked over so the AA of the ships might change, the stats of the planes are changing a lot, and then this thread is about how to improve the carrier battle model overall.

I think we are at the point of making the building blocks accurate before getting to a new model, because we already know the existing model is off kilter.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: spence

It appears that no one finds it interesting that the model "predicts" that the IJN can walk into an ambush where they are outnumbered 2 to 1 in fleet carriers and still come off with an even exchange (of carriers) more often than not.

I do also, but how much of that is due to the pilot skill stats, the plane stats, etc. things beyond just the number of carriers? They've said that pilot skill is changing a lot, the Orbat is getting worked over so the AA of the ships might change, the stats of the planes are changing a lot, and then this thread is about how to improve the carrier battle model overall.

I think we are at the point of making the building blocks accurate before getting to a new model, because we already know the existing model is off kilter.

WITPQS (what in the world does that mean anyway?) may be on to something: you better not try that in RHS - particularly 1943 or later. You won't be coming out even - and you may not come out at all. The early Japanese planes do not compete well with F6Fs and F4Us - nor of course should they. And a TBF is not in the same ballpark as a TBD. Even in 1942 US dive bombers deliver thousand pound bombs - and fragile Japanese carriers cannot sluff off very many of those. There is never any uber cap in RHS - so the Japanese have to depend on luck and AAA - and in RHS a start of game DD might have as little as one .30 cal per side for light AAA - it may have SP guns or very low quality 5 inch (AAA wise - they are wonderful for surface actions). I don't think the engine is as busted as the data.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: el cid again

There is no inherant reason this is impossible in code - if reaction means one hex it is very reasonable as well -
and it would be cool chrome. But it isn't up to us. The mere existence of this would encourage Japanese players NOT to put all their warships in the Carrier TF.

Three hex reaction (three out, engagement, three back, during the night phase) was what the CVTF commanders had to worry about.

But not realistic. There is a 6 hex movement limit = it takes all 12 hours to do that. You get no time to get information, no time to plot your couse - nothing but sailing. 3 out and back is never gonna happen. 2 might - and 1 should be fairly SOP. Let the die (luck) decide.

[spence]

I'll admit that I didn't do any really scientific analysis of what I was seeing in this scenario.

As a general impression it seems US losses to flak are in the same ballpark (1-2 planes)as those that were experienced in the real 1942 carrier battles when the IJN CVs are only accompanied by a single DD each. US losses are 5-6 times heavier when the IJN CVs are supported by the AAA of the all cruisers/destroyers in the TF.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: el cid again

There is no inherant reason this is impossible in code - if reaction means one hex it is very reasonable as well -
and it would be cool chrome. But it isn't up to us. The mere existence of this would encourage Japanese players NOT to put all their warships in the Carrier TF.

Three hex reaction (three out, engagement, three back, during the night phase) was what the CVTF commanders had to worry about.

But not realistic. There is a 6 hex movement limit = it takes all 12 hours to do that. You get no time to get information, no time to plot your couse - nothing but sailing. 3 out and back is never gonna happen. 2 might - and 1 should be fairly SOP. Let the die (luck) decide.

Realistic--that was exactly what the IJN did. They knew where the USN TF was hanging out at dusk, and they had been planning the reaction, so with the fall of night, they detached and charged. We were pulling out at the same time, except for ships dead in the water, so the engagements never happened--except possibly the Hornet--but they had a strong influence on what both sides actually did.

[jwilkerson]

Ok, so to try to provide an executive summary of what I've seen debated so far .. first I'll list out the 11 factors:

(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”
(2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)
(3) Light Landing System
(4) Air Search
(5) Damage Control (both designed in DC as well as “as practiced”
(6) Air frames (for example, in early ’42 we have A6M2, D3Y, B5N versus F4F, SDB, TBD)
(7) Air Crew Skills
(8) Shipboard and Fleet anti-aircraft
(9) CAP control
(10) Air Ordnance
(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

And a link back to the scope post http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

So the most consistent theme I see, is Spence (and a few others) arguing that FLAK (factor #8 above) is the factor which produces the largest gap between game results and real life results and hence would be priority #1 for being addressed. Does anyone agree or disagree with this? Are their any other factors which merit adjustment?

[spence]

In the discussion of the SAG movement I think there may have been some confusion about whether the hexes were 40 mile or 60 mile hexes. I'd support 3 x 40 mile hexes.


I think the SAG "reaction" or whatever folks are calling it is kind of a good thing. If something could be coded that would allow it that would be great and it might encourage the IJN Player to use historical doctrine. I'd be leery of coding it too simply because it proved to be not particularly effective. I would suggest though that a similar "retreat reaction" of say 1 (40 or 60 mile) hex also be coded for the CVTF such that the "charge" as Herwin puts it be a pretty chancey thing. IRL the IJN surface forces didn't catch anything but the abandoned, flaming wreck of the Hornet. In that instance they never even caught up with the 2 DDs that were trying to scuttle Hornet.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: spence

In the discussion of the SAG movement I think there may have been some confusion about whether the hexes were 40 mile or 60 mile hexes. I'd support 3 x 40 mile hexes.


I think the SAG "reaction" or whatever folks are calling it is kind of a good thing. If something could be coded that would allow it that would be great and it might encourage the IJN Player to use historical doctrine. I'd be leery of coding it too simply because it proved to be not particularly effective. I would suggest though that a similar "retreat reaction" of say 1 (40 or 60 mile) hex also be coded for the CVTF such that the "charge" as Herwin puts it be a pretty chancey thing. IRL the IJN surface forces didn't catch anything but the abandoned, flaming wreck of the Hornet. In that instance they never even caught up with the 2 DDs that were trying to scuttle Hornet.

4x40 or 3x60. The key distance was 200 nm.

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Ok, so to try to provide an executive summary of what I've seen debated so far .. first I'll list out the 11 factors:

(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”
(2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)
(3) Light Landing System
(4) Air Search
(5) Damage Control (both designed in DC as well as “as practiced”
(6) Air frames (for example, in early ’42 we have A6M2, D3Y, B5N versus F4F, SDB, TBD)
(7) Air Crew Skills
(8) Shipboard and Fleet anti-aircraft
(9) CAP control
(10) Air Ordnance
(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

And a link back to the scope post http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

So the most consistent theme I see, is Spence (and a few others) arguing that FLAK (factor #8 above) is the factor which produces the largest gap between game results and real life results and hence would be priority #1 for being addressed. Does anyone agree or disagree with this? Are their any other factors which merit adjustment?

Joe I've been reading between the lines, but some have come right out and said that more control over the items on your list is what we need to look at. Though I'd be the first to say there needs to be some randomness or misfortune if you will, inherent in the design.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: spence

In the discussion of the SAG movement I think there may have been some confusion about whether the hexes were 40 mile or 60 mile hexes. I'd support 3 x 40 mile hexes.


I think the SAG "reaction" or whatever folks are calling it is kind of a good thing. If something could be coded that would allow it that would be great and it might encourage the IJN Player to use historical doctrine. I'd be leery of coding it too simply because it proved to be not particularly effective. I would suggest though that a similar "retreat reaction" of say 1 (40 or 60 mile) hex also be coded for the CVTF such that the "charge" as Herwin puts it be a pretty chancey thing. IRL the IJN surface forces didn't catch anything but the abandoned, flaming wreck of the Hornet. In that instance they never even caught up with the 2 DDs that were trying to scuttle Hornet.

I still beg the question how is this terribly different than how the game currently exists?

As the game currently exists-

Turn 1 -Night Sequence- Opposing CV TF's approach each other at 3-4 hexes distant.
Turn 1 -Day Sequence- Opposing Air strikes are launched and resolved.
Turn 1 - Day Ends

Turn 2 -Japanese player forms SAG from CFTV or already had the SAG formed and orders it to move to the location of the Allied CVTF with retirement allowed
Turn 2 -Night Sequence Japanese SAG executes move and either finds Allied CVTF and engages in Surface Combat or not.
Turn 2 Day Day Sequence - SAG starts to return to Home Port
Turn 2 Day - Additional Air Strikes are launched...

[mlees]

ORIGINAL: herwin

Three hex reaction (three out, engagement, three back, during the night phase) was what the CVTF commanders had to worry about.

But while the SAG is sailing (reacting) those three hexes, the enemy should also moving.

I would not agree with your suggestion if the SAG got 6 "free" hexes of movement (out and back) while the enemy (presumedly CVTF) did not.

[spence]

I still beg the question how is this terribly different than how the game currently exists?

As the game currently exists-

Turn 1 -Night Sequence- Opposing CV TF's approach each other at 3-4 hexes distant.
Turn 1 -Day Sequence- Opposing Air strikes are launched and resolved.
Turn 1 - Day Ends

Turn 2 -Japanese player forms SAG from CFTV or already had the SAG formed and orders it to move to the location of the Allied CVTF with retirement allowed
Turn 2 -Night Sequence Japanese SAG executes move and either finds Allied CVTF and engages in Surface Combat or not.
Turn 2 Day Day Sequence - SAG starts to return to Home Port
Turn 2 Day - Additional Air Strikes are launched...

The 30 kt speed of advance/retreat postulated assumes calm or gentle seas. In anything worse than that the DDs couldn't keep up without suffering significant structural damage.

Another factor to consider, is what formation does the SAG assume. To have a reasonable chance of searching a hex it needs to be dispersed in line abreast...that is the formation Nagumo formed (IAW IJN Doctrine) for his charge at the US CVs at Midway. That is the formation assumed by the IJN SAG at Santa Cruz initially. But in a chance encounter not all of the SAG would be present at the point of contact and whether or not it could concentrate would depend on many circumstances not necessarily under the control of the SAG commander.

I guess I'm with Treespider on this in the end unless the "reaction" is much more limited..

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Ok, so to try to provide an executive summary of what I've seen debated so far .. first I'll list out the 11 factors:

(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”
(2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)
(3) Light Landing System
(4) Air Search
(5) Damage Control (both designed in DC as well as “as practiced”
(6) Air frames (for example, in early ’42 we have A6M2, D3Y, B5N versus F4F, SDB, TBD)
(7) Air Crew Skills
(8) Shipboard and Fleet anti-aircraft
(9) CAP control
(10) Air Ordnance
(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

And a link back to the scope post http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

So the most consistent theme I see, is Spence (and a few others) arguing that FLAK (factor #8 above) is the factor which produces the largest gap between game results and real life results and hence would be priority #1 for being addressed. Does anyone agree or disagree with this? Are their any other factors which merit adjustment?

Yep...Reduction in strike range if full CV strike (entire air group) is co-ordinated.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: spence
The 30 kt speed of advance/retreat postulated assumes calm or gentle seas. In anything worse than that the DDs couldn't keep up without suffering significant structural damage.

Another factor to consider, is what formation does the SAG assume. To have a reasonable chance of searching a hex it needs to be dispersed in line abreast...that is the formation Nagumo formed (IAW IJN Doctrine) for his charge at the US CVs at Midway. That is the formation assumed by the IJN SAG at Santa Cruz initially. But in a chance encounter not all of the SAG would be present at the point of contact and whether or not it could concentrate would depend on many circumstances not necessarily under the control of the SAG commander.

I guess I'm with Treespider on this in the end unless the "reaction" is much more limited..

What it does add "weight" to is the arguement that the Japanese did NOT think of their "screening forces" as AAA escort in the way the Allies did.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Ok, so to try to provide an executive summary of what I've seen debated so far .. first I'll list out the 11 factors:

(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”
(2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)
(3) Light Landing System
(4) Air Search
(5) Damage Control (both designed in DC as well as “as practiced”
(6) Air frames (for example, in early ’42 we have A6M2, D3Y, B5N versus F4F, SDB, TBD)
(7) Air Crew Skills
(8) Shipboard and Fleet anti-aircraft
(9) CAP control
(10) Air Ordnance
(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

And a link back to the scope post http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

So the most consistent theme I see, is Spence (and a few others) arguing that FLAK (factor #8 above) is the factor which produces the largest gap between game results and real life results and hence would be priority #1 for being addressed. Does anyone agree or disagree with this? Are their any other factors which merit adjustment?

Joe I've been reading between the lines, but some have come right out and said that more control over the items on your list is what we need to look at. Though I'd be the first to say there needs to be some randomness or misfortune if you will, inherent in the design.

Let me second the last idea: naval warfare involves great skill - both technical and tactical - and it rewards great strategy IN THE LONG RUN - but it also is probably more subject to luck than is usually the case on land. Luck involves being in the right place at the right time, being (or not being) confused about the significance of what you see (even what side it is on - even sometimes if it is a ship or some rock or reef), and being understood / understanding when communications is involved. In many ways what "works" about WITP is the many die rolls - and if some capability is put in - it should generally be not perfect or pat - but more of a possibility that isn't guaranteed every time.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

I still beg the question how is this terribly different than how the game currently exists?

As the game currently exists-

Turn 1 -Night Sequence- Opposing CV TF's approach each other at 3-4 hexes distant.
Turn 1 -Day Sequence- Opposing Air strikes are launched and resolved.
Turn 1 - Day Ends

Turn 2 -Japanese player forms SAG from CFTV or already had the SAG formed and orders it to move to the location of the Allied CVTF with retirement allowed
Turn 2 -Night Sequence Japanese SAG executes move and either finds Allied CVTF and engages in Surface Combat or not.
Turn 2 Day Day Sequence - SAG starts to return to Home Port
Turn 2 Day - Additional Air Strikes are launched...

The 30 kt speed of advance/retreat postulated assumes calm or gentle seas. In anything worse than that the DDs couldn't keep up without suffering significant structural damage.

Another factor to consider, is what formation does the SAG assume. To have a reasonable chance of searching a hex it needs to be dispersed in line abreast...that is the formation Nagumo formed (IAW IJN Doctrine) for his charge at the US CVs at Midway. That is the formation assumed by the IJN SAG at Santa Cruz initially. But in a chance encounter not all of the SAG would be present at the point of contact and whether or not it could concentrate would depend on many circumstances not necessarily under the control of the SAG commander.

I guess I'm with Treespider on this in the end unless the "reaction" is much more limited..

Mark your calenders: Spence and I are on the same side of an issue for a change.

In heavy seas NO SHIP EVER can maintain 30 knots in the direction it wants to go - with the exception it might be possible (but outrageously dangerous) to try to go with the wind and current - something no seaman would contemplate IRL.
I have seen us "applying turns for 18 knots just to make 4 knots good" - which is a reasonable solution if you must (for whatever reason) buck the storm (Murphy often makes you want to go the "wrong" way from the point of view of the weather). On the other hand, if you are free to do so, the very best thing to do is to put the waves on your stern quarter - more or less 45 degrees behind of abeam - so you can ride the waves (instead of having them crash into you). ALL SHIPS risk structural damage in heavy seas, and the more laden the ship - the greater the risk. If you get caught between two waves, the water tries to lift bow and stern - then as the wave moves (whichever wave) along the hull - the water tries to lift only the center - leaving bow and stern in the air. Doing that a few times will break her back - the greater the load (or inherant weight in the case of an armored ship with munitions loaded) - the sooner it will happen. Heavy weather ought to SHUT DOWN movement - force a TF to stay in the hex - or move only one hex on the track. In between actual heavy storm and calm sea should be other weather penalties - wind and current often cost you a hex or two IRL.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Ok, so to try to provide an executive summary of what I've seen debated so far .. first I'll list out the 11 factors:

(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”
(2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)
(3) Light Landing System
(4) Air Search
(5) Damage Control (both designed in DC as well as “as practiced”
(6) Air frames (for example, in early ’42 we have A6M2, D3Y, B5N versus F4F, SDB, TBD)
(7) Air Crew Skills
(8) Shipboard and Fleet anti-aircraft
(9) CAP control
(10) Air Ordnance
(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

And a link back to the scope post http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

So the most consistent theme I see, is Spence (and a few others) arguing that FLAK (factor #8 above) is the factor which produces the largest gap between game results and real life results and hence would be priority #1 for being addressed. Does anyone agree or disagree with this? Are their any other factors which merit adjustment?

Yep...Reduction in strike range if full CV strike (entire air group) is co-ordinated.

And let the player decide if the strikes will attempt to coordinate - or will go in as fast as they can get off the deck / ground? Die rolls might ALSO decide the strike is not coordinated - but the player should be able to specify "don't even try"

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: spence
The 30 kt speed of advance/retreat postulated assumes calm or gentle seas. In anything worse than that the DDs couldn't keep up without suffering significant structural damage.

Another factor to consider, is what formation does the SAG assume. To have a reasonable chance of searching a hex it needs to be dispersed in line abreast...that is the formation Nagumo formed (IAW IJN Doctrine) for his charge at the US CVs at Midway. That is the formation assumed by the IJN SAG at Santa Cruz initially. But in a chance encounter not all of the SAG would be present at the point of contact and whether or not it could concentrate would depend on many circumstances not necessarily under the control of the SAG commander.

I guess I'm with Treespider on this in the end unless the "reaction" is much more limited..

What it does add "weight" to is the arguement that the Japanese did NOT think of their "screening forces" as AAA escort in the way the Allies did.

Yes and no. They certainly thought about the use of superior surface combat ships aggressively as such. On the other hand, they also designed CLAA (although one ended up as a DDAA) - and did so from an early date - and built/converted em as well. It is hard to believe these vessels were not intended to be AA screening vessels. In fact, I don't believe it.
I think PLAYERS should decide what to do - let them assign ships to a SAG OR to a task group as a screen. And there is no reason the USN can not play the hunting game - when it has appropriate fast gunships to play it with. IF the PLAYER thinks surface battle is worth it.