ORIGINAL: jwilkerson
Long nap Ron!
[:D]
Lazy daze on those sunny greek isles eh?
[:)]
Were you still gonna "redirect and clarify me"??
Hey Joe, here is my old post in the thread...
My main beefs with the current incarnation is that there are a few tactical details which have been included in an operational level game which impact the mechanics negatively while further, other tactical details which would go a long way to counter those currently included are glaringly absent, leaving the mechanics somewhat crippled as a result.
1) Having rigid tactical level data such as exact range figures for aircraft but having operational level 60 mile hexes often results in a/c that have a few extra gallons in the tank enjoying an extra hex range over a/c that have just a few less gallons losing a hex range. This is one of the reasons why Japan regularly gets to hit Allied CVs with strikes yet Allied CV a/c remain on deck in the game yet historically there is no example of this actually occurring. The new map with its' 40 mile hexes should alleviate this somewhat. Perhaps implementing a mechanic which rounds up the a/c range if it is closer to the next further hexside than the center of the hex (basically adding a hex in range) and rounds down the a/c range if closer to the hexside than to the hex center (basically reducing the range by a hex) might also mend the tactical with the operational level of the design.
2) The limitations of the phase/pulse design is another operational level design limitation which plays havoc with such rigid tactical data like a/c range and naval movement during non naval movement phases. Not much can be done about the necessity of the phase/pulse design approach at this point but perhaps the suggestions in (1) can augment the well intentioned but rather clunky reaction mechanism currently used as the sole design feature which attempts to allow for an abstract ability for naval forces to maneuver into/out of range during the air phases.
3) The co-ordinated strike bonus. In the current model, Japan enjoys an arguably unwarranted hard coded strike bonus. In my opinion, this should be removed and have coordination rely upon aircraft endurance, CV operational efficiency/maximums, weather and leader skill (both TF and squadron leaders).
3a) Aircraft endurance. Co-ordination of strikes relied greatly upon an aircrafts ability to loiter while further aircraft massed prior to departing for the target. Historically, the a/c with the longest endurance launched first and the a/c with the shortest launched last. The co-ordinated strike should therefore have a range equal to the lowest endurance a/c. Due to relative a/c speed, sometimes the strike would form up miles from the target to allow the slower longer ranged a/c to proceed while the faster a/c caught up after launching last, lessening the range penalty. The success rate of this latter method of coordination was less than that of those which formed up over the TF as it was much more difficult to join up enroute. These two approaches to co-ordinated strikes had an impact on historical strike ranges, yet the current model does not penalize co-ordinated strike ranges.
3b) CV operational characteristics. Seeing that strikes, CAP and search patrols are launched and recovered, refueled and rearmed per air phase, one must also assume that these varied evolutions occur within a specific portion of an air phase. Therefore, a CVs ops capacity should come into play, even on an operational level, if only to counter balance the unpenalized coodination of strikes and the CAP capability of CV TFs.
CVs had different levels of ops capability, dependent on design. Those CVs converted on the stocks, older prewar purpose built CVs and the smaller CVs had a less efficient ops capability than the larger war built CVs which benefitted from pre war experience and from combat experience. Tactical level wargames have always used these differing capabilites (ie Flattop) and Jim Dunnigan, one of the designers of many tactical carrier games, published some abstract ops capability rates in his Victory at Sea book. What I'm suggesting is that a very basic way of utilizing these abstract capabilities be included in the code to help determine strike sizes , co-ordination, and CAP percentage per CV. Would it be possible to simply use these figures as a multiplier? ie, if a CV was rated at a 70% ops efficiency rating, could this 70% figure be used to limit the max assigned air mission x .70? Therefore, 70% of the CVs airgroup assigned to strike missions can go in the first wave (the remaining 30% go in a seperate wave during the same air phase) or 70% of the a/c assigned to CAP can be aloft at any one time.
3c) I believe both weather and leader skill are factored in right now to some degree.
quote:
ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
quote:
ORIGINAL: jwilkerson
Ok, so to try to provide an executive summary of what I've seen debated so far .. first I'll list out the 11 factors:
(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”
(2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)
(3) Light Landing System
(4) Air Search
(5) Damage Control (both designed in DC as well as “as practiced”
(6) Air frames (for example, in early ’42 we have A6M2, D3Y, B5N versus F4F, SDB, TBD)
(7) Air Crew Skills
(8) Shipboard and Fleet anti-aircraft
(9) CAP control
(10) Air Ordnance
(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)
And a link back to the scope post
fb.asp?m=1657775
So the most consistent theme I see, is Spence (and a few others) arguing that FLAK (factor #8 above) is the factor which produces the largest gap between game results and real life results and hence would be priority #1 for being addressed. Does anyone agree or disagree with this? Are their any other factors which merit adjustment?
Yep...Reduction in strike range if full CV strike (entire air group) is co-ordinated.
Ron S
Hey, you were gonna give me some simple ideas about how to do this!
_____________________________
AE Project Lead
I'm at my sister's house so I'll look for Dunnigan and get back to this...want to find the ops capability chart.
Guess the first thing to do is to define all CVs as either strike carriers (capable of launching half their complement fast enough to avoid a range penalty) or not.
Strike CVs (CVS): by class
Ranger
Lexington
Yorktown
Wasp
Essex
Independence
Saipan
Midway
Illustrious
Indomitable
Implacable
Colossus
Centaur
Majestic
Akagi
Kaga
Hiryu
Soryu
Shokaku
Unryu
Chitose
Taiho
Shinano
All others are not strike carriers.
By defining a CV as a Strike Carrier (neccesitating a new ship type with specific code so that we end up with two distinct CV ship types with somewhat different coded capabilities) we can simply and abstractly model operational capacity. A CVS can launch 50% of its' strike group with no range penalty...all others lose 1 hex range for strikes. Reason for the 50% figure is basically readied deckload. Reason for 1 hex penalty for non CVS is poor ops capacity...ie fewer elevators, poor hanger design etc, smaller deck.
We will also need an addition to the Air Combat TF UI, a toggle between
deferred strikes and
coordinated strikes. If set to
Deferred, the CVS's and CV's in the TF will launch (perhaps make this dependent on TF leader stats as to how often the doctrine chosen by player is followed by TF CDR) 50% strikes. CVS suffer no range penalty, CVs suffer - 1 hex, with the result that the CVS bonus is negated...therefore it is important not to combine CVS and CV types in same TF. If set to
coordinated, then 100% of a CVS/CV complement is launched as a single coordinated strike but with a -1 hex range penalty for CVS and -2 hex range penalty for non CVS.
Just to clarify...the total airgroup of each CVS/CV still gets to participate in each air phase, the only difference being in size and range of strike packets.
Were the IJN coordination bonus should come into play on three issues...1) with regard to deferred strikes (deferred meaning that the slowest aircraft launch first and proceed directly to the target while the faster aircraft launch last and catch up to the slower a/c enroute). The Japanese might get a better chance of forming up enroute than Allied aircraft during the early stages of the war. 2) The IJN bonus can also impact the chance of coordinated strikes staying together the entire trip (not getting seperated). 3) Multiple CVS/CV strike coordination.
Not pertaining to coordination or ops efficiency is the fact that carrier a/c range is too decisive in the game. Not once was there an historical example of a TF with shorter ranged aircraft not launching vs one with longer range. It happens all the time in WITP because of the use of tactical ranges with no tactical ship movement and too few air phases. I propose that shorter ranged a/c still launch vs an enemy CV TF (only vs a CV TF) but that each a/c has to pass a die roll to see whether or not it makes it back. This is to abstractly model naval movement and the high value of CVs as targets. There is also historical instances of this occurring...Mitscher at Phillippine Sea, whereas, as I already mentioned, there are no instances ever of a/c not launching if the range precluded recovery.
