Rookie AAR

[Leandros]

Buckrock wrote: As far as I knew, there was no historical Japanese "advance on Mindanao" that needed to be broken off to free up resources for the
"southbound stage". If you go by the Japanese plans (such as covered in Japanese Monograph Series No. 1) the initial phase of operations for Mindanao involved
only the capturing of the Davao area (and the island of Jolo) for use as a staging base for the later DEI operations. This phase was completed by the 1st Jan '42
and the responsibility for the Davao area was handed over to Homma's 14th Army (main force Miura Detachment). There never appeared to be any plans to use those
forces earmarked for the DEI (16th Army) in any further Mindanao "advances" after the initial phase.

Sorry, Buck, I may have expressed myself clumsily. Even if it may not have been the Japanese intention to occupy Mindanao as a whole in December/January they tried
pretty hard to push inland up to the time that they went for Menado/Kendari. After that only the Miura Detachment and local Japanese conscript units held the area.

Are you saying that it was only the Miura Detachment that participated in the push past Malalag/Digos up till January 8th? Even so, the fact that Mindanao was
supposedly to be left alone till April is a sign of weakness – or over-stretch. More so when one considers the fact that the Japanese southward advance went
quicker than what they themselves expected. Did this happen because the Japanese were better or the Allies “worse”?

To take it a step further; As part of the forces taking Davao (area) were also planned to participate in taking Menado (and/or Tarakan), an inability to occupy
those places, either because of losses suffered in the process or because the Japanese found it necessary for future operations, would also influence on the
occupation of Ambon and Kendari. Those two bases were crucial for the leap across the Banda Sea to Java and Timor. This is what has happened in my scenario.

Buckrock wrote: Can you list the references for these? I've read before about Eisenhower's planning involvement and also about some of the pre-war Estimates
of Japanese capabilities but hadn't come across anything that would suggest what you seem to be using them for in your project.

Thanks.

I cannot list any references other than referring to Morison, who is mentioning this point. I do not remember the text exactly but the point was that of several US
analysts (or people that had the credibility of one) only one, I do not remember his name, I think it was the USN CO of the China station, considered that the
Japanese had the capability to execute more than one major operation beside their engagement in China.

One can discuss what a major operation is, but for the attacked nations the Japanese operations had to look like several even if the Japanese themselves considered
the operations of the Southern Force as one. There were offensive actions against Hawaii, Guam, Wake, Hong Kong, The Philippines, Borneo, Malaya and Thailand.

Eisenhower in his report concluded that the only viable supply route for The Philippines was through the Torres Strait and along the western side of PNG – that is
The Moluccas. IOW, that would be the route to secure. Eisenhower, of course, does not elaborate on this, with the course taken by the USN he had no influence on
this other than participate in the quest for civilian, unescorted transports to try their luck.

“My” aggressive and determined US leadership, however, has a Navy and also some US troops to start with. With their influence as the possible great savior for the
Dutch and the Aussies they also have the weight to make these nations support the US view, and defense plans, rather than the British that Singapore was the key to
saving them. With the loss of POW and Repulse this was only amplified.

To simmer it down a little….these points are my justification for a viable aggressive US leadership, with the President on the bottom of it. Like an inverted
triangle.

Fred

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: Leandros
Are you saying that it was only the Miura Detachment that participated in the push past Malalag/Digos up till January 8th? Even so, the fact that Mindanao was
supposedly to be left alone till April is a sign of weakness – or over-stretch. More so when one considers the fact that the Japanese southward advance went
quicker than what they themselves expected. Did this happen because the Japanese were better or the Allies “worse”?

I think it was the latter, though the Japanese believed the former.

Historically in war, the attacker has the advantage, especially if the territorial goals are realistic. At war's start, the Allies had severe morale, training, and material problems. The Dutch were vastly overstretched with their parent country occupied and trying to hold onto a very large colony with a relative handful of troops. Both the British and Dutch had problems with native populations that had very strong sympathies for the Japanese and aided them quite a bit. The Americans didn't have quite as bad a problem in the Philippines, but there were a few Filipino turncoats.

The Dutch, British, and Australians had all been at war for two years at this point and especially the British and Australians had very little in the way of resources in the Far East at the start of the war. The best units were mostly in North Africa or defending the UK. As you can tell Australia essentially had no fighters at all at the start of the war. The Wirraway was pressed into that role a few times with disastrous results. The Wirraway was essentially a license built bomber version of the North American AT-6 trainer.

The US was trying to gear up for war in late 1941, but they were trying to keep their future Allies in the war too, which was diverting resources from their own units being fitted out. Pearl Harbor was a huge morale blow to the US troops and with the US battle fleet put out of action, the troops in the Philippines knew War Plan Orange was out the window and the Philippines were not defensible. I know you are trying to make the case they were, but the decision to temporarily cut their losses in the PI was an early decision from the top.

Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs pretty much knew more heavy losses without something significant to show for it would be very difficult on American morale. Roosevelt was no expert on the military, even though he had been Secretary of the Navy. However, he had a pretty good understanding of human nature and he was a pragmatist.

Some units were very well trained, such as the cadre of naval air crews, but anyone who understood the situation knew that while they knew the mechanics of their job, none of them had ever taken live fire and that was a critical problem. The carriers conducted a number of raids attacking Japanese outposts when they could determine the Japanese carriers weren't around. The goal was to get the aircrews blooded and ready to take on the KB.

One thing the game doesn't model very well are the political problems within ABDA. Nobody liked anyone else very well and they were constantly squabbling with each other. There were a few successful joint operations, but there were more problems than successes.

You were complaining about how bad Allied aerial ASW is in the early going. It is abysmal, but then it was for the real Allies too. Here is a list of IHN submarine sinkings by cause:
http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/united-states-submarine-losses/japanese-submarine-casualties-in-world-war-two-i-and-ro-boats.html

Allied aircraft have a total of 2 sinkings before October 1943. After that, casualties begin to skyrocket. In the early going, about all you can hope for is to keep the subs occupied so they don't attack your ships and hope to damage one once in a while.

Bill

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Leandros
Are you saying that it was only the Miura Detachment that participated in the push past Malalag/Digos up till January 8th?

There were two actions in the Digos area in the weeks following the Japanese landings at Davao/Malalag. The first was on Dec 31st when units from the 16th Army took Digos and forced the PA defenders there to withdraw further west. Some accounts state units from Miura Det. made this attack, others say units of Sakaguchi Det. Both may be right as Miura's force was under Sakaguchi's command around this time.

The second (and separate) action began on the 6th January when a Japanese force advanced on the new PA position established 7 miles west of Digos. Despite nearly collapsing on the 8th January, the defence managed to hold the line and the Japanese finally withdrew on the 14th. The records of the 14th Army mention this action as being by elements of Miura's force (now back under 14th Army control). Sakaguchi's force and the SNLF were the only other Japanese regular combat units on Mindanao and they were reportedly in their embarkation areas at this time, preparing to board their transports (which they began to do on the 6th Jan).

Even so, the fact that Mindanao was supposedly to be left alone till April is a sign of weakness – or over-stretch.

Or very efficient use of units. All the Japanese needed from Mindanao was a jumping off point for Dutch Borneo and the Celebes. They got this by taking Davao and only required a single battalion in order to hold it for months. Meanwhile, several Japanese forces large enough for Mindanao's conquest staged through Davao and then headed southward to go after other objectives that were key to winning the campaign.

With the 16th Army expected to be pushing south and engaging the Allied forces in the DEI, the 14th Army did not have an immediate need to go after the rest of Mindanao until Luzon was taken. To do so earlier would have required either a weakening of the Luzon invasion forces or a delay to 16th Army's DEI offensive or more likely, the early release of some of the Southern Army reserves (and the finding of additional shipping for this move). Then there would be the ongoing need to properly garrison this newly taken territory. And all this while there are more valuable objectives elsewhere crying out for some attention.

History would suggest the Japanese were spot on in their decision to not divert further forces to Mindanao until the DEI and Luzon campaigns were over but if you believe that left them open to a real risk, then you might as well go ahead and try to exploit it with your project.

I cannot list any references other than referring to Morison, who is mentioning this point. I do not remember the text exactly but the point was that of several US
analysts (or people that had the credibility of one) only one, I do not remember his name, I think it was the USN CO of the China station, considered that the
Japanese had the capability to execute more than one major operation beside their engagement in China.

In Vol 3 (Pages 53-54) of his History, Morison did refer to the discussions during the "ADB" conference at Singapore (April '41) and stated the following when dealing with where Japan might strike south first:-

"...at Manila or Hong Kong, at Thailand or the Malay Peninsula, at Borneo or some of the Dutch possessions? Nobody then believed the Japanese to be capable of more than one or possibly two such thrusts at a time,...."

Was the above what you were referring to?

Eisenhower in his report concluded that the only viable supply route for The Philippines was through the Torres Strait and along the western side of PNG – that is
The Moluccas. IOW, that would be the route to secure. Eisenhower, of course, does not elaborate on this, with the course taken by the USN he had no influence on
this other than participate in the quest for civilian, unescorted transports to try their luck.

It sounds an interesting report. The only ones of Eisenhower I've seen around normally start with the admission that the Philippines cannot be saved but it is in America's interest to at least make some effort to supply them while they can still offer resistance to the Japanese. To that end, Eisenhower proposed that long range aircraft, submarines and blockade runners be used to carry the supplies/materiel.

Eisenhower was also one of the key drivers in the effort to turn Australia into a major US base, primarily to support the Allied efforts to defend the Barrier but also as the base from which any resupply efforts to the Philippines might originate. I never saw mention of the Moluccas in the accounts dealing with Eisenhower's plans but the USAFFE plans made in the last weeks before Dec 7th appear to suggest that the airbases in Dutch Borneo intended for the air reinforcement route to the Philippines were to be where any US reinforcing ground forces would likely go as a priority.

I did see mention in an account dealing with the blockade runners that one of the three suggested routes from Australia to the Philippines in February was indeed through the Torres Strait and then up along the western coast of New Guinea but a suggested route for a single blockade runner is based on a somewhat different criteria to that for selecting the operational area for any major air, land and sea forces.

“My” aggressive and determined US leadership, however, has a Navy and also some US troops to start with. With their influence as the possible great savior for the
Dutch and the Aussies they also have the weight to make these nations support the US view, and defense plans, rather than the British that Singapore was the key to
saving them. With the loss of POW and Repulse this was only amplified.

From what I read of the historical interactions around this time between the Dutch, Australians and Americans, it may not be that easy to quickly achieve the needed level of Allied committment to US Plans.

Edit - This might serve as an example of what you could face:-
Part of a cable sent on Dec 25th to Churchill and FDR from the Australian leader (Curtin) while the two were at the ARCADIA Conference. It followed an earlier cable from Churchill to Curtin informing him that all would be well with Uncle Sam's help.

"Should United States desire we would gladly accept United States command in Pacific Ocean area. The President has said Australia will be base of utmost importance but in order that it shall remain a base Singapore must be reinforced. In spite of our great difficulties we are sending further reinforcements to Malaya. Please consider this matter of greatest urgency."

To simmer it down a little….these points are my justification for a viable aggressive US leadership, with the President on the bottom of it. Like an inverted
triangle.

If FDR and his new motto didn't kick off the aggressive US hive-mind, then how do you see it starting? There were a lot of historical commanders out there with very different temperments.

[Leandros]

Buckrock wrote: If FDR and his new motto didn't kick off the aggressive US hive-mind, then how do you see it starting? There were a lot of historical commanders out there
with very different temperments.

Thank you for exellent research. It's all well noted. If it didn't kick off.....?....like the RL, I suppose.

Fred

[Leandros]

You were complaining about how bad Allied aerial ASW is in the early going. It is abysmal, but then it was for the real Allies too.

Bill

Thank you, Bill!

Actually, I don't think (didn't mean to, anyway) I was complaining on the Allied inability to sink Japanese submarines but rather the Game's ahistorical use of them.

That said, I complain about the Allied (their air forces') inability to find, and sometimes sink, enemy surface vessels. This must be seen in the light of my
scenario where much more allied resources are in play - earlier.

However, the CO of SS I-17 has given some good entertainment with his "Red Pimpernel" performance in the Torres Strait...[:)],,, Now, on March 6th, SS I-18 has
arrived - seemingly to duplicate him.

Fred

[Buckrock]

I was just trying to understand what you meant by an inverted pyramid with FDR at the bottom. I had originally assumed in your project it was an "aggressive" FDR who must be the driving force for the change in US strategy, which then flows down through the chain of command.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

I was just trying to understand what you meant by an inverted pyramid with FDR at the bottom. I had originally assumed in your project it was an "aggressive" FDR
who must be the driving force for the change in US strategy, which then flows down through the chain of command.

Yes, I expressed myself clumsily. With him at the bottom (of an inverted pyramid) his intentions and decisions could also flow upwards.....[;)]...like a growing
plant - as opposed to seeping downwards....[:)]...

Fred

[Leandros]

As a complement to my recent response to Bill:

Only a couple of days ago (beginning of March), an enemy CVL force (3 carriers, 3 CA’s, 3 CL’s and 8 DD’s – the exact observation was made by an own 3-DD unit
clashing with it east of Sorong) arrived east of Sorong, seemingly to assist in countermanding my landings in Sorong meant to push out the recently arrived enemy
forces there. I had a 3-carrier force (Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga) positioned SE Ceram, on the other side of the Sorong land-tongue, for some days to give
support to same. My carrier scouts discovered the enemy CV force, earlier I had reports that carrier planes were overhead Sorong.

Strangely enough, even if my planes had shown themselves to the enemy TF my carriers were not discovered by it so no strike, as feared, materialized from that side
(earlier it always had). However, none of my carrier planes attacked the other party.

I pushed my carriers forward, near the west coast of northern NPG for the next day, and laid out a wide net of scouts and naval attack patrols by both carrier and
land-based units.

The next day the enemy CV TF had moved west, into the center of the storm, so to speak, between Halmahera and Ceram. He was now within escort range for both my
land-based (B-26’s and A-24’s) and carrier planes. Still, no response against my carriers. My carrier planes, however, started reporting the enemy TF again,
mainly the heavy cruiser Chokai. Several SBD-strikes followed and hits were reported. In-between that, a couple of small enemy strikes were launched against Namlea
and Ambon but were broken up by fighters flying from the two bases. At the same time an unescorted 8-plane Betty raid flying from Jolo Island was massacred by the
same fighters, 6 were shot down by P-39 and P-400’s scrambled from Namlea and Ambon.

At the end of the day the enemy force was reported as two, the main force proceeding west, the other, a 2-ship TF, going east. I reckoned the last one was perhaps
a damaged Chokai, with escort, withdrawing to Palau.

Next morning the CV TF was almost out of the Banda Sea, departing through the western approaches. The 2-ship unit was now 1 ship (reported), having crept farther
east, passing NW of Sorong.

While the enemy carriers seemed just as unapproachable as before it was the first time own carrier planes came properly to blows with them even if with quite
insignificant results - what is known, anyway. But, the enemy behavior as such was quite perky and almost comical without any thoughts of the enemy concentration
he was passing through, almost majestically. This force was exposed to my carrier planes, B-26’s, Aussie Hudsons and US A-24’s flying from Ambon and Namlea, B-26,
139’s (two dozen) and (some) B-17E’s flying from Kendari, PBY’s and Do-24’s, all configured for naval attack, from all the bases around the Banda and Moluccan Sea.
Even half a dozen B-17E’s flying from Darwin. The different units were organized in an overlapping fashion.

Still, with minimal (known) results. This is what I’m complaining about…....

Fred

[Buckrock]

The best way to get help in identifying the no fly problem is to post screenshots. Start with those of the base(s) where the majority of your useless squadrons are located and then perhaps the squadron screens of those air units that let you down the most in this latest effort.

Commonly for a base, the culprit is supply or aviation support related. For squadrons, it's often in the area of mission settings, fatigue, and morale.

And I'll ask the obvious question, since you were going after a Japanese CV task force (that likely has CAP), were there definitely friendly fighters available to escort your land based bombers for their strike?

[BBfanboy]

I had the same thought on screenshots being needed, but I was wondering if weather was responsible for some of the results. Bad weather seems to be the norm rather than the exception for weeks at a time in some areas.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

I had the same thought on screenshots being needed, but I was wondering if weather was responsible for some of the results. Bad weather seems to be the norm rather
than the exception for weeks at a time in some areas.

Be that as it may, for land-based bombers to find enemy vessels has been extremely difficult, in my game, anyway. Even when the search arc is quite narrow. To bomb
specific points - ground forces, airfields and ports is no problem, also without escorts. The last few days my 3-CV TF planes have been quite successful in finding
enemy vessels, there has been dozens of directed sightings both in the morning and afternoon. But, the ranges have been quite short and the enemy TF’s in question
have been almost stationary. After that, a dozen or more reports of hits on cruisers, PB’s and DD’s every day. But not 1 – one, confirmed sinking.

It is now March 9th 1942, the RL day of the surrender of the Dutch East Indies. In the game the Japanese have only just recently started landing on Java, Singapore
is still intact, if surrounded, so Sumatra is untouched. They are inching towards Soerebaja, so the ADA leadership has decided (and I’ve been able to) to withdraw
some good Dutch units to Denpasar, east of Soerebaja. Denpasar was selected because it has a good airfield and Kendari, on the northern side of the Banda Sea, is
still intact, and reinforced by US forces. Denpasar shall be reinforced both with Aussie and US forces. That’s as far west as US forces shall be deployed. The
remaining Dutch fighters have been withdrawn there and shall be supplemented by some US.

I’m just playing now to see if I can manage to open the Zamboanga gap. Even if Zamboanga is in my hands the Japanese have Jolo Island and Cotabato, Mindanao.
Cagayan and Davao, too. I need at least to recapture Jolo Island, both to deny the enemy the use of it as well as for my own use. After that my intention is to
fortify a couple of the airfields on the western Philippine islands to have air cover for the first transports all the way to Bataan.

To succeed in this I need at least a fighter squadron or two on each of them. A 75-plane P-39 Pursuit Group is just now assembling in Darwin. Those should give
me just enough additional air power to execute this operation – Operation Jolo. The critical point is to shuttle the advancing amphibious sea transports between
the ports with air cover. I have available 3 infantry regiments with support units embarked on ships in Namlea and Ambon to take Jolo and/or Cotabato. One more
shall be loaded up in Ternate after I just cleaned out the Japanese there. It should be possible to extract a couple of battalion-sized units from Menado, too.
This operation should be possible now that I have thrown the enemy out of Ternate for the second time. With Saumlaki, Ambon, Namlea, Ternate, Menado and Zamboanga
in own hands the Philippine Relief Route is half-way realized.

In two to four days everything should be in place if the opposition does not go berserk in the Celebes and Moluccan Seas again. Presently he seems to be occupied
on Java, Port Moresby and Milne Bay. I have to stop repair jobs on ships in Darwin and Ambon to use everything that floats, and shoots, to escort the transports.
I have been resting my few remaining P-36 fighters as they have the best range and are needed to fly CAPs to cover the jump over the Celebes Sea. The enemy can
fly bombing missions from Jolo, Cotabato, Cagayan, Tarakan and bases on Luzon. The only thing that can keep them away from the ships is a solid fighter defense
– CAPs. I have picked the fastest transports for the first assault waves.

My attempt to throw the Japanese out of Milne Bay failed. Their defense was too strong, my forces too weak. As a secondary effect BB Warspite, on its way from
Washington to India, was sunk by a 1-torpedo hit from a Betty bomber while yielding artillery support to the Milne Bay landings. The six bombers flew from Rabaul.
OTOH, the strengthening of the Port Moresby defense is going well. I don’t think the enemy can hold out much further there.

The final point now is to arrange for a number of supply transports to stand by for the breakthrough and decide whether both Jolo and Cotabato shall be invaded,
or just Jolo.

Fred

P.S.: SS I-17 - the Red Pimpernell - is active in the Torres Strait again.....[&:]--

[Leandros]

March 14th 1942

What was left of the Japanese invasion force near Port Moresby surrendered on the afternoon of March 9th. Some Aussie units on their way to reinforce the PM
garrison could therefore be redirected to Timor.

More Aussie Kittyhawk squadrons are coming into play which means the US fighter squadron in PM can be released. First part of an Aussie Beaufighter squadron
is also coming into service.

Operation JOLO – the retaking of Jolo Island and, eventually, Cotabatan, is now ready to be launched. Cotabatan is important, too, with its good airfield, flanking
the approaches to the Zamboanga Gap. If that is possible just now shall depend on the progress of the first assault wave on Jolo Island. That said, Tarakan shall
also be a thorn in the eye in future operations. That shall eventually come later.

Just now one Marine and two Army infantry regiments are ready, amphibiously loaded, in Menado, Ternate, Namlea and Ambon. There are also numerous support units,
Engineers, FA battalions, Tank battalions, Engineering and Base Forces ready to follow up. The various convoys shall be skip-jumped forward on max speed between
these bases as the operation progresses. Transports with higher than normal speeds have been picked for this operation. The crucial part is the jump over the
Celebes Sea, between Menado and Jolo/Zamboanga, avoiding enemy bombings and naval counter-attacks. Central in this is the deployment of fighter units to protect
the ships in the ports and during the crossing. Zamboanga and Menado airfields have been maxed up with fighters. This system of protecting shipping has worked
nicely up till now.

25 B-26’s and an equal number of A-24’s are concentrated in Menado to attack shipping and Jolo airfield. A dozen B-17E’s shall fly from Namlea and a couple of
dozen Dutch and US PBY’s and Do-24’s shall operate against the area from several bases.

The weak point is naval protection even if a number of submarines have been stationed around Jolo Island and along the axis Menado-Jolo. There are too few good
destroyers and cruisers so I’ve cleaned the bases for AVD’s, APD’s, DM’s, DMS’s and AM’s to supplement the proper fighting ships. Ships in repair have also been
pressed back into service. Two of the old battlewagons have just passed Torres Strait on their way north, the third one is in Pago Pago, refueling after its
(unsuccessful) escapades around Canton Island. With the battlewagons are more cruisers and destroyers.

It should be understood that the upcoming landings aren’t considered proper amphibious, in that the information received from local sources is that the enemy
hasn’t developed his shore defenses properly but has rather withdrawn his fighting forces for subsequent landings. He feels safe and does not have the means to
protect what he has already taken, at the same time going on to new objectives. This is valid for both Jolo Island and Cotabato. If it’s true, we shall soon see.

The CV Task Force has had a couple of rest days in Ambon under cover of local and own fighters flying from the airfield ashore. I’m not involving them in the
operation but is rather sending them down to Timor to chase an enemy cruiser force loitering north of Koepang. Even if neither Sumatra nor Java have been properly
occupied by the Japanese I suspect Timor may be their next target considering their constant losses trying to occupy the Moluccan islands. If the carriers shall
be used in Operation JOLO depends on how it works out. CV Yorktown is on its way north to join the three other carriers.

The purpose with this operation isn’t to retake occupied country as such but to ensure the establishing of airfields along the sea route to Bataan to cover future
transports. When/if Jolo is retaken (or neutralized) transports shall first supply the airfields in question, San Jose and Iloilo on Panay and Cebu City. All
these are still in US hands but are short on aviation fuel. This has to be remedied before the fighters can move in.

The enemy has been suspiciously tranquil the last week. There is some activity on Eastern Borneo, Macassar and Central Java and he is obviously consolidating
himself in the Lae/Buna area. He has just landed in, and taken, Hollandia further up the northern coast of NPG and he has forces on Guadalcanal. Operation JOLO
may waken him up….

If Bataan can be supplied and the defense of it succeeds the enemy shall have so much less forces to use elsewhere. It's all about delaying him so the Allies can
build up their resurces. More of the AIF is on its way from Aden.

[center]“Time is of the Essence”.[/center]

Fred

[Leandros]

Evening, March 17th 1942

The pre-landing bombardment of Jolo Island started early in the morning of March 15th by two separate cruiser/destroyer squadrons. On their way to their stations
the one led by CA Chester clashed with an enemy convoy consisting of 2 PB’s, 1 CM and 1 DMS escorting three transports probably carrying reinforcements to Jolo
Island. All seven ships were sunk by gunfire and torpedoes. DD Anderson suffered one shell hit.

As the Jolo landings developed the battleship Haruna with cohorts performed a raid along the western coast of Halmahera, sinking the transports Arkansas and Kota
Goeng in Ternate harbor. Heavy cruiser Kinusaga, leading a light cruiser and three destroyers, sank the large transport Crescent City near Djailolo. It carried
remnants of units leaving Djailolo after having captured that base. The two Japanese raids generated almost 600 allied casualties.

A destroyer identified as the Usugumo at the same time raided Dili Harbor and damaged four transports there.

Later in the day several bomb hits were reported on both Haruna and Usugumo by B-17E’s flying from Namlea and SBD’s from the own carrier TF east of Timor.

The Jolo landings by the 8th Marines started at noon supported by heavy cruiser Indianapolis and two destroyers. The enemy defense was weak, but the first Marines
wave suffered 121 casualties, many due to accidents. Before the landings a four-APD enemy unit was chased off by Indianapolis and her destroyers.

During the landings two Betty and Lily strikes developed against the landing convoy, in all nine planes. They were intercepted by 7 and 14 P-39 fighters flying
from Zamboanga. 1 Betty destroyed, 1 Lily damaged. No damage on ships.

At the same time 15 B-26 flying from Menado attacked Jolo airfield, each dropping 6 x 600 lbs GP bombs from 10.000 feet. 1 Topsy destroyed on ground, 2 airbase,
1 supply, 7 r/w hits. A later attack by 9 B-26 destroyed 1 Betty on the ground and achieved 4 airbase, 3 r/w hits.

An enemy CV TF of unknown composition launched 8 Jeans and 3 Zeros from the northern approaches of the Malacca Strait. Ship under attack was DD Lawrence. The raid
was intercepted by 1 P-39. No losses on either side.

While the landings were taking place an unusually powerful bombing raid developed against the Cebu airfield - 22 Vals. Some Stearmans on the ground were destroyed
or damaged. Hope we shall get there before them. Cebu has a good airfield.

The Jolo landings continued through the 16th as did the Haruna escapades near Ternate. Transport Betelgeuse trying to escape from Ternate was caught and sunk. The
enemy 4-APD unit shows up again outside the landing area as the 2nd Marine Raider Bn is about to go ashore but it is chased away by the escorts. First Raider wave
has 57 casualties. At the same time the 8th Marines are continuing to pour troops ashore.

Outside Pelelieu CL Tama is hit by a torpedo from SS Gato. Tama was previously damaged, limping back to Pelelieu escorted by heavy cruiser Chotai. Whether Chotai
was damaged, too, is unclear. During the previous days several bomb hits have been reported on her by SBD’s. The two cruisers may have been mixed up by the pilots
but there may also have been damage on both. CL Tama was sunk by the torpedo hit. This is later confirmed to be CL Kashii.

During the day heavy cruiser Chester, on her way back to Zamboanga, hits upon an enemy transport escorted by two PB’s. All three are heavily damaged. An enemy
convoy escapes from Indianapolis, but another does not get away – 1 APD and 2 AVD’s are sunk, 2 other damaged. Several transports are damaged, too.

25 B-26 bomb Jolo airfield during the day. 1 supply, 4 r/w hits.

The landings continued during the 17th. 25 x B-26’s bomb Jolo airfields - 2 Lilys, 1 Topsy destroyed on the ground, 8 airbase, 2 supply and 12 r/w hits.

In the afternoon the 8th Marine Regiment and the Raiders make a concerted attack on Jolo City. The enemy is driven out of town and the airfield is captured.
12 Bettys, 12 Zeros and 2 Topsys are destroyed on the ground.

Well, that was that. Good job by the Marines! But, it’s not finished. While the enemy has been denied the use of the airfield they are still there and now knowing
how the Japanese work they may well try to reinforce the garrison. The question is if the forces dedicated so far are enough? Should I use some of the reserves or
rather go for Cotabato, too? Or use it all for the airfields farther north, on Panay or Mindoro?

Fred

[Leandros]

April 2nd 1942.

The moment of truth has arrived. Tomorrow starts Operation Lucena, the final stage in the quest to supply the forces at Bataan. When the airfield near Lucena,
on the south-western side of Luzon, has been captured, the supply ships shall have fighter coverage all the way to Bataan. Poised for the assault are, amphibiously
loaded, the 134th and 161st IR’s, 2nd USMC FA Bn, 811th EAB, 754th Tank Bn and 70th Coast Artillery AA Regiment in Tay Tay, Palawan and San Jose and Iloilo on Panay
Island. As back-up is 132nd IR on ships in Zamboanga.

This has been achieved by base-hopping fighter units northwards to cover the ship movements. The last capture before Lucerne was Tay Tay on Palawan. That, too,
because it had a fighter strip. It was stormed by the 161st IR which has since embarked again to land either in Lucena or to reinforce the Bataan forces. Depends
on how things develop.

The last two weeks have been quite eventful. The Jolo resistance was broken in the evening of the 17th. The airfield there has come to good use as has the one in
Cotabato since the enemy, for unknown reasons, withdrew from there. San Jose on Panay has been reinforced to secure it as an intermediate base for the supply
ships.

The enemy was thrown out of Port Moresby only to come back again. He is squeezed more and more with little possibility of reinforcements. Presently it is of Little
importance but it ties up a lot of forces. It has also been difficult to dislodge him from his beachhead near Sorong. He has better possibilities of reinforcement
there with his open supply axis to Palau. This has been difficult to cut with the need for own naval resources in the northbound base-hopping.

Bombers and dive-bombers have gradually been moved forward, too, and this evening more than thirty PBY’s shall be moved forward to harass enemy shipping activity
tomorrow. Not unexpectedly, an enemy CS force has moved in through the San Bernardino Strait, they have certainly detected our build-up. A transport convoy was
sighted in the same area yesterday, therefore two small cruiser units were directed there on their way to bombard Lucerne. That worked well but as they were not
back under fighter-cover in the morning both suffered by bomber strikes from Luzon. Cruisers Devonshire and Colombo were damaged by torpedo hits. This was
unfortunate as such tactics have worked well in the last couple of weeks. With those ships out of the game I still have heavy cruisers San Francisco, Indianapolis
and Chester with several destroyers to cover the landings.

The enemy’s bomber forces in the Philippines seem to have shot their strength, their attack formations are getting smaller and smaller with very little to show for
it as they are intercepted by our fighter forces wherever they go.

Fred

[Leandros]

April 4th 1942

The 161st IR and 134th Base Force are firmly ashore in Lucena, the enemy has been chased out of the town and the airfield is in our hands.

Yesterday he threw everything he had in the air against us. Bombers flew out from the Manila area, Vigan, Legaspi, Hainan, Formosa, Miri, Borneo and two small CV
TF’s on the western and eastern side of the Philippines. Most concentrated on the transport fleet outside the Lucena beaches and single vessels which had not been
able to get back under fighter cover. The large transport Aguimonte was hit by two torpedoes dropped by Bettys flying from Formosa. It sank with 996 casualties.
134 others were pulled out of the water. Later in the day the transport Cap de Jacques was bombed with 18 casualties. It was hit again later in the day but is
still afloat.

Several naval vessels also got the enemy’s attention. The cruiser St. Louis was damaged by air torpedo, DD King was hit and sunk near Sibuyan, DD’s Reid and Porter
are both damaged - others got away scot-free. The transport Clan Macilwaith was their last victim of the day. It was sunk by two air-launched torpedoes in the
afternoon outside Lucena. All personnel had got ashore but it went down with a lot of equipment and supplies.

Enemy attacks on the bases farther south - Tay Tay, Iloilo, San Jose, Cebu and Zamboanga have been frustrated by local CAP’s. While their air offensive started out
quite violently in the morning it petered out towards the evening. However, the distance from the fighter fields to the beachhead area was too large to ensure an
effective CAP over it.

Today the enemy has come on much weaker and with an increase in fighter resources applied to the beachhead area he has not been able to inflict much damage. From
tomorrow morning our fighters shall fly from Lucena airfield.

Hopefully, tomorrow morning the first reinforcements, with supplies, shall also land on Bataan.

Fred

[Leandros]

I had to take a little break to do something useful for a change, and read up on the half-finished chapters of my book project – so far some 30-40 depending on
how I organize them. I had reached end of January ’42 when I started “working” on WitP. In the meantime the book has rested.

I made it back to Bataan within April 9th ’42 but as those who have followed my postings have seen, with some severe losses. OTH, so has the enemy. Can’t say I
have cheated much, either. Anyway, not more than what I’ve lost in being inexperienced with the game. I still have a large PP pool. The Allies, the Dutch and
Anzacs have been very cooperative, as they should according to one of my main pre-requisites. I have had priority in transport shipping, and of fighting units
I’ve only had what’s available in the game. They’ve been dispatched as fast as they were available in RL. In RL many of those units later turned up in The Solomons
campaign. As you may know, another main pre-requisite of mine was a US leadership that saw no need for withholding the already planned westward transports when
the Japanese attacked. It was quite clearly a case of serious over-stretch on their part.

The carrier groups have been put to good use, mostly transporting army and USMC fighter units. Lately they have also done some offensive work with reasonable
results. In this, my second scenario, I’ve been able to keep them out of harm’s way. I learnt that in the first scenario. I must say all my expectations have
been met concerning my hoped-for future use of the game – as a sort filing cabinet.

The big question now is which scenario is most suitable to start up with again, which is most realistic and follows the historical development, at least into
January when the enemy shall first experience his first setbacks due to the ahistorical Allied cooperation and efforts.

Of the two I’ve been partially through, no. 1 and no 2, no. 1 seemed to be the best in this respect. Any suggestions, guys?

Fred

[jmalter]

hi Fred,

when playing against the IJ AI, the game selects randomly from 12 'scripts' w/ presumably-different levels of IJ agressiveness. No info is available about the different scripts, but they have been updated, see the thread tm.asp?m=3198064 in the tech-support forum.

I wonder if you'd like to consider a game w/ an 08Dec41 start-date, I think this option incorporates the historical results of the initial IJ strikes at Pearl Harbor & elsewhere.

I'm personally getting much enjoyment from playing the DBB modified scenarios against the AJ AI, but not all of those scenario files are compatible w/ play against the AI. Research their website carefully if you're interested. https://sites.google.com/site/dababeswi ... is-dababes

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: jmalter

hi Fred,

when playing against the IJ AI, the game selects randomly from 12 'scripts' w/ presumably-different levels of IJ agressiveness. No info is available about the
different scripts, but they have been updated, see the thread tm.asp?m=3198064 in the tech-support forum.

I wonder if you'd like to consider a game w/ an 08Dec41 start-date, I think this option incorporates the historical results of the initial IJ strikes at Pearl
Harbor & elsewhere.

I'm personally getting much enjoyment from playing the DBB modified scenarios against the AJ AI, but not all of those scenario files are compatible w/ play against
the AI. Research their website carefully if you're interested. https://sites.google.com/site/dababeswi ... is-dababes

Thank you! Problem is I'm scared stiff of downloads/updates that could mess up my system now. I loaded and updated WitP in March so I suppose i have a reasonably
updated version.

If the 8th December scenario gives the most realistic start of the game, that is what I am looking for. I experienced the game's upstart variations in my
two first games, using the same scenario.

Fred

[Yaab]

Just a follow-up on "supply realism", which I touched upon a few pages earlier.

You could always haul resources from DEI/Commonwealth/China to Philippines as a proxy for supply. There is LI in Manila, and you could create a resources stockpile there, and produce supply (food/ammo) there. That would represent timber/ore for rifles, TNT for shells, salt for food etc.
Resources are universal, and supply should be national.

Just a thought really, if you like realism.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Yaab

Just a follow-up on "supply realism", which I touched upon a few pages earlier.

You could always haul resources from DEI/Commonwealth/China to Philippines as a proxy for supply. There is LI in Manila, and you could create a resources stockpile
there, and produce supply (food/ammo) there. That would represent timber/ore for rifles, TNT for shells, salt for food etc.
Resources are universal, and supply should be national.

Just a thought really, if you like realism.

Thank you, Yaab. As I see it, "realism" in the game, the way I intend to use it, is to have what was there in the RL plus what is eventually added by the changed
(more agressive) attitude of the US leadership and the improved co-operation (more assets offered for the direct supply and defense of the The Philippines) of the
Dutch and Aussies. This shall not take effect untill the "new" (in effect, an ADA instead of ABDA) co-operation shall show some results. This would start to happen
in the end of December. Untill then little is changed on either side.

IOW, allied improvements in the chances of success can be expected to be seen at that time as well as eventual Japanese responses to this. The last one is the
balancing act of the "realism" side. As an example, very little would be different on Luzon because of the allied build-up in the Moluccas and Southern Philippines.
However, when the historic Japanese progress is impeded upon some reactions should be expected. But, considering that their historice progress was better than they
expected this change should also be quite marginal in the beginning.

As to your proposal, to improve on the resources/supply situation (on Luzon, anyway) implies that a supply route is kept open. That is what the US leadership is going
to use their resources on in the initial stages. Here I'm going with the War Plan Department's (Gerow/Eisenhower) suggestion that such a route would have to be
established through the Eastern Moluccans. As we know this was not possible as resources were diverted/used elsewhere.

As it develops both Dutch and Aussie resources, civilian as well as military, shall come into play much more, and earlier, than in the RL.

Fred