Modeling of Carrier Battles

[m10bob]

In the early days in the Pacific, the USN was even using its' Daunlesses in flying low CAP missions to help ward off enemy torpedo planes.
Is this viable, (in spite of the obvious problems as encountered IRL of risking enemy fighter cover?)



http://www.aviation-history.com/airmen/coralsea.htm

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

In the early days in the Pacific, the USN was even using its' Daunlesses in flying low CAP missions to help ward off enemy torpedo planes.
Is this viable, (in spite of the obvious problems as encountered IRL of risking enemy fighter cover?)

I suppose one could actually class Dauntless SBD-3s as fighter-bombers to achieve this early war doctrinal use, but keep SBD-5s simple dive-bombers.

Guess it would f-up the SBD-3 as a DB though![:(]

[bradfordkay]

" Yep...Reduction in strike range if full CV strike (entire air group) is co-ordinated.



Hey, you were gonna give me some simple ideas about how to do this!"


Joe,

Cid has proposed what I have been thinking for many pages as I waded through this thread: no air attacks at extended range can be made up of more than one squadron (with fighter escort). Air attacks at normal range have a chance (based upon all the factors already used in the game) of being coordinated into multi-squadron attacks.

Sounds simple to me, and as relatively realistic as we have now.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Here ya go Joe...[8D] Perhaps something like this is workable?

Guess the first thing to do is to define all CVs as either strike carriers (capable of launching half their complement fast enough to avoid a range penalty) or not.

Strike CVs (CVS): by class

Ranger
Lexington
Yorktown
Wasp
Essex
Independence
Saipan
Midway

Illustrious
Indomitable
Implacable
Colossus
Centaur
Majestic

Akagi
Kaga
Hiryu
Soryu
Shokaku
Unryu
Chitose
Taiho
Shinano

All others are not strike carriers.

By defining a CV as a Strike Carrier (neccesitating a new ship type with specific code so that we end up with two distinct CV ship types with somewhat different coded capabilities) we can simply and abstractly model operational capacity. A CVS can launch 50% of its' strike group with no range penalty...all others lose 1 hex range for strikes. Reason for the 50% figure is basically readied deckload. Reason for 1 hex penalty for non CVS is poor ops capacity...ie fewer elevators, poor hanger design, smaller deck etc.

We will also need an addition to the Air Combat TF UI, a toggle between deferred strikes and coordinated strikes. If set to Deferred, the CVS's and CV's in the TF will launch 50% strikes (perhaps make this dependent on TF leader stats as to how often the doctrine chosen by player is followed by TF CDR). CVS suffer no range penalty, CVs suffer - 1 hex, with the result that the CVS bonus is negated if a non CVS type is included in the same TF...therefore it is important not to combine CVS and CV types in same TF. If set to Coordinated, then 100% of a CVS/CV complement is launched as a single coordinated strike but with a -1 hex range penalty for CVS and -2 hex range penalty for non CVS. The TF will always launch a deferred strike if range precludes a coordinated one, regardless of player setting.

Just to clarify...the total airgroup of each CVS/CV still gets to participate in each air phase, the only difference being in size and range of strike packets.

Where the concept of an early war IJN coordination bonus should come into play is with the following three issues...1) with regard to deferred strikes (deferred meaning that the slowest aircraft launch first and proceed directly to the target while the faster aircraft launch last and catch up to the slower a/c enroute). The Japanese might get a better chance of forming up enroute than Allied aircraft during the early stages of the war. 2) The IJN bonus can also impact the chance of coordinated strikes staying together the entire trip (not getting seperated). 3) Multiple CVS/CV strike coordination (only with CVS/CV within same TF).

Not pertaining to coordination or ops efficiency is the fact that carrier a/c range is too decisive in the game. Not once was there an historical example of a TF with shorter ranged aircraft not launching vs one with longer range. It happens all the time in WITP because of the use of tactical ranges with no tactical ship movement and too few air phases. I propose that shorter ranged a/c still launch vs an enemy CV TF if out of range(only vs a CV TF) but that each a/c has to pass a die roll to see whether or not it makes it back. This is to abstractly model naval movement within the air phases and the high value of CVs as targets. There is also historical instances of this occurring...Mitscher at Phillippine Sea, whereas, as I already mentioned, there are no instances ever of a/c not launching if the range precluded recovery.


In conjuction with the IJN coordination bonus, an early war Allied CAP bonus should exist, as well as differentation between Allied and IJN TF flak defence.

Regarding the CAP bonus...

Allied CAP was theoretically better from the start of hostilities given the Allied use of radios in their aircraft (facilitates communication between CAP elements), their early adoption of fighter direction utilizing radar and aircraft communication capability (British had practiced this well before Pearl Harbor) and of course the lack of any of the above for Japan.

I'd lean towards establishing a base line for CAP capability (1.0) and have Japan start below it (perhaps 0.75 penalty) and gradually improve the capability with bonuses for such documented advances as radar, radio equipped a/c, doctrine and combat experience. For Allies, instead of initiating a single generalized bonus at what appears to be a generalized date, perhaps institute a multiple step progression rate and start at a more reasonable date. Perhaps allow the Allies a 1.0 capability at games start, increase it to 1.25 in June/42, 1.50 in Dec/42, 1.75 in June/43 and 2.0 in Dec/43 to reflect their early experience (Britsh), equipment, doctrinal advantages and gradual accumulation of combat experience.

Regarding your strike carrier // strike size // range idea ...

Hey this is pretty cool! Definitely simplier than what I've been pushing around!

How did you decide which ships were "in" and which were "out"??

Like Independence in ... Chitose in ... Junyo out ... Zuiho out ... Sangamon out ??

===

This would definitely be easier to code than my ideas .. that doesn't mean it will get in .. and certainly doesn't mean it will get in for the initial release .. but a range calculation (essentially) could be plugged in far easier than some other - roughly equivalent - but more complex solutions. Of course this includes a UI change. Those are conceptually easy but surprisingly tedious to code.

Regarding no instances of no launch if range precluded recovery...what about first day of Battle of Philippine Sea? USN did not launch - they waited until next day?

[okami]

A strike of aircraft from the same carrier loses one minute of flight time for every aircraft after twelve have been launched. The Japanese do not include A6M2 or M3 fighters due to their extended range. So I full strike from a 72 plane Japanese carrier would lose 72-12 initial -24 fighters or 36 flight minutes. While the same strike from an American carrier would lose 60 flight minutes. The main problem is that a flight minute has a different effect for each plane involved. One flight minute at 360NM/H would be 6NMs while the same flight minute at 240NM/H would only be 4NMs. Taking the slowest plane in the strike this can give a wild variation on lost range. So a flight moving at 360NM and losing 36 flight minutes would lose 36x6/2=108nm while only losing 36x4/2=72nm for a flight moving at 240NMs. This effect also should be applied to land based strikes as well.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: okami

A strike of aircraft from the same carrier loses one minute of flight time for every aircraft after twelve have been launched. The Japanese do not include A6M2 or M3 fighters due to their extended range. So I full strike from a 72 plane Japanese carrier would lose 72-12 initial -24 fighters or 36 flight minutes. While the same strike from an American carrier would lose 60 flight minutes. The main problem is that a flight minute has a different effect for each plane involved. One flight minute at 360NM/H would be 6NMs while the same flight minute at 240NM/H would only be 4NMs. Taking the slowest plane in the strike this can give a wild variation on lost range. So a flight moving at 360NM and losing 36 flight minutes would lose 36x6/2=108nm while only losing 36x4/2=72nm for a flight moving at 240NMs. This effect also should be applied to land based strikes as well.

I see lots of words here - I do not see a comprehensible statement. Could you reformulate this exposition? There could be value here as well.

Thx.

[okami]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: okami

A strike of aircraft from the same carrier loses one minute of flight time for every aircraft after twelve have been launched. The Japanese do not include A6M2 or M3 fighters due to their extended range. So I full strike from a 72 plane Japanese carrier would lose 72-12 initial -24 fighters or 36 flight minutes. While the same strike from an American carrier would lose 60 flight minutes. The main problem is that a flight minute has a different effect for each plane involved. One flight minute at 360NM/H would be 6NMs while the same flight minute at 240NM/H would only be 4NMs. Taking the slowest plane in the strike this can give a wild variation on lost range. So a flight moving at 360NM and losing 36 flight minutes would lose 36x6/2=108nm while only losing 36x4/2=72nm for a flight moving at 240NMs. This effect also should be applied to land based strikes as well.

I see lots of words here - I do not see a comprehensible statement. Could you reformulate this exposition? There could be value here as well.

Thx.

My point is that the lose of range directly proportional to the amount of planes flown. Not the carriers sending the strike. Although maximum strike number would be based on carrier capacity. To extrapolate on the above in an example let us assume that an American carrier with 24 F4F4, and 48 SBD3 was set to strike a Japanese carrier with 24 A6M2, 24 D3A2 and 24 B5N2. The Japanese have the advantage of possible finding the American carrier at a range of 5 hexes while the US can only spot at 4 hexes. If both carriers wanted to launch a maximum alpha strike of all their planes while leaving no fighters for CAP. The following would be the resulting ranges. For the US. 72 plane strike takes 60 flight minutes to get aloft. The SBD3 being the slowest plane at 169nm cruise speed. They would lose 169nm/2 or 84.5nm and thus only have a range of 240nm-84.5= 155.5 or less than 3 hexes. Meanwhile the Japanese launching the same 72 aircraft would only lose 36 flight minutes as their fighters could and would be aloft earlier and can stay up longer. So 36 flight minutes using the slowest plane, the B5N2 at 171nm means the Japanese lose 102.6nm/2 or 51.3nm and thus have a range of 268.7nm or 4 hexes. The allies could only launch a strike of this nature which would constitute an extended range attack. While for them to be in range of the Japanese the Japanese could still launch a normal range alpha strike. I am not a programmer and I do not know if you can write code to incorporate this dynamic. I also don't know how much this would slow down the processing of a turn. But for those arguing that the alpha strike should somehow lessen the range of aircraft, it has a great effect on the allies than the Japanese. Simple put one flight minute lost for every plane in a strike over 12 aircraft quickly reduces the allies to extended range missions. While the Japanese with much greater ranges in both scout and strike aircraft can still send in an alpha strike at normal ranges. I don't know if this helps.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: okami
A strike of aircraft from the same carrier loses one minute of flight time for every aircraft after twelve have been launched. The Japanese do not include A6M2 or M3 fighters due to their extended range. So I full strike from a 72 plane Japanese carrier would lose 72-12 initial -24 fighters or 36 flight minutes. While the same strike from an American carrier would lose 60 flight minutes. The main problem is that a flight minute has a different effect for each plane involved. One flight minute at 360NM/H would be 6NMs while the same flight minute at 240NM/H would only be 4NMs. Taking the slowest plane in the strike this can give a wild variation on lost range. So a flight moving at 360NM and losing 36 flight minutes would lose 36x6/2=108nm while only losing 36x4/2=72nm for a flight moving at 240NMs. This effect also should be applied to land based strikes as well.

I would like to understand this little better too. Some questions about the process that causes this:

A strike of aircraft from the same carrier loses one minute of flight time for every aircraft after twelve have been launched.

Why after the first twelve?

Why one minute per aircraft?

So a flight moving at 360NM and losing 36 flight minutes would lose 36x6/2=108nm while only losing 36x4/2=72nm for a flight moving at 240NMs. This effect also should be applied to land based strikes as well.

Why do you divide by 2 here?

Is this a known standard formula from carrier operations? Where did it come from?

Thanks in advance. [8D]

[okami]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

I would like to understand this little better too. Some questions about the process that causes this:

A strike of aircraft from the same carrier loses one minute of flight time for every aircraft after twelve have been launched.

Why after the first twelve?
In any flight strike plan there is an inherant 15% fuel alottment for loitering. The launching of 12 aircraft was found to not use this alottment so the loss of flight time is after the first 12.
Why one minute per aircraft?
Launch prep and launch time for each aircraft is rated at one minute in the flight strike plan. Some carrier crews would take less time but we should be looking for a simple standard in a complex operation which is not excessive.

So a flight moving at 360NM and losing 36 flight minutes would lose 36x6/2=108nm while only losing 36x4/2=72nm for a flight moving at 240NMs. This effect also should be applied to land based strikes as well.

Why do you divide by 2 here?
All Witp ranges are divided by 2 so they represent there and back again. So an SBD3 with a 320nm range in Witp can actually go 480nm round trip.
Is this a known standard formula from carrier operations? Where did it come from?
The game Rising Sun uses this formula for flight operations. As the game is played at the US Naval Academy I think it should be pretty accurate. I am not a Naval Officer and one of them could improve on this I think.
Thanks in advance. [8D]

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: m10bob

In the early days in the Pacific, the USN was even using its' Daunlesses in flying low CAP missions to help ward off enemy torpedo planes.
Is this viable, (in spite of the obvious problems as encountered IRL of risking enemy fighter cover?)

I suppose one could actually class Dauntless SBD-3s as fighter-bombers to achieve this early war doctrinal use, but keep SBD-5s simple dive-bombers.

Guess it would f-up the SBD-3 as a DB though![:(]

Actually, the SBD 3 WAS pretty messed up as a DB because they did not have a bomb sight defogger fitted yet and going from high altitude to low altitude in a true dive bombing approach was pretty inaccurate,(due to the bombsights fogging up.
This is well documented and Midway is the only major battle which was not affected by this problem.
For this problem, while in the south Pacific, the SBD 3 was
1.Very inaccurate (as a DB),and
2.Used as more of a FB (in it's angle of attack, which was closer to 45degrees, than a poss 70 degree "dive".)

Nobody wants to lose their "DB"'s, but if we are looking to portray history of this fine plane, well, this might be a way.??


http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/shi ... relim.html


http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/AC/aircraf ... t_info.htm


http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-CN- ... ral-4.html


http://www.rootsweb.com/~flindian/planes.pdf

(This last site is pretty nice and is not limited to just the SBD)

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Here ya go Joe...[8D] Perhaps something like this is workable?

Guess the first thing to do is to define all CVs as either strike carriers (capable of launching half their complement fast enough to avoid a range penalty) or not.

Strike CVs (CVS): by class

Ranger
Lexington
Yorktown
Wasp
Essex
Independence
Saipan
Midway

Illustrious
Indomitable
Implacable
Colossus
Centaur
Majestic

Akagi
Kaga
Hiryu
Soryu
Shokaku
Unryu
Chitose
Taiho
Shinano

All others are not strike carriers.

By defining a CV as a Strike Carrier (neccesitating a new ship type with specific code so that we end up with two distinct CV ship types with somewhat different coded capabilities) we can simply and abstractly model operational capacity. A CVS can launch 50% of its' strike group with no range penalty...all others lose 1 hex range for strikes. Reason for the 50% figure is basically readied deckload. Reason for 1 hex penalty for non CVS is poor ops capacity...ie fewer elevators, poor hanger design, smaller deck etc.

We will also need an addition to the Air Combat TF UI, a toggle between deferred strikes and coordinated strikes. If set to Deferred, the CVS's and CV's in the TF will launch 50% strikes (perhaps make this dependent on TF leader stats as to how often the doctrine chosen by player is followed by TF CDR). CVS suffer no range penalty, CVs suffer - 1 hex, with the result that the CVS bonus is negated if a non CVS type is included in the same TF...therefore it is important not to combine CVS and CV types in same TF. If set to Coordinated, then 100% of a CVS/CV complement is launched as a single coordinated strike but with a -1 hex range penalty for CVS and -2 hex range penalty for non CVS. The TF will always launch a deferred strike if range precludes a coordinated one, regardless of player setting.

Just to clarify...the total airgroup of each CVS/CV still gets to participate in each air phase, the only difference being in size and range of strike packets.

Where the concept of an early war IJN coordination bonus should come into play is with the following three issues...1) with regard to deferred strikes (deferred meaning that the slowest aircraft launch first and proceed directly to the target while the faster aircraft launch last and catch up to the slower a/c enroute). The Japanese might get a better chance of forming up enroute than Allied aircraft during the early stages of the war. 2) The IJN bonus can also impact the chance of coordinated strikes staying together the entire trip (not getting seperated). 3) Multiple CVS/CV strike coordination (only with CVS/CV within same TF).

Not pertaining to coordination or ops efficiency is the fact that carrier a/c range is too decisive in the game. Not once was there an historical example of a TF with shorter ranged aircraft not launching vs one with longer range. It happens all the time in WITP because of the use of tactical ranges with no tactical ship movement and too few air phases. I propose that shorter ranged a/c still launch vs an enemy CV TF if out of range(only vs a CV TF) but that each a/c has to pass a die roll to see whether or not it makes it back. This is to abstractly model naval movement within the air phases and the high value of CVs as targets. There is also historical instances of this occurring...Mitscher at Phillippine Sea, whereas, as I already mentioned, there are no instances ever of a/c not launching if the range precluded recovery.


In conjuction with the IJN coordination bonus, an early war Allied CAP bonus should exist, as well as differentation between Allied and IJN TF flak defence.

Regarding the CAP bonus...

Allied CAP was theoretically better from the start of hostilities given the Allied use of radios in their aircraft (facilitates communication between CAP elements), their early adoption of fighter direction utilizing radar and aircraft communication capability (British had practiced this well before Pearl Harbor) and of course the lack of any of the above for Japan.

I'd lean towards establishing a base line for CAP capability (1.0) and have Japan start below it (perhaps 0.75 penalty) and gradually improve the capability with bonuses for such documented advances as radar, radio equipped a/c, doctrine and combat experience. For Allies, instead of initiating a single generalized bonus at what appears to be a generalized date, perhaps institute a multiple step progression rate and start at a more reasonable date. Perhaps allow the Allies a 1.0 capability at games start, increase it to 1.25 in June/42, 1.50 in Dec/42, 1.75 in June/43 and 2.0 in Dec/43 to reflect their early experience (Britsh), equipment, doctrinal advantages and gradual accumulation of combat experience.

Regarding your strike carrier // strike size // range idea ...

Hey this is pretty cool! Definitely simplier than what I've been pushing around!

How did you decide which ships were "in" and which were "out"??

Like Independence in ... Chitose in ... Junyo out ... Zuiho out ... Sangamon out ??

===

This would definitely be easier to code than my ideas .. that doesn't mean it will get in .. and certainly doesn't mean it will get in for the initial release .. but a range calculation (essentially) could be plugged in far easier than some other - roughly equivalent - but more complex solutions. Of course this includes a UI change. Those are conceptually easy but surprisingly tedious to code.

Regarding no instances of no launch if range precluded recovery...what about first day of Battle of Philippine Sea? USN did not launch - they waited until next day?

Be great if some sort of mechanic makes it into the game for sure. Will make CV combat, a huge aspect of the Pacific War, less of a rock, paper, scissors situation. Glad you like the conceptual simplicity of it.

Regarding no instances of no launch if range precluded recovery...what about first day of Battle of Philippine Sea? USN did not launch - they waited until next day?

Well, 1st Phillipine Sea is difficult to translate into game terms as this was not a straight CV vs CV launched exchange. Ozawa utilized land bases which lay between his TFs and the USN FCTF...ie, Ozawa's planes launched from the CVs and were to land on the air bases, refuel, then return to the IJN CVs. So, the IJN CVs were out of range in game terms, therefore the shorter ranged Allied CV a/c would/could not respond.

Another aspect of 1st PS was that Spruance was overall commander, and being cautious, he did not follow the advice of his aggressive subordinates (Mitscher, Burke) and move his CVs into strike range (in game terms, the CVs did not react). He was a good little Admiral and chose to cover the landings and wait for the IJN to come to him. Seeing as we already have reaction modelled and is impacted by CMDR Agressiveness, perhaps the launching of strikes with the possibility of losing a/c upon return due to lack of fuel (deferred strikes which may preclude recovery) be a result of CMDR Agressiveness as well.

Regarding your strike carrier // strike size // range idea ...

Hey this is pretty cool! Definitely simplier than what I've been pushing around!

How did you decide which ships were "in" and which were "out"??

Like Independence in ... Chitose in ... Junyo out ... Zuiho out ... Sangamon out ??

As to why I chose the above CVs as candidates for CVS status, this is entirely an opinion of mine based on my readings on the subject. Basically the above list is tentative and requires a more specific set of parameters. Also, it is simply a class choice, so if someone wanted to change the list, the editor makes it easy....it's just an OOB issue.

[herwin]

Basically, it was a function of how efficient the carrier was at launching a strike. The US CVLs were originally intended to carry a half carrier wing (18 VF, 18 VSB, 9 VT). They were reduced to 24 VF and 9 VT based on operational experience. Their fall 1945 configuration was to be 36 VF as CAP carriers.

[TheElf]

Technically speakin these CVS' were known as Fleet Carriers or Fast Carriers.

A small distinction...

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker


Well, 1st Phillipine Sea is difficult to translate into game terms as this was not a straight CV vs CV launched exchange. Ozawa utilized land bases which lay between his TFs and the USN FCTF...ie, Ozawa's planes launched from the CVs and were to land on the air bases, refuel, then return to the IJN CVs. So, the IJN CVs were out of range in game terms, therefore the shorter ranged Allied CV a/c would/could not respond.

Actually existing code could handle this....in a zen sort of way...The Japanese CV planes could be staged to the land bases during the Orders Phase in preparation to fly the naval strikes when the turn is executed. In the game they are actually on the airfields but in your mind you could picture them as being in the air enroute to target.


Of course knowing most peoples luck it would rain at the airfield and the CV planes wouldn't launch.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

Pages 23-28 of the Pacific War Encyclopaedia.

Ranger and Wasp were overcrowded, like the Ryujo. The top ten classes in order from most efficient to least were: Ranger, Wasp, Yorktown, Soryu, Hiryu, Unryu, Ryujo, Saipan, Colossus, Essex. Shinano was 55th.

Carrying capacity efficiency: Aircraft/full load displacement.

Page 26 has aviation fuel efficiency: Avgas in 1000s of gallons, same per aircraft, sorties (based on 300 gallons/sortie), and rank. The best were typically escort carriers. The worst were various abortions.

Pages 27-28 has manpower efficiency: Crew/aircraft. Not really a good measure.

Rating efficiency this way misrepresents Shinano badly. At one point it was intended to have no organic air group - which would make it infinately inefficient. It went through two different stages of air group development, neither of which was anything like its capacity - because it had a role somewhat like Unicorn - to maintain and support aircraft - and during a battle also to rearm and refuel them faster than could be done on their own decks.

It probably also misrepresents Hiryu, Soryu and the later war Japanese carriers based on them in the opposite direction: they don't displace very much and they have fair air compliments - but they are only impressive measured in this statistical way. They could only handle aircraft at about 2/3 the rate of a Shokaku or a Tahio.

The British Illustrious class is another case which is badly treated by this rating method - it depends critically on the sub class how they will rate - because of greatly different hanger capacities (1 deck, 1.5 decks or 2 decks of hanger). Yet all of them were virtually identical in aircraft handling efficiency - never mind it does not show up in this rating methodology.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Here ya go Joe...[8D] Perhaps something like this is workable?

Guess the first thing to do is to define all CVs as either strike carriers (capable of launching half their complement fast enough to avoid a range penalty) or not.

Strike CVs (CVS): by class

Ranger
Lexington
Yorktown
Wasp
Essex
Independence
Saipan
Midway

Illustrious
Indomitable
Implacable
Colossus
Centaur
Majestic

Akagi
Kaga
Hiryu
Soryu
Shokaku
Unryu
Chitose
Taiho
Shinano

All others are not strike carriers.

By defining a CV as a Strike Carrier (neccesitating a new ship type with specific code so that we end up with two distinct CV ship types with somewhat different coded capabilities) we can simply and abstractly model operational capacity. A CVS can launch 50% of its' strike group with no range penalty...all others lose 1 hex range for strikes. Reason for the 50% figure is basically readied deckload. Reason for 1 hex penalty for non CVS is poor ops capacity...ie fewer elevators, poor hanger design, smaller deck etc.

We will also need an addition to the Air Combat TF UI, a toggle between deferred strikes and coordinated strikes. If set to Deferred, the CVS's and CV's in the TF will launch 50% strikes (perhaps make this dependent on TF leader stats as to how often the doctrine chosen by player is followed by TF CDR). CVS suffer no range penalty, CVs suffer - 1 hex, with the result that the CVS bonus is negated if a non CVS type is included in the same TF...therefore it is important not to combine CVS and CV types in same TF. If set to Coordinated, then 100% of a CVS/CV complement is launched as a single coordinated strike but with a -1 hex range penalty for CVS and -2 hex range penalty for non CVS. The TF will always launch a deferred strike if range precludes a coordinated one, regardless of player setting.

Just to clarify...the total airgroup of each CVS/CV still gets to participate in each air phase, the only difference being in size and range of strike packets.

Where the concept of an early war IJN coordination bonus should come into play is with the following three issues...1) with regard to deferred strikes (deferred meaning that the slowest aircraft launch first and proceed directly to the target while the faster aircraft launch last and catch up to the slower a/c enroute). The Japanese might get a better chance of forming up enroute than Allied aircraft during the early stages of the war. 2) The IJN bonus can also impact the chance of coordinated strikes staying together the entire trip (not getting seperated). 3) Multiple CVS/CV strike coordination (only with CVS/CV within same TF).

Not pertaining to coordination or ops efficiency is the fact that carrier a/c range is too decisive in the game. Not once was there an historical example of a TF with shorter ranged aircraft not launching vs one with longer range. It happens all the time in WITP because of the use of tactical ranges with no tactical ship movement and too few air phases. I propose that shorter ranged a/c still launch vs an enemy CV TF if out of range(only vs a CV TF) but that each a/c has to pass a die roll to see whether or not it makes it back. This is to abstractly model naval movement within the air phases and the high value of CVs as targets. There is also historical instances of this occurring...Mitscher at Phillippine Sea, whereas, as I already mentioned, there are no instances ever of a/c not launching if the range precluded recovery.


In conjuction with the IJN coordination bonus, an early war Allied CAP bonus should exist, as well as differentation between Allied and IJN TF flak defence.

Regarding the CAP bonus...

Allied CAP was theoretically better from the start of hostilities given the Allied use of radios in their aircraft (facilitates communication between CAP elements), their early adoption of fighter direction utilizing radar and aircraft communication capability (British had practiced this well before Pearl Harbor) and of course the lack of any of the above for Japan.

I'd lean towards establishing a base line for CAP capability (1.0) and have Japan start below it (perhaps 0.75 penalty) and gradually improve the capability with bonuses for such documented advances as radar, radio equipped a/c, doctrine and combat experience. For Allies, instead of initiating a single generalized bonus at what appears to be a generalized date, perhaps institute a multiple step progression rate and start at a more reasonable date. Perhaps allow the Allies a 1.0 capability at games start, increase it to 1.25 in June/42, 1.50 in Dec/42, 1.75 in June/43 and 2.0 in Dec/43 to reflect their early experience (Britsh), equipment, doctrinal advantages and gradual accumulation of combat experience.

I think it is incorrect to allege that only these carriers could "launch half their capacity" in a single strike. If you knew you were going to need to launch at a certain time - an attack on a land base perhaps? - you could do so with virtually any carrier - even horrible Long Island.

The "inefficient" Hiyo and Junyo did better than this - and a lot of their "inefficiency" is criticism of one of the hangers which could only support fighters (due to height) - it still supported those fighters and - well - does a carrier not always need fighters? A lot of what occurs is related to crew (and aircrew) skills - so the "inefficient" Ryuho was inefficient in more than just terms you can measure by counting lifts or deck space. We just had to retire a gigantic USN CVA because its captain had not maintained it properly - just having the ship is not enough. I think the efficiency of a ship and its captain and the air squadrons are already soft programmable - all we need is to make sure they get used. A "green" ship should not be as good as a worked up ship is, and a ship with a captain incompetent in air ops should be good either - even if it is a wonderful Essex (or whatever).

[okami]

ORIGINAL: okami

Could not strike coordination be linked to experience? First the carriers experience(planning the strike) end result modifier. The strikeleaders rating(leading the strike) end result modifier. Finally squadrons experience(executing the strike) end result modifier. Would this approach better model the strike coordination abilities of both sides. It would also differentiate between carriers on the same side. So that while the KB of 1941 may have a better coordination than it's opponents, war loses in pilots and the gaining of experience by the allies will eventually even the playing field.

I think this is a much better way to deal with strike size without creating subjective ship classes or changing the game engine. All of these factors are already in the game and just need to be utilized properly. As El Cid resently stated why should a green crew on an Essex function better than an experienced crew on a lesser ship? Doctrine and experience should be the criteria for strike size with ship capacity being the maximum size. Number of aircraft in a strike should effect strilke overall range but again this would be modified by strike experience and flight deck crew experience. All in the game already just waiting for us to use them.

[Ron Saueracker]

I think it is incorrect to allege that only these carriers could "launch half their capacity" in a single strike. If you knew you were going to need to launch at a certain time - an attack on a land base perhaps? - you could do so with virtually any carrier - even horrible Long Island

My point is that this is the amount of aircraft capable of being launched quickly, without the loss of a/c endurance and strike range. Of course all carriers could launch a 100% air group strike, I'm just saying this takes time and results in loss of strike range. I'm also trying to keep it simple for AE. If you want to count elevators, crew skill, hanger height and number of hangers etc this is all well and good, fill your boots, but most likely it won't even be considered until WITP 2.

By the way, after I found Dunnigan, I realized the aircraft capacity/tonnage was not what I was looking for so I did not use it in selecting strike carrier qualification.

[Ron Saueracker]

We just had to retire a gigantic USN CVA because its captain had not maintained it properly

Cid, what is this about? JFK CV 67?

[m10bob]

For allied carrier operations, (including launching order of planes and capability), I recommend Belotes' TITANS OF THE SEAS..It even mentions WHY certain planes were not used on the jeep carriers.
Helldivers were for the larger flattops only, due to room to store and launch, but the jeeps could handle the TBF/TBM's (just as large) because they were more versatile,(load wise) and took less time to launch.
The order in which planes were launched changed in roughly '43, (but I am at the office and don't remember why or what..)I can look it up if anybody wants it, but its' in that book, and likely others..I know it had to do with how many could launch on a single strike, and why..