The Elephant Vanishes : obvert (J) vs Historiker_SqzMyLemon_Canoerebel (A)

[Lowpe]

It has happened to me before. It has happened to Obvert before, albeit to a lesser extent than what I took.[:D]

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

It has happened to me before. It has happened to Obvert before, albeit to a lesser extent than what I took.[:D]

Well, it all feels the same when you can't field your CAP or add replacement airframes due to lack of supply.

[Chickenboy]

Obvert,

As one of only a handful of PBEM players that have made it past July 1945, would you say that you see a difference in the effectiveness of nighttime bombing post ground-attack radar implementation? In other words, absent the questionable code inherent with night bombing uber-accuracy of ports and airfields, have you noticed even greater ability of the B-29s to hit tactical targets at night?

[HansBolter]

In my scenario 40 Ironman Nasty Ported to Babes, the AI has a huge air force guarding all strategic assets.

In mid '44 I started a night bombing campaign. By late '45 I have somewhere around 2000 B29s operational flying from three bases.

I have around 1200 B29-25s on Tinian, 400 or so B29B on Guam amd a mixture of about 400 B29-1s and B29Bs at Shanghai.

When I assign them a target I typically send every last one of them against it, rarely splitting targets.

On any given night about 60% stray due to night and I get ONE coordinated strike of about 100-120 bombers. The remainder trickle in in groups of 2-6.

Over the course of 16 months of strategic bombing I have run up a total of 39k victory points.

On any given night MAYBE about 400-500 bombers out of 2000 assigned actually fly a mission.

The point I am making here is that the game engine already severely limits the efficacy of night bombing.

[Wuffer]

Excuse me please, but do we talk about night bombing in general (e.g. area bombing) or precision strikes against air fields and/or ports?

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Wuffer

Excuse me please, but do we talk about night bombing in general (e.g. area bombing) or precision strikes against air fields and/or ports?

Important clarification. Few doubt the efficacy of nighttime strategic bombing (e.g., targeting manpower and starting fires that coincidentally damage other fixtures in the hex), whether high or low altitude. The argument / HRs are based upon the efficacy and realism of nighttime precision strikes against airfields, ports and the like tactical targets and whether the game's rendition of them is reflected in reality or needs to be tempered with HRs.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

In my scenario 40 Ironman Nasty Ported to Babes, the AI has a huge air force guarding all strategic assets.

In mid '44 I started a night bombing campaign. By late '45 I have somewhere around 2000 B29s operational flying from three bases.

I have around 1200 B29-25s on Tinian, 400 or so B29B on Guam amd a mixture of about 400 B29-1s and B29Bs at Shanghai.

When I assign them a target I typically send every last one of them against it, rarely splitting targets.

On any given night about 60% stray due to night and I get ONE coordinated strike of about 100-120 bombers. The remainder trickle in in groups of 2-6.

Over the course of 16 months of strategic bombing I have run up a total of 39k victory points.

On any given night MAYBE about 400-500 bombers out of 2000 assigned actually fly a mission.

The point I am making here is that the game engine already severely limits the efficacy of night bombing.

As Andre mentioned, the only HR restriction is on airfield/port strikes. All Strat bombing is open game!! And you're totals are almost four times those of the Allied totals for the same period in this game. He's used the B-29s for a variety of tactical strikes and many vulnerable daylight strikes. I think Lowpe is basically saying that numbers like yours justify a sustained and persistent night bombing Strat campaign to thwart a tough daylight CAP concentrated in big industrial centers.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Obvert,

As one of only a handful of PBEM players that have made it past July 1945, would you say that you see a difference in the effectiveness of nighttime bombing post ground-attack radar implementation? In other words, absent the questionable code inherent with night bombing uber-accuracy of ports and airfields, have you noticed even greater ability of the B-29s to hit tactical targets at night?

Well, his recent tactical strikes have been very effective, but I've not noticed a demonstrable difference as far as I can recall. I'd have to look back a bit. Hard to measure as recent strikes are against little opposition a well on the fringes.

Something to be aware of though and watch for.

[HansBolter]

Guess I haven't been paying close enough attention.

Thought your 50 plane restriction applied to all night bombing.

Can't understand why he isn't sending 2,000 B29s against a single strategic target at night, in the hope that 500-600 actually arrive on target.

Is your night CAP truly so effective as to make this an impossibly lopsided affair, or is that just CRs perception, which has caused him to not pursue the tactic?

Leaves one to wonder.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

Guess I haven't been paying close enough attention.

Thought your 50 plane restriction applied to all night bombing.

Can't understand why he isn't sending 2,000 B29s against a single strategic target at night, in the hope that 500-600 actually arrive on target.

Is your night CAP truly so effective as to make this an impossibly lopsided affair, or is that just CRs perception, which has caused him to not pursue the tactic?

Leaves one to wonder.

Hans,

My opinion is that CR has been attracted to the use of his B-17/24/29s in non-strategic roles much more frequently than using them in a strategic role. How often has he used them to hit troops in cities or in the field versus a concerted effort to raze cities in a planned strategic bombing campaign? Based on Obvert's AAR (which I exclusively follow), I think I can count the number of nighttime strategic city attacks on one or two hands in the last 10 months of game time.

[HansBolter]

Well, I would guess some of the appeal in using them tactically is a result of an inability to use them strategically in the daytime, or at least a perception of an inability.

If an asset of that magnitude is sitting unused it plays on the mind of the player leading one to look for some effective use.

Given how critical strategically degrading Japan is to an Allied victory I'm surprised he hasn't put more effort into it.

[Lowpe]

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

Given how critical strategically degrading Japan is to an Allied victory I'm surprised he hasn't put more effort into it.

I don't think a lot of PBEMs go that way...I think Japan is crushed militarily and seldom economically unless it is Japans own fault...i.e. they run the economy into the ground themselves. Of course there are exceptions.[;)]

[Lowpe]

ORIGINAL: obvert
I think Lowpe is basically saying that numbers like yours justify a sustained and persistent night bombing Strat campaign to thwart a tough daylight CAP concentrated in big industrial centers.

+1. Thanks.[:)]

[Mike Solli]

This is all very interesting stuff. I read only this AAR, so I really have no idea what CR is thinking or doing. Given the difficulty he is having in this game (thanks to you), some of the reasons for the seemingly inefficient use of the B-29s may be in his mind. If he believes he can't use the B-29s in a historical way, then he may be grasping at straws as Hans said. Using them in penny packets may be what he thinks is his only way to use them effectively. I'd have to agree that massive daylight B-29 raids on industry would be difficult for you to counter over time. How many B-29s are in the Allied inventory by this point in the war anyway?

[Lowpe]

Mike,

Once upon a time I had a spreadsheet of all Allied plane reinforcements and production by month. Haven't looked at it in years...A quick look and I can't find it.

Perhaps I got it from Koniu or from his AAR?

[Wuffer]

This was all obvious since the invasion of Sakhalin. Imagine D-Day without the strategic campaign first. Perhaps the Allies' previous experience was that the Empire's economy will crash by it's own anyway?

The forced analogies of the civil war probably did not allways help so much, too (keep them, please, don't get me wrong, know your history, but have a look at the Prussian campaigns too). And read Sun Tsu again.
You will never ever solve a strategic problem with only tactical measures.

Your strategical target in this game (it's never a simulation, but allways an abstraction) is to kill the war machine, you could do so by burning the oil wells, conquering them, disrupt the shipping lanes or even by creating another bottleneck in the Home Islands, e.g. a concentrated effort against engines or a/c factories. Palembeng is the most important hex, not Tokyo.

But let us keep in mind that this's a picked up one. And that I'm talking too much. )

[HansBolter]

I'm at November 24th, 1945 in my AI game.

My B29 losses have been mostly to AA, with a small number falling to interceptors.

My strategic campaign started in September of '44, so it has run for 14 months.

I have bombed only at night except for one very disappointing daytime atomic bomb attack on Tokyo.

I have well over 2,000 operational B29s.

Squadrons are STILL arriving from Europe.

Checked last night and strategic bombing victory points are at 42k.

[Bif1961]

In Europe as in the Pacific strategic bombing was best used against fuel/oil production targets. Both the Germans and Japanese were able to produce weapons of war almost until the end but couldn't fuel them to employ them. The Axis had more planes than pilots and couldn't train the new pilots they did have for lack of fuel. The Yamato was sent on a one way journey, partly because of lack of fuel and many other combat vessels were left in port for lack of fuel. Subs were important in the Pacific as a critical strategic weapon and not in Europe by the Allies. Hence the mention that Palembang is more important than Tokyo when it comes to strategic value. However, there are a lot of VPs to be harvested via strategic bombing of Japanese cities.

[Lowpe]

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

I'm at November 24th, 1945 in my AI game.

My B29 losses have been mostly to AA, with a small number falling to interceptors.

My strategic campaign started in September of '44, so it has run for 14 months.

I have bombed only at night except for one very disappointing daytime atomic bomb attack on Tokyo.

I have well over 2,000 operational B29s.

Squadrons are STILL arriving from Europe.

Checked last night and strategic bombing victory points are at 42k.

Even though it is Ironman Nasty, I don't think the night fighters have been beefed up any.

Does the AI have stiff NF CAP over Tokyo and Osaka? My guess is not, or you would of lost more planes.

[HansBolter]

The AIs night cap is substantial, but obviously not overwhelming.
Since it is an Ironman game I have faced all kinds of advanced air frames.

My B29s down nearly as many interceptors as they take losses.

I stayed away from the huge concentration at Tokyo, starting my campaign against Nagasaki, moving on to Hiroshima and then Osaka.
I have since taken Nagasaki, have reduced forts in Hiroshima to 3 and am almost at the gates of Osaka, so the night strategic bombing campaign will be moving to Tokyo soon.

Flak has taken more than interceptors and I also obviously haven't suffered the kind of losses CR has so his total number of usable air frames must be lower than mine.

This game is also a few months behind mine, so I would venture to guess he likely has somewhere around 1300-1500 B29s available.