"The strategic aim in Normandy was for Montgomery to hold the line in the east and allow the Americans to break out in the west. In general, that's how it played. He had many problems. He created a rod for his own back by assigning Caen as a target for the first day. It was 10 miles inland, and never on bearing in mind what stood before Sword beach in the city." IronDuke
I don't see this as true, and you also did not justify your claim that Monty won... and didn't Patton in this same light win?
Monty was threatened by Ike with removal, read Ambrose... at Normandy for sitting on his ass. And Goodwood, sorry about Godwin mistake was hardly a victory...
So please answer the ?, Where did monty win? I can accept you don't want to credit Patton, but really stating Monty won anything after a North Africa is absurd... again what victories are you refering too?
Freeboy,
Your citing facts, giving honest opinions and asking for my evidence to back me up, so I feel bound to reply. None of the unpleasantness in this thread is your fault, so I don't propose to appear as if I am ignoring you. I propose to copy this into a separate thread and discuss with you there if acceptable?
the "Kriegstagebuch des OKW", Originalausgabe IV/1, 1944/45, clearly states the composition of the 352nd VG division. it was composed out of "Marschbbattalion", "Gneisenauverbänden", "Festungsbattalionen". The Staff of the OB West reports, that the level of training and unit cohesion was very bad, there was also a lack of officers.
What is this source, I don't recognise it. Is there an English language version?
Regards,
Ironduke
A Marchbattalion was a thrown together outfit from a unit, consisting of what "unnessary", unnedeed and available personnel could be found there.
Gneisenauverbände were probably ex-naval personnel (Gneisenau being a damaged battleship)
A Festungsbattalion typically consisted of personnel medically unfit for regular infantry duty.
Overall this seems to support your stance.
The "Kriegstagebuch" is the war diary of the OKW btw. A primary source if there ever was one[;)]
Ignoring the wulfir
Fighting the EUnuchs from within
"The strategic aim in Normandy was for Montgomery to hold the line in the east and allow the Americans to break out in the west. In general, that's how it played. He had many problems. He created a rod for his own back by assigning Caen as a target for the first day. It was 10 miles inland, and never on bearing in mind what stood before Sword beach in the city." IronDuke
I don't see this as true, and you also did not justify your claim that Monty won... and didn't Patton in this same light win?
Monty was threatened by Ike with removal, read Ambrose... at Normandy for sitting on his ass. And Goodwood, sorry about Godwin mistake was hardly a victory...
So please answer the ?, Where did monty win? I can accept you don't want to credit Patton, but really stating Monty won anything after a North Africa is absurd... again what victories are you refering too?
Sicily for instance. Operation Veritable and Blockbuster also comes to mind. Monty generally did fine in a set piece tactical situation.
Ike couldn´t have removed Monty even if he wanted to. Simple as that.
Ignoring the wulfir
Fighting the EUnuchs from within
I am posting the information below to dispel the notion that Patton's tactics were incomplete and that the advance three divisions of Third Army did not incur tough fighting.
The selected information below is from the United States Army Official History of the Battle of the Bulge. The portions included below include only the first couple of days of action. In actuality all these elements of Third Army would be engaged in continuous fighting for many, many days, as the Germans began moving in to engage Third Army with more German fighting units, including the elite 1SS Panzer Division.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1965
"This volume represents the most exhaustive collection of personal memoirs by leading participants ever attempted for a general staff history of a major campaign. The memoirs take two forms: interviews with American participants shortly after the action described, and written accounts prepared immediately after the end of World War II by the German officers who took part in the Ardennes Campaign. The use of the combat interview in the European Theater of Operations was organized by Col. William A. Ganoe, theater historian, but the specific initiation of an intensive effort to cover the Ardennes story while the battle itself was in progress must be credited to Col. S. L. A. Marshall. The enlistment of the German participants in the Ardennes, first as involuntary then as voluntary historians, was begun by Colonel Marshall and Capt. Kenneth Hechler, then developed into a fully organized research program by Col. Harold Potter, who was assisted by a very able group of young officers, notably Captains Howard Hudson, Frank Mahin, and James Scoggins."
CHAPTER XXI
The III Corps' Counterattack Toward Bastogne
The Supreme Commander himself was well aware of the Third Army commander's penchant for cut and thrust tactics and probably needed little urging to take some action calculated to hold Patton within the constraints of "the big picture." On the other hand Eisenhower recognized that the continued occupation of Bastogne, the key to the entire road net on the south side of the German Bulge, was essential to future offensive operations. Patton, as the SHAEF staff saw it, would make the narrow thrust on the Arlon-Bastogne axis, but any more ambitious plans would have to be subordinated to the larger strategy. [1] Eisenhower, therefore, told Bradley that the American counterattack via Bastogne should be held in check and not allowed to spread, that it was, after all, only a steppingstone for the "main counteroffensive."
Preparations for the Attack
Possibly the "lucky" commander needed some curb on his inherent optimism, but regardless of any pose which Patton may have assumed in the war council at Verdun he and his staff went about the business of mounting this first counterattack coolly and methodically. [2] The direction of attack already had been set by General Eisenhower, that is, north from an assembly area around Arlon. The immediate mission, assigned by the higher command after the Verdun meeting, was the "relief" of Bastogne and the use of its road net as a sally port for a drive by the Third Army to St. Vith in the larger Allied offensive. Dday for the counterattack was 22 December.
The 26th Division (Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul) was full of rifle replacements, mostly inexperienced and lacking recent infantry training. This division had seen its first combat in October and had lost almost 3,000 men during bitter fighting in Lorraine. Withdrawn in early December to take over the Third Army "reinforcement" training program at Metz, the 26th Division had just received 2,585 men as replacements and, on 18 December, was beginning its program (scheduled for thirty days) when the German counteroffensive canceled its role as a training division. The "trainees," men taken from headquarters, antitank sections, and the like, at once were preempted to fill the ranks left gaping by the Lorraine battles. Knowing only that an undefined combat mission lay ahead, the division rolled north to Arlon, completing its move shortly before midnight of the 20th. Not until the next day did General Paul learn that his division was to attack on the early morning of the 22d.
The 80th Division (General McBride) was in good condition. As one of the units being primed by the Third Army for the forthcoming attack against the West Wall, the 80th had been granted priority on replacements, had been rested at St. Avold, and on 18 December was on its way into the line near Zweibrucken when General Patton ordered the move to Luxembourg. There the 80th found itself under the control of the III Corps, its only orders to take up a reserve battle position in the 4th Infantry Division zone. On 21 December McBride first learned that his division would attack the following morning.
The 4th Armored Division (Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey) had come north under hurried and contradictory orders, the result of the usual time lag between a command decision reached in personal conferences by the top commanders and the receipt of this decision in the lower tactical units. CCB, for example, operated for two days under VIII Corps while the rest of the division was en route to III Corps-a fact that has bearing on the subsequent story of Bastogne. On the night of 18 December General Bradley had told Patton, "I understand from General Ike you are to take over the VIII Corps." That same night CCB, 4th Armored, started for Longwy and the road to Luxembourg. The next day the rest of the division followed, under verbal orders from Patton attaching the 4th Armored Division to the III Corps. These orders were countermanded, then reaffirmed by the 12th Army Group in the course of the 19th.
The 4th Armored Division had won a brilliant reputation during the autumn battles in Lorraine. It was a favorite of the Third Army commander; so, when its leader, Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, was returned to the United States for rest and recuperation, General Patton named his own chief of staff as Wood's successor. On 10 December the 4th Armored Division came out of the line after five months of incessant fighting. The last phase of combat, the attack in the Saar mud, had been particularly trying and costly. Replacements, both men and materiel, were not to be had; trained tank crews could not be found in the conventional replacement centers-in fact these specialists no longer were trained in any number in the United States. When the division started for Luxembourg it was short 713 men and 19 officers in the tank and infantry battalions and the cavalry squadron.
The state of materiel was much poorer, for there was a shortage of medium tanks throughout the European theater. The division could replace only a few of its actual losses and was short twenty-one Shermans when ordered north; worse, ordnance could not exchange worn and battledamaged tanks for new. Tanks issued in the United Kingdom in the spring of 1944 were still operating, many of them after several major repair jobs, and all with mileage records beyond named life expectancy. Some could be run only at medium speed. Others had turrets whose electrical traverse no longer functioned and had to be cranked around by hand. Tracks and motors were worn badly: the 8th Tank Battalion alone had thirty-three tanks drop out because of mechanical failure in the l60mile rush to the Ardennes. But even with battle-weary tanks and a large admixture of green tankers and armored infantry the 4th Armored Division, on its record, could be counted an asset in any operation requiring initiative and battle know-how.
The [initial] night battles had shown clearly that the 80th Infantry Division faced hard going as the 24th dawned. The advance had carried north to a point where it impinged on the Seventh Army communications leading to the Bastogne battleground.
The first real test of strength came when the leading company was a couple of miles southeast of Grosbous, from which town a road led north to Eschdorf. Here the advance battalion of the 915th Regiment [of the 352nd VGD] struck so suddenly and with such force that the lead company fell back for at least half a mile. The guns supporting the 104th Infantry were in position, however, and finally bent back the counterattack. In the meantime a handful of riflemen from the 109th Infantry, 28th Division, who had been waging a long battle in Grosbous until driven out by four German tanks, made their way back to the 104th. As it turned out the body of the 352d Volks Grenadier Division was not present here but was in the 80th Division zone. The 915th Regiment consisting of troops now split off from their trains, artillery, and the bulk of the division by the wedge which the 80th had thrust forward west of Ettelbruck, withdrew to make a stand in the neighborhood of Grosbous. Colonel Palladino left Company E to hold in check some Germans who had taken to the nearby woods, while the rest of the 104th Infantry continued tramping north along the road to Grosbous. The village itself was taken a couple of hours after midnight in a surprise attack by a combat patrol from Company G.
The series of blocks thrown against the 352d Volks Grenadier Division by the 80th Division and the 104th Infantry gave the western wing of the 26th Division a clear field. By the middle of the afternoon the 328th had covered nearly six miles without firing or receiving a shot. The advance guard was nearing the village of Arsdorf, from which a series of small roads and trails radiated through ravines and along ridges to the Sure, when a few rounds came in from self-propelled guns firing from a hill to the north. Concurrently reports arrived from the 26th Reconnaissance Troop that there was a strong German force in Rambrouch on the left flank. Night was near and the true strength of the enemy unknown; so the regiment halted while scouts worked their way to the front and flanks.
Who were these German troops? Since it was known that the 352d Volks Grenadier Division could not have reached this point the first guess was that the 5th Parachute Division, believed to be farther north, had pushed down into the area. Actually the 328th Infantry had run into the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, which the Seventh Army had borrowed from the OKW reserve, rushing it across the front to bolster this south flank. At first the brigade had been sent in to hold the Sure River line, but the Seventh Army then decided to expand its blocking position well to the south of the river, and so turned the brigade through Bourscheid and Eschdorf to the neighborhood of Arsdorf. This unit contained a battalion of forty Mark IV and Panther tanks, one battalion of mobile infantry, and one of foot, but thus far only a few tanks and the rifle battalion in personnel carriers were on the scene.
While the 104th moved forward to hit the enemy congregated at Grosbous, the 328th Infantry reorganized to keep the drive going, under somewhat optimistic orders to seize crossings on the Wiltz River. At midnight the 1st and 3d Battalions jumped off to take Grevils-Bresil, from which a fairly good ridge road ran north to Eschdorf. The village was garrisoned by two companies of the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade, reinforced by several Panthers from the Seventh Army reserve. Unshaken by a half-hour shelling, the Germans held tenaciously to the village all night long.
When daylight came on 23 December the 26th Division had little to show for its night attack. The 104th Infantry held Grosbous, but the 328th was checked at Grevils-Bresil by a company of stubborn German infantry backed up with a few tanks. In the woods south of Grosbous the men of Company E, 104th Infantry, had taken on more than they had bargained for: a couple of hundred riflemen from the 915th Regiment [of the 352nd VGD] led in person by the regimental commander. (The American regimental commander had to throw in Company I, but even so this pocket was not wiped out until Christmas Eve.)
The Third Army commander [Patton], veteran tanker, himself prescribed the tactics to be used by Gaffey and the 4th Armored. The attack should lead off with the tanks, artillery, tank destroyers, and armored engineers in the van. The main body of armored infantry should be kept back. When stiff resistance was encountered, envelopment tactics should be used: no close-in envelopment should be attempted; all envelopments should be started a mile or a mile and a half mile back and be made at right angles. Patton, whose experience against the Panther tank during the Lorraine campaign had made him keenly aware of its superiority over the American Sherman in gun and armor, ordered that the new, modified Sherman with heavier armor (the so-called Jumbo) should be put in the lead when available. But there were very few of the Jumbos in the Third Army.
In any case General Kokott, commanding the 26th Volks Grenadier Division responsible for the Chaumont-Martelange sector, had taken steps to reply to the attack on Chaumont. This village lies at the bottom of a bowl whose sides are formed by hills and connecting ridges. The rim to the northeast is densely wooded but is tapped by a trail leading on to the north. Along this trail, screened by the woods, the Germans brought up the 11th Assault Gun Brigade, numbering ten to fifteen remodeled Mark III carriages, bearing 75-mm. guns and with riflemen clinging to their decks and sides. Rolling down the slope behind an artillery smoke screen, the German assault guns knocked out those American tanks they could sight and discharged their gray-clad passengers into the village.
The American riflemen (Lt. Col. Harold Cohen's 10th Armored Infantry Battalion) battled beside the crippled and mired tanks in what Maj. Albin Irzyk, the veteran commander of the 9th Tank Battalion, called the bitterest fighting his battalion ever had encountered. The forward artillery observer was dead and there was no quick means of bringing fire on the enemy assault guns, which simply stood off and blasted a road for the German infantry. Company A, 10th Armored Infantry Battalion, which had led the original assault against Chaumont, lost some sixty-five men. The battle soon ended. [12] In small groups the Americans fell back through the dusk to their original positions, leaving eleven Shermans as victims of the assault guns and the mud.
It was daylight when tanks and infantry resumed the assault at Warnach, driving in from three sides with the riflemen clinging to the tanks. The battle which ensued was the most bitter fought by CCA during the whole Bastogne operation. Heilmann, commanding the 5th Parachute Division, had reasoned that the sector he held south of Bastogne was far too wide for a connected linear defense, and so had concentrated the 15th Parachute Regiment along the Martelange-Bastogne road. Warnach was the regimental command post and there was at least one rifle battalion in the village, reinforced by a battery of self-propelled tank destroyers. Two American artillery battalions kept this enemy force down, firing with speed and accuracy as the Shermans swept in, but once the artillery lifted, a house-to-house battle royal commenced in earnest. Four Shermans were destroyed by tank destroyer fire at close range. The enemy infantry fought desperately, filtering back into houses which had been cleared, organizing short, savage rushes to retake lost buildings, and showing little taste for surrender. But try as they might the German paratroopers could not get past the American armored infantry and at the tanks-only one was knocked out by German bazooka fire. The result was slow to be seen but none the less certain. At noon, when the battle ended, the Americans had killed one hundred and thirty-five Germans and taken an equal number of prisoners. The little village cost them sixtyeight officers and men, dead and wounded.
Chaumont, on the 23d, and Warnach, on the 24th, are tabbed in the journals of the 4th Armored as "hot spots" on the march to Bastogne. Quite unexpectedly, however, a third developed at Bigonville, a village some two and a half miles east of the Bastogne highway close to the boundary between the 4th Armored and the 26th Infantry Division. The gap between these divisions, only partially screened by light forces, suddenly became a matter of more than normal concern on the night of 22 December with reports that a large body of German armor was moving in (actually the advance guard of the Fuehrer Grenadier Brigade which had appeared in front of the left wing of the 26th Division). To protect CCA's open right flank, Gaffey ordered Col. Wendell Blanchard to form the Reserve Combat Command as a balanced task force (using the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion and 37th Tank Battalion) and advance toward Bigonville. Early on 23 December CCR left Quatre-Vents, followed the main road nearly to Martelange, then turned right onto a secondary road which angled northeast. This road was "sheer ice" and much time was consumed moving the column forward.
[In Bigonville]. . . the German infantry held their fire until the Americans were in the streets, then cut loose with their bazookas, light mortars, and small arms. While the two assault companies of the 53d advanced from house to house the tanks of the 37th blasted the buildings ahead, machine-gunned the Germans when they broke into the open, and set barns and out-buildings afire with tracer bullets.
Perhaps a few of the armored officers still believed that a hell-forleather tank attack could cleave a way to Bastogne. But by the evening of 24 December it seemed to both Gaffey and Millikin that tanks were bound to meet tough going in frontal attack on the hard-surfaced roads to which they were confined and that the operation would demand more use of the foot-slogger, particularly since the German infantry showed a marked proclivity for stealing back into the villages nominally "taken" by the tankers. . .
Thus far the Third Army counterattack had tended to be a slugging match with frontal assault and little maneuver. General Patton's insistence on bypassing centers of resistance had been negated by the terrain, the weather, and the wide-reaching impact of the earlier VIII Corps demolitions scheme.
For the next three days the [80th] division would wage a lone battle to reach and cross the Sure River, the scene of action being limited to the wedge formed on the north by the Sure and on the east by the Sauer River with a base represented by the Ettelbruck-Heiderscheidergrund road. This area the 80th came to know as the Bourscheid triangle. Within this frame lay thick forests, deep ravines, and masked ridges, the whole a checkerboard of little terrain compartments. Control of a force larger than the battalion would be most difficult, artillery support-except at clearings and villages-would be ineffective, and the maintenance of an interlocking, impervious front nigh impossible. Once a battalion cleared a compartment and advanced to the next the enemy could be counted on to seep back to his original position. Unobserved fire and loss of direction in the deep woods, down the blind draws, and along the twisting ridges made each American unit a potential threat to its neighbors, often forcing the use of a single battalion at a time. The infantryman would be duly thankful when tanks, tank destroyers, or artillery could give a hand or at least encourage by their presence, but the battle in woods and ravines was his own.
The initial fire plan had called for the battery of 155's to plaster the center of the town, and these shells still were coming in when the infantry half-tracks entered the streets. Far more vulnerable to the rain of shell fragments than the tankers, the armored infantrymen leaped from their vehicles for the nearest doorway or wall. In the smoke and confusion the German garrison, a mixed group from the 5th Parachute and 26th Volks Grenadier Divisions, poured out of the cellars. The ensuing shooting, clubbing, stabbing melee was all that the armored infantry could handle and the C Team tanks rolled on to glory alone.
The "relief column" heading out of Assenois for the Bastogne perimeter now consisted of the three Sherman tanks commanded by Lieutenant Boggess, the one half-track which had blundered into the tank column, and two more Shermans bringing up the rear. Boggess moved fast, liberally spraying the tree line beside the highway with machine gun fire. But a 300-yard gap developed between the first three vehicles and the last three, giving the enemy just time to throw a few Teller mines out on the road before the half-track appeared. The half-track rolled over the first mine and exploded. Captain Dwight then ran his tow tanks onto the shoulder, the crews removed the mines, and the tanks rushed on to catch up with Boggess. At 1650 (the time is indelibly recorded in the 4th Armored Division record) Boggess saw some engineers in friendly uniform preparing to assault a pillbox near the highway. These were men from the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion-contact with the Bastogne garrison had been made. Twenty minutes later Colonel Abrams (subsequently awarded the DSC for the action at Assenois) shook hands with General McAuliffe, who had come to the outpost line to welcome the relieving force.
the "Kriegstagebuch des OKW", Originalausgabe IV/1, 1944/45, clearly states the composition of the 352nd VG division. it was composed out of "Marschbbattalion", "Gneisenauverbänden", "Festungsbattalionen". The Staff of the OB West reports, that the level of training and unit cohesion was very bad, there was also a lack of officers.
What is this source, I don't recognise it. Is there an English language version?
Regards,
Ironduke
A Marchbattalion was a thrown together outfit from a unit, consisting of what "unnessary", unnedeed and available personnel could be found there.
Gneisenauverbände were probably ex-naval personnel (Gneisenau being a damaged battleship)
A Festungsbattalion typically consisted of personnel medically unfit for regular infantry duty.
Overall this seems to support your stance.
The "Kriegstagebuch" is the war diary of the OKW btw. A primary source if there ever was one[;)]
Dammit, I keep having to come back here. I understood some of the German terms as I've seen them before, but do you know if this war diary exists in english translation? To my shame I don't know any foreign languages (except I know some American and a some Australian - well, not much Australian really, just enough to be able to swap PBEMs with RaverDave).
(I didn't know the term Gneisenauverbände, I probably should have recognised the name in there. Although, I did know naval ratings were drafted in. Thanks for the info).
Mitcham gives some detail but not enough, Nafziger is essentially all about TOEs. Any other recommendations? There are works by Cole and Jentz and Westwood I've considered.
But when you belittle Patton by suggesting the opposition Third Army faced could barely shoot back, you also (by implication) belittle the fighting efforts of the brave American units (the 26th, 80th, 4th Armored, 35th) who faced those same German units in some very tough fighting.
This is a lie, only this continuing lie could have drawn me back, but I will refute it no more, so feel free to continue to repeat these lies, as you will not have to face correction. How you can accuse someone of something like this on the basis of "implication" says more about you than it ever will about me. I also notice you ignored my legion of challenges. No doubt you will quote your one challenge at some point soon.
I do not, and never have, belittled the bravery of any Soldier in any army. I have never carried arms, I do not have this right. My point (as you well know) was that the fighting should have been over quicker had Patton deployed the men properly. I belittled Patton's operational plan, not the brave men who won the battle despite having to live with that poor plan.
I notice you feel free to belittle the opposition the Germans fought at every turn in 1940. Yet yours is somehow reasoned analysis, I'm sure.
I have clearly explained my point, this accusation is therefore clearly a lie. It is tactics like this that exasperated EricGuitarJames into leaving the thread, and now I. I will be posting my final thoughts on Patton in a separate thread. This one is no longer worth it although I am happy for my words and arguments to be compared to yours and to allow others to make up their own minds which of us argued better.
IronDuke
Please. . . .
If you want to leave this thread because the argument is going against you, then at least do like a man.
But don't do it by casting aspersions upon my name or intentions - understand?
And don't accuse me of lying [:-]
You were clearly attacking Patton - no doubt about that.
You did not attack Third Army's fighting men.
But then you latched onto trying to show how insignificant was the opposition Patton faced. In post after post, you tried to show that the German opposition facing Third Army was almost insignificant, going to the ridiculous extreme of claiming that some German units could not even "shoot back". [8|]
In doing this, by implication, you then made the opposition Third Army faced, to be less significant than it was in reality.
This may not have been your intention, but by implication, that was the end result.
If I am a boxer, and you attack my manager, and through that attack, downplay my opponent's abilities, then by implication, you have also made my victory over that opponent to have been less than it is.
Understand?
As for Guitarjames - he jumped ship when the argument was going badly for him. . .
You seemed to be more than happy to gleefully attack me and destroy Patton's good name, along with the others in this thread, when I was all alone.
As for this thread:
Let the reader be witness - I have stood my ground against all attacks, even when I was all alone for days, and even when the opposition numbered several individuals.
What is this source, I don't recognise it. Is there an English language version?
Regards,
Ironduke
A Marchbattalion was a thrown together outfit from a unit, consisting of what "unnessary", unnedeed and available personnel could be found there.
Gneisenauverbände were probably ex-naval personnel (Gneisenau being a damaged battleship)
A Festungsbattalion typically consisted of personnel medically unfit for regular infantry duty.
Overall this seems to support your stance.
The "Kriegstagebuch" is the war diary of the OKW btw. A primary source if there ever was one[;)]
Dammit, I keep having to come back here. I understood some of the German terms as I've seen them before, but do you know if this war diary exists in english translation? To my shame I don't know any foreign languages (except I know some American and a some Australian - well, not much Australian really, just enough to be able to swap PBEMs with RaverDave).
(I didn't know the term Gneisenauverbände, I probably should have recognised the name in there. Although, I did know naval ratings were drafted in. Thanks for the info).
Mitcham gives some detail but not enough, Nafziger is essentially all about TOEs. Any other recommendations? There are works by Cole and Jentz and Westwood I've considered.
But as to the quality of the translation I do not know. The german original is of course preferable, but when you do not read/write german well....[;)]
Ignoring the wulfir
Fighting the EUnuchs from within
Freeboy,
Your citing facts, giving honest opinions and asking for my evidence to back me up, so I feel bound to reply. None of the unpleasantness in this thread is your fault, so I don't propose to appear as if I am ignoring you. I propose to copy this into a separate thread and discuss with you there if acceptable
Iron Duke
no problem, I enjoy fresh debate and don't mind being corrected, of course when I'm wrong that is lol
This is the book you rate higher than the Official United States Army History of this period? I shouldn't be surprised considering you call Whiting a "distinquished" author
Attachment (1)
As I wrote (but you evidently didnt read) I was unable to access the site. So what is wrong with Williamson's work? Are we going to get another list of reviews from 'ordinary Joe's' who send in 'customer reviews' to Amazon? Gosh, their opinion carries so much weight[8|].
Since Williamson concurs with MacDonald, Keegan, Gilbert, Parker, Pimlott and Quarrie then he is probably correct. If, however, despite all of the evidence to the contrary you wish to believe that the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne and not in the north and that the 352nd VG Division was a highly trained, highly motivated, well equipped division then be my guest.
Let the reader be witness - I have stood my ground against all attacks, even when I was all alone for days, and even when the opposition numbered several individuals
Hahahahahahahahaha
I doubt too many will get to here, they'll be bored by your constant repetition.
Hahahahahahahahaha
Thankyou for using the World Wide Web. British designed, given freely to the World.
This is the book you rate higher than the Official United States Army History of this period? I shouldn't be surprised considering you call Whiting a "distinquished" author
Attachment (1)
As I wrote (but you evidently didnt read) I was unable to access the site. So what is wrong with Williamson's work? Are we going to get another list of reviews from 'ordinary Joe's' who send in 'customer reviews' to Amazon? Gosh, their opinion carries so much weight[8|].
Since Williamson concurs with MacDonald, Keegan, Gilbert, Parker, Pimlott and Quarrie then he is probably correct. If, however, despite all of the evidence to the contrary you wish to believe that the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne and not in the north and that the 352nd VG Division was a highly trained, highly motivated, well equipped division then be my guest.
You couldn't access that US Army website, therefore, you concluded that the 1SS Panzer was not at Bastogne. [8|]
You have displayed the same level of analysis as your friend Whiting, it seems.
I never said the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne - get your facts straight.
And I never said the 532nd VGD was a "highly trained, highly motivated, well equipped division". These are your words.
I said it was an average to good division - most certainly not the best. But the quality of the 26th, 35th and 4th armoured divisions were mainly green, tired soldiers as well.
Read the Official history of the period above and you'll see what I mean.
Some excerpts:
"The first real test of strength came when the leading company was a couple of miles southeast of Grosbous, from which town a road led north to Eschdorf. Here the advance battalion of the 915th Regiment [of the 352nd VGD] struck so suddenly and with such force that the lead company fell back for at least half a mile. The guns supporting the 104th Infantry were in position, however, and finally bent back the counterattack. In the meantime a handful of riflemen from the 109th Infantry, 28th Division, who had been waging a long battle in Grosbous until driven out by four German tanks, made their way back to the 104th. . . .
"In any case General Kokott, commanding the 26th Volks Grenadier Division responsible for the Chaumont-Martelange sector, had taken steps to reply to the attack on Chaumont. This village lies at the bottom of a bowl whose sides are formed by hills and connecting ridges. The rim to the northeast is densely wooded but is tapped by a trail leading on to the north. Along this trail, screened by the woods, the Germans brought up the 11th Assault Gun Brigade, numbering ten to fifteen remodeled Mark III carriages, bearing 75-mm. guns and with riflemen clinging to their decks and sides. Rolling down the slope behind an artillery smoke screen, the German assault guns knocked out those American tanks they could sight and discharged their gray-clad passengers into the village."
You couldn't access that US Army website, therefore, you concluded that the 1SS Panzer was not at Bastogne.
Don't be stupid (difficult though you seem to find it). I collated the information from other sources and quoted from Williamson.
I never said the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne - get your facts straight.
Read your own post from page 10
When elements of Third Army (which had many GREEN troops, and had been travelling non-stop for 2 days and nights in severe winter weather, without proper sleep, food or rest) attacked to relieve Bastogne, they were attacked by the 352nd (in concealment), the 5th parachute Division, and the elite 1SS Panzer Division.
If you are going to lie, at least do it consistantly[:D]
I read the excerpt you posted. It's a compilation if personal memoirs, apparently without rigorous historical analysis. Personal memoirs are notoriously unreliable unless corroborated from other sources.
Thankyou for using the World Wide Web. British designed, given freely to the World.
You couldn't access that US Army website, therefore, you concluded that the 1SS Panzer was not at Bastogne.
Don't be stupid (difficult though you seem to find it). I collated the information from other sources and quoted from Williamson.
I never said the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne - get your facts straight.
Read your own post from page 10
When elements of Third Army (which had many GREEN troops, and had been travelling non-stop for 2 days and nights in severe winter weather, without proper sleep, food or rest) attacked to relieve Bastogne, they were attacked by the 352nd (in concealment), the 5th parachute Division, and the elite 1SS Panzer Division.
If you are going to lie, at least do it consistantly[:D]
I read the excerpt you posted. It's a compilation if personal memoirs, apparently without rigorous historical analysis. Personal memoirs are notoriously unreliable unless corroborated from other sources.
Kevinugly:
Don't be stupid (difficult though you seem to find it). I collated the information from other sources and quoted from Williamson.
You seem to be doing this well enough on your own [8|]
So your "sources" don't mention the 1SS Panzer at Bastogne, therefore, it must NOT be there??
Even though I told you initially that the Official History PLACES it there.
What on earth are you arguing about??
Read your own post from page 10
It's not there because I never said it. Post the quote of it.
If you are going to lie, at least do it consistantly
I read the excerpt you posted. It's a compilation if personal memoirs, apparently without rigorous historical analysis. Personal memoirs are notoriously unreliable unless corroborated from other sources.
I can see where you would call the Official History of the US Army version "unreliable" [8|]
This is getting ridiculous AND embarrassing.
Not only have you called me a liar on several occassions, but now you choose authors such as Whiting over the Official Histories which are BASED ON eyewitness testimony (primary sources) from BOTH sides. [8|]
Here is a quote from you previously calling me a liar:
Have you actually read any books about the 'Bulge'. This is a downright LIE! 1st SS Panzer was in the north, by the time 3rd Army had reached Bastogne KG Peiper (1st SS spearhead containing the armour and the best infantry) had run out of petrol and ammo. This shows how desperate you are becoming if you are going to resort to blatant falsehoods
And which I proved that the 1SS Panzer WAS at Bastogne.
Now little boy, move along. . . and go back to your sandbox. . . and leave the adults alone. . .
Now I know why a horse has a tail to keep the flies away. . . [8|]
I never said the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne - get your facts straight.
Read your own post from page 10
Uh, Kevin, I hate to break the bad news to you, but it is YOU who said the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne [8|]
Here is your quote from page 11 of this thread:
Abandoning all of their heavy equipment they were withdrawn from La Gleize early in the morning of the 25th December 1944 apparently utterly exhausted. According to my reading ('The Blood Soaked Soil: Battles of the Waffen SS' by Gordon Williamson pp.171-5) some SS troops were redeployed to the area of Bastogne around the 28th. It may well be that some of the Liebstandarte ended up here as part of an ad-hoc battlegroup and these were the men the 35th Division ran into. I looked at the divisional site and read the story - interesting but factually suspect as most of them are. The other I cannot link to so I can't comment on its veracity. But Patton comments on the SS troops the 3rd Army ran into saying "They are colder, weaker and hungrier than we are" (Williamson, p.174). Add to that they were almost certainly out of tanks and heavy artillery (2nd SS Pz Corps was down to 30 tanks on the 25th December and they hadn't been as heavily engaged as 1st Corps) you can see that they hardly deserved the epithet 'elite'. Whatever, the remnants of Liebstandarte were completely withdrawn on 1st January 1945 for a refit prior to their Gotterdamerung in Hungary.
Now. . . run along. . . like a good little boy. . . before you hurt yourself. . .
A Marchbattalion was a thrown together outfit from a unit, consisting of what "unnessary", unnedeed and available personnel could be found there.
Gneisenauverbände were probably ex-naval personnel (Gneisenau being a damaged battleship)
A Festungsbattalion typically consisted of personnel medically unfit for regular infantry duty.
Overall this seems to support your stance.
The "Kriegstagebuch" is the war diary of the OKW btw. A primary source if there ever was one[;)]
Dammit, I keep having to come back here. I understood some of the German terms as I've seen them before, but do you know if this war diary exists in english translation? To my shame I don't know any foreign languages (except I know some American and a some Australian - well, not much Australian really, just enough to be able to swap PBEMs with RaverDave).
(I didn't know the term Gneisenauverbände, I probably should have recognised the name in there. Although, I did know naval ratings were drafted in. Thanks for the info).
Mitcham gives some detail but not enough, Nafziger is essentially all about TOEs. Any other recommendations? There are works by Cole and Jentz and Westwood I've considered.
But as to the quality of the translation I do not know. The german original is of course preferable, but when you do not read/write german well....[;)]
It has indeed been translated, but when the page you posted did a search of 60000 booksellers (i was impressed) it came up with the suggestion I contact the publisher because no one was claiming to sell it. I might just do this. I appreciate the link, including the one to the bookfinder page, might well come in useful.
Cheers,
Ironduke
I spend twelve pages and 30 plus posts wading through this, you're here for five minutes and get the best cameo of the lot.
You also forgot to mention the counterattack by the 1st S.S. Panzer “Der Fuhrer” Division which was sent south in an attempt to cut-off Patton's relieving forces fighting outside of Bastogne.
"We did not know that Hitler had ordered some of his best remaining troops to cut off the Third Army’s relief of Bastogne at all costs. Now across our front from our right came the elite 1st S.S. Panzer “Der Fuhrer” Division, sent down from the German Sixth Army to break us
The eastern assault force comprised the under-strength 1st SS Panzer and the 167th Volks Grenadier Divisions; its drive was to be made via Lutrebois toward Assenois.
1SS Panzer
The 1st SS Panzer was still licking its wounds after the fight as advance guard of the Sixth Panzer Army, when Model ordered the division to move south, beginning 26 December.
Perhaps you missed the post by Kevinugly when he called me a liar for mentioning 1SS Panzer showed up to attack Third Army.
That post was for him. . .
I never said the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne - get your facts straight.
So your "sources" don't mention the 1SS Panzer at Bastogne, therefore, it must NOT be there??
Even though I told you initially that the Official History PLACES it there.
And which I proved that the 1SS Panzer WAS at Bastogne.
Uh, Kevin, I hate to break the bad news to you, but it is YOU who said the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne
Life is so unfair [:(]. I can at least claim to be the one who got the gem that Patton ordered his men to attack a fortress in bad weather, little air or artillery support, inadequate ammunition, with rampant trench foot in the ranks and no gas for the vehicles, in order to keep their morale up.
If you want to post these quotes, feel free, I am no longer a part of this thread so do not feel able.
Von Rom, I apologise for calling you a liar. I've realised that it is just that you haven't got a clue what you are talking about. The Leibstandarte (or Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler to give it its full title) is the name of 1st SS Panzer Division, historians use them interchangeably. All of the first twelve divisions had names like this, the 2nd SS Panzer was entitled Das Reich, the 3rd SS Panzer was entitled Totenkopf and so on. If you didn't know the names of the other divisions that would be understandable but anyone who has studied the German armies and their battles on the East Front or West Front should know of the Leibstandarte and the Das Reich divisions and the divisional numbers they refer to. I'm sorry, but it really is that basic, and not only for their battle honours but also for the atrocities they were responsible for. It calls into question every post you have made because it is such a fundamental gap in your knowledge. If I had known about this I wouldn't have called you a liar so again please accept my apologies.
Regarding the 'Official History', if it was that comprehensive and accurate historians really wouldn't have much to do except re-gurgitate its text. 'Personal memoirs', first-hand accounts and the like are very useful 'primary sources' of information for the historian but human memory is fallible, which is why a group of witnesses to an event will each relate it quite differently. Add to this the stress of being under fire and you can see why a military historian will not take documents such as these at face value. I'm not belittling the collection or the men who contributed to it, I'm sure that for them their recollections are true, but without extensive corroboration all those stories are little more than just 'stories'. 'Context' is everything here, I should know, I was heavily criticised by one of my History Professors for not doing this in an early draft of my MA thesis on 'Women and the Home Front in WW2'.
Thankyou for using the World Wide Web. British designed, given freely to the World.
