MT - The problem with your contention that the IJNAF land based flotillas were comprised of experienced veterens & ought to have high skill ratings is that it is not true. The vast majority of IJNAF land based air flotillas had almost no combat experience prior to 7 December. Plenty of training but very little combat experience.
Put an F-16 flown by a new Navy pilot just out of combat training against any F4F (Vietnam jet fighter) and the F16 will wuppass every time. Better avionics, better cannons, much much much faster, more maneuverable, better radar and better missiles. The Phantom is an aircraft that simply proves that with enough thrust, even a brick can fly. The best the Phantom could hope for is to escape unless, of course, you're going to dumb the F16 pilot down to the "Golly skipper, *How again do I retract my landing gear?*" level of training typical of late WWII IJNAF/IJAF pilots.
Another fellow posted the remark that the IJNAF "taught a new school of warfare that the Allies had to learn" in the Pacific. What a joke. Japanese pilots were trained specifically for 1 on 1 dogfighting and never learned the zoom, shoot & scoot tactic (and were rudely surprised when the Allies used it against them). Their aircraft was specifically designed for high manueverability and long range at the expense of high speed. The mentality was one of heroic indvidual combat. And droves of expert Japanese pilots learned fatal lessons like "don't make solo Samurai approaches on SBD formations," "don't make level or climbing approaches on a B17 from the rear," and "don't get into a head-to-head pass with an allied fighter."
Japan was the last major combatant to learn the value of 2 plane sections, and only installed radios in every fighter plane in mid 1943 (so fighter discipline tended to fall apart very quickly when an engagement began). It's not that the Allies were so danged brilliant from the get go. Britain learned its lessons in 1940 at the hand of the Luftwaffe. Chennault studied the Battle of Britain and taught his pilots the value of zoom & scoot and staying with your wingman. By mid 1941, however, said indoctrination was standard training for US army pilots, largely owing to the hard lessons learned and passed on by the RAF. The 400 hours of advanced flight training received by the typical army pilot in 1941-1942 was better quality training than the indoc that Japanese pilots recieved.
Beyond these things, there's still the basic problem that GGPW does not remotely duplicate historic results even when you contrive to set up the historic match-ups.
Maybe GGPW needs to fix the training rates. Assuming that 10 hours of advanced training equates with one point of exp then the standard rate gain for USAF USN USMC pilots should be 2 per week. But, given that the US learned new tricks & tactics much faster than the Japanese you might give a small random chance that an air unit set on training would gain 3 exp per week. For USN and USMC units after April 1942, set the gain rating to 4 exp per week to reflect the inception of the advanced combat training schools. I say April (rather than July) because it seems easier than a complex rule like: "after the first time any allied aircraft *type* has a combat with Japanese fighters, increase the experience rate gain for all other a/c units flying that type by 2 points."
Aircraft comments
MT
I missed your last inquiry.
Maybe.... a rule that grants a temporary (for the duration of the combat) 1 point increase/decrease in the dogfight value per 5 mph maximum speed difference for a fighter engaged in combat against another fighter. So for example a P40 vs a Zeke gets a temporary, uh, 3 or 4 point df value gain and the zeke a temporary 3 or 4 point df value loss. I'm guessing that the P40s if flown by "new" pilots would not inflict huge losses and at the same time their loss rate would decline. This might simulate faster planes' ability to disengage when in trouble.
Also, give the early war USAF and USMC a few pretty decent units. Some of these formations had been around and through fairly advanced training since 1940. Increaese the USN experience ratings for the at-start carriers. Reduce the experience penalty for transitioning between certain kinds of a/c... vindicators to sbds, F2Us to F4Fs, TBDs to TBFs. P39/40s to P38/47s. Don't, though, reduce the penalty for transitioning from SBDs to "The Beast" Helldivers.
Also, there was at least one deployed operational P38 squadron in the Pac theater sent there right after Pearl Harbor. I'll try to track down the unit designation and OB for you.
I missed your last inquiry.
Maybe.... a rule that grants a temporary (for the duration of the combat) 1 point increase/decrease in the dogfight value per 5 mph maximum speed difference for a fighter engaged in combat against another fighter. So for example a P40 vs a Zeke gets a temporary, uh, 3 or 4 point df value gain and the zeke a temporary 3 or 4 point df value loss. I'm guessing that the P40s if flown by "new" pilots would not inflict huge losses and at the same time their loss rate would decline. This might simulate faster planes' ability to disengage when in trouble.
Also, give the early war USAF and USMC a few pretty decent units. Some of these formations had been around and through fairly advanced training since 1940. Increaese the USN experience ratings for the at-start carriers. Reduce the experience penalty for transitioning between certain kinds of a/c... vindicators to sbds, F2Us to F4Fs, TBDs to TBFs. P39/40s to P38/47s. Don't, though, reduce the penalty for transitioning from SBDs to "The Beast" Helldivers.
Also, there was at least one deployed operational P38 squadron in the Pac theater sent there right after Pearl Harbor. I'll try to track down the unit designation and OB for you.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Repying to several posts here at once...
1) I absolutely agree with the fact PacWar IS a strategy game on a large scale and cannot possibly handle all aspects of the Air War. It does do an overall nice job!
2) The allegations of 1:1 kill ratios in the Pacific Theatre are NOT dogfighting ratios, but included EVERY form of plane destruction in the air and on the ground...Dogfighting, Bombing, Strafing, Mechanical malfunction,were all counted in these tallies.
While it was a (nearly) true ratio by wars end, it wasnt constant thruout the war as repeatedly said by Major Tom. Early in the war 41-43 the Jap forces destroyed Thousands of aircraft of the Allied Forces with the above means. By 1943-45 it was the other way around.
3) The P-40 strengths and weaknesses have been gone over repeatedly in the past 55 yrs since the war was done. Simply put- it was a rugged fighter, not meant as a air superiority fighter but ground support fighter, The US/Allies ADAPTED the P-40 to use its strengths (again this was pointed out in previous posts)against Japanese BOMBER formations, not dogfighting other fighters!
4) It seems that mdiehl is saying that the entire format/history of the Pacific Air War represented by the game is wrong. I strongly disagree to this, the air tactics applied by the Japanese were revolutionary FOR THIER TIME! The Allied pilots were forced to invent/learn/pass on new tactics to counter the Japanese superiority of that time. Granted the technological advances of the time favored the Allies (radios,radar,etc.) Still tactics ruled the skies and 1941-1943 Japan rode our butts all over the Pacific. Midway was a Defensive operation mind you- the US carriers were poised to flee if they didnt get surprise (often forgotten) and the High Brass were seriously worried about PH being taken by the Japanese. (read Nimitz's book) True the US did place MUCH more value on pilots lives than the Japanese, but until the tides of war changed and Japanese losses occurred (re: Coral Sea, Solomons) there was no reason to believe at that time, that US strategy was going to be that successful against the Japanese
So your reasoning is 20/20 hindsight- not contemporary (for that time).
5) WHY is anyone comparing F4's and F22's to WWII??? The tactics are all wrong!!! The evolution from Korea to today is based on Platform/Missile tactics when Air/Air kill of WWII was totally different? the supremacy today is stealth and attitude (facing)when altitude and speed was the primary concern in WWII....flying somewhat related but different.
1) I absolutely agree with the fact PacWar IS a strategy game on a large scale and cannot possibly handle all aspects of the Air War. It does do an overall nice job!
2) The allegations of 1:1 kill ratios in the Pacific Theatre are NOT dogfighting ratios, but included EVERY form of plane destruction in the air and on the ground...Dogfighting, Bombing, Strafing, Mechanical malfunction,were all counted in these tallies.
While it was a (nearly) true ratio by wars end, it wasnt constant thruout the war as repeatedly said by Major Tom. Early in the war 41-43 the Jap forces destroyed Thousands of aircraft of the Allied Forces with the above means. By 1943-45 it was the other way around.
3) The P-40 strengths and weaknesses have been gone over repeatedly in the past 55 yrs since the war was done. Simply put- it was a rugged fighter, not meant as a air superiority fighter but ground support fighter, The US/Allies ADAPTED the P-40 to use its strengths (again this was pointed out in previous posts)against Japanese BOMBER formations, not dogfighting other fighters!
4) It seems that mdiehl is saying that the entire format/history of the Pacific Air War represented by the game is wrong. I strongly disagree to this, the air tactics applied by the Japanese were revolutionary FOR THIER TIME! The Allied pilots were forced to invent/learn/pass on new tactics to counter the Japanese superiority of that time. Granted the technological advances of the time favored the Allies (radios,radar,etc.) Still tactics ruled the skies and 1941-1943 Japan rode our butts all over the Pacific. Midway was a Defensive operation mind you- the US carriers were poised to flee if they didnt get surprise (often forgotten) and the High Brass were seriously worried about PH being taken by the Japanese. (read Nimitz's book) True the US did place MUCH more value on pilots lives than the Japanese, but until the tides of war changed and Japanese losses occurred (re: Coral Sea, Solomons) there was no reason to believe at that time, that US strategy was going to be that successful against the Japanese
So your reasoning is 20/20 hindsight- not contemporary (for that time).
5) WHY is anyone comparing F4's and F22's to WWII??? The tactics are all wrong!!! The evolution from Korea to today is based on Platform/Missile tactics when Air/Air kill of WWII was totally different? the supremacy today is stealth and attitude (facing)when altitude and speed was the primary concern in WWII....flying somewhat related but different.
Yes the Japanese destroyed thousands of Allied a/c early in the war. Yes, while doing so, they lost thousands of a/c. Leaving aside the carrier battles, which, people have said, make lousy examples because the a/c loss rate is heavily influenced by the survival of the parent CV, Allied kill ratios in FIGHTERS from August 1942 through January 1943 over the canal were 1:1. That's primarily Zekes vs F4Fs and P40s, with some P39s (and, heaven help their pilots, some P400s) thrown in.
GGPW does not produce historic results with engagements contrived to be the hirstoric units.
On amore general level, there comes apoint where no previous combat experience can prepare a pilot for the situation where his antiquated crate is horribly out-classed by his opponent. The determing factors over the years (even for gun combat) have been durability, cannon strength and airspeed. The early war P40s were slightly faster and their pilots somewhat less able than the early war IJN pilots. The factors should cancel out because, historically, THEY DID.
Manfred von Richtofen in a DIII vs. any Allied pilot in a P40 just out of basic combat training would have a zero percent chance of killing the P40 in ten thousand encounters. He might escape alive, and he might hope that the P40 pilot would fly his plane into the ground. But a shoot down?
Never.
So GGPW doesn't have to revamp the system. Just monkey with the system to teh point where historical engagements produce historical attrition rates. If that means changing the exp ratings, dogfight ratings, or just declaring a result. Whatever it takes to get historically accurate results.
GGPW does not produce historic results with engagements contrived to be the hirstoric units.
On amore general level, there comes apoint where no previous combat experience can prepare a pilot for the situation where his antiquated crate is horribly out-classed by his opponent. The determing factors over the years (even for gun combat) have been durability, cannon strength and airspeed. The early war P40s were slightly faster and their pilots somewhat less able than the early war IJN pilots. The factors should cancel out because, historically, THEY DID.
Manfred von Richtofen in a DIII vs. any Allied pilot in a P40 just out of basic combat training would have a zero percent chance of killing the P40 in ten thousand encounters. He might escape alive, and he might hope that the P40 pilot would fly his plane into the ground. But a shoot down?
Never.
So GGPW doesn't have to revamp the system. Just monkey with the system to teh point where historical engagements produce historical attrition rates. If that means changing the exp ratings, dogfight ratings, or just declaring a result. Whatever it takes to get historically accurate results.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
While all the Aircraft losses and PW AC modeling discussions demanding changes for greater accuracy or more historic outcomes are both interesting and useful to those just coming to this great game I must say that they are not new.
This has been an ongoing issue since the old Comp U Serve PW forums and before.
And, as always, it reflects an incomplete understanding of the games design philosophy and interface use, ( i.e. How To Play The Game ) the very incomplete and poorly organized manual being the major problem.
This is, as stated up-thread, a Grand Strategic game, and as such IMHO, as well a others, does a damm good job of _simulating_ WW II Pacific air combat within the parameters of weekly turns on a huge scale.
I will also say, again, that any changes to the default aircraft in the Matrix Version can be done by those who want to with the Editors available. Change to your hearts content, play a few full `41 games from both sides and present the evidence.
I for one want no changes to the US and Japanese Aircraft or Airgroups in the offical version because I believe that it will screw up the game balance as the game progresses in both PBEM and vs AI.
As it stands now the game, both PBEM, and vs the AI can be won by either side.
[This message has been edited by Blackjack (edited October 25, 2000).]
[This message has been edited by Blackjack (edited October 25, 2000).]
This has been an ongoing issue since the old Comp U Serve PW forums and before.
And, as always, it reflects an incomplete understanding of the games design philosophy and interface use, ( i.e. How To Play The Game ) the very incomplete and poorly organized manual being the major problem.
This is, as stated up-thread, a Grand Strategic game, and as such IMHO, as well a others, does a damm good job of _simulating_ WW II Pacific air combat within the parameters of weekly turns on a huge scale.
I will also say, again, that any changes to the default aircraft in the Matrix Version can be done by those who want to with the Editors available. Change to your hearts content, play a few full `41 games from both sides and present the evidence.
I for one want no changes to the US and Japanese Aircraft or Airgroups in the offical version because I believe that it will screw up the game balance as the game progresses in both PBEM and vs AI.
As it stands now the game, both PBEM, and vs the AI can be won by either side.
[This message has been edited by Blackjack (edited October 25, 2000).]
[This message has been edited by Blackjack (edited October 25, 2000).]
I agree that the IJNAF started to lose numbers at high rates during the Soloman Island campaign. Yet, this is not totally due to the American experience levels. For one, their method of pilot rotation was virtually non-existant (pilots got worn out, made a mistake, and died). They were the ones flying offensive missions over long distances (from Rabul to Guadalcanal is a pretty long distance to fly!).
One can compare this to The Battle of Britain. The German forces were the more experienced ones, and indeed until the focus was shifted to bombing British cities they were winning the battle (more British planes lost than German planes). The Germans had similar quality planes than the British, but, had better tactics and more experience/training. The British benefit was that they were defending their own territory (they didn't have to spend an hour flying just to get to the battle, this part of flying is pretty exhausting and boring, making the pilots less effective).
Your analogy on pilots is totally unconfounded. You are using a small statement that I said and making unjust assumptions. I never said that he knew everything about every aircraft, just that he isn't learning as much now on the same aircraft that he did when he started. He is going for his two engine license now, which will require a new set of rules and learning curve.
I don't say that training is pointless, but, you do not have the same experiences, or ability to fight an enemy through just purely training. Especially in the 1940's when knowledge of your enemies aircraft and tactics were absolutely ZERO. Sorry for the pun.
Training is to get the pilot to survive their first few minutes of actual combat. Combat experience is to get the pilot to survive the rest of their tour/war.
Possibly some USAAF, RAF and RAAF groups will recieve slignt improvements in experience (55 instead of 50), but, there will be no massive increases.
One can compare this to The Battle of Britain. The German forces were the more experienced ones, and indeed until the focus was shifted to bombing British cities they were winning the battle (more British planes lost than German planes). The Germans had similar quality planes than the British, but, had better tactics and more experience/training. The British benefit was that they were defending their own territory (they didn't have to spend an hour flying just to get to the battle, this part of flying is pretty exhausting and boring, making the pilots less effective).
Your analogy on pilots is totally unconfounded. You are using a small statement that I said and making unjust assumptions. I never said that he knew everything about every aircraft, just that he isn't learning as much now on the same aircraft that he did when he started. He is going for his two engine license now, which will require a new set of rules and learning curve.
I don't say that training is pointless, but, you do not have the same experiences, or ability to fight an enemy through just purely training. Especially in the 1940's when knowledge of your enemies aircraft and tactics were absolutely ZERO. Sorry for the pun.
Training is to get the pilot to survive their first few minutes of actual combat. Combat experience is to get the pilot to survive the rest of their tour/war.
Possibly some USAAF, RAF and RAAF groups will recieve slignt improvements in experience (55 instead of 50), but, there will be no massive increases.
Hi All.
In the interest of full disclosure here are some stats. I hope that they will influence the assumptions that go into future design elements of either GGPW or, more likely, the future WITP simulation. I will be completely candid here both about game philosophy and then data.
Philosphy
I take it as given that it is desirable that a historical simulation duplicate history to the highest degree possible when the simulation is presented with historic conditions. That is, the same air units with the same experience levels stationed at the sam bases fighting the sam battles as they historically did ought to generate roughly historical results. I do not understand and frankly have no sympathy for the position that one should exaggerate the Axis capabilities in the interest of game balance. To the extent that a game design knowingly includes erroneous assumptions or a weak model, it is neither "historical" nor a "simulation." The best path, in my view, is to make the assumptions and models as accurate as possible and set the victory conditions accordingly.
2. The problem with GGPW, all version is, in my view, that IJN air flotillas armed with Zekes and Betties have an exaggerated capability to inflict damage on opposing P40s and F4Fs with unrealistically low attrition rates. I have stated in the past that fighters vs. fighters the ratio of losses should be roughly 1:1. Others have challenged my assertion, stating either that the Japanese did not suffere 1:1 losses against these Allied planes, or that the 1:1 loss ration represents all Japanese a/c lost vs all Allied fighters lost. Such statements are incorrect. Nevertheless, bear in mind that GGPW in these early encounters does not generate 1:1 or 1:2 or even 1:5 ratios favoring the Japanese in either fighters or in all types of a/c. The loss ratios that I typically encounter are on the order of 20:1 favoring the Japanese. frankly, if the simulation even narrowed it down to 2:1 it would be a vast improvement.
Now, I'd like to thank the previous posters who put up the aircraft performance characteristic data. Hopefully if this forum will be used to improve future games designs there will be more data and less abstract discussion about whether experience or planes should make teh difference in combat. Frankly, I don't really care how the solution is obtained (increasing allied expericne, decreasing IJN experience, changing the plane stats, or just revamping the combat system entirely) so long as it gets fixed.
Does the system need fixing? You decide. Here are the facts as researched by Richard Frank in *Guadalcanal* (1990, Penguin Books). These are based on both US and IJN air unit records kept by bean counters on the ground, not on pilots claimed kills. So unless you read and write Japanese and have inspected the military records that Frank inspected, claims that his research is erroneous are rejected a priori. Here are the data:
From August 7 1942 through January 1943 land based (not carrier) aircraft lost in combat (not non-combat losses) at Guadalcanal and its surrounds (up approximately to Rendova.. the air units were stationed at Henderson and, mostly for the Japanese, Rabaul) were as follows (Frank 1990:645-646).
US: F4F-70, SBD-24, TBF-2, P400/P39-13, B17-7, PBY-7.
IJN (25th Air Flotilla): Zero-72, Val-11, Betty-95, Flying boats-12, Irving-1.
My trusty calculato makes the loss ratios as follows: all US vs all Japanese- 123:191 or 1.6:1 favoring the Allies. Of course, many of the US and Japanese bombers were lost attacking ground targets or ships, and besides which no one disputes that fighters shoot down bombers and patrol craft when they get at them. So expressed in terms of all US fighters vs all Japanese fighters the combat loss ratio is 1.2:1 favoring the Japanese. Now, we *could* stop there, but reading through frank's book I see no confirmed P39/400 kills vs Zekes. I may be wrong of course so read through it yourself if you like. The P400 was a particularly miserable a/c because of its complete lack of high-altitude capability. So, it is reasonable, in my opinion, to back out the P39/400s. The resulting combat loss ratio is exactly 1:1 for F4Fs vs. A6M2s (long range variant).
What were the respective training levels of the units? Of course, "training" is quantified in GGPW as a 1-100 number but it's not clear how one selects the number that an air unit ought to be assigned in the GGPW order of battle. Frank's summary emphasizes two interesting facts. First, the fighter units stationed at Guadalcanal were fairly typical for the time,. MAG 23 (VMF223 and VMF224) for example was comprised of pilots recently out of flight school and veterans reassigned from Midway, and the air groups were formed on May 1, 1942 (see p.139). The 25th air flotlla was an elite IJNAF unit. Of 24 Zekes available on 7 August, the pilots included Saburo Sakai, Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, and Toshio Ota... three of Japan's very best pilots.
Conclusion: Commonplace ordinary USMC and USN pilots relatively fresh out of flight school with a few veterens distributed in their ranks flying mostly F4Fs fought the top ranked Japanese aces and their highly trained elite IJNA opposition to a dead draw flying A6M2s.
Therefore, to the extent that GGPW does not produce similar results under similar circumstances, the air-air combat simulation in GGPW is flawed. Either the game designers need to adjust the relative experience ratings of the USN/USMC and IJNAF units to markedly decrease the differential, or the combat system needs to be revamped, or the basic assumptions about the performance of the aircraft need to be changed.
If I can find comparable high quality publications regarding the performance of P40s vs. Zekes and other highly maneuverable a/c I will try to post updates... if, that is, anyone wants to know.
Best to all.
In the interest of full disclosure here are some stats. I hope that they will influence the assumptions that go into future design elements of either GGPW or, more likely, the future WITP simulation. I will be completely candid here both about game philosophy and then data.
Philosphy
I take it as given that it is desirable that a historical simulation duplicate history to the highest degree possible when the simulation is presented with historic conditions. That is, the same air units with the same experience levels stationed at the sam bases fighting the sam battles as they historically did ought to generate roughly historical results. I do not understand and frankly have no sympathy for the position that one should exaggerate the Axis capabilities in the interest of game balance. To the extent that a game design knowingly includes erroneous assumptions or a weak model, it is neither "historical" nor a "simulation." The best path, in my view, is to make the assumptions and models as accurate as possible and set the victory conditions accordingly.
2. The problem with GGPW, all version is, in my view, that IJN air flotillas armed with Zekes and Betties have an exaggerated capability to inflict damage on opposing P40s and F4Fs with unrealistically low attrition rates. I have stated in the past that fighters vs. fighters the ratio of losses should be roughly 1:1. Others have challenged my assertion, stating either that the Japanese did not suffere 1:1 losses against these Allied planes, or that the 1:1 loss ration represents all Japanese a/c lost vs all Allied fighters lost. Such statements are incorrect. Nevertheless, bear in mind that GGPW in these early encounters does not generate 1:1 or 1:2 or even 1:5 ratios favoring the Japanese in either fighters or in all types of a/c. The loss ratios that I typically encounter are on the order of 20:1 favoring the Japanese. frankly, if the simulation even narrowed it down to 2:1 it would be a vast improvement.
Now, I'd like to thank the previous posters who put up the aircraft performance characteristic data. Hopefully if this forum will be used to improve future games designs there will be more data and less abstract discussion about whether experience or planes should make teh difference in combat. Frankly, I don't really care how the solution is obtained (increasing allied expericne, decreasing IJN experience, changing the plane stats, or just revamping the combat system entirely) so long as it gets fixed.
Does the system need fixing? You decide. Here are the facts as researched by Richard Frank in *Guadalcanal* (1990, Penguin Books). These are based on both US and IJN air unit records kept by bean counters on the ground, not on pilots claimed kills. So unless you read and write Japanese and have inspected the military records that Frank inspected, claims that his research is erroneous are rejected a priori. Here are the data:
From August 7 1942 through January 1943 land based (not carrier) aircraft lost in combat (not non-combat losses) at Guadalcanal and its surrounds (up approximately to Rendova.. the air units were stationed at Henderson and, mostly for the Japanese, Rabaul) were as follows (Frank 1990:645-646).
US: F4F-70, SBD-24, TBF-2, P400/P39-13, B17-7, PBY-7.
IJN (25th Air Flotilla): Zero-72, Val-11, Betty-95, Flying boats-12, Irving-1.
My trusty calculato makes the loss ratios as follows: all US vs all Japanese- 123:191 or 1.6:1 favoring the Allies. Of course, many of the US and Japanese bombers were lost attacking ground targets or ships, and besides which no one disputes that fighters shoot down bombers and patrol craft when they get at them. So expressed in terms of all US fighters vs all Japanese fighters the combat loss ratio is 1.2:1 favoring the Japanese. Now, we *could* stop there, but reading through frank's book I see no confirmed P39/400 kills vs Zekes. I may be wrong of course so read through it yourself if you like. The P400 was a particularly miserable a/c because of its complete lack of high-altitude capability. So, it is reasonable, in my opinion, to back out the P39/400s. The resulting combat loss ratio is exactly 1:1 for F4Fs vs. A6M2s (long range variant).
What were the respective training levels of the units? Of course, "training" is quantified in GGPW as a 1-100 number but it's not clear how one selects the number that an air unit ought to be assigned in the GGPW order of battle. Frank's summary emphasizes two interesting facts. First, the fighter units stationed at Guadalcanal were fairly typical for the time,. MAG 23 (VMF223 and VMF224) for example was comprised of pilots recently out of flight school and veterans reassigned from Midway, and the air groups were formed on May 1, 1942 (see p.139). The 25th air flotlla was an elite IJNAF unit. Of 24 Zekes available on 7 August, the pilots included Saburo Sakai, Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, and Toshio Ota... three of Japan's very best pilots.
Conclusion: Commonplace ordinary USMC and USN pilots relatively fresh out of flight school with a few veterens distributed in their ranks flying mostly F4Fs fought the top ranked Japanese aces and their highly trained elite IJNA opposition to a dead draw flying A6M2s.
Therefore, to the extent that GGPW does not produce similar results under similar circumstances, the air-air combat simulation in GGPW is flawed. Either the game designers need to adjust the relative experience ratings of the USN/USMC and IJNAF units to markedly decrease the differential, or the combat system needs to be revamped, or the basic assumptions about the performance of the aircraft need to be changed.
If I can find comparable high quality publications regarding the performance of P40s vs. Zekes and other highly maneuverable a/c I will try to post updates... if, that is, anyone wants to know.
Best to all.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
[quote]Originally posted by mdiehl:
Yes the Japanese destroyed thousands of Allied a/c early in the war. Yes, while doing so, they lost thousands of a/c. [QUOTE]
Not So -read further
[QUOTE]
Allied kill ratios in FIGHTERS from August 1942 through January 1943 over the canal were 1:1. That's primarily Zekes vs F4Fs and P40s, with some P39s (and, heaven help their pilots, some P400s) thrown in.
Yes the Japanese destroyed thousands of Allied a/c early in the war. Yes, while doing so, they lost thousands of a/c. [QUOTE]
Not So -read further
[QUOTE]
Allied kill ratios in FIGHTERS from August 1942 through January 1943 over the canal were 1:1. That's primarily Zekes vs F4Fs and P40s, with some P39s (and, heaven help their pilots, some P400s) thrown in.
Wow - what a wonderful topic!
Those advocating massive Japanese superiority in Fighter-to-Fighter combat in the first year of the Pacific War should read:
Bloody Shambles, Volume I (Shores/Cull/Izawa) ISBN 0 948817 50 X
Bloody Shambles, Volume II (Shores/Cull/Izawa) ISBN 0 948817 67 4
The First Team (Lundstrom) ISBN 0-87021-189-7
The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign (Lundstrom) ISBN 1-55750-526-8
Together these books constitute a very detailed history of air operations in Malaya/ABDA/Burma and by U.S. Navy Carrier Fighter Squadrons in the first year of the war. The data is so detailed it would take weeks to extract fighter-to-fighter loss rates.
But allied fighters could and did frequently defeat first line Japanese fighters, including Zeros. Even Buffaloes shot down zeros. A loss rate of maybe 1.5-1 in favor of the Japanese would probably be historically correct.
However, I believe that PacWar and War In The Pacific should not use special offsets for air combat (or any other type of combat). The game engine should merely run the values of the opposing unit (with the appropriate amount of luck factored in). If Zeros meet P-40s in December, 1941, the combat should be resolved based on the game values for the aircraft and pilots involved. No special consideration for one side of the other.
I am sorry, but, I don't believe your figures about the losses in the first 6 months.
In just the first week the allies lost 500 aircraft (180 at Pearl Harbor alone). During the entire first 6 months both the IJNAF and IJAAF lost just 300 aircraft. Not thousands.
The Japanese kill ratio in the early part of PacWar is realistic.
Never argue in absolutes, because if it ever happens, even just once, your argument is thrown out.
If the P-40 pilot tried to dogfight the DIII, then Richtofen COULD have won. A P-40 COULD lose to a DIII. Many of the Polish aircraft at the start of WWII were totally obsolete, and put up quite a defence against the Luftwaffe (with one of the best trained, and best equipped airforces in Europe) and inflicted around 200 air kills. According to your logic, this didn't happen.
The Ki-27 could out turn a P-51 (but the P-51 was about twice as fast). A very competent pilot in an obsolete aircraft can exploit what strengths their plane has over the weaknesses of even the most advanced aircraft flown by an average-mediocre pilot. Biplanes can easily out turn monoplanes. If the P-40 pilot used the wrong tactics against ANY biplane it would be toast. However, a P-51 should have a higher manuverability than a Ki-27, because the difference in speed is VERY noticable. (unlike the difference between the A6M and P-40)
Just like the argument of losses in the Coral Sea, and Midway, just using numbers cannot measure pilot or aircraft quality. You forget that strategic tactics can have a great affect. The Germans were stopped outside of Moscow and suffered severe losses, does this mean that the Russians were of equal quality? No, they just had a better strategic plan, and were aided by other factors (German supply, extremely cold Russian winter, poor implementation of strategic goals, etc..). Tactically the Germans defeated the Russians at every corner, strategically they screwed up.
Historically, the Japanese system of supply and replacement was abominal. They did not have the same effective system of supply to keep their forces at 100% activation like the US. Numerically they appear to be equal, but, the IJNAF was thrown piecemiel against the USNAF and USAAF because of lack of supplies to repair and launch all of their aircraft to gain air superiority.
REMEMBER, Guadalcanal spanned MANY months where neither side clearly had the upper hand. Air superiority was only gained by America in the last stages of the battle (early 1943). During the first few months, however, the Japanese controlled the skies (until logistics and attrition took its toll).
The reason why USAAF, and USNAF experience is lower than the Japanese, is, that the US were using tactics ill suited for their aircraft, while the Japanese tactics were well suited for theirs. This was fixed through trial and error, experience gained through loss. PacWar models this. Giving the P-40 pilots good experience at the beginning of the game is like stating that they have preemptive knowledge and know how to use their aircraft to the fullest, which they didn't. Chennault never fought the A6M, just the Ki-43, and even these just in small numbers (most of his opponents were Ki-27's). His tactics were not take up overnight by all US pilots.
The reason why the P-40 is not better in manuver than the A6M is, because the P-40 can outrun a A6M doesn't mean that it can outfight it in every scenario. Manuverability focus' mainly on turning radius along with a slighter use of speed. Since the A6M drastically outstripps the P-40 in manuverability, and the P-40 is only barely faster than the A6M it makes no sense to close the gap between the two aircraft.
If the Japanese only had 1500 pilots for their IJNAF, and did not have either an equipment or pilot qualitative edge over the Americans, then how could they ever have inflicted the damage they did, or survive as long as they did? It makes no sense to say that the Japanese and Americans were on an even footing on day one, otherwize the war should have been over by late 1942.
Conclusion: There are more factors in play than just aircraft type and numbers and pilot experience as reasons for losses in historical battles.
Therefore: Aircraft manuverability, and air groups will not be changed.
In just the first week the allies lost 500 aircraft (180 at Pearl Harbor alone). During the entire first 6 months both the IJNAF and IJAAF lost just 300 aircraft. Not thousands.
The Japanese kill ratio in the early part of PacWar is realistic.
Never argue in absolutes, because if it ever happens, even just once, your argument is thrown out.
If the P-40 pilot tried to dogfight the DIII, then Richtofen COULD have won. A P-40 COULD lose to a DIII. Many of the Polish aircraft at the start of WWII were totally obsolete, and put up quite a defence against the Luftwaffe (with one of the best trained, and best equipped airforces in Europe) and inflicted around 200 air kills. According to your logic, this didn't happen.
The Ki-27 could out turn a P-51 (but the P-51 was about twice as fast). A very competent pilot in an obsolete aircraft can exploit what strengths their plane has over the weaknesses of even the most advanced aircraft flown by an average-mediocre pilot. Biplanes can easily out turn monoplanes. If the P-40 pilot used the wrong tactics against ANY biplane it would be toast. However, a P-51 should have a higher manuverability than a Ki-27, because the difference in speed is VERY noticable. (unlike the difference between the A6M and P-40)
Just like the argument of losses in the Coral Sea, and Midway, just using numbers cannot measure pilot or aircraft quality. You forget that strategic tactics can have a great affect. The Germans were stopped outside of Moscow and suffered severe losses, does this mean that the Russians were of equal quality? No, they just had a better strategic plan, and were aided by other factors (German supply, extremely cold Russian winter, poor implementation of strategic goals, etc..). Tactically the Germans defeated the Russians at every corner, strategically they screwed up.
Historically, the Japanese system of supply and replacement was abominal. They did not have the same effective system of supply to keep their forces at 100% activation like the US. Numerically they appear to be equal, but, the IJNAF was thrown piecemiel against the USNAF and USAAF because of lack of supplies to repair and launch all of their aircraft to gain air superiority.
REMEMBER, Guadalcanal spanned MANY months where neither side clearly had the upper hand. Air superiority was only gained by America in the last stages of the battle (early 1943). During the first few months, however, the Japanese controlled the skies (until logistics and attrition took its toll).
The reason why USAAF, and USNAF experience is lower than the Japanese, is, that the US were using tactics ill suited for their aircraft, while the Japanese tactics were well suited for theirs. This was fixed through trial and error, experience gained through loss. PacWar models this. Giving the P-40 pilots good experience at the beginning of the game is like stating that they have preemptive knowledge and know how to use their aircraft to the fullest, which they didn't. Chennault never fought the A6M, just the Ki-43, and even these just in small numbers (most of his opponents were Ki-27's). His tactics were not take up overnight by all US pilots.
The reason why the P-40 is not better in manuver than the A6M is, because the P-40 can outrun a A6M doesn't mean that it can outfight it in every scenario. Manuverability focus' mainly on turning radius along with a slighter use of speed. Since the A6M drastically outstripps the P-40 in manuverability, and the P-40 is only barely faster than the A6M it makes no sense to close the gap between the two aircraft.
If the Japanese only had 1500 pilots for their IJNAF, and did not have either an equipment or pilot qualitative edge over the Americans, then how could they ever have inflicted the damage they did, or survive as long as they did? It makes no sense to say that the Japanese and Americans were on an even footing on day one, otherwize the war should have been over by late 1942.
Conclusion: There are more factors in play than just aircraft type and numbers and pilot experience as reasons for losses in historical battles.
Therefore: Aircraft manuverability, and air groups will not be changed.
I truely believe that the Japanese did not just have to walk across the Pacific to take it. As I said earlier, 300 aircraft were lost. Many British, American, Australian, New Zealand, and even Dutch pilots were able to score kills on Japanese aircraft, even the venerable fighter aircraft.
Yet, they were still outfought. Sometimes the Allies caught the japanese with their pants down and scored some good kills (Allied action from P2 airfield on Sumatra caused the IJAAF a lot of grief!). But, they lacked the ability to successfuly defend their bases.
Not every IJNAF A6M group is at 80+ experience, and most IJAAF groups are just at 70 experience (whittled down to 60 when replacements fill out the groups). Not every allied airgroup has 40 experience either.
Yet, they were still outfought. Sometimes the Allies caught the japanese with their pants down and scored some good kills (Allied action from P2 airfield on Sumatra caused the IJAAF a lot of grief!). But, they lacked the ability to successfuly defend their bases.
Not every IJNAF A6M group is at 80+ experience, and most IJAAF groups are just at 70 experience (whittled down to 60 when replacements fill out the groups). Not every allied airgroup has 40 experience either.
Conclusion: Commonplace ordinary USMC and USN pilots relatively fresh out of flight school with a few veterens distributed in their ranks flying mostly F4Fs fought the top ranked Japanese aces and their highly trained elite IJNA opposition to a dead draw flying A6M2s.
gotta disagree with such a broadband and biased conclusion (no offense) Maj. Tom presented the arguments nicely so i wont repeat and i'm trying to stay out of this thread as much as possible.
I'll put it this way...how can a wargame profess to be 'accurate' if, contrary to established wargaming procedures such as comparing unit(squadron) experience with equipment data, it 'overrides' or modifies that combat routine in favor of one side over the other? (i.e. US airgroups, regardless of exp and plane type should NEVER suffer worse than 1:1 plane losses in fighter vs fighter combat)
What if, in SP:WAW this was an established 'national characteristic' of German Panzer forces, that they always be able to destroy at least their own number of tanks for every unit they lose? would accusastions of bias towards German equipment/units be thrown down?
yep. Because such a topic has come up in the past.
Leave the aircraft ratings as they are. As others have said, not all IJN airgroups were 'elite' and not all USN/MC units were wet behind the ears barely able to shift a flight stick.
I hope that nodoby has taken this discussion personally, it was never ment to be so.
Remember, everyone has an editor so you can make the changes that you feel to be necessary. However, I, and others in the Matrix team do not feel that Japanese and American pilot experience and aircraft statistics have compromised the game. The US can still relatively easily win the game, as long as this occurs, why fuddle with the statistics.
None of us will ever get to the 'truth' of the matter. We all argue points that are true, but, none of us has gotten the entire truth, and none of us ever will.
Remember, everyone has an editor so you can make the changes that you feel to be necessary. However, I, and others in the Matrix team do not feel that Japanese and American pilot experience and aircraft statistics have compromised the game. The US can still relatively easily win the game, as long as this occurs, why fuddle with the statistics.
None of us will ever get to the 'truth' of the matter. We all argue points that are true, but, none of us has gotten the entire truth, and none of us ever will.
Well Nik, we gotta agree to disagree. For the 'Canal the facts are what they are. If in your version of history 1:1 combat ratio of F4s vs A6M2s constitutes evidence of IJN superiority, well, I can't imagine any kind of evidence that would change your mind.
A large proportion of those "thousands" (actually hundreds) of Allied a/c destroyed in the early war IJN raids were parked when they were destroyed, and of those destroyed in a/a combat many were not the types that I have been discussing. Of course the Allies lost droves of F2As in Singapore and Burma. The plane was slow, undergunned, and underarmored. Of course the Allies lost lots of bombers, and P39s, and "retired" (from the BoB) hurricanes, and P36s &c. My discussion is of P40s F4Fs and A6M2s. Of course, if someone else wants to research the operational loss stats for F2As, Vindicators and the like, I am sure the data will be interesting.
MT. Of course you are right there were no P40s at Guadalacanal. My previous post was solely directed at the claim of overwhelming a/c superiority of A6M2s vs F4F and overwhelming Japanese pilot superiority. The evidence would indicate that one or both of those claims is wrong. As I said I recall somewhere that the kill ratios for P40s in a/a combat were similar. That is why I concluded in my last msg that I'll post P40 operational loss ratios vs A6M2s when I can find them.
A large proportion of those "thousands" (actually hundreds) of Allied a/c destroyed in the early war IJN raids were parked when they were destroyed, and of those destroyed in a/a combat many were not the types that I have been discussing. Of course the Allies lost droves of F2As in Singapore and Burma. The plane was slow, undergunned, and underarmored. Of course the Allies lost lots of bombers, and P39s, and "retired" (from the BoB) hurricanes, and P36s &c. My discussion is of P40s F4Fs and A6M2s. Of course, if someone else wants to research the operational loss stats for F2As, Vindicators and the like, I am sure the data will be interesting.
MT. Of course you are right there were no P40s at Guadalacanal. My previous post was solely directed at the claim of overwhelming a/c superiority of A6M2s vs F4F and overwhelming Japanese pilot superiority. The evidence would indicate that one or both of those claims is wrong. As I said I recall somewhere that the kill ratios for P40s in a/a combat were similar. That is why I concluded in my last msg that I'll post P40 operational loss ratios vs A6M2s when I can find them.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
nothing wrong with that. I'd only conclude by mentioning that the figures your throwing around are from US sources only. Figures of kills and kill ratios between combatatives often contradict each other and in some cases are hotly disputed.
another tidbit i'd mention was that if the P-40 and F4F were so great, why the rush to replace them with better aircraft? why not have massed produced them to death since, by your assumptions an "average" USN pilot can whip an "elite" IJN pilot, something i will disagree with.
but enough with beating a dead horse. Anybody have a chance to try the new MS simmulator on the Pacific yet? We could all settle this in the skies
another tidbit i'd mention was that if the P-40 and F4F were so great, why the rush to replace them with better aircraft? why not have massed produced them to death since, by your assumptions an "average" USN pilot can whip an "elite" IJN pilot, something i will disagree with.
but enough with beating a dead horse. Anybody have a chance to try the new MS simmulator on the Pacific yet? We could all settle this in the skies
-
Doug Olenick
- Posts: 88
- Joined: Tue Sep 26, 2000 8:00 am
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MDiehl,
I have to disagree with your F-16 vs. F4 Phantom theory. First, a Navy pilot would not be on the stick of an F-16--it's a USAF bird. Second, while the Falcon is much more manueverable than a Phantom, the two are closely matched in speed, with the Phantom having an edge. Weapon systems are similar although the F-16's are much more modern. In a staight up dogfight the decision will come down to pilot skill. However, the F-16 would have a good chance of zapping a Phantom from long range with an AMRAAM.
There are numerous cases, some pointed out in this thread, of obsolete planes putting up great a fight against first tier fighters.
During the early Malta battles the Brits held off massive Italian and German air attacks with three biplane fighters, Hawker Furies I think. These managed to shoot down several time their number.
US units flying P-39s managed to holld their own around Port Moresby in early 1942.
If a pilot is a novice he, or now she as well, is at a great disadvantage in a dogfight.
I have to disagree with your F-16 vs. F4 Phantom theory. First, a Navy pilot would not be on the stick of an F-16--it's a USAF bird. Second, while the Falcon is much more manueverable than a Phantom, the two are closely matched in speed, with the Phantom having an edge. Weapon systems are similar although the F-16's are much more modern. In a staight up dogfight the decision will come down to pilot skill. However, the F-16 would have a good chance of zapping a Phantom from long range with an AMRAAM.
There are numerous cases, some pointed out in this thread, of obsolete planes putting up great a fight against first tier fighters.
During the early Malta battles the Brits held off massive Italian and German air attacks with three biplane fighters, Hawker Furies I think. These managed to shoot down several time their number.
US units flying P-39s managed to holld their own around Port Moresby in early 1942.
If a pilot is a novice he, or now she as well, is at a great disadvantage in a dogfight.
To reply to Don Bowen,
My purpose is not to advocate Japanese air superiority on a grand scale. Each flight of Japanese or Allied aircraft had odds either in thier favor or against them. Most of the time it was one of three things that decided the outcome MORE than the type of aircraft flying or pilot skill.
1)Altitude- the rule for air combat... have it, dont waste it and likely live to fight another day.
2)Attitude- the relative facing (o'clock) of planes beginning a battle. (ie; behind and above the victim)
3)Maintenance- the best fighting squadrons generally had the best of supplies available and ground crewmen working 24hrs on the planes. This is why the US was able to salvage many fighters that were severely damaged. Japanese supply was not even close.
I will even go so far as to say that the US pilots were more capable than thier Japanese counterparts in the early part of the War. The Thatch Weave and other skills taught to new pilots were created in a span of a year or so after front line fighter pilots learned quick from seeing Japanese tactics for the first time themselves. This was used with F4F's and allowed them to protect themselves and the bombers for a longer period allowing many victories that would not have occurred using prior tactics. This does not translate into skill though because if they didnt have the prerequisites listed above going into battle- then your enemy did...
Actually I really think the advantage ranged in scale from absolute Japanese superiority to complete Allied superiority on a fight by fight basis. The number of planes involved, the starting altitude, attitude and condition of the plane played a big part in the outcome of a particular fight as much as pilot skill...
Thats why I am hoping Matrix does an Air War game covering the Pacific (and hopefully the world conflict) all of these items could be sucessfully modeled and fought out in a gaming atmosphere suited for this type of posting. Not a strategic multi-level game like PacWar.
My purpose is not to advocate Japanese air superiority on a grand scale. Each flight of Japanese or Allied aircraft had odds either in thier favor or against them. Most of the time it was one of three things that decided the outcome MORE than the type of aircraft flying or pilot skill.
1)Altitude- the rule for air combat... have it, dont waste it and likely live to fight another day.
2)Attitude- the relative facing (o'clock) of planes beginning a battle. (ie; behind and above the victim)
3)Maintenance- the best fighting squadrons generally had the best of supplies available and ground crewmen working 24hrs on the planes. This is why the US was able to salvage many fighters that were severely damaged. Japanese supply was not even close.
I will even go so far as to say that the US pilots were more capable than thier Japanese counterparts in the early part of the War. The Thatch Weave and other skills taught to new pilots were created in a span of a year or so after front line fighter pilots learned quick from seeing Japanese tactics for the first time themselves. This was used with F4F's and allowed them to protect themselves and the bombers for a longer period allowing many victories that would not have occurred using prior tactics. This does not translate into skill though because if they didnt have the prerequisites listed above going into battle- then your enemy did...
Actually I really think the advantage ranged in scale from absolute Japanese superiority to complete Allied superiority on a fight by fight basis. The number of planes involved, the starting altitude, attitude and condition of the plane played a big part in the outcome of a particular fight as much as pilot skill...
Thats why I am hoping Matrix does an Air War game covering the Pacific (and hopefully the world conflict) all of these items could be sucessfully modeled and fought out in a gaming atmosphere suited for this type of posting. Not a strategic multi-level game like PacWar.
Nikademus. The figures that I quote are from Frank's (1990) book on Guadalcanal. His sources were not "US Sources only." According to the introduction, appendices, bilbliography, and notes, the Japanese loss records that Frank provides come from and ONLY from operational histories published by members of the Japanese general staff in the 1960s, and original unit records written in Japanese by the logistics personnel attached to the 25th Air Flotilla and the 11th Air Fleet (to which the 25th was subordinate) from August 1942 through January 1943. The American loss records come from logistical records of the combat units assigned to Guadalcanal. I do not see how the data on Japanese a/c losses could be any better.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?