Douglas MacArthur Discussion

[bradfordkay]

"The Phillipine Scouts constituted the Phillipine Army until 1941."

This is a misleading statement. The Phillipine Scouts were the heart of the PA, but they did not even constitute the majority of the army MacArthur claimed to have. In 1935, MacArthur was sent to the PI as "military advisor" to President Quezon. He was authorized to conscript and train a large new army as well as prepare the country's defenses. MacArthur resigned his commission in the US Army on Dec 31, 1937 and was then named commander in chief of the PA.

He was supposed to train about 150,000 men per year starting in 1936 but the actual numbers dropped every year. Apparently, only a tiny portion of those conscripts even finished their training. According to Alan Schom, The Eagle and the Rising Sun, the Phillipine Army consisted of 468 officers and 3697 men, though MacArthur reported to the Phillinpine government that it had 6000 officers and 135,000 enlisted men.

This is where I speak of his defrauding the Phillipine and US gov'ts. If he had actually taken his commission (to build a Phillipine Army capable of defending the country) to heart, he would have had at least a couple of hundred thousand effective men instead of a few thousand. If he had factually reported the state of the Phillipine Army then Washington would never have authorized his proposed change from the Bataan bastion defense.

The problem with the truth of your statement is that it is MacArthur's fault that it proved to be true. The multiple PA divisions were an undisciplined mob, with only Mac to blame. He had siz years before the balloon went up to create an army and failed miserably. He then compounded his mistakes by thinking that he had a real army and using a strategy that was untenable in reality, condemning his troops to a cruel siege with extremely short rations...

[String]

ORIGINAL: Sarge


Which we know is BS, Gen Washington proves that wrong and indeed was one the greatest commanders [:)]

ORIGINAL: Sarge
We differ in opinion




PS: No one is stating ‘greatest

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

"The Phillipine Scouts constituted the Phillipine Army until 1941."

This is a misleading statement. The Phillipine Scouts were the heart of the PA, but they did not even constitute the majority of the army MacArthur claimed to have. In 1935, MacArthur was sent to the PI as "military advisor" to President Quezon. He was authorized to conscript and train a large new army as well as prepare the country's defenses. MacArthur resigned his commission in the US Army on Dec 31, 1937 and was then named commander in chief of the PA.

He was supposed to train about 150,000 men per year starting in 1936 but the actual numbers dropped every year. Apparently, only a tiny portion of those conscripts even finished their training. According to Alan Schom, The Eagle and the Rising Sun, the Phillipine Army consisted of 468 officers and 3697 men, though MacArthur reported to the Phillinpine government that it had 6000 officers and 135,000 enlisted men.

Assuming he was given the funds for the program. Just because you legislate something, doesn't mean its been funded. 150k per year is a fantasy. This source shows a training program of 40k a year beginning in 1937. Doubtful even those numbers were ever reached.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_1.htm#p8

According to the source above, the PA was supposed to be approx. 10k strong with 400k reserves by 1946. Schom's figure doesn't have a date to it, but it is probably reporting the full-time PA army, not the reserves. Either that or MacArthur managed to mobilize 10 divisions w/ only 4k in manpower. As far as numbers MacArthur reported to the Phillipine government, they sound about right on paper (assuming the date is 1941, no date is given). Whether they mobilized in that number is another matter.

This is where I speak of his defrauding the Phillipine and US gov'ts. If he had actually taken his commission (to build a Phillipine Army capable of defending the country) to heart, he would have had at least a couple of hundred thousand effective men instead of a few thousand. If he had factually reported the state of the Phillipine Army then Washington would never have authorized his proposed change from the Bataan bastion defense.

A 'couple of hundred thousand effective men'? Effective, to me, means trained and equipped. MacArthur either lied about the state of their training to Washington or was delusional concerning it. Probably both. Granted, their training was insufficient, but were the means and the funds available? MacArthur's misrepresentations aside, how realistic was it for the Phillipines to have trained men (even when they're reservists) and equipment in a number approaching the size of the US Army by 1941? The only source of equipment for the PA was the US. If the US Army didn't have 200k-300k equipped men in 1941, the PA sure wasn't going to have them. A fact known to Washington and one which they were trying to remedy.

The problem with the truth of your statement is that it is MacArthur's fault that it proved to be true. The multiple PA divisions were an undisciplined mob, with only Mac to blame. He had siz years before the balloon went up to create an army and failed miserably.

True, with mitigating circumstances listed above. With regards to failing to create an army that could deal with the IJA, the PA performed no worse than its peers, the British Army in Malaya and Burma and the Dutch Army in the East Indies.

He then compounded his mistakes by thinking that he had a real army and using a strategy that was untenable in reality, condemning his troops to a cruel siege with extremely short rations...

I agree. I essentially stated that back on #24.

[bradfordkay]

I don't think that we are in disagreement, for the most part. It is true that funding for the PA was reduced as the war approached (Quezon was afraid of upsetting the Japanese), but the training that the conscripts received was far below any reasonable standards. Instead of arguing against the cutbacks and doing the best with what he had, MacArthur spent his time socializing in Manila (and accepting a hefty payment from the PI gov't).

400,000 reserves by 1946 does seem to agree with my comment about a couple of hundred thousand "effective" troops (okay, so maybe "trained" would be a better description, since their equipment was substandard) by 1942, given the annual numbers that your source quotes...

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

I don't think that we are in disagreement, for the most part.

Ditto, enjoyed the discussion. [:'(]

[skyhawk1]

I once saw an excellent TV Programme called "AMERICAN CAESAR" - MacArthur was the subject and it was reasonably 'warts & all'.
 
My Grandfather fought in New Guinea - he crossed the Kokoda Track 3 times on foot after being wounded once and dropped by malaria once - he went on to fight in the Buno - Gona Campaign and landed in Balikpapan.   He was 7th Division 2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) and had fought in North Africa, Syria Jeruselum and various other AO's for 2 years before being sent to New Guinea to relieve the untrained, ill-equipped Militia (who were the first people who actually stopped the Jap -- ANYWHERE!).   When The 2nd AIF relieved the Militia they then fought all the way across the New Guinea Highlands (via an airborne assault on Nadzab) to the North/East Coast (Buna, Gona etc) where they saw a piece of Generalship that astounded them.
 
MacArthur INSISTED that US Army units be involved in certain parts of the battle despite the fact that they were, TOTALLY untrained (many had NEVER fired their rifles), totally under-equipped (they had to borrow weapons from the Aussies- which is a real turn-up) and their Commanders refused (r) refused to heed advice given by the vastly experienced Australian Commanders.........the end result was a very costly (and embarassing debacle) that only came good with "Allied" help.
 
The Aussies were really pissed off when ordered (with the full agreement of Tubby Blamey) to land at Balikpapan - it was unnecessary as it had already been totally isolated and had absolutely NO STRATEGIC VALUE WHATSOEVER!   They were also pissed off to have been denied the chance to participate in the Philipines Campaign - seeong as they were fighting anyway they would have preferred to fight where it really mattered.
 
I can't speak for all Australians but I CAN speak for my Grandfather and EVERY other Aussie Digger who served under MacArthur that I know and they ALL HATED HIM as a Glory-hunting, egotistical, xenophobic, narsocist!!!
 
btw......Blamey was also disliked with a passion by those same troops - he was seen as MacArtur's lackey.   There were other reasons also but they are outside the scope of this 'discussion'.
 
The Military are the SERVANTS of the Civilian Government and that is as it should be.   Speaking out against those in authority is OK, even commendable, BUT there comes a time for "YES SIR!" and MacArthur obviously wasn't capable of seeing that.   If you doubt that then just look at EVERY country that;s ruled by their Military and you'll see what I mean.   Burma's Military Junta's absolute refusal to allow humanitarian Aid into the country recently illustrates the point elaquently I believe.
 
nb ... no one will ever convince me that INCHON wasn't the luckiest military action ever but I suppose a lucky General beats a good General sometimes eh?
 

[Capt. Harlock]

ORIGINAL: skyhawk1

no one will ever convince me that INCHON wasn't the luckiest military action ever but I suppose a lucky General beats a good General sometimes eh?

Good point there. From what I've read, the Navy people were well aware that they'd been lucky, and refused any further major amphibious ops during the Korean war. (They reasoned the North Koreans would be more prepared in the future.)

[SuluSea]

I'm a fan of MacAuthur but have always wonder'd why U.S. Airpower in the P.I. was destroyed on the ground after having the information that Pearl was  attacked. Can anyone shed any light on this for me.

[Big B]

They were largely destroyed on the ground on Dec 8th(Manila time) because they flew morning CAP, and recon to bomb Formosa. Formosa was clouded in at the time so no air attack was ordered for the morning, but the B-17's were arming up for airfield attack later that day. Meanwhile, the Fighters landed from morning CAP to re-fuel and re-arm - just at the time when the Japs from Formosa arrived. They were pretty much caught out of position and helpless.

If you had an Ouija board, they would have known that the Japs were arriving and that was the wrong time to be on the ground, but USAFFE was caught unprepared and the rest is history.

ORIGINAL: SuluSea

I'm a fan of MacAuthur but have always wonder'd why U.S. Airpower in the P.I. was destroyed on the ground after having the information that Pearl was attacked. Can anyone shed any light on this for me.

[HansBolter]

ORIGINAL: Big B

They were largely destroyed on the ground on Dec 8th(Manila time) because they flew morning CAP, and recon to bomb Formosa. Formosa was clouded in at the time so no air attack was ordered for the morning, but the B-17's were arming up for airfield attack later that day. Meanwhile, the Fighters landed from morning CAP to re-fuel and re-arm - just at the time when the Japs from Formosa arrived. They were pretty much caught out of position and helpless.

If you had an Ouija board, they would have known that the Japs were arriving and that was the wrong time to be on the ground, but USAFFE was caught unprepared and the rest is history.

ORIGINAL: SuluSea

I'm a fan of MacAuthur but have always wonder'd why U.S. Airpower in the P.I. was destroyed on the ground after having the information that Pearl was attacked. Can anyone shed any light on this for me.

Yes, but that's not the full story. His air commander pleaded with his chief of staff to be allowed to launch a bombing raid on Formosa and was stonewalled by the chief of staff who never let him talk to Mac. The COS was auspiciously keeping Mac sequestered from his subordinates because MAC was hiding in his office suffereing a near emotional breakdown. It was only after he recomposed himself and reemerged from hiding that orders went out for action that inevitably came too late. That delay in taking decisive action will forever damn him.

Wasn't it Arliegh Burke who said the difference between a good and bad commander is about 10 seconds? Mac wasted far more than 10 seconds before he took action.

[SuluSea]

Thanks guys, any recommended reading on The General that deals almost entirely on WW2 in the Pacific?

[darken92]

ORIGINAL: skyhawk1
I can't speak for all Australians but I CAN speak for my Grandfather and EVERY other Aussie Digger who served under MacArthur that I know and they ALL HATED HIM as a Glory-hunting, egotistical, xenophobic, narsocist!!!

btw......Blamey was also disliked with a passion by those same troops - he was seen as MacArtur's lackey.   There were other reasons also but they are outside the scope of this 'discussion'.

As an Australian I have to agree with these statements. A lot of our men died because of McArthur and Blamey. They were more politician then Generals. I could never think well of either for what they did.

Of course that is not to say others could do better and I am sure if I was of another nationality I may feel different. I would suspect you would be hard pressed to find an Aussie who like either well.

[skyhawk1]

Suggested reading as requested;
 
The Odd Couple.  Blamey and MaCarthur at War by Jack Gallaway (University of Queenland Press)
 
and;
 
http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/locations/macintv.htm