P-38E/F - Super plane?!?

[rominet]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants
You are correct. I had some emails with Brian about this after I looked in the editor and saw the Zero had moved slots to disable the bonus. I forgot what his reasoning was on this as my old computer died recently.

Do you remenber the slot numbers?

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: Hard Sarge

the 1st and the 14th went to the MTO, they may of been stationed on the west coast, or trained on the west coast, but not really should not be part of a PTO OOB

Ah - gotcha... i'd have to look up the FGs to see which ones were actually stationed there that ended up in the Pacific... the developer of the mod might just have picked a couple of random FGs...

Eventually, some of the Med units ended up in the CBI (transferring through the Mideast, iirc.)

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Hard Sarge

my question is, why are these two ETO FG's on the west coast for the OOB ? (both may of been based on the West Coast, trained on the West Coast, but they headed to NA soon)

No, not all the FG headed to North Africa/ETO - MOST did, but originally (as mentioned) after 7 Dec almost every unit with P-38s was sent to the West Coast (except for one training unit in Louisiana, iirc.) They were stationed there until the panic died down, then sent MOST to Britain or North Africa.

i'd have to go back and pull my files (at home) but there were a couple of squadrons sent into combat (at least one in the Aleutians and a second went to Oz a bit later), and some more units stationed on the West Coast that were not moved for some time... they eventually were released to the Pacific.

I want to say it was the 14th FS that went to the Aelutians, which was formed with remnants of those who survived Pearl. They were stationed on the West Coast as part of the West Coast defense. I understand that part of the readme for this mod does state that these units should remain with the West Coast command.

[Jzanes]

Are these battles the results of sweeps?  Who is sweeping who?  Being the "sweeper" gives a big advantage to a force.

[ny59giants]

Do you remenber the slot numbers?

If you open up the "SCEN" folder and then the Database Editor, click on the "Aircraft" tab. In stock, CHS, and RHS the Zero (with early war bonus) is in slot 3. This mod leaves that slot empty and moves the Zero to Slot 14.

[USSAmerica]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

Thought those were Ds, not Cs... but i'll check later...

In CHS 155, and I'm sure whichever number corresponds to Nikmod, the Allies do start with 1 airgroup of 24 P-38F's, and a handful in the pool as replacements.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: Jzanes

Are these battles the results of sweeps?  Who is sweeping who?  Being the "sweeper" gives a big advantage to a force.

Usually, but: i've seen my sweepers chopped to pieces on occasion... there is an element of chance that can really zap you! [X(]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: rominet

To my knowlegde (but it is only my knowlegde[8|]), the ratio in Salomons-New Guinea in 42-43 is about 1 allied fighter against 3 jap fighters.

Perhaps, but this counts the P-39, P-40, and even the Wirraway... [8|]

The P-38 was also extensively used as a fighter bomber or even pure bomber (it was sometimes fitted with a Norden bombsight)... the times the "kill ratio" of the P38s in the Pacific/CBI fell to around 3 to 1 was when it got jumped during these types of missions... normally it was much greater. As i have mentioned, even against the Luftwaffe when it was fighting on the wrong side of the odds, its A-to-A ratio was around 3 to 1.

EDIT: Personally in my PBEM, the P-38 might get a 1-1 ratio against Zeros, but i doubt it even does that well... but the war is yet young. [:D]

You might enjoy the attached.

Preliminary results from a regression analysis of World War II air combat records

H R Erwin

[Draft written mid-1978]

I have been attempting to determine the technology-dependent components of World War II fighter combat effectiveness. The measure used in this study is the ratio of exchange rates in combat against identical opponents. It is not clear that this is a transitive relation. Insufficient information is presently available to verify this. [This assumption remains unverified, although the underlying data for this study was suggestive in its general consistency.]
Training, experience and effectiveness of ground control have been factored out of the analysis in the following way. World War II British experience indicates that an effective air defence system tripled the effect of fighter aircraft, and combat experience multiplied a pilot’s effectiveness some 4½ times. Finally, American experience in the Pacific indicates an approximately 4-fold increase in pilot effectiveness in the interval from 100 to 400 hours of flight training. [In other words, combat data in the open literature were adjusted for these factors when known. The data I used actually classified the type of engagement.]
To simplify the analysis, the actual number used [below] is 2 log2(ratio) rather than the ratio itself. This has the effect of linearising the relationships between multiplicative factors. [All factors were multiplicative.]
The nine factors analysed in this study were wing loading, rate of turn, power loading, maximum airspeed, altitude of maximum airspeed, service ceiling, firepower, and maximum rate of climb. Four studies were made. The first study was of overall effectiveness. The significant factors were as follows: [These are tables with three columns, separated by |.]
Factor|Increase of 1|Mean Value
Speed|+22.5 mph|371 mph
Rate of turn|x2|0.19 radians/sec @ 240 ft/sec
Ceiling|+25000 feet|36140 feet
Climb|+7000 feet/minute|2968 feet/minute
The second study was of air superiority aircraft only.
Factor|Increase of 1|Mean Value
Speed|+20 mph|381 mph
Rate of turn|x2.5|0.20 radians/sec @ 240 ft/sec
Altitude of maximum speed|-20000 feet|19500 feet
Ceiling|+13000 feet|37000 feet
Rate of climb|+25000 feet/minute|3200 feet/minute
The third study was of interceptors.
Factor|Increase of 1|Mean Value
Speed|+30 mph|369 mph
Rate of turn|x2.5|0.20 radians/sec @ 240 ft/sec
Altitude of maximum speed|+8000 feet|19770 feet
Rate of climb|+2000 feet/minute|2906 feet/minute
The fourth study was of escort fighters (8 types with limited data)
Factor|Increase of 1|Mean Value
Speed|+28 mph|375 mph
Rate of turn|x4|0.19 radians/sec @ 240 ft/sec
Altitude of maximum speed|-5500 feet|21500 feet
Ceiling|+3000 feet|38000 feet
Climb|+1500 feet/minute|2941 feet/minute
A number of conclusions resulted. First, the easiest way of increasing effectiveness was to increase speed. This was normally handled by decreasing drag losses rather than increasing power-to-weight ratio (i.e., acceleration and climb). Only marginal increases in effectiveness were possible by decreasing wing loading or increasing power. Generally, speed, power and wing loading (in that order) contributed most to the effectiveness of fighters with speed by far the most important.
A note should be included here as to the method used to determine fighter ratings. The set of fighters on which I had [open source] effectiveness data [what shot down what by individual engagement] for World War II was ordered by this data. This resulted in a rather complete partial ordering. [I was able to derive ratios for almost all Allied aircraft against their Axis opponents of the same period and vice versa.] This was converted into a well-ordering by a process of cutting and fitting. [In other words, transitivity was assumed to hold.] Next numerical data [exchange ratios] were used to derive aircraft ratings. The statement in Morse and Kimball that the Spitfire 9 had twice the exchange rate of the Spitfire V provided useful data. Likewise the relative losses of the P-51 and P-47 against the German Lufwaffe provided more data. Finally statements that two aircraft were equal in combat or one was marginally superior (rated as +1) were used. This resulted in a numerical scale. The first regression analysis on the whole population demonstrated the existence of two distinct subpopulations—interceptors and (air superiority) fighters. This led to further analyses. The difference between fighters and interceptors appears to be that fighters fight fighters by making diving attacks. Interceptors don’t fight interceptors, and only fight fighters as an adjunct to making an interception. If a fighter makes a diving attack on an interceptor, it succeeds in stopping the interception only about 20% of the time (when it succeeds in shooting down the interceptor). Thus it must engage in a dogfight. If the interceptor has superior manoeuvrability, it may win enough of these dogfights to hold its own in terms of exchange rate despite a marked inferiority in speed.
Hopefully more data will be available in the near future to allow a significant extension of this study. [It wasn’t.]

[Additional Notes, I don't have the underlying statistical data any more.]
1. The standard aircraft used was the FW190A4, since it fought almost everything Allied during the late period of the war, and there were plenty of open-source data available. It was rated a 11.
2. The Spitfire V was inferior to the Bf109G, which was inferior to the FW190A4, so those were rated 9, 10, and 11.
3. The P-47 had an even exchange ratio against the Bf109G, and the P-51 had a 2-1 exchange rate, so those were rated 10 and 12.
4. The Spitfire V was marginally superior to the A6M3, so that model of the Zero was rated as an 8.
5. The F4U1 was marginally inferior to the P-51, so it was rated an 11.
6. The F6F was somewhat inferior to the F4U1 and definitely superior to the A6M3, so it was rated a 10.
7. The Bf109F, Bf109E, and Spitfire I were brought into the scale by noting that the latter two were an even match, the Spitfire V was a marginal improvement of the Spitfire I, but still superior to the Bf109E. The Bf109F was about equal to the Spitfire V, with superiority only at higher altitudes. Hence the ratings were Spitfire I—8, Bf109E—8, and Bf109F—9.5.
8. The Hurricane IIB was the equal of the A6M3, and the F4F was slightly inferior. So the former was rated an 8, and the latter a 7.
9. From this point on, adding planes involved carefully considered arguments. For example, the P-40B was marginally inferior to the A6M3, so it was rated a 7. The P-39 was definitely inferior to everything on the list, so it was rated a 6. The Hurricane I came in at 7.
10. The F2A was rated a 6 since it was marginally inferior to the F4F. The P-35 was also rated a 6 for similar reasons.
11. European data indicated the P-38 was inferior to the GAF fighters and Pacific data better than the Zero, so it was rated an 8.
12. The Typhoon and Tempest were rated as a match for the FW190A4 and superior to the Bf109G. The C202 was a match for the Spitfire V. The C205V was almost a match for the P-51, so it was rated 11.5. For similar reasons, the Ki100 was rated 11.5.
13. Since good Shinden (N1K1-J) pilots found the F6F a fairly easy kill, despite the speed difference, it was rated a 10.
14. The Ki61 was superior to the faster Bf109E, so it was rated a 9.
15. The Ki43 was marginally inferior to the P-38, so it was rated a 7.
16. The MiG 3 was rated an 8 based on its performance against the early Bf109 models. The Yak 3 was rated a 10 because it was an overall match to the Bf109G.
17. The Bf110 was rated a 6 based on the problems it had with the Hurricane I.
18. The Ta152H was markedly superior to the P-51, so it was rated a 14.
19. There were other data used very carefully to supplement these. For example, interceptors were known to shoot down bombers and escorts in about equal numbers, so the performance of P-40s in northern Australia during 1942 intercepting Japanese attacks (4-1) meant their performance against the escorts was about 2-1. That then had to be adjusted for the superiority of an air defence system (3-1), resulting in the conclusion that the P-40s were slightly inferior to the Zeros, so confirming other analyses.

[rtrapasso]

The kill ratio of the P-38 to Zero is only marginally related to the relative strengths of the aircraft... the fact that the P-38 was faster, could outdive the Zero, had radios, and USAAF doctrine designed to take advantages of these is what determined kill ratios.

An analogy: the average domestic cat is more than a match for the average domestic dog... each time i've seen a cat and dog get into it one on one, the cat will win... but what do you suppose the kill ratio of cat vs. dog is? Very bad ratio for the cat... why? Well, the fact the dog can run off when it gets into trouble, and because of dog doctrine: namely it is a pack hunter.

If a cat sees a dog, it will run despite the fact it will be a match for the dog... it runs because it knows that if there is one dog after it, probably one or more are coming right behind.

So, my point is the fact the someone rates the P-38 one number and the Zero another really is irrelevant as it wasn't the fighting abilities of the aircraft determine the outcome of the fight: it was the fact the P-38 squadrons could pick and choose their fights and MAKE the Zero fight in the way the P-38 could express its strengths, and the Zero could not.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The kill ratio of the P-38 to Zero is only marginally related to the relative strengths of the aircraft... the fact that the P-38 was faster, could outdive the Zero, had radios, and USAAF doctrine designed to take advantages of these is what determined kill ratios.

An analogy: the average domestic cat is more than a match for the average domestic dog... each time i've seen a cat and dog get into it one on one, the cat will win... but what do you suppose the kill ratio of cat vs. dog is? Very bad ratio for the cat... why? Well, the fact the dog can run off when it gets into trouble, and because of dog doctrine: namely it is a pack hunter.

If a cat sees a dog, it will run despite the fact it will be a match for the dog... it runs because it knows that if there is one dog after it, probably one or more are coming right behind.

So, my point is the fact the someone rates the P-38 one number and the Zero another really is irrelevant as it wasn't the fighting abilities of the aircraft determine the outcome of the fight: it was the fact the P-38 squadrons could pick and choose their fights and MAKE the Zero fight in the way the P-38 could express its strengths, and the Zero could not.

My dog cowers in fear at the site of a cat. [8|][:D]

[rominet]

A cat is always better than a dog [:D]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The kill ratio of the P-38 to Zero is only marginally related to the relative strengths of the aircraft... the fact that the P-38 was faster, could outdive the Zero, had radios, and USAAF doctrine designed to take advantages of these is what determined kill ratios.

An analogy: the average domestic cat is more than a match for the average domestic dog... each time i've seen a cat and dog get into it one on one, the cat will win... but what do you suppose the kill ratio of cat vs. dog is? Very bad ratio for the cat... why? Well, the fact the dog can run off when it gets into trouble, and because of dog doctrine: namely it is a pack hunter.

If a cat sees a dog, it will run despite the fact it will be a match for the dog... it runs because it knows that if there is one dog after it, probably one or more are coming right behind.

So, my point is the fact the someone rates the P-38 one number and the Zero another really is irrelevant as it wasn't the fighting abilities of the aircraft determine the outcome of the fight: it was the fact the P-38 squadrons could pick and choose their fights and MAKE the Zero fight in the way the P-38 could express its strengths, and the Zero could not.

Yes, but that means the difference between a Japanese squadron and an American squadron was in the software--how the units actually fought. I have a strong suspicion an American unit flying Zeros would have held its own against P-38s. Look at the tabular data. What's interesting is that wing loading, power loading, and firepower didn't show up as significant. The big technical characteristic was airspeed--especially for air superiority aircraft--followed by rate of turn. Translating: software (cohesion and co-ordination) was the most important factor; next pilot skill; third tempo (speed); and lastly, the remaining technical factors.

[engineer]

I dug into a dry USAAF official history.  The 11th Fighter Squadron was deployed to Alaska prior to war and equipped with obsolescent fighters (probably P-36's).  The 18th Fighter Squadron arrived at the end of December, 1941 and was equipped with some form of P-40.  The 54th Fighter Squadron arrived at the end of May, 1942 and appears to have been the P-38 equipped squadron.   The 42nd Fighter Squadron arrived on June 3.  In response to the invasion of Attu and Kiska, the 54th Fighter Group arrived on June 21 with the 56th and 57th Fighter Squadrons.  The combat aircraft inventory in Alaska on June 3, 1942 is given as:

B-17           6
LB-30          2
B-18           9
B-26           21

A-29           7 (Whatever these are)

P-36           11 
P-38           20
P-39           15
P-40           49

The four squadrons appear to a little under strength in terms of air frames. The P-36s were scattered at several bases so I expect that the 11th FS was partway through an upgrade and the P-36s were probably being used as utility planes/scouts/couriers. Twenty-one of the P-40s were at Cold Bay, the P-39s and P-38s were at Elmendorf. 12 P-40s were at Umak and 16 more were at Kodiak

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/numbered_studies/467596.pdf

[engineer]

A-29 = USAAF version of the Hudson light bomber.  The US grabbed 153 airframes out of the Lend-Lease order to use for coastal ASW patrols. As better planes became available they slipped into training, light cargo, and transport roles.  http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3159

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: engineer

A-29 = USAAF version of the Hudson light bomber.  The US grabbed 153 airframes out of the Lend-Lease order to use for coastal ASW patrols. As better planes became available they slipped into training, light cargo, and transport roles.  http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3159

They weren't stressed as a bomber, so they served as an early-war stopgap. I wonder if the game takes this into account somehow.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The kill ratio of the P-38 to Zero is only marginally related to the relative strengths of the aircraft... the fact that the P-38 was faster, could outdive the Zero, had radios, and USAAF doctrine designed to take advantages of these is what determined kill ratios.

An analogy: the average domestic cat is more than a match for the average domestic dog... each time i've seen a cat and dog get into it one on one, the cat will win... but what do you suppose the kill ratio of cat vs. dog is? Very bad ratio for the cat... why? Well, the fact the dog can run off when it gets into trouble, and because of dog doctrine: namely it is a pack hunter.

If a cat sees a dog, it will run despite the fact it will be a match for the dog... it runs because it knows that if there is one dog after it, probably one or more are coming right behind.

So, my point is the fact the someone rates the P-38 one number and the Zero another really is irrelevant as it wasn't the fighting abilities of the aircraft determine the outcome of the fight: it was the fact the P-38 squadrons could pick and choose their fights and MAKE the Zero fight in the way the P-38 could express its strengths, and the Zero could not.

I hit page 466 of Bergerud today, where he summarises the pace of the fighter campaign. "In the South Pacific it was a rare day if 100 aircraft were involved in an engagement." "Air warfare, like other forms of battle in World War II, was above all a struggle of attrition. For most of the time between spring 1942 and winter 1943-44 neither side was completely dominant (until the final weeks), which in itself amplified the element of attrition." I'm playing RHS, so the air model is toned down a bit, but the Allies still gain absolute air supremacy in the South Pacific by the winter of 1942-43.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The kill ratio of the P-38 to Zero is only marginally related to the relative strengths of the aircraft... the fact that the P-38 was faster, could outdive the Zero, had radios, and USAAF doctrine designed to take advantages of these is what determined kill ratios.

An analogy: the average domestic cat is more than a match for the average domestic dog... each time i've seen a cat and dog get into it one on one, the cat will win... but what do you suppose the kill ratio of cat vs. dog is? Very bad ratio for the cat... why? Well, the fact the dog can run off when it gets into trouble, and because of dog doctrine: namely it is a pack hunter.

If a cat sees a dog, it will run despite the fact it will be a match for the dog... it runs because it knows that if there is one dog after it, probably one or more are coming right behind.

So, my point is the fact the someone rates the P-38 one number and the Zero another really is irrelevant as it wasn't the fighting abilities of the aircraft determine the outcome of the fight: it was the fact the P-38 squadrons could pick and choose their fights and MAKE the Zero fight in the way the P-38 could express its strengths, and the Zero could not.

I hit page 466 of Bergerud today, where he summarises the pace of the fighter campaign. "In the South Pacific it was a rare day if 100 aircraft were involved in an engagement." "Air warfare, like other forms of battle in World War II, was above all a struggle of attrition. For most of the time between spring 1942 and winter 1943-44 neither side was completely dominant (until the final weeks), which in itself amplified the element of attrition." I'm playing RHS, so the air model is toned down a bit, but the Allies still gain absolute air supremacy in the South Pacific by the winter of 1942-43.

So, you are claiming what? That the Allies didn't have total dominance of the air across the entire South Pacific? Well, no, of course they didn't - but i don't think that means that they did not have air superiority over many areas: i.e. New Guinea.

The Japanese had lost air control by the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and were essentially unable to run supply convoys into their ports. This does NOT mean a total cessation of supplies (some still snuck in). It does NOT mean a total cessation of air activity on the part of the Japanese. A battle of attrition will continue until one side has (essentially) nothing left. This doesn't mean one side doesn't have air superiority (even if it is not "totally dominant").

And i sincerely doubt that in most games that the Allies have total air domination everywhere in the South Pacific by December 31, 1943 (or even March 20, 1944 - the last day of the Winter of 1943-44), in RHS or not.

[engineer]

[blockquote]quote:

ORIGINAL: engineer

A-29 = USAAF version of the Hudson light bomber.  The US grabbed 153 airframes out of the Lend-Lease order to use for coastal ASW patrols. As better planes became available they slipped into training, light cargo, and transport roles.  http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3159
[/blockquote]


They weren't stressed as a bomber, so they served as an early-war stopgap. I wonder if the game takes this into account somehow.

At least in stock it seems to me that the design team has made a number of simplifying assumptions about the pace of deployment of units into the game and whether or not to include them into the game.  The absence of the A-29's is one example of this.  The absence of ASW blimps is another.  (They're easy to mod in as very slow patrol planes with their associated base forces and an HQ unit).  The rationale is pretty easy to discern, taking these forces out of the Allied OOB only effects play in a handful of cases where the Japanese player mounts a serious attack on North America (or at least a serious submarine campaign along the coast).  The Japanese did historically send several subs on war patrols into this area in 1941 and early 1942 and scored some kills.  However, if the designers do that (provide the USA with lots of ASW squadrons in early 1942), then there's no provision (outside of a house rule) that prevents the Allied player from stripping the west coast with judicious use of his political points and ahistorically thickening up his ASW capabilities (or strike if he switches to A-20 or B-25) in the South Pacific in 1942.   If I put myself into the role of a game designer, I can easily imagine foregoing the incremental insurance of having a better simulation of an unlikely circumtance in favor of avoiding a systematic imbalance in a likely circumstance. 

There is a similar equipment story on the Vengeance dive bomber.  This was originally designed for the French by Vultee in the USA.  By the time it got into production, France was gone and the British and Australians used it in combat.  As the A-31 and A-35 it flew for the USAAF, but all of the squadrons ended up re-equipping with twin engined bombers before deploying overseas.  In the unlikely circumstance of an all-out attack on the USA in 1942, one would expect the US OOB to have some Vengeance squadrons on the West Coast, but the design decision is to postpone bringing them in and do so after they've been re-equipped with twin engined planes. 

Sorry for digressing OT.

My 2 cents on the debate immediately above is that we're getting off into the weeds.  WitP is detailed game.  At the margins it's going to diverge from history.  There are at least three reasons for this:  deliberate design choices with respect to scope (like I've ascribed to the A-29/A-31/A-35 omissions in the game), engine limitations, and deliberate engine decisions that yield ahistorical results (but make a better game).  A point that Herwin and rtrapasso agree upon is that doctrine has a dramatic effect on air combat results but to our best understanding there's not an obvious "doctrine" handle in the code apart from the special effects like the Zero bonus and the AVG bonus that covers this.  How do we disaggregate the various causes from the result?

However, if I put my designer hat on, one thing that might be done is to give the benefit of the doubt to different sides at different stages of game to reinforce the simulation side.  For example, in the late game, the benefit goes to the Allies so one defaults to "rounding down" factors of Japanese systems and "rounding up" Allied systems.  In the early game things are reversed.  That approach is a bit more subtle since the results will be buried with the hardware and training advantages that each side had in those phases of the game.  However, the result of that is that the mid-game when the initiative is in transistion would be when those effects might most be observable in anomalous results.   

[USSAmerica]

CHS does have a few squadrons of A-29 Hudsons assigned to the West Coast. [:)]

ORIGINAL: engineer

My 2 cents on the debate immediately above is that we're getting off into the weeds. 

As for this quote, engineer, it's the best description of most "debate" type discussions around here that I've ever heard. [8D][:D]

[bradfordkay]

"CHS does have a few squadrons of A-29 Hudsons assigned to the West Coast."


I moved them to my central and south pacific bases because of their long range. They became my best naval search aircraft during 1942.