Manila or Pearl-new paradigm?

[ny59giants]

Brad,
I forgot that McNabb is a Chicago boy. He could have gone back home. [;)]
I have always hated the Cowgirls and always will. So, Mcnabb and the skins are not a big deal to me.

OT - A perfect Sunday in the fall is a Giants win and a Cowgirls loss. [:)]

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

Brad,
I forgot that McNabb is a Chicago boy. He could have gone back home. [;)]
I have always hated the Cowgirls and always will. So, Mcnabb and the skins are not a big deal to me.

OT - A perfect Sunday in the fall is a Giants win and a Cowgirls loss. [:)]

Wow. You have increasingly fewer good days in the fall, ny59giants. [:'(]

[ny59giants]

Andre,
That was some party at Jerry's new house last September.

[zace]

[blockquote]quote:

ORIGINAL: zace

Not to mention they are only 7 hours apart....  Are you saying that the Japanese were incapable of using a clock to coordinate them within a little?  Or that the attack on PH would not have worked had it been a little later in the day?[/blockquote]
The attack at Pearl was just after 7am Honolulu. That's midnight Manila. I'll accept a surprise NIGHT port attack as being roughly the same time. Wanna do that? Probably not. You're looking for a daylight MORNING phase attack. Manila has time to scramble. Just because they didn't IRL, dithered, and were destroyed on the runway doesn't mean that IJ players should be afforded the assumption of gross incompetence demonstrated by the Allied air command, Phillipines on that day.


[blockquote]quote:


Remember pearl was set so early so they could raid more times than they did....  If I am not allowed to strike multiple targets as IJ then the allies are not allowed to issue any orders including cap to any units at or within range of PH so I can make the decision to re-sortie the aircraft on the 7th (on that side of the date line)
[/blockquote]
I'm sorry, but I honestly don't understand what you're trying to say here.

Addressing these together.  The raid happened so early on the 7th local date in HI because the Japanese had time and plans to launch the planes multiple times against the island.  If you are saying the raid has to be that early then why can't KB strike multiple times in a single day against HI?  The game mechanics limit this.

If you are saying the game mechanics say you can have a morning raid on both then you miss the point.  The surprise would happen in both places if you hit manila at 8am and HI at 2-3Pm.  You would still have plenty of time and since AE restricts me from carrying out multiple attacks the same day with the same planes this is more realistic in the context of the game.

Not to mention that the attacks on Manila do not always go in the AM phase and in truth I have had a PH attack go in the afternoon phase.  IRL the IJ did not attack the harbor there but instead destroyed the planes.  In the game you can just build more from supplies....never mind that the frames arn't even on the island.

It is very fanboyish to say that one side can not do something because of how it matches with reality while wearing shades that block out actual reality then not restrict the other side.  IF manila were not attacked that day (clark in reality) then none of the ships likely would have left port.  Are you saying that the IJ player can't attack manila but then the Allies can't sortie ships for 4 days or until they do?

The whole idea that the IJ were not capable of coordinating raids across time zones is rather insulting IMHO.  We have every indication from history that they were well within their capability to do so if they wanted and the fact that they did not want to do this on PH day is not a representation of abilities and should not restrict as though it were.

I would like to distinguish between gross incompetence and surprise. There is a distinction. One can 'give' the IJ player a first strike surprise. To also 'give' them first day morning phase incompetence is an unjustifiable boon, IMO. I've not seen that selector switch on setup.

What you call incompetence I call surprise.  You look at things with the eyes of today on.  Remember this is 1941.  Most Americans believe that they will stay out of the war, that war will not come to them, that this could never happen.  When PH happened it put everyone in shock and the reactions of other commands you read that day are because of this...  You are too stuck in the movies where the US was itching to go to war.  This just wasn't the case.

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

[John 3rd]

Nicely said Zace.
 
I too really believe that the Commanders in Luzon---read Dugout Doug--would have been caught flat-footed from a Port Strike.  The Commander of the Asiatic Fleet was very competent but even he didn't react quickly.  The Japanese crushed Clark in the afternoon when the Americans had had well over 8 hours warning.  The Japanese strikes came in over land along a route predicted and they achieved surprise. 
 
What are the chances of the surprise coming from an ocean attack with even less warning?  It is much greater.  Michael and I chatted about this on the phone earlier today and we see the 'sortie x number of SS' HR as a great relief to the Asiatic Fleet.  Some prepared SS Skippers could--and actually did--simply pull the plug and submerge to the bottom of Manila Bay to wait out the attack.
 
If the game allowed for surprise on at PH and surprise off at Manila then I might think somewhat about that; however, this is not allowed and so isn't a viable option.  It is still anyone's call as to allowing this.  This is a HR matter for players to decide upon.  Let each pairing decide whatever they think is possible and/or realistic.
 
 

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: zace

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

Tell you what. Get AE fixed so that the AVERAGE Japanese losses at a surprised PH equal the historical (29 aircrews and 41 aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair), and I'll listen to your theories about what might or could have happened. As long as the loss average remains somewhere between 9-10, then "historical" arguments are bunk.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

Andre,
That was some party at Jerry's new house last September.

Were you talking about the playoff game that we hosted for the 2009 season? That would have been in January. How'd the Pipsqueaks do in the playoffs? [:'(]

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: zace

[blockquote]quote:

ORIGINAL: zace

Not to mention they are only 7 hours apart....  Are you saying that the Japanese were incapable of using a clock to coordinate them within a little?  Or that the attack on PH would not have worked had it been a little later in the day?[/blockquote]
The attack at Pearl was just after 7am Honolulu. That's midnight Manila. I'll accept a surprise NIGHT port attack as being roughly the same time. Wanna do that? Probably not. You're looking for a daylight MORNING phase attack. Manila has time to scramble. Just because they didn't IRL, dithered, and were destroyed on the runway doesn't mean that IJ players should be afforded the assumption of gross incompetence demonstrated by the Allied air command, Phillipines on that day.


[blockquote]quote:


Remember pearl was set so early so they could raid more times than they did....  If I am not allowed to strike multiple targets as IJ then the allies are not allowed to issue any orders including cap to any units at or within range of PH so I can make the decision to re-sortie the aircraft on the 7th (on that side of the date line)
[/blockquote]
I'm sorry, but I honestly don't understand what you're trying to say here.

Addressing these together.  The raid happened so early on the 7th local date in HI because the Japanese had time and plans to launch the planes multiple times against the island.  If you are saying the raid has to be that early then why can't KB strike multiple times in a single day against HI?  The game mechanics limit this.

If you are saying the game mechanics say you can have a morning raid on both then you miss the point.  The surprise would happen in both places if you hit manila at 8am and HI at 2-3Pm.  You would still have plenty of time and since AE restricts me from carrying out multiple attacks the same day with the same planes this is more realistic in the context of the game.

Not to mention that the attacks on Manila do not always go in the AM phase and in truth I have had a PH attack go in the afternoon phase.  IRL the IJ did not attack the harbor there but instead destroyed the planes.  In the game you can just build more from supplies....never mind that the frames arn't even on the island.

It is very fanboyish to say that one side can not do something because of how it matches with reality while wearing shades that block out actual reality then not restrict the other side.  IF manila were not attacked that day (clark in reality) then none of the ships likely would have left port.  Are you saying that the IJ player can't attack manila but then the Allies can't sortie ships for 4 days or until they do?

The whole idea that the IJ were not capable of coordinating raids across time zones is rather insulting IMHO.  We have every indication from history that they were well within their capability to do so if they wanted and the fact that they did not want to do this on PH day is not a representation of abilities and should not restrict as though it were.

I would like to distinguish between gross incompetence and surprise. There is a distinction. One can 'give' the IJ player a first strike surprise. To also 'give' them first day morning phase incompetence is an unjustifiable boon, IMO. I've not seen that selector switch on setup.

What you call incompetence I call surprise.  You look at things with the eyes of today on.  Remember this is 1941.  Most Americans believe that they will stay out of the war, that war will not come to them, that this could never happen.  When PH happened it put everyone in shock and the reactions of other commands you read that day are because of this...  You are too stuck in the movies where the US was itching to go to war.  This just wasn't the case.

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

Zace,

First off, cool it with the fanboy comments. Those don't sit well in this forum. You want to debate, let's talk. Keep the name calling off of the forum.

So hard coding surprise in the game where surprise occured IRL is the order of the day? Because of incompetence in the Phillipines (you read surprise) an 8 hour alert must be assumed to equate to how things shook out IRL. Therefore, two port surprise attacks are warranted?

OK. So on or about June, 1942, The IJN is bound to assume some major loss of initiative in a carrier battle in the game? This should be assumed in the game that the USN gets off a plucky attack that decapitates the IJN force. After all, that's what happened IRL.

Look, what happened IRL cannot be coded into the game mechanics. You want the same level of surprise / incompetence that happened IRL? Fine. Have a December 8 historical start. No problem.

That's about all I've got to say on this matter, zace. Thanks for your posts.

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: zace

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

Tell you what. Get AE fixed so that the AVERAGE Japanese losses at a surprised PH equal the historical (29 aircrews and 41 aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair), and I'll listen to your theories about what might or could have happened. As long as the loss average remains somewhere between 9-10, then "historical" arguments are bunk.

Has that been going on? The only attack I've conducted resulted in me losing 20+ Vals and 20+ Kates. It was horrific to watch...

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: zace

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

Tell you what. Get AE fixed so that the AVERAGE Japanese losses at a surprised PH equal the historical (29 aircrews and 41 aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair), and I'll listen to your theories about what might or could have happened. As long as the loss average remains somewhere between 9-10, then "historical" arguments are bunk.

Has that been going on? The only attack I've conducted resulted in me losing 20+ Vals and 20+ Kates. It was horrific to watch...

Look at all the posted AR's. It's very uncommon for the Japanese to lose as many as 20 A/C..., and it's generally around 10. If you lost 40, you must be the only other person in the world with luck as bad as mine. [:(]

[bklooste]

Nemos AAR is interesting PH wasnt sunk and wake not taken and at the start of 42 he invades the Marshals with all the old BBs.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: zace

Go read on reactions to traumatic situations which are thought to be impossible.  The first reaction is denial and largely the non-responsiveness of commanders across the globe was because of this.  Then when it finally set in that this was correct, was not a drill, and actually happened they went into stunned mode and just didn't act at all.  All of this is because of surprise on a national level.

Tell you what. Get AE fixed so that the AVERAGE Japanese losses at a surprised PH equal the historical (29 aircrews and 41 aircraft lost or damaged beyond repair), and I'll listen to your theories about what might or could have happened. As long as the loss average remains somewhere between 9-10, then "historical" arguments are bunk.

What about the almost 400 allied air craft lost or damaged beyond repair historically at PH id gladly give 41 aircraft for that.

[witpqs]

Part of the decision to attack Pearl Harbor early on a Sunday morning was that is was assessed to be the time of least readiness and awareness.

The surprise achieved was not simply a matter of "We are here and you didn't see us coming!"

[zace]

First off, cool it with the fanboy comments. Those don't sit well in this forum. You want to debate, let's talk. Keep the name calling off of the forum.

Perhaps I did not use the comment well.  It was not to say in game one side or the other but to believe that one side is capable and another is not is exactly that.  Don't get me wrong we do it every day.  Ask around the US before 9-11 and see how many US citizens thought it was even remotely possible.  We always see things the way we want unfortunately.

The comment that started this was that it is physically impossible for the IJ to attack both Manila and PH with the same effects as the surprise effects in the game.  This is clearly wrong as they did it.  If you have ever tried to attack both you will learn that with weather and everything else you rarely get what you are expecting...

The statement that it can't be done is wrong.

The surprise achieved was not simply a matter of "We are here and you didn't see us coming!"

It largely was...except they did see it coming.

The same surprise could be achieved at dinner.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: zace

The surprise achieved was not simply a matter of "We are here and you didn't see us coming!"

It largely was...except they did see it coming.

The fact that two radar operators saw contacts, reported that to a new lieutenant who misinterpreted the report and the information went no farther is not relevant. In fact, there is serious doubt among historians that even the best handling of the contact would have had material effect.

Conspiracy theories aside (I presume you are not referring to them), there was no cohesive view that they were coming to Pearl Harbor, nor any that they were coming on that day. The various pieces of information here and there in the vast pool of greatly dispersed information notwithstanding.

This is partly the state of affairs that the first turn surprise code represents. The remaining part is the attack occurring early on Sunday morning. You say:

The same surprise could be achieved at dinner.

The IJN planners disagreed with you, as they specifically cited early Sunday morning as the optimum time due to the lowest level of readiness. I have yet to see any historian's opinion that agrees with what you assert on this.

What you propose is reasonable provided that First Turn Surprise is OFF, and the Allied player gets to set air group missions as desired. The reason for that second point is that the air group settings were designed as part of the first turn surprise setting. Remember too that many important units at Pearl Harbor start the game with many devices disabled for the purpose of aiding the IJ starting attacks. It is my understanding that IRL there were not so many AA guns, for example, without crews or otherwise out of service.

That way IJ still gets in a powerful blow, but at somewhat higher risk.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

Nicely said Zace.

I too really believe that the Commanders in Luzon---read Dugout Doug--would have been caught flat-footed from a Port Strike.  The Commander of the Asiatic Fleet was very competent but even he didn't react quickly.  The Japanese crushed Clark in the afternoon when the Americans had had well over 8 hours warning.  The Japanese strikes came in over land along a route predicted and they achieved surprise. 

Oddly enough, the reason the Japanese were so successful in the PI was that they DIDN'T show up when they planned to..., the weather in Formosa had them "socked in" all morning when the Americans were up looking for an attack. It cleared up just in time to let them catch the US on the ground re-fueling and preparing it's own strike. Blind stupid luck, good or bad, depending on your point of view.

I'm not defending MacArthur..., the man was a first-class jack-ass (along with Bereton, his air commander). But the Japanese not only benefited from good planning in their opening moves..., they also had a world-class run of "good luck" in everything they tried. Which turned against them about the first of May, and "crapped out" entirely in early June.

[John 3rd]

Your point is well taken Sir.  The weather did impact the mission and it played right into the Japanese hands.  CRAZY how that worked isn't it.  They still had that peacetime lethargy though.  Let's see...how about we land ALL the planes, refuel ALL of them at the same time, and then get back up after out lunch and cup of coffee...
 
BRILLIANT!
 

[bklooste]

Clark , Fall of France and Tarantino shows local surprise , readiness and a "peacetime attitude" are more important than strategic surprise .  It is for this reason that i think 2 port strikes are reasonable .
 
How mamy planes did the british lose at Tarantino ?  And they were already at war ! 

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

What about the almost 400 allied air craft lost or damaged beyond repair historically at PH id gladly give 41 aircraft for that.

I believe if you check the actual data, you'll find that the Allies didn't have close to 400 A/C at PH..., and that the actual loss was 186.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: bklooste

What about the almost 400 allied air craft lost or damaged beyond repair historically at PH id gladly give 41 aircraft for that.

I believe if you check the actual data, you'll find that the Allies didn't have close to 400 A/C at PH..., and that the actual loss was 186.

I have checked it many times my memory wasnt that far off .. ok here goes Of the 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged (thats 347 , and many of the damaged planes were unrepairable just like the Japanese since we now count these as "destroyed" ) . eg Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. The three on patrol returned undamaged.

You show me an AAR with almost 90% of allied planes damaged and almost 50% destroyed ( more if you count damaged beyond repair)

Leaving the allies with 3PBYs alone in PH is worth 20 extra aircraft but i note in some AARs japan does loose 40+ and damaged is normally in the 30-60 range but i never seen more than a fraction of the allied losses.