Early Barbarossa

[sPzAbt653]

Initially, Hitler made the decision to attack Russia in July 1940. He wanted to go in late August or early September 1940. The weather was of no major concern to him, but the time it would take to redeploy units from the west to the east, and the time to recall 30-35 divisions that had been disbanded after France fell, caused him to change his mind and reschedule the attack for May 1941. By that time the Wehrmacht would be redeployed, and it seems as a matter of convenience the spring thaws would be in most part over.

In December 1940, Hitler decided to eliminate the Allied base in Greece sometime in March/April 1941. The timing would be based on gettting Bulgaria to join the Axis and redeploying units to Bulgaria. This operation had no influence on the projected start of Barbarossa.

In March 1941, Bulgaria joined the Axis. But before the Greece attack was started, Yugoslavia joined the Allies (or at least became Anti-Nazi). This caused Hitler to order an overwhelming 500,000 troops (including 8 Pz Div's) to attack Yugoslavia and postpone Barbarossa for 6 weeks so that the panzers could be refitted and redeployed.

This last point seems to be the major consideration in the timing. Hitler didn't want those 8 Pz Div's to miss the show in Russia.

[sPzAbt653]

I agree with Colin on his points concerning motorization. But hypothetically, I think a scenario could be devised along the lines of reducing U-boat and Luftwaffe production between the end of the Battle of Britain and the start of Barbarossa, diverting those resources to vehicle and vehicle fuel production, and training some Luftwaffe personnel to drive, and other Luftwaffe personnel to fix trucks instead of planes. Once Barbarossa was over in 6-8 weeks, all could return to normal. Hypothetically.

[sPzAbt653]

The Germans left almost 50 divisions in the west when they started Barbarossa. Its possible that, hypothetically, some of those divisions could have been deployed for the attack on Russia in May 1941, and units that were used in Yugoslavia and Greece could have taken their place when they became available.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Panama

Every trained regular. There were precious few of those. And STAVKA was doing a good job of keeping that number down by continually throwing units at the Germans. The Germans would not have had to go and find the RKKA. It was constantly being put right in front of them. I don't see why this would have changed given Stalin was as crazy six weeks earlier.

Even if there were no huge pockets in the beginning, there certainly would have been some later. The Bailystok pocket would still have formed. Those units were ordered forward, not backward. The Kiev and Uman pockets would have still been there or something like them. Same with the pockets formed with the initial pushes towards Moscow.

Now, if you have a Soviet player who runs for the hills then you'll pocket nothing. If the Soviet player is forced to play as Stalin ordered his units to then the outcome is still up in the air, mud or no mud.

Yeah but at the end of the day, if there's mud, the Russians can't move as quickly to their destruction and the Germans can't be there to administer it as easily.

Mud completely mired the German drive after Vyazma against what was a destroyed Russian army. By Zhukov's testimony, the Russians were actually outnumbered by the Germans -- but the Germans simply couldn't move.

Now, even if things aren't that extreme in May in Belorussia, the more that factor is present, the less destruction the Germans can dish out to the Russians -- and however slow the Russian learning curve, the more time they have, and the more regulars they still have alive after a few weeks, the better off they'll be.

The one factor I am inclined to examine is that I suspect the specific date of June 22 for the jump off wasn't determined by the mud, but by the need to move units north from the Balkans after Merkur. Apparently, the traffic press was so heavy that 22 Luftlande simply couldn't be moved south to take part in the invasion of Crete.

So while May 15th may not have been doable, it's entirely possible that absent the German commitment to the Balkans, Barbarossa could have gone off earlier than 22 June. After all, kick off for Blau was on June 5th, and Zitadelle was held up not by mud, but by the desire to get more Tigers and Panthers to the units taking part.

[ColinWright]

Another point that bears repeating is that hypotheticals such as still more divisions moved from the West and still more diversion from U-boats to tanks assume that Russia is expected to be a tough nut to crack.

It wasn't. It was expected to be a pushover. I believe that as it was, Hitler intervened to assign more divisions, not fewer, to the operation. Based on World War One, and based on what had happened in Finland, there just wasn't any reason to expect Russia to be hard where France had been so easy.

Now, these things could have happened. Hitler could have had a neurotic fear of the Beast in the East or something. However, there are good reasons why they didn't. The evidence just didn't support a belief that Germany was going to be in for a tough fight -- and indeed, for at least the first month, it looked like she wasn't. I believe it was Halder who declared the campaign won in his diary at some point in late July.

It's even possible that had the campaign been fought on the same basis as that in the West -- as a matter of a balance of power struggle, with the loser getting reduced to the status of a second-rate power but retaining national sovereignty -- it would have been over after a month. Stalin did consider approaching Hitler and asking for an armistice, for a second Brest-Litovsk. If Hitler hadn't made it already made it clear his goals were national and political extermination, it's possible Stalin would have gone ahead with his approach and thrown in the towel.

This in turn sets up some really novel hypotheticals for 1942-43. Like Russia strikes when Germany is firmly committed to a 1942 Seelowe.

[sPzAbt653]

Another point that bears repeating is that hypotheticals such as still more divisions moved from the West and still more diversion from U-boats to tanks assume that Russia is expected to be a tough nut to crack.

Well, that's not at all what I said. I said that if the Germans were going to focus on motorization they might divert resources from the Luftwaffe and/or U-Boats, and that they might move more divisions from the west in order to execute the Balkans campaign without delaying Barbarossa. Has nothing to do with fear of Russia.

[Panama]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
It's even possible that had the campaign been fought on the same basis as that in the West -- as a matter of a balance of power struggle, with the loser getting reduced to the status of a second-rate power but retaining national sovereignty -- it would have been over after a month. Stalin did consider approaching Hitler and asking for an armistice, for a second Brest-Litovsk. If Hitler hadn't made it already made it clear his goals were national and political extermination, it's possible Stalin would have gone ahead with his approach and thrown in the towel.

Yes. Same situation between Germany and the Allies when Roosevelt declared unconditional surrender as the only condition.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

They already were looting the west for vehicles: that's part of how they doubled the number of motorized divisions from 1940 to 1941. Ditto looting fuel: the Germans seized the major part of the available fuel stocks anyway in 1940.

They evidently cranked it up after Barbarossa - most likely due to necessity. I'm assuming they take that step before Barbarossa. It's possible you're right about the fuel, but I'm doubtful. What constitutes "available" most likely was a shifting concept. The occupied countries weren't devoid of economic activity from the start.

Regardless, Germany's economy could have been a short-term source of fuel in a pinch - if it could have made the difference. German families would get their groceries delivered by ox cart for a while. Some non-war industry could be suspended.

Furthermore, remember that I'm lowering the FSL some. That means units get to lower supply levels sooner. That means they have lower average Movement Allowances. That means they are using less fuel than historically - due to lower duty-cycles. (I could do this better if we had component supply, of course.)

And, let me repeat that trucks that are just carrying troops forward don't get as much use as trucks that are carrying supplies. The troop trucks just move forward with the troops. The supply trucks make continuous round-trips. The fuel needs aren't going to be that much greater.

Now, of course, they won't have the option to loot after Barbarossa anymore. So, Barbarossa had better be especially successful. And that won't be a given, since their supply net won't be advancing any faster than before. I've set up the VPs so that the Axis have to take Leningrad and Moscow just to get a draw.

I don't see how you can see going to full motorization as requiring only a 50% increase in vehicles. The Germans are going to go from thirty or so motorized divisions to a hundred and fifty or so -- I read that as a 500% increase, not 50%. Perhaps you're just replacing all the horses with trucks: but the infantry can't walk any more -- not if the divisions are to be motorized.

The infantry divisions are heavily motorized already - but those trucks only carry supplies. Adding enough trucks to give the infantry a ride is only a small increase - about 50%, as I said.

As to just driving the trucks till they drop -- these aren't modern vehicles. If one looks up breakdown rates and engine life for 1940's trucks, it's not like one's going to get years of trouble-free driving. They seem to have required constant attention. So unlike you or me and our 2002 Toyota, the drop is going to come pretty quick.

They're still trucks. And the amount looted would significantly exceed the amount necessary to motorize the divisions. So there would be lots of spares being delivered. Note that TOAW combat kills a lot of trucks that in reality would have been left in the rear - so this is actually being modeled in a perverse way.

The relatively cooperative populations of the occupied West are going to jib when the Wehrmacht abruptly seizes everything, food deliveries collapse, etc. Indeed, it's possible a catastrophic decline in productivity would more than erase any gains from implementing the scheme you suggest. As I say, I think this idea is essentially utopian -- in the real world, it wouldn't be practical.

Let's repeat - they did this historically. Just after Barbarossa. Now they'll do it before. And, are you admitting that those trucks were in operation in the occuppied countries?

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

So, wherever the mud was, it would have dried out in the Ukraine before Poland and etc. Since Poland was dried out about a month later at the most, I'm doubtful that mud was much of an issue in the Ukraine in May.

Well, they are different climate systems, and I just don't see how what happened in one can offer much of a guide to what happens in the other. Maybe there isn't a muddy period. Maybe the Germans attacked after it. I don't think the answers will be terribly useful in any case.

Perhaps you missed my real point. Poland is north of the Ukraine. Poland was completely dry by June 22. Therefore the Ukraine should be dry well head of that.

Not really. Tanks yes -- but halftracks were still pretty few and far between, and the artillery was almost entirely towed.

The tanks would be the ones carrying out the tactical penetrations and envelopements, etc. So, tactically, I don't see much of an issue. And Soviet tactical reactions would have been slowed by the mud just as well.

And, Poland's roads might be more plentiful and better constructed than those of Russia's interior. And the terrain wouldn't have been already chewed up by armies in combat prior to launch.

And, the Soviets themselves are going to be weaker due to five weeks less production and reorganization.

Note that this will change fast. That first load of fuel will get the panzers perhaps a hundred miles from the frontier. Thereafter, trucks are indeed going to have to be making it up to the front.

But their supply head is right behind them - in contrast to in the Fall, when it was hundreds of miles in the rear. I expect that was the real impediment to any progress during the mud phase. Supply - that was already tight - suddenly became harder to obtain. A good time to pause things. That wouldn't be the case in Poland. But, note that I'll drop the supply radius for the start accordingly.

The Germans certainly thought they had to wait until the ground had dried -- and they were there. They should know.

Hitler was such a military genius. As he proved in this campaign.

I'm dubious of the assumption that TOAW 'mud' adequately models its impact on combat operations. Historically, both the Spring and the Fall Raputista brought everything to a screeching halt, or close to it. That happened every year, and in every sector. That much we do know.

Very hard to make mud appear in TOAW during the game. If we could fix that, it might not be so bad. But I agree it is an issue. But it's not an issue in the Editor. The "screeching halt", though, is a conscious choice. Probably a cost/benefit matter.

But note that even if operations are merely hampered, the Germans might still be better off waiting -- and certainly would have been if things had gone as they anticipated. After all, the game plan was to smash the Russians right at the onset -- as they more or less did. That requires moving as quickly as possible. If the Germans can start five weeks sooner but with only 60% of the historical impact, they might be better off waiting.

I think there's a tendency to underestimate the harm that was done to the Red Army in the opening weeks of the campaign. The bulk of their regular army was smashed. Thereafter, they were working largely with reserves -- and learning largely by doing. Indeed, 'learning by dying' might be more apt.

This fact continued to dog their performance at least through 1943. Every trained regular that survives those first few weeks contributes to a more effective Red Army thereafter. Therefore, even if the Germans can commence operations sooner, if there is a significant loss in the impact of the initial onslaught, it immediately becomes questionable if it might not have been better to wait.

The Germans don't want an initial assault that's significantly mired in mud. And given that the Luftwaffe found the fields unusable until June, the suggestion is that things were indeed muddy.

That's the stuff the scenario is intended to investigate. Which would be more valuable: fully exploiting the destruction of the frontier forces or having an extra five weeks?

And, let's not forget that the mud is in the process of drying out. It isn't 100% muddy one day and dry the next. The mud will become progressively scarcer - especially in the south.

And, of course, then there's the combined "What if": What if they fully motorized AND launched early?

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt653

Another point that bears repeating is that hypotheticals such as still more divisions moved from the West and still more diversion from U-boats to tanks assume that Russia is expected to be a tough nut to crack.

Well, that's not at all what I said. I said that if the Germans were going to focus on motorization they might divert resources from the Luftwaffe and/or U-Boats, and that they might move more divisions from the west in order to execute the Balkans campaign without delaying Barbarossa. Has nothing to do with fear of Russia.

Yeah, but given confidence that Russia will be a cakewalk, why would they do this?

They want to continue to build up the Luftwaffe and the U-boats, and they don't want to create opportunities for Britain to mount raids and/or for Vichy to rethink surrender. They'd do what they did -- continue U-boat production and maintain ample forces in the West.

Bear in mind that aside from Britain, Vichy was still to some extent an independent actor with considerable military resources at her disposal in North Africa. -- Then too, the United States was all but openly at war with Germany by this point. There would be costs and risks associated with pulling troops and resources away from the West. Absent a perceived need, why would this happen?

It's a bit like expecting me to cancel that lavish homeowners policy so I can save up money for that cancer operation I'm going to need next year. Problem is, I don't know I have the cancer yet, so why would I feel the need to cancel the lavish homeowners policy?

It's true that Hitler could have committed greater resources to Barbarossa. However, that he should have depends on hindsight. While there were dissenting voices, the consensus was that Russia would be a cakewalk, and 80% or whatever it was of the Wehrmacht's resources seemed ample to administer the requisite hammer blow.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

They already were looting the west for vehicles: that's part of how they doubled the number of motorized divisions from 1940 to 1941. Ditto looting fuel: the Germans seized the major part of the available fuel stocks anyway in 1940.

They evidently cranked it up after Barbarossa - most likely due to necessity. I'm assuming they take that step before Barbarossa. It's possible you're right about the fuel, but I'm doubtful. What constitutes "available" most likely was a shifting concept. The occupied countries weren't devoid of economic activity from the start.

They weren't devoid of economic activity because they largely got by with horse-drawn transportation, bicycles, etc. Look at some photos of Paris under the occupation. The absence of fuel is a 'hard' fact. Little more can be garnered because it simply isn't there.

In any case, you're talking about multiplying the Wehrmacht's fuel needs several times over. Even if you could scare up another 10% somehow, that wouldn't permit you to do what you propose.

Regardless, Germany's economy could have been a short-term source of fuel in a pinch - if it could have made the difference. German families would get their groceries delivered by ox cart for a while. Some non-war industry could be suspended.

You don't get it. It's not like these were fully motorized economies in the first place, with trucks and fuel all over the place. What's more, the squeeze had already happened. What trucks there were had largely been taken. Such measures might fuel one more division. They're not going to fuel another 150.

Furthermore, remember that I'm lowering the FSL some. That means units get to lower supply levels sooner. That means they have lower average Movement Allowances. That means they are using less fuel than historically - due to lower duty-cycles. (I could do this better if we had component supply, of course.)

Ditto. I can't 'kind of' drive to LA with one third of the requisite gas. I simply can't.

And, let me repeat that trucks that are just carrying troops forward don't get as much use as trucks that are carrying supplies. The troop trucks just move forward with the troops. The supply trucks make continuous round-trips. The fuel needs aren't going to be that much greater.

It's academic, since you're not even close to having the fuel you would need, but the reverse is the case. Combat operations burn fuel like crazy. Supply columns can at least travel in a straight line and think about efficiency. Combat units are reversing, going off ten km to the left and then changing their mind, revving up and getting out now, etc.

Now, of course, they won't have the option to loot after Barbarossa anymore. So, Barbarossa had better be especially successful. And that won't be a given, since their supply net won't be advancing any faster than before. I've set up the VPs so that the Axis have to take Leningrad and Moscow just to get a draw.

This is a bit like saying that you'll get me to drive those four hundred miles with three gallons of gas by threatening to fine me if I don't. Will and incentives don't matter: the fuel isn't there.

I don't see how you can see going to full motorization as requiring only a 50% increase in vehicles. The Germans are going to go from thirty or so motorized divisions to a hundred and fifty or so -- I read that as a 500% increase, not 50%. Perhaps you're just replacing all the horses with trucks: but the infantry can't walk any more -- not if the divisions are to be motorized.

The infantry divisions are heavily motorized already - but those trucks only carry supplies. Adding enough trucks to give the infantry a ride is only a small increase - about 50%, as I said.

Just the contrary was the case. The Wehrmacht stripped the rest of the army of all the trucks it could to motorize the additional divisions it did motorize. You're trying to squeeze the fat out of an anorexic.

As to just driving the trucks till they drop -- these aren't modern vehicles. If one looks up breakdown rates and engine life for 1940's trucks, it's not like one's going to get years of trouble-free driving. They seem to have required constant attention. So unlike you or me and our 2002 Toyota, the drop is going to come pretty quick.

They're still trucks. And the amount looted would significantly exceed the amount necessary to motorize the divisions. So there would be lots of spares being delivered. Note that TOAW combat kills a lot of trucks that in reality would have been left in the rear - so this is actually being modeled in a perverse way.

I don't think this actually responds to the points I raised. There aren't all that many extra trucks to be looted, removing what trucks aren't already in the motorized divisions will have drastic consequences, and the Wehrmacht was quite aware of the desirability of motorization and historically did about all it could. There were excellent reasons it didn't do more, and you can't just ignore these reasons by fiat.

I mean, you might as reasonably give them tactical nuclear weapons. Hey: a crash program over the winter of 1940-41. Why not? The arguments you employ to permit full motorization will suffice to permit this as well.

The relatively cooperative populations of the occupied West are going to jib when the Wehrmacht abruptly seizes everything, food deliveries collapse, etc. Indeed, it's possible a catastrophic decline in productivity would more than erase any gains from implementing the scheme you suggest. As I say, I think this idea is essentially utopian -- in the real world, it wouldn't be practical.

Let's repeat - they did this historically. Just after Barbarossa. Now they'll do it before. And, are you admitting that those trucks were in operation in the occuppied countries?

No -- they didn't do it historically. The Wehrmacht did not go to full motorization after Barbarossa. It was never able to do this because the trucks were never there and the fuel was never there.

What's more, no matter what rabbits you pull out of your hat, they never will be. This didn't happen because it couldn't happen. Indeed, it was in 1942 that German operations began to be noticeably impacted by a lack of fuel for what divisions were motorized. This happened not just in North Africa, but on both fronts of Army Group South's advance. Not enough fuel for even the divisions that are motorized -- and not enough trucks to bring supplies up to them. Motorize the whole army, and you've just taken the situation from strained to hopeless. Now they'll really be out of fuel.

An earlier start is kind of debatable. The 'full motorization' is just a complete non-starter.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

So, wherever the mud was, it would have dried out in the Ukraine before Poland and etc. Since Poland was dried out about a month later at the most, I'm doubtful that mud was much of an issue in the Ukraine in May.

Well, they are different climate systems, and I just don't see how what happened in one can offer much of a guide to what happens in the other. Maybe there isn't a muddy period. Maybe the Germans attacked after it. I don't think the answers will be terribly useful in any case.

Perhaps you missed my real point. Poland is north of the Ukraine. Poland was completely dry by June 22. Therefore the Ukraine should be dry well head of that.

Actually, Poland is north of the Carpathians. It's as much west as it is north of the Ukraine.

Moreover, while the Germans can pile over a hundred divisions up in Poland and allow Stalin to continue to hide his head in the sand, he's going to have a hard time denying reality if these divisions are piling up in Rumania -- which is where they would need to go if you're to get around the mud.

Not to mention that now you'll be attacking on a narrow front, which will reduce the extent of the frontage the Russians are facing catastrophe on, not to mention that Rumania's transportation infrastructure was decidedly limited and it's questionable if the entire Wehrmacht can be staged through there...and not to mention, it's yet to be established that the Ukraine is in fact dry by May.

Historically, the Germans were overwhelmingly concentrated in German-held territory -- as usual, for good reason. In the case of Barbarossa, that means Poland. So the issue remains -- when did the mud dry in Poland? From the available evidence -- the Luftwaffe's inability to begin deploying by then -- not by May 15th.

Not really. Tanks yes -- but halftracks were still pretty few and far between, and the artillery was almost entirely towed.

The tanks would be the ones carrying out the tactical penetrations and envelopements, etc. So, tactically, I don't see much of an issue. And Soviet tactical reactions would have been slowed by the mud just as well.

Honestly. Are you aware of the concept of panzer operations? Yes, the infantry and the artillery -- not to mention refills on fuel and shells -- need to come too. The tanks can't just go tearing off by themselves for a month until the mud dries.

And, Poland's roads might be more plentiful and better constructed than those of Russia's interior. And the terrain wouldn't have been already chewed up by armies in combat prior to launch.

Now we're postulating a road net that 'might' be better. I doubt if it was paved -- and if it ain't paved...mud. As to the 'terrain chewed up by armies in combat' I don't think that was the problem later. Army Group Center was advancing through nice fresh terrain when the mud hit that fall -- that didn't solve the problem.

And, the Soviets themselves are going to be weaker due to five weeks less production and reorganization.

As was demonstrated all too clearly that fall, if the mud's a problem, the condition of the Red Army doesn't matter. An advance can't happen.

More to the point, if the advance is even significantly handicapped, any (debatable) reduced readiness on the part of the Red Army is going to be more than offset by the reduced destruction the Wehrmacht can inflict on it. It's not like the Red Army did okay in late June -- it was torn completely to pieces. It really couldn't have done much worse.

Note that this will change fast. That first load of fuel will get the panzers perhaps a hundred miles from the frontier. Thereafter, trucks are indeed going to have to be making it up to the front.

But their supply head is right behind them - in contrast to in the Fall, when it was hundreds of miles in the rear.

Once they've advanced a hundred miles, it won't be right behind them. It'll still be firmly stuck at the railhead. Not to mention -- what condition have those tanks left those roads in? It still being muddy and all.

Picture a dirt road that is still decidedly...moist. Now run a panzer regiment and its associated vehicles over it. Now tell me what you see.

I expect that was the real impediment to any progress during the mud phase. Supply - that was already tight - suddenly became harder to obtain. A good time to pause things. That wouldn't be the case in Poland. But, note that I'll drop the supply radius for the start accordingly.

You make it sound as if Army Group Center decided, 'might as well take a break' when the mud hit -- they could have kept advancing if they really wanted to.

Au contraire. They were fully aware of the condition of the Red Army opposite them and fully aware of the need to make progress. They probably should have just taken a break.

However, they didn't. For about a week, they kept trying to forge ahead, expending enormous amounts of fuel and energy.

Progress was pathetic. The mud simply wouldn't permit an advance. No way of moving at more than foot speed, no way of getting up supplies, and no way of outflanking even the most limited opposition. A complete non-starter.

The Germans certainly thought they had to wait until the ground had dried -- and they were there. They should know.

Hitler was such a military genius. As he proved in this campaign.

Hitler and the rest of the Wehrmacht. What we have here on the one hand is the unanimous opinion of everyone who actually saw the situation first-hand -- and on the other hand, yours. Who do you think we should go with?

As with the full-motorization, you can't just alter reality by fiat. While some alteration is always possible, things generally happened the way they did for good reason. It's not like everyone was willfully stupid until Curtis LeMay came along.

I'm dubious of the assumption that TOAW 'mud' adequately models its impact on combat operations. Historically, both the Spring and the Fall Raputista brought everything to a screeching halt, or close to it. That happened every year, and in every sector. That much we do know.

Very hard to make mud appear in TOAW during the game. If we could fix that, it might not be so bad. But I agree it is an issue. But it's not an issue in the Editor.

You're missing the point. TOAW 'mud' imposes a mild delay. That's not what happened.

The "screeching halt", though, is a conscious choice. Probably a cost/benefit matter.

As noted, this was not in fact the case. Army Group Center exhausted itself trying to slug through it anyway. It simply couldn't be done.

But note that even if operations are merely hampered, the Germans might still be better off waiting -- and certainly would have been if things had gone as they anticipated. After all, the game plan was to smash the Russians right at the onset -- as they more or less did. That requires moving as quickly as possible. If the Germans can start five weeks sooner but with only 60% of the historical impact, they might be better off waiting.

I think there's a tendency to underestimate the harm that was done to the Red Army in the opening weeks of the campaign. The bulk of their regular army was smashed. Thereafter, they were working largely with reserves -- and learning largely by doing. Indeed, 'learning by dying' might be more apt.

This fact continued to dog their performance at least through 1943. Every trained regular that survives those first few weeks contributes to a more effective Red Army thereafter. Therefore, even if the Germans can commence operations sooner, if there is a significant loss in the impact of the initial onslaught, it immediately becomes questionable if it might not have been better to wait.

The Germans don't want an initial assault that's significantly mired in mud. And given that the Luftwaffe found the fields unusable until June, the suggestion is that things were indeed muddy.

That's the stuff the scenario is intended to investigate. Which would be more valuable: fully exploiting the destruction of the frontier forces or having an extra five weeks?

But since you can't properly simulate the mud in the first place, and haven't even worked out when it did dry, you can't really simulate anything except 'what if the mud wasn't there?' That's interesting -- but not very likely. It presumably was there -- witness the inability of the Luftwaffe to deploy. How badly, and until when -- that would be what to find out. However, we can pretty much rule May 15 out.

And, let's not forget that the mud is in the process of drying out. It isn't 100% muddy one day and dry the next. The mud will become progressively scarcer - especially in the south.

And, of course, then there's the combined "What if": What if they fully motorized AND launched early?

Don't forget the tactical nuclear weapons and the possibility the Red Army is armed with spears.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt653

Initially, Hitler made the decision to attack Russia in July 1940. He wanted to go in late August or early September 1940. The weather was of no major concern to him, but the time it would take to redeploy units from the west to the east, and the time to recall 30-35 divisions that had been disbanded after France fell, caused him to change his mind and reschedule the attack for May 1941. By that time the Wehrmacht would be redeployed, and it seems as a matter of convenience the spring thaws would be in most part over.

In December 1940, Hitler decided to eliminate the Allied base in Greece sometime in March/April 1941. The timing would be based on gettting Bulgaria to join the Axis and redeploying units to Bulgaria. This operation had no influence on the projected start of Barbarossa.

In March 1941, Bulgaria joined the Axis. But before the Greece attack was started, Yugoslavia joined the Allies (or at least became Anti-Nazi). This caused Hitler to order an overwhelming 500,000 troops (including 8 Pz Div's) to attack Yugoslavia and postpone Barbarossa for 6 weeks so that the panzers could be refitted and redeployed.

This last point seems to be the major consideration in the timing. Hitler didn't want those 8 Pz Div's to miss the show in Russia.

Broadly, yeah. But at the same time, the mud was real, and it would seem that the May 15th start wouldn't have worked in any case.

One would want to ascertain what would have worked. It's interesting to contemplate. Hitler could have just ignored Yugoslavia. In fact, for all of Churchill's 'Yugoslavia has found her soul,' the parties that carried out the coup rushed to reassure the Germans of their continued submissiveness, and a Yugoslavia that found itself surrounded by Italy, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and an Axis-occupied Greece and Albania indeed would have found it best to behave.

At the same time, the German plan did rest on transiting Yugoslavia to outflank the Greek defenses north of Salonika. So Hitler's going to want to go through at least the southern corner of Yugoslavia -- whether it's with her permission or without it. Now, can he do that without bothering to simultaneously overrun the rest of it?

I can see Germany simply informing Yugoslavia that 'well, our divisions are coming through Nis anyway. We suggest you don't interfere.' Even Serbs can bow to reality.

Now Hitler can mount Barbarossa as originally planned -- which brings us to when the mud did dry. Here, one presumably has some Luftwaffe units reporting that 'yeah, we're here and this field is dry enough to use now.' That would give us something resembling a working start date.

[ColinWright]

Another aspect of the whole Yugoslavia question is the the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Yugoslavia on 5 April 1941.

That's interesting -- from a number of angles. However, what happens if Hitler does forgo attacking Yugoslavia and just transits the southeast corner as planned?

Does Yugoslavia resist? And if so, what happens then?

There also remains the point: why should Hitler refrain from smashing the Yugoslavs? What causes him to be aware of the imperative need to start Barbarossa as soon as possible? What's wrong with June 22nd? From the perspective of early 1941, it looks fine.

On the one hand, he can administer deeply satisfying chastisement to somebody who has just willfully defied him: Serbs were spitting on the German ambassador. On the other hand, he can ignore what is rapidly becoming a potential belligerent on his flank (see the pact with Russia).

Absent a gift for seeing into the future, seems like kind of a no-brainer to me.

[ColinWright]

About the mud, this is what Keegan has to say:

"...the German army found it even more difficult than expected to position the units allocated for Barbarossa in Poland; while the lateness of the spring thaw, which left the eastern European rivers in spate beyond the predicted date, meant that Barbarossa could not have begun very much earlier than the third week of June, whatever Hitler's intentions..."

This is from a general history, but absent contradictory data, it'll have to do. No early Barbarossa.

[Telumar]

One simply could assume that the spring thaw came early instead of late. What about that? [:'(] 

The scenario would be hypothetical anyway, so..

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Telumar

One simply could assume that the spring thaw came early instead of late. What about that? [:'(] 

The scenario would be hypothetical anyway, so..

Winter was early too. It could be adjusted at either end. However, the distinction would be that weather isn't subject to human control. Assuming it could have been different is a hypothetical as well -- but of a different kind.

Personally, my feeling has always been that if the Germans had just driven straight on Moscow rather than first stopping to argue and then allowing themselves to be seduced by Kiev, they would have taken the city by early October and Soviet Union would have disintegrated.

Alternatively, if Hitler had gone for Rosenberg's concept of setting up a series of automous and dependent states in the European portion of the USSR rather than pursuing a policy of indiscriminate bestiality, the USSR would have collapsed as well.

Pursuing both would have pretty much ensured victory by the end of 1942 at the latest -- and perhaps considerably sooner.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

They weren't devoid of economic activity because they largely got by with horse-drawn transportation, bicycles, etc. Look at some photos of Paris under the occupation. The absence of fuel is a 'hard' fact. Little more can be garnered because it simply isn't there.

I remain doubtful. The war got meaner as it progressed. Especially after Barbarossa. There was more to be squeezed out.

In any case, you're talking about multiplying the Wehrmacht's fuel needs several times over. Even if you could scare up another 10% somehow, that wouldn't permit you to do what you propose.

No I'm not. There's only a 50% increase in trucks - and their fuel needs will not be as great as the supply column trucks. So, perhaps a 20% increase in fuel needs - and the shortfall will be shared among all units due to the reduced FSL.

You don't get it. It's not like these were fully motorized economies in the first place, with trucks and fuel all over the place. What's more, the squeeze had already happened. What trucks there were had largely been taken. Such measures might fuel one more division. They're not going to fuel another 150.

I'm not buying that either. It's very improbable that Germany would have taken all the trucks or fuel out of its economy. That would hit production.

Ditto. I can't 'kind of' drive to LA with one third of the requisite gas. I simply can't.

If you get 1/3 of the requisite gas every week you get there in three weeks. There is a rate of fuel production. If it is sufficient for only 80% of the army's needs, then they only move 80% as far per unit of time. And that's exactly what lowering the FSL models.

It's academic, since you're not even close to having the fuel you would need, but the reverse is the case. Combat operations burn fuel like crazy. Supply columns can at least travel in a straight line and think about efficiency. Combat units are reversing, going off ten km to the left and then changing their mind, revving up and getting out now, etc.

It doesn't matter if they can move in a straight line or not. They are moving continuously - from the terminal to the unit, then from the unit back to the terminal - repeat. That's what the vast majority of trucks were doing. That's in contrast to combat units where the trucks don't move at all unless the unit moves - and the unit only moves forward, if it moves. And I'm not making panzer divisions out of them. The trucks will only move operationally. The infantry divisions still fight on foot.

Just the contrary was the case. The Wehrmacht stripped the rest of the army of all the trucks it could to motorize the additional divisions it did motorize. You're trying to squeeze the fat out of an anorexic.

I've already given the statistics used, but I'll repeat them:

Historically the Germans sent 322,000 trucks into Barbarossa. They needed 170,000 more to fully motorize (a 53% increase). They looted 290,000 after Barbarossa failed. (120,000 extra).

No -- they didn't do it historically.

My sources say they did.

The Wehrmacht did not go to full motorization after Barbarossa. It was never able to do this because the trucks were never there and the fuel was never there.

It was too late then, because of the truck losses in Barbarossa. The looting was used to replace those losses.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Actually, Poland is north of the Carpathians. It's as much west as it is north of the Ukraine.

So what? The fact remains it is north of the Ukraine. Cooler. Yet fully dry by June 22. The Ukraine - at the same latitude as Yugoslavia, by the way - should have been dry much sooner.

Moreover, while the Germans can pile over a hundred divisions up in Poland and allow Stalin to continue to hide his head in the sand, he's going to have a hard time denying reality if these divisions are piling up in Rumania -- which is where they would need to go if you're to get around the mud.

Not to mention that now you'll be attacking on a narrow front, which will reduce the extent of the frontage the Russians are facing catastrophe on, not to mention that Rumania's transportation infrastructure was decidedly limited and it's questionable if the entire Wehrmacht can be staged through there...and not to mention, it's yet to be established that the Ukraine is in fact dry by May.

Historically, the Germans were overwhelmingly concentrated in German-held territory -- as usual, for good reason. In the case of Barbarossa, that means Poland. So the issue remains -- when did the mud dry in Poland? From the available evidence -- the Luftwaffe's inability to begin deploying by then -- not by May 15th.

?? What are you talking about? I'm not redeploying anything to Rumania. I'm just trying to figure out if there should be mud in the Ukraine.

Honestly. Are you aware of the concept of panzer operations? Yes, the infantry and the artillery -- not to mention refills on fuel and shells -- need to come too. The tanks can't just go tearing off by themselves for a month until the mud dries.

I'm quite certain that mud wouldn't provide a tactical defensive benefit to the Soviets. I don't think there's any historical evidence for that. Their reactive movements would have been just as affected. Operationally, resupply would be affected. But, that's modeled via reducing the supply radius. Exploitation will be affected, but that's modeled by mud tiles.

Now we're postulating a road net that 'might' be better. I doubt if it was paved -- and if it ain't paved...mud. As to the 'terrain chewed up by armies in combat' I don't think that was the problem later. Army Group Center was advancing through nice fresh terrain when the mud hit that fall -- that didn't solve the problem.

No, it makes a difference how the road is constructed as to just how bad mud affects it. Soviet roads were particularly bad. And the terrain wasn't fresh in the fall - it was full of manuvering Soviets.

As was demonstrated all too clearly that fall, if the mud's a problem, the condition of the Red Army doesn't matter. An advance can't happen.

Of course it matters. And advances did happen. Note that there was no mud halt in the spring of 1945. Fighting was continuous from January to May everywhere. Frontlines were pretty close to the Barbarossa start, too.

Once they've advanced a hundred miles, it won't be right behind them. It'll still be firmly stuck at the railhead. Not to mention -- what condition have those tanks left those roads in? It still being muddy and all.

Picture a dirt road that is still decidedly...moist. Now run a panzer regiment and its associated vehicles over it. Now tell me what you see.

That will be modeled by mud tiles and the reduced supply radius.

You make it sound as if Army Group Center decided, 'might as well take a break' when the mud hit -- they could have kept advancing if they really wanted to.

Au contraire. They were fully aware of the condition of the Red Army opposite them and fully aware of the need to make progress. They probably should have just taken a break.

However, they didn't. For about a week, they kept trying to forge ahead, expending enormous amounts of fuel and energy.

Progress was pathetic. The mud simply wouldn't permit an advance. No way of moving at more than foot speed, no way of getting up supplies, and no way of outflanking even the most limited opposition. A complete non-starter.

That sounds like just what I said. Mud does slow progress, and especially slows supplies. Under the circumstances of the fall, it was time for a break. The circumstances were different back in May.

Hitler and the rest of the Wehrmacht. What we have here on the one hand is the unanimous opinion of everyone who actually saw the situation first-hand -- and on the other hand, yours. Who do you think we should go with?

Their rationale was based upon a host of inaccurate pre-war assessments of Soviet strengths. Even their assessment of the mud was an opinion only. It would only become a fact if they had actually invaded and foundered in the mud. Since they didn't, it will remain an opinion for eternity. So many of their opinions about the Soviets were wrong, as it turned out. I have the edge of 20:20 hindsight.

But since you can't properly simulate the mud in the first place, and haven't even worked out when it did dry, you can't really simulate anything except 'what if the mud wasn't there?' That's interesting -- but not very likely. It presumably was there -- witness the inability of the Luftwaffe to deploy. How badly, and until when -- that would be what to find out. However, we can pretty much rule May 15 out.

Mud tiles and a lowered supply radius will model the operational effects of the mud. I don't expect any tactical effects, other than the cost of moving into a mud hex - and don't expect it would matter one way or the other - the frontier Soviets were so easy to roll. It's a design decision. Since it's a hypothetical anyway, it's anybody's opinion how to do it.

[BillLottJr]

ORIGINAL: polarenper

How about a complete hypothetical where Tukhachevsky is in charge of the red army and the Germans are fully motorized?

That would would actually be quite interesting.