China

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Symon

ORIGINAL: Big B
Trying to get a realistic China is addicting... is it not? [:D]

Addicting as hell !! There were several instances of certain Provincial Governors forbidding defeated troops of a neighboring Province from crossing a river (border) into their Province, thereby causing the complete destruction of the next-door Provincial Forces. How to model this? I'm clearing my mask and purging my regulator and diving deep into the ins-and-outs of the pwhexe system and its relationship to the code.

Maybe, just maybe, I can find something simple and straight forward that I can propose to Michael, that won't bend the stock system. A simple attribute cut-off should do the trick - there's room for it, not much, but some. Baby steps. [8D]

Ciao. John

I'm guessing "provinicial" borders (read -nations) with limitations on access to those "territories"... or perhaps its something else...

Too unweildly.

A bunch of extra Chinese squads being used would be much simplier. 200 Sichuan provincial squads a month to be used by the Sichuan regional forces. 150 Central Chinese squads for use with the core KMT formations, so on and so on.

[Symon]

ORIGINAL: treespider
i'm guessing "provinicial" borders (read -nations) with limitations on access to those "territories"... or perhaps its something else...

Aww, pooh, dude. Did ya hear? Joe Wilkerson posted that Mike Scholl died of cancer over the Easter weekend. He was one of us, and now he is gone.. A friend. God bless and keep. John

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: Symon
Joe Wilkerson posted that Mike Scholl died of cancer over the Easter weekend. He was one of us, and now he is gone.. A friend. God bless and keep. John

He just posted here a few days back ... wow. Gonna miss him and his perspective.

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: oldman45

My question is, did the Japanese ever really entertain the idea of taking over all of China? I was under the impression that they just wanted the coastal and industrial centers.

Not that I am aware of. My opinion from my reading; many of the IJA generals were looking for 'turf' to exercise their feudal lordship over. It wasn't conquest as a country per se, but more like "I want a feudal estate to call my own". Once they had their area, they were content to hold it and live easy.

In my mod, what I have done for china is to drive up the PP's on a lot of the leaders of IJ units in china. Most of them are just so-so (mediocre Land, low everything else), and if you make them a 50 - 75 PP leader, then as a player you are more or less stuck with them for a long time. This really curtails a lot of the IJ expansion. Lousy leaders will always catch up with you and cause you to have those really lousy rolls that are hard for the IJ to recover from. Lose 200 - 500 squads a couple of times due to a bad roll as the IJ and your China offensive gets squashed pretty quick.

My justification is that these guys were all pretty politically "in" and not likely to accept a repost without fighting it.

I'm looking forward to Johns fixes here as well. I feel between the two, china for me will be "fixed".

[btd64]

ORIGINAL: Symon

ORIGINAL: treespider
i'm guessing "provinicial" borders (read -nations) with limitations on access to those "territories"... or perhaps its something else...

Aww, pooh, dude. Did ya hear? Joe Wilkerson posted that Mike Scholl died of cancer over the Easter weekend. He was one of us, and now he is gone.. A friend. God bless and keep. John

LONG LIVE JOHN.

Moment Of Silence...............................................................................
GP

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Symon

ORIGINAL: treespider
i'm guessing "provinicial" borders (read -nations) with limitations on access to those "territories"... or perhaps its something else...

Aww, pooh, dude. Did ya hear? Joe Wilkerson posted that Mike Scholl died of cancer over the Easter weekend. He was one of us, and now he is gone.. A friend. God bless and keep. John

No. I didn't hear. Sad news indeed.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: oldman45

My question is, did the Japanese ever really entertain the idea of taking over all of China? I was under the impression that they just wanted the coastal and industrial centers.

No... but they did draft a plan for an offensive into Szechuan in 1942-43 that would have effectively knocked Chiang out of the war. Problem is they had to devote resources to other theaters and shelved the plans....and there was no guarantee the plan would have succeeded.

From Japanese Monograph No.71, p 121:

Plan to Capture Szechwan Province
As the operations in the south had progressed satisfactorily and by spring of 1942 the objective areas had, for the most part, been occupied, Imperial General Headquarters decided to investigate the possibility of taking advantage of the favorable situation.

The large bases for supplies and reorganization of fighting strength as well as approximately one-half of the enemy's war production enterprises were located in Szechwan Province. This area was also known to be used as a pool for American air force strength. It was estimated, therefore, that if the Japanese forces could deal a heavy blow to the Chinese Central Army which guarded this area and, at the same time, destroy the Chungking Government's bases of resistance, the possibility of defeating the enemy would be great. If this operation were successful, even though the enemy might not surrender, their position would be only that of a local government and the chances of promoting a settlement of the China Incident would be greatly improved. Furthermore, by occupying this area, any attempt by the British or American air forces to raid the Homeland from bases in China could be frustrated.

Imperial General Headquarters regarded this as an important objective both because it could bring about the submission of the Chu ngking Government and also because it could help to expand the success of the initial phase of the Pacific Star. An immediate decision, however, could not be made due to the changing conditions both in Japan and abroad as well as to the indefinite national strength. Preparations were ordered which would not affect other areas to any great extent as it was considered necessary to use every opportunity to conduct operations against China when the overall situation permitted.

The plan required the annihilation of the main force of the Chinese Central Army, the capture of key sectors in Szechwan Province, the destruction of enemy bases of resistance and the acceleration of the submission and capitulation of the Chungking Government. To attain these objectives, the main force of the China Expeditionary Army from the Changan area and, an element from the Ichang area were to advance toward the Szechwan Plains. During this period, the already occupied territories were to be maintained and secured with the minimum strength necessary. Close unity was to be emphasized between the operational directives and the political and propaganda measures to be taken against Chungking.

It was planned that an Area Army from south Shansi Province with approximately ten divisions and an Army from Ichang area, with approximately six divisions, would commence their attacks in the spring of 1943. The Area Army, after securing the Changan area, was to advance to the vicinity of Kuan Yuan and the Army was to advance into the area along a line running north and south of Wanhsien. With the completion of preparations in these areas, the offensive was to be taken. Chungking and Chengtu were to be occupied as well as the key sectors in Szechwan Province. If necessary, campaigns were then to be conducted to annihilate the enemy bases of resistance in essential areas.

The period for this operation was estimated to be approximately five months. During this time the occupied areas were to be maintained and secured and the enemy checked in order to facilitate the offensive operation.

The strength to be employed in t-is operation was the China Expeditionary Army to which were to be attached elements from the Homeland, Manchuria and the southern area.

On 3 September 1942, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the China Expeditionary Army to make the necessary preparations. During the latter part of September, however, due to the gradual shift in power in the Solomons Campaign, Imperial General Headquarters decided to postpone temporarily the dispatch of materiel required in the Szechwan Operation and gave orders to the China Expeditionary Army to this effect.

Toward the end of 1942, because of the adverse situation in the southeastern area and also because of lack of shipping, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the suspension of the Szechwan Operation. Further,, it was decided that it would be impossible to conduct this operation in 1943. In fact, it was regarded as impossible to conduct active operations in the China area before the war situation in the southeastern Pacific improved considerably. Future operations in the China area were, therefore to be conducted according to the following plan:

“The over-all situation of the Japanese Army is such that not only will the supply of men and materiel to China be stopped but divisions and other units will be sent from China to the south Pacific area and other points. Operations in China will be conducted according to the present mission of the China Expeditionary Army within the bounds mentioned above. Special emphasis will be placed upon the necessity to maintain order in the occupied regions. Every effort w ill be made to conserve the fighting strength of the China Expeditionary Army until such time as the war situation in the south Pacific area is settled satisfactorily. Aerial operations will be carried out in accordance with the changes in situation, especially to cope with the increase' in the enemy air force. For the time being, however, operations will be limited to the present :scale. Aerial warfare ' against China will be emphasized subsequent to the spring of next year and preparations will be undertaken for these increased aerial operations in order to crush the enemy's aerial initiative after the spring of 1943.”

At the end of February 1943, the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army was given the following mission:

“Occupied areas will be maintained. The enemy will be crushed and his will to continue the war destroyed. Control of the air will be wrested from the enemy air force which is based in China. In spring the air force will be reinforced and aerial operations. will be conducted in cooperation with a ground offensive. Security will be maintained in cities as well as in areas with important natural resources and along lines of communication. Troops will be concentrated gradually in order to meet any change: in the situation and the fighting strength will be increased.”

[oldman45]

Thanks for the info Treespider.

[traskott]

How u can move all that supply unloaded at Rangoon to China ?

Thanks !![:)]

[Symon]

ORIGINAL: traskott
How u can move all that supply unloaded at Rangoon to China ?

Thanks !![:)]

You can't. In '41 and up till Rangoon was taken, the actual (real, counted) numbers were; for every 1500 tons unloaded at Rangoon, 500 tons made it to Kunming. And then there was another looooong trip to Chungking and then (maybe) the front. Unknown tens of thousands of tons were taken by Japan on the docks.

[Symon]

There were several types of Chinese Inf Squads, both throughout the forces and by time. There’s a good indication of the squad makeup of the German trained divisions, but those were fought out at Nanking and had to be reconstituted and retrained at their home stations without the benefit of the imported equipment that was lost on the field.

Nonetheless, it’s pretty well understood that the (elite) Chinese squad was built around an LMG (ZB26, basically a Bren) with 10 more rifles. It kinda morphed a bit in ’39-’41 (considering the dearth of ordnance) to include the Type 27 GL (knee mortar), in ‘teams’ of 3. The actual echelon placement of GL teams was all over the map, but the March ’42 Central Command Regimental organization tables make clear that a Regt was contemplated as having 54 LMGs and 54 GLs; this necessarily implies either a reasonable company component, or a ‘penny’ distribution. There are no sources, so one must apply simple organizational and tactical logic to the problem.

Thus, manpower and weapons are aggregated at the company level and a nominal squad, with nominal LC, A-S, A-A is derived that functions within the Chinese Div/Corps/Army OOB assault value paradigm.

Next is the “nominal” Central Command squad. Then the better (more progressive) WL squads. Then the ‘peasant levy’ units. Stay tuned.

Ciao. John

[spence]

The objective here appears to be to disable the proposition that Imperial Japan could simultaneously pursue victory in China and while attacking "everybody else" after failing to achieve victory in China when that was all they had to do. Perhaps that might be achieved better by removing some of the offensive potential of the IJA than by increasing the defensive potential of the Chinese.

By 1941 the war in China had become pretty static. Was not there a tendency of the IJA to blame the stalemate on Western aid rather than any failings on itself. This war was being waged in a very underdeveloped area and the IJA had basically a horse drawn supply chain. Just moving supply from one place to another was therefore a serious drain on IJA combat power because of the number of troops involved in moving the supply and maintaining control of the IJA LOCs. The IJA couldn't motorize its supply chain, which might have allowed it to project more combat power, because it didn't have the fuel to do so.

The Japanese could "solve" the "fuel for supply motorization problem" and the "Western aid problem" by attacking/beating everybody else.

Perhaps if the Japanese had a higher percentage of disabled or disrupted squads (not sure what the difference actually is) amongst its infantry components then it would have less offensive potential in China while still maintaining a decent defensive capability. Since the solution to both disruption and disablement is time and supply then a major offensive in China would require that the Japanese divert a bunch of supply to the Chinese Theater which of course would put them on the "horns of a dilema" with their war raging all over the map. The disabled/disrupted infantry squads would represent troops engaged in LOC protection/supply movement duties. Just a thought.

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: Symon

ORIGINAL: traskott
How u can move all that supply unloaded at Rangoon to China ?

Thanks !![:)]

You can't. In '41 and up till Rangoon was taken, the actual (real, counted) numbers were; for every 1500 tons unloaded at Rangoon, 500 tons made it to Kunming. And then there was another looooong trip to Chungking and then (maybe) the front. Unknown tens of thousands of tons were taken by Japan on the docks.

Well you can actually (in the game) and it works in stock and every mod because that's how the supply routine works. While you might not get supply to any of those "supply restricted bases" that only get a certain amount of supply
per day depending on size, you can get hundreds of thousands of tons to China if you unload enough at Rangoon. It will just flow to Paoshan and further on to China. That is how it works. This is what I meant in
my previous post. And if someone comes up telling me this isn't true, I have posted several dozen of screenshots in my AARs that show supply moving to China en masse. You get spoilage of course but it is flowing.

All China needs is supply. Get some supply there and it can't be taken by the Japanese, get a good amount there and Japan will collapse in 43 when the Chinese have 30,000 av rolling over them. I am sure this will
seen as negative critics of the supply routine. I am just saying how it works and if Allied players would not abandon the whole map all the time, they wouldn't have to complain about China falling as it's mostly
their own fault. No Rangoon, no Burma, no supply in China.

edit: knowing that words don't mean anything most often, here's a) one of the screenshots and b) the link to the AAR I have taken it out that later on also shows what happens when China gets supply.

fb.asp?m=3115237

In the first 8 weeks alone far over 100,000 tons of supply went to China. Due to fully building forts and recovering squads/devices, the actual number of supply going there was far higher. Without Burma, it was
only going down FAST. The longer you hold Burma, the more supply moves to China. Only if you move supply to Rangoon of course. And it's of course not only supply that is moving there, fuel also flows there. I've
never moved fuel to Rangoon so that's only from what is refined in Burma and what already was there. Moving high quantities of fuel there probably leads to the same flow as with supply.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: spence

The objective here appears to be to disable the proposition that Imperial Japan could simultaneously pursue victory in China and while attacking "everybody else" after failing to achieve victory in China when that was all they had to do. Perhaps that might be achieved better by removing some of the offensive potential of the IJA than by increasing the defensive potential of the Chinese.

By 1941 the war in China had become pretty static. Was not there a tendency of the IJA to blame the stalemate on Western aid rather than any failings on itself. This war was being waged in a very underdeveloped area and the IJA had basically a horse drawn supply chain. Just moving supply from one place to another was therefore a serious drain on IJA combat power because of the number of troops involved in moving the supply and maintaining control of the IJA LOCs. The IJA couldn't motorize its supply chain, which might have allowed it to project more combat power, because it didn't have the fuel to do so.

The Japanese could "solve" the "fuel for supply motorization problem" and the "Western aid problem" by attacking/beating everybody else.

Perhaps if the Japanese had a higher percentage of disabled or disrupted squads (not sure what the difference actually is) amongst its infantry components then it would have less offensive potential in China while still maintaining a decent defensive capability. Since the solution to both disruption and disablement is time and supply then a major offensive in China would require that the Japanese divert a bunch of supply to the Chinese Theater which of course would put them on the "horns of a dilema" with their war raging all over the map. The disabled/disrupted infantry squads would represent troops engaged in LOC protection/supply movement duties. Just a thought.

Astute observations by Mr Spence, ( I would differ with the static notion, but I digress) which couples nicely with Castor Troy's post below it...

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: Symon

ORIGINAL: traskott
How u can move all that supply unloaded at Rangoon to China ?

Thanks !![:)]

You can't. In '41 and up till Rangoon was taken, the actual (real, counted) numbers were; for every 1500 tons unloaded at Rangoon, 500 tons made it to Kunming. And then there was another looooong trip to Chungking and then (maybe) the front. Unknown tens of thousands of tons were taken by Japan on the docks.

Well you can actually (in the game) and it works in stock and every mod because that's how the supply routine works. While you might not get supply to any of those "supply restricted bases" that only get a certain amount of supply
per day depending on size, you can get hundreds of thousands of tons to China if you unload enough at Rangoon. It will just flow to Paoshan and further on to China. That is how it works. This is what I meant in
my previous post. And if someone comes up telling me this isn't true, I have posted several dozen of screenshots in my AARs that show supply moving to China en masse. You get spoilage of course but it is flowing.

All China needs is supply. Get some supply there and it can't be taken by the Japanese, get a good amount there and Japan will collapse in 43 when the Chinese have 30,000 av rolling over them. I am sure this will
seen as negative critics of the supply routine. I am just saying how it works and if Allied players would not abandon the whole map all the time, they wouldn't have to complain about China falling as it's mostly
their own fault. No Rangoon, no Burma, no supply in China.

edit: knowing that words don't mean anything most often, here's a) one of the screenshots and b) the link to the AAR I have taken it out that later on also shows what happens when China gets supply.

fb.asp?m=3115237

In the first 8 weeks alone far over 100,000 tons of supply went to China. Due to fully building forts and recovering squads/devices, the actual number of supply going there was far higher. Without Burma, it was
only going down FAST. The longer you hold Burma, the more supply moves to China. Only if you move supply to Rangoon of course. And it's of course not only supply that is moving there, fuel also flows there. I've
never moved fuel to Rangoon so that's only from what is refined in Burma and what already was there. Moving high quantities of fuel there probably leads to the same flow as with supply.

In my mod I limit the Japanese offensive potential by placing far more places for them to garrison on the map both conqurered and unconquered. Chinese potential is limted likewise with garrison requirements,restrictions on the capabilities of the HQ's in China, as well as supply flow restrictions in China which affect both sides. The Chinese also will face a supply crunch if kept under pressure by the Japanese...its a delicate balance that needs to be struck.

[Symon]

Doing the Chinese squads takes a bit of abstraction. If one takes the general rifle squad as a basis, the weapon FP works out to 8.7 (9), this includes a % of GD teams. This is bad, since the assault-value algorithm only looks at devices with Anti-Soft > 10 (thought it was 9, but it’s not, it’s 10). So to make it happen, and give everyone an A-S of 11 or greater, some adjustments have to be made on the LC of the different squads and their aggregation up into a unit.

So there will be squads of 12, 15 and 18 men, and Regiments of 81, 66, and 54 squads, respectively (full-up). Firepower ranges from a respectable 17, down to 13. Although the numbers aren’t that far apart, the calculation, are. 81 x 17 is 1377; 54 x 13 is 702. Then, of course, the AV difference is 81 v 54. Then, of course, the experience difference is similar. Then, of course, the leadership skills are similar. Then, of course, almost everybody will be short, and the only reinforcements are from levys, and only a very, very, few of them got any training.

Anyway, approaching a system.

Ciao. John

[Symon]

ORIGINAL: spence
The objective here appears to be to disable the proposition that Imperial Japan could simultaneously pursue victory in China and while attacking "everybody else" after failing to achieve victory in China ... blah, blah ...

The objective here is to make Chinese forces more grainy such that players can use them in the manner that Chaing did. If you don't know what you are talking about, the best approach is to keep your mouth shut and see what comes along.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Symon

Doing the Chinese squads takes a bit of abstraction. If one takes the general rifle squad as a basis, the weapon FP works out to 8.7 (9), this includes a % of GD teams. This is bad, since the assault-value algorithm only looks at devices with Anti-Soft > 10 (thought it was 9, but it’s not, it’s 10). So to make it happen, and give everyone an A-S of 11 or greater, some adjustments have to be made on the LC of the different squads and their aggregation up into a unit.

So there will be squads of 12, 15 and 18 men, and Regiments of 81, 66, and 54 squads, respectively (full-up). Firepower ranges from a respectable 17, down to 13. Although the numbers aren’t that far apart, the calculation, are. 81 x 17 is 1377; 54 x 13 is 702. Then, of course, the AV difference is 81 v 54. Then, of course, the experience difference is similar. Then, of course, the leadership skills are similar. Then, of course, almost everybody will be short, and the only reinforcements are from levys, and only a very, very, few of them got any training.

Anyway, approaching a system.

Ciao. John

Is my memory correct that those squad-type devices with an anti-soft of less than 11 still have an AV albeit at a 1 for 10 ratio?

So 10 squads with an anti-soft of 9 give you an AV of 1.

[Symon]

You have your system. I have mine. Thanks

[treespider]

Helpful as always.[:D]

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: treespider

Is my memory correct that those squad-type devices with an anti-soft of less than 11 still have an AV albeit at a 1 for 10 ratio?

So 10 squads with an anti-soft of 9 give you an AV of 1.

I don't have the code in front of me, but I believe squads with an anti-soft<10 are not counted for offensive AV calculations. They are counted on defense. The actual anti-soft and anti-armor numbers are used in the shooting against one another phase and a higher value gives a device more of a chance to inflict damage. In the assault phase, AV is just calculated by adding up devices with an anti-soft>9. So if you have 50 squads with an a-s value of 10, that is an AV of 50. If you have 50 squads with an a-s value of 20, it's still an AV of 50.

Bill