Hypothetical Dec 7th

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

You have answered my post so can only assume you are answering me....

You assume incorrectly. I too would have assumed incorrectly if I had thought you were replying to witqps.

I address an individual at the top of a post or quote an individual [white box] when I am addressing them.

Alfred

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: warspite1

You have answered my post so can only assume you are answering me....

You assume incorrectly. I too would have assumed incorrectly if I had thought you were replying to witqps.

I address an individual at the top of a post or quote an individual [white box] when I am addressing them.

Alfred

warspite1

There is a line, bottom right hand corner of the post box. It says in reply to. As you can see I was replying to you not witpqs and you were, seemingly, replying to me.

[Big B]

Well this has turned into an 'interesting exchange'. What happened historically IS what happened.
But for fun, my own 2c on would war have been possible without the PH raid.

The point has been made that to give the embargo teeth - forward deployment was a necessity, otherwise the US could never declare war on Japan - presuming the US must goad Japan into striking, otherwise Japan would be free to simply conquer Asia/Pacific and thumb it's nose at a powerless USA.
As much as US public opinion was decidedly against getting involved in a foreign war on Dec 6th, 1941 - I don't know what would have happened without Japan attacking the US directly ...but it is clear the Japanese Leaders never considered peace with the US as feasible by late 1941.

Certainly, putting the fleet at PH offered up a tempting target for the Japanese to hit on Day One - which could only encourage the Japanese policy makers to choose war (both the US and Japan knew that PH was vulnerable to such a raid - the US having done it themselves recently in fleet exercises...and initial surprise attack was also the way Japan had started wars with China and Russia in that living generation).

Japan knew the US was gearing up for war by late 1940, the US having enacted the draft in Sep 1940 (numbers skyrocketing into the millions already), passed the Two Ocean Navy Act in Jul 1940 (all those 1942-1945 ships are already under construction), and was engaged in an undeclared 'shoot on site' war with German U-Boats in the Atlantic by 1941.
Also, ignoring the US leaves the Philippines in American hands, which the US could built up with impunity, leaving Japan's industrial security at the USA's mercy.

Given the above, if avoiding a war with the USA in 1941 was a realistic possibility for Japan - simply by getting resources elsewhere - it staggers my imagination Japan would not have simply done so.

In post #16 I asked: "are we suggesting that the only real deciding factor between war and peace was because the US sent the Fleet to Pearl and a few planes to the Philippines? "
I still can't see it that way. Those acts in themselves are trivial, certainly not significant enough to commit to going to war over - risking national ruin.

I believe the embargo had all the force necessary to force Japan to act - and to act first, because it would have ruined the Japanese economy - as the Japanese understood very well, and the USA did NOT have to act - but merely wait out Japan and watch her economy implode.

I would further put forth that given that Japan must react with either war or concessions - keeping the Pacific Fleet out of harm's way on the West Coast - could only have had a sobering effect on Japanese leaders by depriving them of any hopeful way to begin the war with some advantage....


Back to my original question - what does the KB get assigned to do? the suggestions of Singapore, PI, early DEI, or a PH raid non-the-less .. are all valid (to me).

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Alfred,

What you are saying is that without the Pearl Harbor strike (or a substitute) there would have been no war initiated by Japan. Yet my understanding of Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor plan was that it was, "If you insist on going to war, this is the only sensible way to start it." Not, "Here is a plan you've been hoping for so you can go to war." My understanding is that the leadership of Japan was going to war, not that they were going to war because the Pearl Harbor plan allowed them to.

1. No casus bellus, no American declaration of war.

2. Even when a casus bellus exists, nations do not automatically go to war. The pre-war Panay incident was a casus bellus but no war resulted. The 1979 storming of the American embassy in Tehran provided a casus bellus but no war resulted.

3. The Soviet - Japanese Non Aggression Pact, which settled the internal North v South expansion debate was signed after the American fleet had moved to Pearl Harbor. That decision was not an irrevocable decision to go to war as seen by the fact that Japan was able to expand it's interests in Indo-China without precipitating war and subsequently expanded to Portuguese Timor without a war with Portugal.

4. The Japanese government had not decided to go to war when planning for the Pearl Harbor strike and all the other Day 1 actions was begun. For example, the Malay operation planning only began in earnest in September 1941 well after the American fleet had publicly moved to Pearl Harbor and when there were no British capital ships at Singapore. The government had still not irrevocably committed itself to war when the planning was finalised. The decision to go to war was only finalised just before the KB set sail at the end of November 1941 as the government wanted to be certain that the diplomatic negotiations had failed.

5. In theory had there been a breakthrough in the diplomatic negotiations after the KB had sailed it might have been recalled. However by the time of setting sail, both sides had no real expectation of a diplomatic breakthrough hence why the heightened level of awareness warning was sent out to American commanders in early December.

6. Not everyone in the army was in support of the China involvement. The officers stationed in China were very much in favour of the China operation but those stationed in Japan were not so solidly in favour. One needs to distinguish between Manchukuo which the army was solidly behind and was something the Americans could tolerate, and the rest of China where there was internal army debate and which was the real bone of contention with the Americans.

7. The navy was not impressed with China. In part because it was not the decisive enemy. The navy had tolerated the China involvement (ie the non Manchukuo part) because it gave it bargaining chips to build the secret super battleships to defeat the real enemy. Without the ability to implement Clauswitzian theory by striking at Pearl, and at a time when the super battleships were not yet available, the navy would have been opposed to a war resulting from the China involvement when other diplomatic actions remained possible.

8. It is ironic that Tojo was much more lukewarm to starting a war than had been Prince Konoye. Remember Tojo was not a "China" general. Whilst there may have been some admirals who saw some value in destroying the Asiatic Fleet (which is the point Sardauker makes) those admirals would not have pretended that it constituted destroying the main enemy force. The most likely scenario is that there would have been no army-navy consensus that war was the best outcome.

It is important to remember that all the internal debate about going to war was conducted with the knowledge that a decisive battle on day 1 was possible. Big B's scenario means that no decisive battle on day 1 was possible. With the main enemy force intact there was no guarantee that the Americans would implement Plan Orange.

Imagine you are Tojo (or even Prince Konoye) and the war starts with the American Pacific Fleet intact and able to be fully reinforced with the entire American Atlantic Fleet. You have no knowledge that Germany and Italy will declare war on the USA within days. You don't know that the American airforce in the Philippines is going to be effectively destroyed within days. OK so you can expect to get to land troops on Luzon without interference, even perhaps Mindanao too, although that might be cutting it fine. Landing in Malay shouldn't be a problem as there are no British capital ships around (although you might discover their arrival after the troop ships have set sail. And then what? How do you maintain the SLOC, when your troops are still from Singapore and still pressing forward on Luzon, when the entire American Pacific Fleet (and soon to be joined by the Atlantic Fleet and whatever the Royal Navy is able to send) turns up at Singapore. With an airforce evacuated from the Phillippines. How easy do you think it is going to be to maintain progress towards Singapore let alone the DEI.

It is one thing to be pre disposed to go to war when it is possible to destroy the main enemy force on day 1, another thing entirely when you are the weaker military and there is no possibility of do so on day 1. How exactly do you get the enemy to the peace table if you haven't inflicted grievious losses on them or captured vital territory? How do you then get that decisive victory. When there are several non military courses of action still open.

Alfred

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: warspite1

You have answered my post so can only assume you are answering me....

You assume incorrectly. I too would have assumed incorrectly if I had thought you were replying to witqps.

I address an individual at the top of a post or quote an individual [white box] when I am addressing them.

Alfred

warspite1

There is a line, bottom right hand corner of the post box. It says in reply to. As you can see I was replying to you not witpqs and you were, seemingly, replying to me.

And that line is automatically generated with the fast reply/when quoting. You don't fast reply so you don't see it in your posts but if you paid attention to other people's posts you would notice, if you cared.

Alfred

Edit: Looked at post after it appeared to confirm my statement is correct. It says "in reply to warspite1" because I quoted him. Without the quote it would have been a fast reply and would have in reply to myself.

[warspite1]

When there are several non military courses of action still open.

The USSR agreeing to provide Japan with oil aside, what are the other options open to Japan?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Alfred




You assume incorrectly. I too would have assumed incorrectly if I had thought you were replying to witqps.

I address an individual at the top of a post or quote an individual [white box] when I am addressing them.

Alfred

warspite1

There is a line, bottom right hand corner of the post box. It says in reply to. As you can see I was replying to you not witpqs and you were, seemingly, replying to me.

And that line is automatically generated with the fast reply/when quoting. You don't fast reply so you don't see it in your posts but if you paid attention to other people's posts you would notice, if you cared.

Alfred

warspite1

What does that mean? I tend to "reply" or "quote". Either way the 'in reply to' line refers to who I am replying to or quoting.

Why do you say 'if you paid attention to other people's posts you would notice, if you cared'?

That sentence makes no sense to me. Could you explain please? Thanks.

[Alfred]

1.  Dummy companies.
 
2.  Importation via third party countries.  Obvious candidates include the Soviet Union (this would be different from getting oil directly from them) Thailand, Vichy France (via Indo-China) and Portugal (via Timor/Macau).
 
3.  Licence synthetic fuel technology from IG Farben.  Japan and Manchukuo had coal.
 
The first two are standard modern sanction busting measures.  Not as well developed/known in the 1930s/1940s but if predisposed towards setting them up, possible.  Think of Italy circumventing the League of Nations oil embargo.  It had been done, it could be done again if necessary.
 
The third option requires a longer time period to set up but again with a will, possible.
 
Then there are the diplomatic options.  China and Manchukuo are not the same thing.  Manchukuo is non negotiable for the Japanese and luckily for them, it isn't a line in the sand for the Americans.  The Japanese colonists are in Manchukuo.  The war industries deemed necessary to survive a repetition of the Great War are in Manchukuo.  The profits which the senior army leaders are making come from Manchukuo.  The League of Nations had already effectively determined that Manchukuo belonged to Japan, which is a major factor in explaining why the Americans were not drawing a line in the sand over it.  Chiang Kai Shek had given up on Manchukuo.
 
China was different.  It doesn't have the Japanese investment which had gone into Manchukuo.  Japan had backed down over the Panay incident.  It could do so again.  People here seem to assume that the Chinese population liked Chiang Kai Shek and totally disliked his opposite number on the Japanese side.  This is not so, especially after Chiang allowed the flooding.  There was scope for Japan to move into the background.  It was not Japan's intent to conquer China, which is why it never deployed sufficient forces to capture China before 1944.  Having a friendly government in control sufficed for Japan.
 
The problem was that in 1941, the Japanese military could see a successful outcome resulting from military action precisely because they could destroy the main enemy force on day 1.  Predisposed to this line of thought, a government which is dependent on the support of the military, is not focussing on non military options to achieve the overall goals.  But remove that decisive military option, which would be the case if the fleet is back at San Diego, and as a consequence the military splits into pro and anti war camps, it becomes possible to look at the non military options more closely.
 
Alfred

[Alfred]

warspite1,
 
That is a reply.  I have singled you out.
 
Look at post #43.  The white block is quoting witpqs.
 
I do a reply when directing my comments to a specific individual.  I do a quote when I am addressing specific issues.  Post #47 has several quotes, all included because I am addressing them.  If a post has only some issues which I am going to address, I edit the quote by adding ellipsis before and after to show I have removed the preceding and succeeding text.  Because the name of the original poster appears at the top of the white block, anyone can read the original unedited quote.
 
Otherwise I just do a fast reply which always automatically claims to be in reply to the preceding poster.  Often by the time I have finished my post and posted it several intervening posts from others may have appeared.
 
Alfred

[dr.hal]

Please folks, as I understand it, we are all friends here and thus we are all correct, in a way!

What I would like to point out is the difficulty of writing about history. The main problem for historians is to get out of their present day shoes and insert themselves into the shoes of those that walked the history that the historian is trying to cover. There is a huge difference between history and historiography. The later entails the study of the writers AT THE TIME of events to be covered to review and understand THEIR biases and particular views. For example, I wrote that Americans didn't want to get caught up in another "European squabble" and was challenged that my view was dismissive of Japan and the Pacific theater as that was the topic of discussion. However what I was trying to relay (and it would appear I did so badly) was that AT THE TIME, most Americans had NO IDEA as to where Pearl Harbor was, let alone have an understanding of the geopolitical events taking place is Asia. This is not to say that said events were not important to the political elites of the country, but the masses didn't have that luxury. If one asked the normal voter of the day, where in the world is there a conflict (ignoring Waldo for the moment), virtually everyone would say in Europe between England (SIC) and Germany!!! This is despite the fact that war in Asia had been going on since 1931 or at least by most accounts 1936, years before the 1939 start in Europe. So my statement was a reflection of the thoughts of the time, not our thoughts colored by our own understanding of the time. Thus I would argue, as Alfred has done, that there is no way that the US would get involved in a second European squabble without a real kick in the pants. This also means to me, that although weapons would be developed by the US and eventually brought into production, it would be on a scale that would not even approach what we actually did thanks to Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto even recognized this by indicating, after he found out that the attack took place BEFORE the declaration of war (read ultimatum) was submitted to our Secretary of State, that Japan was doing nothing more than pulling the tail of a tiger (or words to that effect).

In short, it is very difficult to separate yourself from your present day biases and education especially when trying to explore history. It is also very difficult for present day authors to write about present day events without inserting their own biases and views. I give real credit to those few authors that APPROACH the ideal of getting the separation into their works. A very difficult task.

So I hope this puts my comments into a better light.... Cheers, Hal

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

1.  Dummy companies.

2.  Importation via third party countries.  Obvious candidates include the Soviet Union (this would be different from getting oil directly from them) Thailand, Vichy France (via Indo-China) and Portugal (via Timor/Macau).

3.  Licence synthetic fuel technology from IG Farben.  Japan and Manchukuo had coal.

The first two are standard modern sanction busting measures.  Not as well developed/known in the 1930s/1940s but if predisposed towards setting them up, possible.  Think of Italy circumventing the League of Nations oil embargo.  It had been done, it could be done again if necessary.

The third option requires a longer time period to set up but again with a will, possible.

Then there are the diplomatic options.  China and Manchukuo are not the same thing.  Manchukuo is non negotiable for the Japanese and luckily for them, it isn't a line in the sand for the Americans.  The Japanese colonists are in Manchukuo.  The war industries deemed necessary to survive a repetition of the Great War are in Manchukuo.  The profits which the senior army leaders are making come from Manchukuo.  The League of Nations had already effectively determined that Manchukuo belonged to Japan, which is a major factor in explaining why the Americans were not drawing a line in the sand over it.  Chiang Kai Shek had given up on Manchukuo.

China was different.  It doesn't have the Japanese investment which had gone into Manchukuo.  Japan had backed down over the Panay incident.  It could do so again.  People here seem to assume that the Chinese population liked Chiang Kai Shek and totally disliked his opposite number on the Japanese side.  This is not so, especially after Chiang allowed the flooding.  There was scope for Japan to move into the background.  It was not Japan's intent to conquer China, which is why it never deployed sufficient forces to capture China before 1944.  Having a friendly government in control sufficed for Japan.

The problem was that in 1941, the Japanese military could see a successful outcome resulting from military action precisely because they could destroy the main enemy force on day 1.  Predisposed to this line of thought, a government which is dependent on the support of the military, is not focussing on non military options to achieve the overall goals.  But remove that decisive military option, which would be the case if the fleet is back at San Diego, and as a consequence the military splits into pro and anti war camps, it becomes possible to look at the non military options more closely.

Alfred

warspite1

Well this is the first time I have ever heard anyone suggest a third option so am really keen to explore this. I would have to say at first glance it seems highly unlikely (or at least requires a load of follow-up questions that I don’t know if you can answer – if not perhaps you have a source I can read up on)?

The reasons (although I cannot claim to be an expert and so are gut feelings) are as follows:

The problem with dummy companies and routing through third party countries (particularly given the size and position of those countries) is that surely it is not difficult for the US to spot something amiss.

This is not like the case of Italy where you had the British and French keen to embargo Italy, but the US (who were a major supplier of oil) outside of the League of Nations and frankly quite happy to provide the oil. Here, and importantly the country that imposes the embargo is also the supplier of 78-80% of all of Japan’s oil (and we are talking a lot of oil). The enforcer and the seller are one and the same.

Once the embargo is in place surely it would be very easy for someone to spot that Portugal is suddenly quadrupling its oil usage or whatever. Increased oil exports to French Indo-China and Thailand is going to be looked on suspiciously given their proximity to Japan.

I have no idea of the timescale for the synthetic fuel and what it would entail and what could be produced. It would be great to get some detail on that.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly there are two more (linked) reasons:

- Loss of face. I hear what you say about China, but there is still the ‘loss of face’ that would be involved in the army being ordered out of the country. With everything known about the Japanese, how they acted and what was important to them, this loss of face would have been no small matter.

- Furthermore, Japan was always a resource poor country. That position has not suddenly changed in the 1940’s, but incidents like this – where a 3rd party can effectively hold them to ransom as to what they can and can’t do – would have brought into sharp relief the fact that Japan will always be beholden to someone else’s whims.

These two are very powerful arguments for why, despite all evidence to the contrary as to the US capabilities, the Japanese went to war.

Tojo quote to Konoye (from The Road to War - Overy)

'Sometimes it is necessary to jump with one’s eyes closed from the veranda of the Kiyomizu temple’.

Anyone jumping from the temple risked death, smashed on the rocks hundreds of feet below, but there was the smallest chance of survival. In other words, trust the spirit of the Samurai for it was better for the nation to die than to be dishonoured.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Alfred,

What you are saying is that without the Pearl Harbor strike (or a substitute) there would have been no war initiated by Japan. Yet my understanding of Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor plan was that it was, "If you insist on going to war, this is the only sensible way to start it." Not, "Here is a plan you've been hoping for so you can go to war." My understanding is that the leadership of Japan was going to war, not that they were going to war because the Pearl Harbor plan allowed them to.

1. No casus bellus, no American declaration of war.

2. Even when a casus bellus exists, nations do not automatically go to war. The pre-war Panay incident was a casus bellus but no war resulted. The 1979 storming of the American embassy in Tehran provided a casus bellus but no war resulted.

3. The Soviet - Japanese Non Aggression Pact, which settled the internal North v South expansion debate was signed after the American fleet had moved to Pearl Harbor. That decision was not an irrevocable decision to go to war as seen by the fact that Japan was able to expand it's interests in Indo-China without precipitating war and subsequently expanded to Portuguese Timor without a war with Portugal.

4. The Japanese government had not decided to go to war when planning for the Pearl Harbor strike and all the other Day 1 actions was begun. For example, the Malay operation planning only began in earnest in September 1941 well after the American fleet had publicly moved to Pearl Harbor and when there were no British capital ships at Singapore. The government had still not irrevocably committed itself to war when the planning was finalised. The decision to go to war was only finalised just before the KB set sail at the end of November 1941 as the government wanted to be certain that the diplomatic negotiations had failed.
There are unrelated points in that paragraph, but in reply: The Japanese government not having irrevocably committed itself to war as of a certain time is not the point. They had decided on doing so. Could they have changed their mind? Yes. Would they have in the circumstances described? I do not believe so. Even after KB sailed they could have been recalled, yes (you mention below). I believe the government had no desire to do so, excepting basically a capitulation by the US.

5. In theory had there been a breakthrough in the diplomatic negotiations after the KB had sailed it might have been recalled. However by the time of setting sail, both sides had no real expectation of a diplomatic breakthrough hence why the heightened level of awareness warning was sent out to American commanders in early December.

6. Not everyone in the army was in support of the China involvement. The officers stationed in China were very much in favour of the China operation but those stationed in Japan were not so solidly in favour. One needs to distinguish between Manchukuo which the army was solidly behind and was something the Americans could tolerate, and the rest of China where there was internal army debate and which was the real bone of contention with the Americans.

7. The navy was not impressed with China. In part because it was not the decisive enemy. The navy had tolerated the China involvement (ie the non Manchukuo part) because it gave it bargaining chips to build the secret super battleships to defeat the real enemy. Without the ability to implement Clauswitzian theory by striking at Pearl, and at a time when the super battleships were not yet available, the navy would have been opposed to a war resulting from the China involvement when other diplomatic actions remained possible.

8. It is ironic that Tojo was much more lukewarm to starting a war than had been Prince Konoye. Remember Tojo was not a "China" general. Whilst there may have been some admirals who saw some value in destroying the Asiatic Fleet (which is the point Sardauker makes) those admirals would not have pretended that it constituted destroying the main enemy force. The most likely scenario is that there would have been no army-navy consensus that war was the best outcome.

It is important to remember that all the internal debate about going to war was conducted with the knowledge that a decisive battle on day 1 was possible. Big B's scenario means that no decisive battle on day 1 was possible. With the main enemy force intact there was no guarantee that the Americans would implement Plan Orange.

Imagine you are Tojo (or even Prince Konoye) and the war starts with the American Pacific Fleet intact and able to be fully reinforced with the entire American Atlantic Fleet. You have no knowledge that Germany and Italy will declare war on the USA within days. You don't know that the American airforce in the Philippines is going to be effectively destroyed within days. OK so you can expect to get to land troops on Luzon without interference, even perhaps Mindanao too, although that might be cutting it fine. Landing in Malay shouldn't be a problem as there are no British capital ships around (although you might discover their arrival after the troop ships have set sail. And then what? How do you maintain the SLOC, when your troops are still from Singapore and still pressing forward on Luzon, when the entire American Pacific Fleet (and soon to be joined by the Atlantic Fleet and whatever the Royal Navy is able to send) turns up at Singapore. With an airforce evacuated from the Phillippines. How easy do you think it is going to be to maintain progress towards Singapore let alone the DEI.

It is one thing to be pre disposed to go to war when it is possible to destroy the main enemy force on day 1, another thing entirely when you are the weaker military and there is no possibility of do so on day 1. How exactly do you get the enemy to the peace table if you haven't inflicted grievious losses on them or captured vital territory? How do you then get that decisive victory. When there are several non military courses of action still open.

Alfred

As Hal pointed out above, it is difficult to separate ourselves from what we already know or believe we know when studying history. The Japanese leadership did not know what would be the outcome of the Pearl Harbor strike. Yet they went ahead with it. Even though Yamamoto's real goal was to destroy the USN carriers - 3 of them thought to be based at Pearl though only 2 were - the actual attack was considered highly successful. History put a different light on that because of the USN carriers' absence. But in the minds of the Japanese government then it went well, which they would not count on. And you have just mentioned other things which they could not know would also go so well, such as the destruction of much of the USA Air Corps in the PI, the sinking of POW and Repulse, and even more - and yet Japan went ahead with those things all being uncertain or outright unknown.

But if the US Pacific Fleet was not based at Pearl Harbor they would have gotten cold feet and not gone ahead? I just don't see it. I just don't see them making that decision.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: witpqs
As Hal pointed out above, it is difficult to separate ourselves from what we already know or believe we know when studying history. The Japanese leadership did not know what would be the outcome of the Pearl Harbor strike. Yet they went ahead with it. Even though Yamamoto's real goal was to destroy the USN carriers - 3 of them thought to be based at Pearl though only 2 were - the actual attack was considered highly successful. History put a different light on that because of the USN carriers' absence. But in the minds of the Japanese government then it went well, which they would not count on. And you have just mentioned other things which they could not know would also go so well, such as the destruction of much of the USA Air Corps in the PI, the sinking of POW and Repulse, and even more - and yet Japan went ahead with those things all being uncertain or outright unknown.

But if the US Pacific Fleet was not based at Pearl Harbor they would have gotten cold feet and not gone ahead? I just don't see it. I just don't see them making that decision.

I agree with you witpqs

I can't escape the notion that some are missing the 800Lb white elephant in the room...

What dictated Japan's decision to go to war with America was economic sanctions; the embargo - the freezing of Japanese assets in 1941.....not a Philippine buildup nor the Pacific Fleet being at Pearl Harbor.

It has been pointed out that even as the KB sailed across the Pacific to hit Hawaii - peace was still on the table for the Japanese Govt....war was not inevitable.
Yes - I fully agree.

But I call to attention to what is meant by - 'If diplomatic progress could be made'.
What diplomatic progress was that? Getting the US Govt.to remove the fleet from PH? Demilitarize the Philippines?- NO - It was getting the US Govt. to end it's economic sanctions.

It's not that different from today - "it's the economy ...." as they say.

I said it before and I'll repeat it here - The US Govt. did not have to act - it did not have to do anything further to show the Japanese Govt. it meant business - their economy was going to be in trouble.
It was the Japanese Govt.that HAD to act - either for war or concessions,... and we know what their response was.
Having or not having convenient target to strike on Day One does not alter the root cause for the Japanese Govt. to act.

[dr.hal]

Very good stuff Big B.

But I think the focus of the discourse is around what would the KB do if there was no prime rib at Pearl. Way back when, at the beginning of this discussion, I said I believe they would be best employed taking out the threat at Manila. I don't believe they could have gone against Singapore in terms of a "surprise tactic", as the British were too aware of things (after all they had been at war for over two years).

But the discussion has hit upon or detoured to the underlying premise of would the Japanese have gone to war at all given the lack of opportunity to take out the US fleet in a "decisive battle" as they themselves defined it. Clearly the IJN was reluctant to take on the sleeping giant, while the IJA had no such hesitation. So in my mind and underscored by the authors of the day, the fight was between the IJN and IJA for dominance in terms of a grand strategy in response to the US LED (note the capitols) embargo (which the British, Dutch and other states supported). In the end, as we know, the IJN reluctantly went along with the Army in terms of going to war. A very real factor in that support was the fact that the US fleet was now (latter half of '41) within striking distance of the Japanese Navy. So all these factors came together into a "perfect (Pacific) storm" know as the Pacific Theater of War.

The historical question that underscores this is would the IJN have put up more of a fight to stay OUT of a conflict with the US if there was no target at Pearl. The literature of the day is not clear on this, hence the ambiguity within our discussion. I firmly believe that the IJN would have fought harder NOT to fight. I don't know if they would have carried the day. Hal

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

warspite1

Well this is the first time I have ever heard anyone suggest a third option so am really keen to explore this. I would have to say at first glance it seems highly unlikely (or at least requires a load of follow-up questions that I don’t know if you can answer – if not perhaps you have a source I can read up on)?

The reasons (although I cannot claim to be an expert and so are gut feelings) are as follows:

The problem with dummy companies and routing through third party countries (particularly given the size and position of those countries) is that surely it is not difficult for the US to spot something amiss.


Correct but spotting something and being able to do something effective about it are two completely different things.

For a start, there are the diplomatic consequences. How do you stop a third party from reexporting without antagonising that third party. Do you want to turn them into an enemy? Do you want Vichy France to throw in its lot with the Axis. Depending on when this occurs, this could be a significant boost to Italo-German operations in Africa. Do you want to create further difficulties with rubber supply, the one commodity the USA is dependent on foreign sources. Same with Portugal, do you think Britain will thank the USA for the new U-boat bases in the Azores, or Angola/Mozambique perfectly positioned astride the Cape Town route used for all those convoys not able to use the Mediterranean.

How exactly do you measure an unacceptable increase in demand for oil from these 3rd parties. An immediate jump of 400% is a bit of a give away. But what if the increase is only 50%, justified as a prudent course of stockpiling for a rainy day. You can't just invade them, there is probably no casus bellus to put before Congress. Are you prepared for a trade embargo in return and possible job losses in certain Congressional districts. These are all difficult issues to deal, all with costs which cannot be avoided.


This is not like the case of Italy where you had the British and French keen to embargo Italy, but the US (who were a major supplier of oil) outside of the League of Nations and frankly quite happy to provide the oil. Here, and importantly the country that imposes the embargo is also the supplier of 78-80% of all of Japan’s oil (and we are talking a lot of oil). The enforcer and the seller are one and the same.


Never said it would be easy. But then neither is fighting a war successfully against an enemy potentially much stronger than yourself, unless of course you can get that decisive victory on day 1. In some respects Italy was in a better position to circumvent an oil embargo but there were also other factors that placed Japan in a stronger position. The foreign exchange position was better for Japan, as was the capacity of its population to tolerate starvation/deprivation to free up resources for the military. Not difficult to imagine Japan making it a condition for the non aggression pact to be supplied with oil from the Soviet Union before Barbarossa at which point Uncle Joe becomes Japan's Roosevelt to Italy. The benefits of diversifying their oil sources had not be lost on the Japanese.


Once the embargo is in place surely it would be very easy for someone to spot that Portugal is suddenly quadrupling its oil usage or whatever. Increased oil exports to French Indo-China and Thailand is going to be looked on suspiciously given their proximity to Japan.

I have no idea of the timescale for the synthetic fuel and what it would entail and what could be produced. It would be great to get some detail on that.


You have a timescale commencing late 1940 when the fleet remains at San Diego (maybe even earlier). Add the stockpile of 12 months which can be extended (as occurred historically) means some 18-24 months to get some plants into operation. Wouldn't be enough to time to fully set up but should suffice to start getting some flow. Depends a lot on how good the technology transfer goes.


Lastly, and perhaps most importantly there are two more (linked) reasons:

- Loss of face. I hear what you say about China, but there is still the ‘loss of face’ that would be involved in the army being ordered out of the country. With everything known about the Japanese, how they acted and what was important to them, this loss of face would have been no small matter.


Ah, but it wouldn't be the army losing face. Some generals most definitely and you can rest assured that there would be some generals in Japan quite happy for these individuals to lose face. It wouldn't be the first time that individual generals had lost face in China and Manchukuo/Siberia. Losing battles to the Soviets generally was not good for the face of the concerned generals. Besides you are presupposing that the diplomatic solution would be seen as a defeat. Many ways to dress up a diplomatic rebuff as a victory and that is the worst case scenario.


- Furthermore, Japan was always a resource poor country. That position has not suddenly changed in the 1940’s, but incidents like this – where a 3rd party can effectively hold them to ransom as to what they can and can’t do – would have brought into sharp relief the fact that Japan will always be beholden to someone else’s whims.


Today yes, but not so in the 1940s. The entire point of moving into Manchukuo was to redress the resource shortages. Post 1918, all militaries had formed the view that autarchy was essential to survive the next war. Japan was amongst the most successful in moving down the autarchy path. Unless you were Britain or France, everyone was deficient in rubber, unless you were the USA, Britain or the USSR, everyone was deficient in oil. But with Manchukuo, Japan was not too badly off and what it needed it could import, such as pig iron from Australia.


These two are very powerful arguments for why, despite all evidence to the contrary as to the US capabilities, the Japanese went to war.


They were only arguments within Japan, at the time, because they thought they could win the war. But that was always predicated on getting that decisive battle right at the beginning. No chance of day 1 victory, no chance of victory anyway. Contrary to what many on the forum consistently depict the Japanese leaders as being stupid/incompetent, they were in fact not so. Just as the Emperor told them August 1945 that the unbearable had to be endured, so they would have done so if told by the Emperor to do so earlier over a different issue.



Tojo quote to Konoye (from The Road to War - Overy)

'Sometimes it is necessary to jump with one’s eyes closed from the veranda of the Kiyomizu temple’.

Anyone jumping from the temple risked death, smashed on the rocks hundreds of feet below, but there was the smallest chance of survival. In other words, trust the spirit of the Samurai for it was better for the nation to die than to be dishonoured.


Which is why I said it was ironic for Tojo was not in the war camp.

[/quote]

[dr.hal]

One more point, as Alfred has alluded to, Hirohito was a key figure, if not THE key figure in this discourse within the Japanese hierarchy at the time. I don't believe his post war writings helped in really understanding his thoughts or influence within this circle of thinkers so the ambiguity continues to this day.

[warspite1]

I will take a look on Amazon and see what I can find on this – and look again over my books that cover the period.

But in the meantime, coming back on your answers I would comment as follows:

warspite1
The problem with dummy companies and routing through third party countries (particularly given the size and position of those countries) is that surely it is not difficult for the US to spot something amiss.

Alfred
Correct but spotting something and being able to do something effective about it are two completely different things.

Yes but as said, that is made easier by the fact that the USA is both putting the embargo in place and the seller of the oil. There is no 3rd party (as in the case of Italy) to get around the embargo (see USSR below).

Alfred
For a start, there are the diplomatic consequences. How do you stop a third party from reexporting without antagonising that third party. Do you want to turn them into an enemy?

There is no reason to antagonise the 3rd Party though. We would not be talking about the US suddenly stopping the supply of oil to those 3rd parties, but simply ensuring that there was no sudden, unexplained 'increase in usage' i.e. surplus oil is being sent to Japan.

Alfred
Do you want Vichy France to throw in its lot with the Axis. Depending on when this occurs, this could be a significant boost to Italo-German operations in Africa.

This is too simplistic. The Vichy/German/British/US relations were complex, and I cannot see that this is possible for two reasons. Firstly remember, the British were keen to stop imports into Metropolitan Vichy France – although the US wishes ultimately carried the day and they provided oil and foodstuffs to Petain. Make no mistake the Vichy regime needed the US. If the US imports stopped, Adolf Hitler wasn't going to lift a finger to make up the shortfall.

The French were able to send shipping between France and West Africa – but not south of Dakar. There was little chance of any oil being sent from Metropolitan Vichy France to Japan.

But this ‘throwing in their lot with the Axis’ did not happen for a number of reasons and so was certainly never going to happen over the size of oil imports to French Indo-China – Hitler’s plans for France post WWII were such that he did not want a rapproachment with France (even if Petain and co could not see it).

Alfred
Same with Portugal, do you think Britain will thank the USA for the new U-boat bases in the Azores, or Angola/Mozambique perfectly positioned astride the Cape Town route used for all those convoys not able to use the Mediterranean.

I think the idea that Portugal is going to join the Axis because the US refuse to send massive amounts of oil to Timor is not realistic. The US and the British worked behind the scenes to keep Franco’s Spain from being seduced by the charms of Axis participation. Portugal, in a fit of pique, is not suddenly going to sign up for getting her Empire dismantled and the country ultimately invaded by the Allies because the US refuses to send bucket loads of oil to Timor and thence to Japan. What exactly is there in it for Portugal?

Alfred
How exactly do you measure an unacceptable increase in demand for oil from these 3rd parties. An immediate jump of 400% is a bit of a give away. But what if the increase is only 50%, justified as a prudent course of stockpiling for a rainy day. You can't just invade them, there is probably no casus bellus to put before Congress. Are you prepared for a trade embargo in return and possible job losses in certain Congressional districts. These are all difficult issues to deal, all with costs which cannot be avoided.

But we are talking about Japan’s oil requirements. Industrial Japan with a very large navy to keep fuelled. A 50% increase in French Indo China’s, Thailand’s and Portuguese Timor’s oil consumption is not going to touch the sides of Japan’s annual requirement.

As for job losses, I really can't see that as an issue. There is plenty of scope for the slack being taken up. The British oil position for one, the expansion of the USN (already well underway) for another and, bearing in mind we are talking July 1941, the USSR is going to be helped - even if oil itself is not required the shipping to Murmansk, Vladivostok and the Middle East (the three points for delivering lend lease) is going to need a lot of oil.

Alfred
Not difficult to imagine Japan making it a condition for the non aggression pact to be supplied with oil from the Soviet Union before Barbarossa at which point Uncle Joe becomes Japan's Roosevelt to Italy. The benefits of diversifying their oil sources had not be lost on the Japanese.

I think to suggest ‘not difficult’ is perhaps a bit of a stretch. At Nomonhan in 1939, the Soviets totally crushed the Japanese - not the other way around. The uneasy peace that followed has to be set against that background. Stalin was relaxing in the warmth of his Nazi-Soviet pact and, given Nomonhan, would be unlikely to be too concerned over Japan. Although I grant you, Stalin probably signed the NS pact thinking that Germany and the Western Allies would beat themselves into a stalemate. That Germany had defeated the French, kicked the British off the continent and then was shaping up for moving into the Balkans, would likely have left him feeling a little less smug.

So the USSR and Japan signed a non-aggression pact in April 1941. Sensing what may be about to come, Japan refuse to sign the pact unless an oil agreement is included. Given the USSR’s strong negotiating position at this point this may or may not happen and Stalin may be forgiven in thinking what is in it for him given Russian/Japanese recent history and given that Japan and Germany have a nice little pact in place themselves? But because of the events in France of 1940 lets say that he does agree to this.

June 1941 Barbarossa is launched and the USSR is in trouble. Are the Soviets really going to be pulling out the stops to fulfil their oil obligations? Is it even possible?

Sure enough the US oil embargo is put in place in July 1941. But things now get complicated. Even if the oil agreement was signed, even if a USSR - busy losing millions of men, busy moving large parts of its industry and busy trying to keep its armies in the field and supplied - is able to physically provide the oil, there is a problem. Fearing the Soviets will collapse, the first US aid to the USSR began in October 1941. So to recap, in your scenario the USSR are supplying oil to Japan to circumvent the US embargo. Meanwhile the US are about to start sending aid to the USSR which is seemingly on the verge of military collapse. That these two agreements would continue side by side seems untenable. Even if such an agreement were initially possible, Japan ends up in the same place by the autumn of 1941 or perhaps as early as June 1941, just two months after signing the agreement in the first place.

warspite1
I have no idea of the timescale for the synthetic fuel and what it would entail and what could be produced. It would be great to get some detail on that.

Alfred
You have a timescale commencing late 1940 when the fleet remains at San Diego (maybe even earlier). Add the stockpile of 12 months which can be extended (as occurred historically) means some 18-24 months to get some plants into operation. Wouldn't be enough to time to fully set up but should suffice to start getting some flow. Depends a lot on how good the technology transfer goes.

Starting it in 1940 seems a little 'forward thinking' but let's suppose someone in Tokyo has their eye on the ball and understands where this initial US embargo will end up. The most important question of all is how much can they realistically provide in terms of Japan’s requirements going forward? In other words how realistic is this as a solution to Japan's problems?


As to the last two points, I will need to revisit some of my books and possibly purchase new ones. The ability of the Japanese to simply remove itself from China at the behest of the US may be possible – although I understand Tojo vetoed a possible plan of withdrawal (which if true surely effectively puts him in the war camp?) – but I find it difficult to believe based purely on Japanese behaviour both before and during World War II.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Alfred,

What you are saying is that without the Pearl Harbor strike (or a substitute) there would have been no war initiated by Japan. Yet my understanding of Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor plan was that it was, "If you insist on going to war, this is the only sensible way to start it." Not, "Here is a plan you've been hoping for so you can go to war." My understanding is that the leadership of Japan was going to war, not that they were going to war because the Pearl Harbor plan allowed them to.

warspite1

What is your take on this witpqs? If the US employs the embargo but does not back up that action with a move to Pearl Harbor and no reinforcement of the PI, does Japan proceed against Malaya and the NEI alone or does she still attack the US?

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Alfred,

What you are saying is that without the Pearl Harbor strike (or a substitute) there would have been no war initiated by Japan. Yet my understanding of Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor plan was that it was, "If you insist on going to war, this is the only sensible way to start it." Not, "Here is a plan you've been hoping for so you can go to war." My understanding is that the leadership of Japan was going to war, not that they were going to war because the Pearl Harbor plan allowed them to.

warspite1

What is your take on this witpqs? If the US employs the embargo but does not back up that action with a move to Pearl Harbor and no reinforcement of the PI, does Japan proceed against Malaya and the NEI alone or does she still attack the US?

I am really uncertain.

A guy that I worked a long time ago with told me about someone in his circle of friends who would go out drinking to bars and nightclubs. A nice enough guy but got more emotional - and belligerent - in his thinking as more alcohol was consumed. You know how people look around occasionally? Eventually, every single person in a bar or nightclub has at more or less looked in your direction, even if it takes a couple of hours. This guy would fixate on one (random) other guy and be watching out for him. When, inevitably, that guy glanced his way he would be ready to spring out of his chair to go pound on the guy and be saying something like "THAT GUY'S BEEN STARING AT US ALL NIGHT!" Friends would talk him down! [:D]

The point is that this is not solely or even centrally about all of the most rational alternatives. This is - at least centrally - about the decisions that the Japanese leadership would make in their own context, emotional, cultural, and otherwise.

On the one hand you have history, where the Fleet did move to Pearl Harbor and the Japanese in power viewed it as provocation. If the Fleet had not moved that might have been viewed as weakness. Weakness could have resulted in bypassing the Philippines or it could have resulted in seizing them while it was easy (capturing the main enemy position before he could react). Plan Orange was mentioned above in terms of it being a specter the Japanese government would have to come to terms with after attacking the US without the Fleet being destroyed. They had a strategy to deal with Plan Orange. They built their own fleet to that strategy. Plan Orange envisioned relief of the Philippines, but could the US have held out in this alternate scenario for the time required to capture and operate bases across the Pacific? IRL it took too long, I am sure it also would have even with 8 old battleships unblemished on day one.

I think the Japanese leadership was in a very aggressive state of mind overall. This discussion is about decisions people did not have to make - alternate history - so every assertion we make is qualified by "but we really don't know". With that in mind, I think that the end of the journey of play and counter play would have been war, started by Japan if not by others before them. Japan was bent on conquest for securing empire, and merely importing oil would not have long satisfied. That oil would always have been at the whim of others.

ADDING: My vote would be that Japan would take the Philippines.

[Sardaukar]

What i think is that lack of Pearl Harbor strike would actually in a way be beneficial to IJN. They could then fall back to their 1930s doctrine of "Decisive Battle" even more, the way their surface navy had trained. That is, Japanese Navy trained against something like War Plan Orange.

IF Japan had been able to push Britain and Dutch out of Pacific quickly, they could then fight "decisive battle" on their ground, mainly near Philippines.

Thus, I advocate using Dec 7 Kido Butai to hit British in and in area of Singapore, to support Malaya landings and in Philippines. First I'd have them to deal with Asiatic fleet, though. Reason for that is that they present as much danger to Philippines landings as Brit BBs to Malaya landings. Same is true about air units too, so they needed to be suppressed also.

In this case I'd see the remote possibility of splitting KB to 2 parts (something that I'd normally frown upon strongly), but only for first strike.

After that, KB should be recombined to wait for inevitable US counter-strike. Japanese made the ultimate strategic mistake in Coral Sea, forgetting following, so well said in Shattered Sword (from memory): "Japanese should have understood that there were only 2 types of targets in Pacific: those that were worth using full KB and those that required none of it."

This sort of "what if" scenario would be interesting and Japanese player could try different ways to achieve Japanese goals in game.