OT: WW2 Documentary

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

You can ascribe this strategic inertia to Hitler "being lucky" if you wish. He certainly rolled a few double-sixes. However in terms of academic study, you'll find that there's generally a more rational approach to looking at the matter.

warspite1

Lol. Why would I ascribe the French and British inertia - you call it inertia or listnessness - I will call it was it was as per post 10 - 'a lesson in muddle, confusion, inaction and indecisiveness. I am sure there are plenty more words that can be ascribed too' - to someone else's luck? That is ridiculous.

That Hitler 'threw a few sixes' is not an excuse for French and British shortcomings. I've not suggested it is. That Hitler was lucky in so many ways in the early war is not in dispute. However that does not absolve the British and French from responsibility for their actions. I've not said it does.

For example, how does Hitler getting lucky in France explain the total horlicks that was the Norwegian Campaign for example? It doesn't.

Once again you seek to have me say things I haven't.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

You've not mentioned it, which seems a glaring omission. It certainly seems relevant to the original topic (Western Allied attacks on the Soviet Union), given the agreements between Poland with France and Britain.

warspite1`

Lol (again). I've not mentioned it and that was a glaring omission? I was writing a brief answer to a specific point, not writing a book. I had no need to necessarily bring up the action taken by Britain and France once war had been declared - other than how I did - which was a general commentary on British and French failings.

So, no omission, glaring or otherwise.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

No, I have my reasons - mainly as I felt the discussion was going down the line of "History Channel diplomacy" (and not from the "good" days).

warspite1

You mean, you disagreed with what was being said?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

That clarifies things. Related to my point above wrt treaties, the absence of a British and French reaction to the Soviet invasion of Poland certainly fuelled those notions.

warspite1

I think by the time the Soviets entered Poland from the east, the Poles had long since ceased caring. Poland was effectively beaten by then. So whilst I am sure if fuelled bad feeling, there were few sadly around to have those feelings - the top echelons were even fewer in number once the Germans and Soviets got to work [:(]....

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

This section highlights what I was referring to by a flawed understanding.

At this level of diplomacy, emotions are kept to the side. Ideology, likes, dislikes, political inclination, all of this is subordinated to diplomatic pragmatism.

In this arena, the British and French simply had less to offer the Soviets.

warspite1

Flawed understanding?.....and yet this is exactly what I said in post 25.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Glad to see that the above chimes with my comments regarding pragmatism.

warspite1

Anyone who doesn't look at a leaders view from the point of view of his/her own country is not making a rational addition to the debate. It's an obvious point - but one that is sadly overlooked too often.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I would have thought that would have been obvious.

If you've only established formal diplomatic relation less than ten years previously, there's only so much progress you can make in terms of thawing the relationship. Granted, the earlier commercial agreements would have helped.

There's also significant benefits associated with having established, long-standing diplomatic relations with countries in terms of efficient communication, understanding who the important players are and their motivations, and a whole host of other benefits.

While you're correct in that pragmatism rules the roost when it comes to getting deals done, there needs to be sufficient understanding to be able to identify the potential for a deal - before any deal can be agreed, common ground needs to be identified and that's where long-standing relations can contribute best.

warspite1

Fine words but sadly irrelevant to the British/French and Soviet positions. You can use hindsight all you like. It wouldn't have mattered a damn (in terms of getting a workable deal done) if diplomatic relations had been in place since the start of the Bolshevik Revolution. Was there a deal to be done? I still haven't heard anyone come up with anything plausible.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

That's correct - because I didn't make that comment with you in mind. Not always about you, warspite [;)]

warspite1

Well when responding to me it would have been helpful to have made that clear as to who you were responding to.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I was referring to the "Great Game" in the context of the tensions between Great Britain and the then Russian Empire in Central and South Asia, but I made the comment thinking more generally around the 1924 elections and the challenging post-war political and social landscape in the UK.

warspite1

I was thrown by the mention of Finland and Poland so assumed you were talking about 1939. If you are talking about the 1920's then yes, the USSR was a Communist regime and Communism wasn't hugely popular in Western European circles [;)] No, the Soviets were definitely not going to make comfortable allies and, with no Hitler type character to worry about, and the Soviets looking to re-build their shattered economy rather than get all up someone's grill an' ****, I don't think anyone was thinking in terms of needing the Soviets as Allies or needing any treaty in the 1920's.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I don't follow you here at all. You contradict yourself by saying that you cannot see how an argument could be made for the M-L catching the Western Allies by surprise, then say that it's hard to see how the pact would not surprise Daladier/Chamberlain.

Clarification would be helpful.

warspite1

Please tell me where I've contradicted myself. You appear to be trying to put words in my mouth.

Post #37 (emphasis mine)

Re post #10, there is simply no underestimation whatsoever. I fail to see how it could be argued that the Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a surprise to the Western Allies. It caught the German (and their would-be allies) and Soviet populations by surprise (and disgust), so it’s hard to see how such a pact would not be surprising to Daladier and Chamberlain (or their would be allies). I don’t follow where you think post #10 even refers to this, let alone underestimates this.

-----

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

More widely wrt post #10, the point on the strategic surprise of the M-L pact partly (but not completely) explains the strategic listlessness of Britain and France. Put it more simply, what worked in the last war was now no longer an option and the landscape geopolitically had changed to be quite different from 1914.

warspite1

The decision to guarantee Poland was taken in early 1939. There was no alliance with the Soviet Union at that time. The decision to make good on the guarantee (if one can call it quite that) was made after the NS Pact was signed. The signing of the pact had very little to do with the 'listnessness' of Britain and France - though wouldn't that be a nice excuse. I encourage you to read about the period 1939-40. The British and French inability to go to war effectively was sadly caused by far more than the signing of the pact - surprising to everyone as it was.

Well, making a guarantee with...questionable...intention of seeing it through falls within my definition of listnessless.

The signing of the pact was very much related to British and French listlessness. Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia. None of those pointed towards the British and French being able to provide the essential aspect for the Soviet Union - an ally to force Germany into a two front war on the continent.

The shifting stances of each towards the Soviet Union is a good illustration of the lack of a clear vision for the Western Allies.. The Soviet Union is at times both the famed Russian steamroller of 1914, and a hollow military shell thanks to the Great Purge.

Similarly, the Soviet Union was either an essential continental partner for maintaining collective security in Europe as well as perceived as a danger to the Versailles settlement in Eastern Europe.

As for the comment regarding reading on '39-'40, what would you recommend?

I covered both Taylor and Evans in an academic setting. That also covered Figes and Pipes in greater or lesser parts, as well as Mawdsley in my own time. Shirer too, but that was quite some time ago now.

I want to say I've read Overy, but I may be thinking of some of his other work rather than covering that specific period.

If you can recommend suitable academic reading beyond this, then please do share

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

You've not mentioned it, which seems a glaring omission. It certainly seems relevant to the original topic (Western Allied attacks on the Soviet Union), given the agreements between Poland with France and Britain.

warspite1`

Lol (again). I've not mentioned it and that was a glaring omission? I was writing a brief answer to a specific point, not writing a book. I had no need to necessarily bring up the action taken by Britain and France once war had been declared - other than how I did - which was a general commentary on British and French failings.

So, no omission, glaring or otherwise.

If that's how you feel, then that's how you feel.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Post #37 (emphasis mine)

Re post #10, there is simply no underestimation whatsoever. I fail to see how it could be argued that the Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a surprise to the Western Allies. It caught the German (and their would-be allies) and Soviet populations by surprise (and disgust), so it’s hard to see how such a pact would not be surprising to Daladier and Chamberlain (or their would be allies). I don’t follow where you think post #10 even refers to this, let alone underestimates this.

warspite1

Right so I said I fail to see how it could be argued. i.e. there is no argument, there is no argument to be made. Simply, no one thinks it came as a surprise. Have you seriously EVER heard it suggested by anyone that it was? Clear?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Well, making a guarantee with...questionable...intention of seeing it through falls within my definition of listnessless.

The signing of the pact was very much related to British and French listlessness. Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia. None of those pointed towards the British and French being able to provide the essential aspect for the Soviet Union - an ally to force Germany into a two front war on the continent.

warspite1

THANK-YOU! [:)] Exactly my point. You've given perfect examples of what you call listnessess and I call something else - and what do you notice? They are all before the signing of the NS Pact - but your argument is that the signing of the pact caused Anglo-French 'listlessness'.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I would have thought that would have been obvious.

If you've only established formal diplomatic relation less than ten years previously, there's only so much progress you can make in terms of thawing the relationship. Granted, the earlier commercial agreements would have helped.

There's also significant benefits associated with having established, long-standing diplomatic relations with countries in terms of efficient communication, understanding who the important players are and their motivations, and a whole host of other benefits.

While you're correct in that pragmatism rules the roost when it comes to getting deals done, there needs to be sufficient understanding to be able to identify the potential for a deal - before any deal can be agreed, common ground needs to be identified and that's where long-standing relations can contribute best.

warspite1

Fine words but sadly irrelevant to the British/French and Soviet positions. You can use hindsight all you like. It wouldn't have mattered a damn (in terms of getting a workable deal done) if diplomatic relations had been in place since the start of the Bolshevik Revolution. Was there a deal to be done? I still haven't heard anyone come up with anything plausible.

That's an incredibly naïve understanding of how diplomacy at the national level actually works.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Post #37 (emphasis mine)

Re post #10, there is simply no underestimation whatsoever. I fail to see how it could be argued that the Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a surprise to the Western Allies. It caught the German (and their would-be allies) and Soviet populations by surprise (and disgust), so it’s hard to see how such a pact would not be surprising to Daladier and Chamberlain (or their would be allies). I don’t follow where you think post #10 even refers to this, let alone underestimates this.

warspite1

Right so I said I fail to see how it could be argued. i.e. there is no argument, there is no argument to be made. Simply, no one thinks it came as a surprise. Have you seriously EVER heard it suggested by anyone that it was? Clear?

As clear as mud. It's actually harder for me to understand what you're saying here.

Let's take it down to daft laddie level for me. Did the M-L take the Western Allies by surprise?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

That's an incredibly naïve understanding of how diplomacy at the national level actually works.

warspite1

Except of course its not. Because I am not referring to what should've been done or what is best practice. I am referring to what happened and why.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

As clear as mud. It's actually harder for me to understand what you're saying here.

Let's take it down to daft laddie level for me. Did the M-L take the Western Allies by surprise?

warspite1

Erm..... [:)]

M_M. Please. The NS Pact surprised the whole freakin' world. If he was up there at the time it would have surprised the man in the moon. It was SO unexpected it was unbelievable.

YES for the avoidance of any doubt. The signing of the NS Pact by the Nazis and the Communists was a freakin' surprise to the British and the French.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

If you can recommend suitable academic reading beyond this, then please do share

warspite1

I think:

The Devil's Alliance (Moorhouse)
and
Chamberlain and Appeasement (Parker)

are worth anyone's time and money.

As regards Britain and France's muddled attempts to make war in 1939-40 I'd recommend:

Norway 1940 (Kersaudy) caveat - a while since I read that one.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Well, making a guarantee with...questionable...intention of seeing it through falls within my definition of listnessless.

The signing of the pact was very much related to British and French listlessness. Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia. None of those pointed towards the British and French being able to provide the essential aspect for the Soviet Union - an ally to force Germany into a two front war on the continent.

warspite1

THANK-YOU! [:)] Exactly my point. You've given perfect examples of what you call listnessess and I call something else - and what do you notice? They are all before the signing of the NS Pact - but your argument is that the signing of the pact caused Anglo-French 'listlessness'.

We're talking at cross-purposes here.

What strategic options are open to the British and French in the aftermath of the M-L pact?

Poland is geographically isolated and now faces hostile powers on both major borders. The power that the Western Allies (primarily the French) would need to keep German forces divided has conducted a volte-face, and is tearing up the post-Versailles landscape in Eastern Europe.

In that context, where the only palatable option is a return to the 1914-18 Western Front, plans around Norway, Sweden and Finland seem much more attractive despite the challenges.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

If you can recommend suitable academic reading beyond this, then please do share

warspite1

I think:

The Devil's Alliance (Moorhouse)
and
Chamberlain and Appeasement (Parker)

are worth anyone's time and money.

As regards Britain and France's muddled attempts to make war in 1939-40 I'd recommend:

Norway 1940 (Kersaudy) caveat - a while since I read that one.

I've not read Moorhouse, but I find it interesting that Evans (who I largely stand by) takes issue with his work.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Well, making a guarantee with...questionable...intention of seeing it through falls within my definition of listnessless.

The signing of the pact was very much related to British and French listlessness. Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia. None of those pointed towards the British and French being able to provide the essential aspect for the Soviet Union - an ally to force Germany into a two front war on the continent.

warspite1

THANK-YOU! [:)] Exactly my point. You've given perfect examples of what you call listnessess and I call something else - and what do you notice? They are all before the signing of the NS Pact - but your argument is that the signing of the pact caused Anglo-French 'listlessness'.

We're talking at cross-purposes here.

What strategic options are open to the British and French in the aftermath of the M-L pact?

Poland is geographically isolated and now faces hostile powers on both major borders. The power that the Western Allies (primarily the French) would need to keep German forces divided has conducted a volte-face, and is tearing up the post-Versailles landscape in Eastern Europe.

In that context, where the only palatable option is a return to the 1914-18 Western Front, plans around Norway, Sweden and Finland seem much more attractive despite the challenges.

warspite1

Yes I think we must be talking at cross purposes. I've lost the thread of what you are saying.

Strategic options are limited after the NS pact (Churchill understood - the USA - but he was some way from becoming PM). So what strategy do you employ? That has nothing to do with the poor war management of the British and French in this period.

Part of the mis-management is that no one seemed to actually understand the state of the French Army (despite knowing that war may result from Hitler's increasingly avaricious claims), and that having a BEF with barely three corps as the British help, wasn't going to cut it.

Which is why I said that the British and French plan to use their greater economic muscle and build up and take the offensive in 1941 (and in the meantime hoping that Hitler would be taken out) was not actually that off the wall. Your last sentence seems to be agreeing with that? Yes?

The fact that adventures elsewhere were palatable to the French (in particular) does not mean they needed to be handled, 'planned' and executed so appallingly.

[RangerJoe]

If the BEF and the French mobile forces could have cut off the German mobile spearhead going into France, then there would have been a stalemate of sorts on the Western Front. The British and the French were very close to doing just that. With a difference to that stalemate - there would have been mobile British and French formations while there would have been little to no German capabilities in that regard. Once the US aircraft showed up in numbers, then the German advantage of the Luftwaffe would have been negated.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I've not read Moorhouse, but I find it interesting that Evans (who I largely stand by) takes issue with his work.

warspite1

I've not read Evans - but did listen to his views on Munich in a lecture he gave a few years back...... Very unimpressed I was too.