Weapon R&R and production

[Mike Scholl]

The Japanese can not support the CV airgroups (replacement pilots) they begin with.

I was taking this into account, although others might not have been. Does point up another interesting possibility. If all that effort had not been put into
"super" BB's, the IJN might have been able to use the shipyards to build some
"Convoy Escorts" and the rest of the resources to raise naval aircrew training
to the point of supplying 40-50 trained aircrews a month in 1942. And maybe
a few more aircraft for them to fly as well.

[TIMJOT]

I was taking this into account, although others might not have been. Does point up another interesting possibility. If all that effort had not been put into
"super" BB's, the IJN might have been able to use the shipyards to build some
"Convoy Escorts" and the rest of the resources to raise naval aircrew training
to the point of supplying 40-50 trained aircrews a month in 1942. And maybe
a few more aircraft for them to fly as well.

I agree Mike. I was assumeing that the resources and capital would have been redirected into greatly expanding and maintaining airgroups and aircrew training capabilities. This is exactly what Yamamato and his airlobby were proposing back when the SuperBB decision was made. If you think of the vast amount of resources spent on the super-battlehip program ( Just the developent of the 18"guns took up immense resources) I do not think that doubleing then quadrupleing the Shokukaku program would be out or the realm of possiblity. I will check some sources and see if I can come up with hard numbers.

[Brady]

Isee your point on the queying of the Musashi on decemner of 41 regarding the resources (raw materials) but non the less a huge amount of manpowere was involved in her fitting out, she wasnot finished untill Aug. of 42 then nhad work up's after that, as mentioned simply crewing hear took a huge amount of man power, which could easly of theroiticaly, been used in the crewing of numoiurs DE, as mentioned above in the quote from the book:

"Yamato and Musashi and their sister ship the converted carier shinano. With armor 16 inches thick and a launch weight second in the world only to the Queen Mary, each of these warship's absorbed mountains of of preschious materails, shipyard capacity, and engenering skill. Total displacement of the three behemoths topped 200,000 tons, which was equilvent of 235 coast defense vessels, or or fully 66 more than Japan built during the whole war"

So say we save a full 1/3rd of this effort by queying the Musahsi and stoping altogether the Shinano, we yeild a potential of aprox. 80 DE's! thats a lot of extra Escorts.

This is why I am woundering if we will be alowed to produce more of a given class (or Class) if we want than were actualy produced during the war.

Now if say I wanted to produce Tanker's in those yards, I could reap substantial benifit's in therioury...

p.153: "Building Warships, which have much specialased equipment and tight design tolerances, was a much more complicated and time consuming task than producing comercial vessels. One authority claimed they were 5 to 6 times as much trouble as merchantmen. Yhe US experance bears out this contention, for a 10,000-ton liberty ship was far simpler to construct than a destroyer a fraction of that displacement. In this case it took 105,000 man-hours to produce the planes for a cargo vessel as compared to 400,000 man hours for the warship. Actual production man hours for the destroyer were at least double those for the liberty ship. In Japan, a 2,000-ton destroyer spent eight months on the ways and took another 4 months fitting out, A submarine of simmilar displacement required nearly 3 years to compleat. A Merchantman of those dimenshions would ocupy a shipyard no more than 6 months, and frequently much less."

" Two million tons is a conserative estimate of the potential new merchant shipping lost during the war by divershion of comercial shipyard capacity to warships. Even a Third of this total would have represented a 20% increase in wartime merchant vesel construction, a subsatatial gain in transportion tonnage by any criterion."

[pasternakski]

If you punks manage to get this game turned into a Jap fanboy exercise in "gee whiz, look what they coulda done if they woulda," I'm gonna be p1ssed at having wasted my seventy bucks on something that isn't worth the effort needed to toss it in the nearest sh1tcan.

[mogami]

Hi, You can Edit 25 new Shokaku class CV into the builds if you want. But during the game you can't start one you have not already put in with the editor.
Both players need the same files for the game to run so you can't edit a scenario and sneak one in. (You can't edit save files either)
However I am certain there will be dozens (if not hundreds) of well thought out scenarios designed and offered by forum members. (I think some people will spend more time making scenarios then playing)
Everyone will find the scenario that reflects their tastes and beliefs and fantasy.

(I'll be playing Scenario 1 )

[Brady]

The underlying premis I am puting forth, basicaly sugest's (or ask's) that if were given controle of the Empire that we be alowed to controle production and research and thus effect how many of whaterever units we see fit for use. Withen the limits of supply and production constraint's. Which as I understand it is inhearent in the game already except insomuch as producing more of a given class beyond those that were produced in the war.

[norsemanjs]

Mogami, you are absolutely right. If people want to try alternate history scenarios the editor will handle it.

As has been pointed out repeatedly nearly all of the capital ships on all sides were already in progress at the wars start. If you want to create more capital ships for either side the editor is the logical place.

For example you want to assume that Japan decided to not build the super battleships and build a slew of tankers, you can eliminate the BB's from the oob and add whatever number of tankers you deem appropriate. This would also lower the commitments to shipyards at the beginning of the game and you would be able to basically bump everything else in the schedule up.

[mogami]

Hi, Norseman I think you understand the system.

[pasternakski]

If people want to try alternate history scenarios the editor will handle it.

The editor will most emphatically not "handle it" for those wanting to buy a game that presents a historical simulation. The basic game "engine" must present mechanics that allow for fighting the historical campaign within constraints presented by actual, not "alternate" history.

For example. You upgrade the quality of both aircraft and pilots available to the Japanese and allow for significant improvement in both as the war progresses. How does the game system, which was designed to handle unit, human, and equipment characteristics within a range relevant to what actually existed, compensate for these aberrations and give the players a game to play that has anything to do with reality? When you change one fighter aircraft type's maneuverability from 20 to 50, what happens to the delicate balances built into the air combat model?

I am not interested in buying a "War in the Pacific Construction Kit."

[Mike Scholl]

If you punks manage to get this game turned into a Jap fanboy exercise in "gee whiz, look what they coulda done if they woulda," I'm gonna be p1ssed at having wasted my seventy bucks on something that isn't worth the effort needed to toss it in the nearest sh1tcan.

....and had you bothered to follow the whole thread you would have noticed
that it was simply a response to some of BRADY's questions and claims. The
discussion was over what might or could have been done had a different choice
been made in 1935---not over what Matrix/2by3 should do in 2003! While I have
gone on record as being in favor of an "official" set of "what if" scenarios being
included in the game as well as the historical, it wasn't the subject of this
thread. BRADY had made a bunch of "Gee I wonder if" statements that had
gone somewhat outside the bounds of credulity, and a couple of us we trying
to bring him back to reality. You should read before you react..., and the PUNK
statement has no place in the discussion under any circumstances.

[mogami]

Yeow Pasternaski now I'm too afraid to ask if any one has a Chinese order of battle for 1931 so I can design a 1931-1945 Campaign. (instead of 1665 turns it is 5110 turns long)

[Brady]

For the sake of clarity this is what I am asking.

When the game starts in 41, I want to be able to stop production on certain clases of ships in favor of producing more of another type, and I sighted Histoical precedent and a lot of info to suport the reasionable request and logic behind doing so.

I never intended or ment to intend that anything priour to Dec. be changed in any way. The way I see it the player takes controle in 41 of the Empire, it's war production capacity and the Military, and the Merchant fleat, using all of these to effect a win or a loss should be up to the player, deciding how many DE's (example) were or are built under his Reign is as important as how he deployes his forces in the field.

[mogami]

Hi Brady the Japanese can not produce any ship not actually built or under construction when war ended. They can alter the arrival dates. You halt production of some ships and accelerate others. Very little built after 44 is going to influence the war in any way (unless the situation for Japan is markedly better then it actually was in 44)
However getting certain ships in 43 rather then 44-45 could prove usefull.
It is still too early for me to say to what degree the player can modifiy his ship building programs. I'll keep you posted as I get farther in testing.

Shinano appears in the que as a CV (because that is what she was built as)
Her durability is 180 and she requires 1066 days at normal construction rate to finish. This means each day she 'eats' 180 ship construction points. A Shimakaze class DD requires 13 points per day normal speed. So halting Shinano would allow 7 Shimakaze DD to build at accelerated rates. (cutting the arrival of Shimakaze from 396 to 198 days. The furthest out on the que PC is 1340 days. durabilty of 5 so 18 of these type ships can be brought forward 670 days (thats almost 2 years sooner)

Also I don't think the ship order of battle is complete yet.

[Brady]

Once Again TY Mogami, and everyone else for answering my question's.

That as you state it Mogami is prety much what I am asking for or hoping for...save the abaility to produce more of a given class than was actualy built, which as you say may be posable if it is deamed ok to do so by the powers to be.

The Only other question I have is regarding the Wodden hulled boats, which were mass produced in standardardized types throught the empire. I am woundering if they are modeled in the Game.

[Zeta16]

Are Japanese ships that were buliding at the end of the war but not finished in the game. Also same with the U.S. ships not yet in the Pacific by Augest of 45.

[pasternakski]

....and had you bothered to follow the whole thread you would have noticed
that it was simply a response to some of BRADY's questions and claims. The
discussion was over what might or could have been done had a different choice
been made in 1935---not over what Matrix/2by3 should do in 2003! While I have
gone on record as being in favor of an "official" set of "what if" scenarios being
included in the game as well as the historical, it wasn't the subject of this
thread. BRADY had made a bunch of "Gee I wonder if" statements that had
gone somewhat outside the bounds of credulity, and a couple of us we trying
to bring him back to reality. You should read before you react..., and the PUNK
statement has no place in the discussion under any circumstances.

I follow the discussion both here and in other threads where nonsense is being talked and have nothing to retract or add.

[mogami]

While you are correct that Japan had increased her production of Merchant
shipping by about 500% during the Thirties, which substantially lowered the
average age of the shipping, I'd have to question the validity of the claims
that Japan started the war with adequate shipping. In 1941 almost 40% of
Japanese cargo was carried in foriegn bottoms. The figures you quote for
Japan's own shipping are accurate enough---but she needed over 10,000,000
tons to meet her needs in the last year of "peace". So she was "short" even
then.

The figures you quote for what the Army and Navy would have to have to
begin the war also seem accurate. But the 4.1 million tons of shipping would
be taken from the civilian usage at the same time that most of the "foriegn
bottoms" were lost to he as well (she managed to sieze slightly over a million
tons in the first months of the war). And neither the Army or the Navy ever
"returned" any of the "borrowed" ships during the war---but instead continued
to demand even more shipping as the war went on.

And while I'm sure you're right that Japanese Yards could have built more
merchant shipping if they hadn't been building ships for the Navy---I don't think
the Japanese Navy could in any way be described as "over-sized" for the task
facing it. Someone had to build those ships for the navy, and with the possible
exception of the Yamato's, those ships were needed (and for that matter given
the shortage of "escorts" quite a few more would have been usefull).

And while the ships themselves may have been relatively new and effecient,
Japanese shipbuilding was not. Even under the pressures of the war it was
taking them between 18 and 24 months to complete all but the smallest ships;
this while the US was building larger vessels in a month or less. And it was used
most ineffeciently as well, averaging less than 75 miles a day in service and
often sailing empty. It seems the game will give the players the opportunity
to "improve" on the effeciency---which alone should improve their supply
abilities over their historical performance.

Hi, Mike the prewar totals for required Japanese shippings included iron ore and coking coal that Japan almost entirely had to import (from the US) The Japanese steel industry had been built up to produce 13 million tons per year.
Without imports it could only produce 1.5 million tons of lower grade steel so over 11.5 million tons of shipping were no longer needed. Once they expanded they were able to produce 7.5million tons in 1944. The 1.5million tons does not require shipping (it moves by rail in the Home Islands. This means in 1944, 6 million tons of shipping were used. (or the 1944 production used stockpiled materials moved earlier) But if we assume it was shipping then the Japanese only required 500,000 tons per month to achive their wartime high in steel production. (Had the material been available in 1941,1942 the Japanese had more then enough shipping to meet the demand)

However the Japanese civilian population certainly felt the lack of shipping long before the industry did. (In fact this had the largest impact on Japanese production of any cause. Hunger reduced production by well over 50 percent in 1945 and reduced it to lesser extents in 43 and 44) The Japanese do not seem to have felt a lack of material before 1945. Their over all industry was so small it was very hard to stop it. The two combined factors that produced the decline throughout the Japanese war effort were lack of food and lack of gasoline.

[Mike Scholl]

There is an error in your calculations above. Total materials imported/exported
in a year does not equal total tonnage of shipping required to do it. Depending
on the distance involved, a million tons of imports AND a million tons of exports
could all be carried by 100,000 tons of shipping making 10 round trips a year.
I'm sure if you had thought about at a bit you wouldn't have worded it that
way.

The figure of 10,000,000 tons of shipping is what the Japanese had and used
during 1941 (including the 3.5 million tons of foriegn bottoms). I don't have
the resources at hand to say exactly how much of what they moved where
with it, just that that was how much they used to move whatever they were
moving. And as you pointed out, for much of the year they were under an
embargo of many strategic materials by the West. That tonnage of goods
wasn't available to be imported. But without it, they still used 10,000,000
tons of shipping to meet their needs in that year. Now if they needed that
tonnage in 1941, and the Army/Navy takes 4.1 million tons of it for the War,
and they lose the use of almost 2.5 million tons of foriegn shipping, then it
stands to reason that their economy is going to be "short" of shipping in 1942.
The economy only has 3.4 millions tons of shipping to meet the demands that
needed 10,000,000 tons in 1941.

[mdiehl]

Y'all are overlooking something and I'm not sure whether anyone cares or is concerned, but...

Cancelling Shinano is not going to allow the Japanese to build DDs faster or in greater quantity. There are other limiting factors. One of these is engines. Japan could not repair and replace engines on her extant container ship and light escort fleet fast enough to keep pace with attrition through use. By 1944, fully 1/3 of the surviving merchant fleet was laid up awaiting maintenance. I guess all this comes down to "shipyard points." If so, the bottom line is that the Japanese should start the war with an insufficient number of shipyard points to both keep the extant merchant and naval fleet in good repair and add new ships. Indeed, they should have a hard time keeping the extant fleet in repair.

[mogami]

There is an error in your calculations above. Total materials imported/exported
in a year does not equal total tonnage of shipping required to do it. Depending
on the distance involved, a million tons of imports AND a million tons of exports
could all be carried by 100,000 tons of shipping making 10 round trips a year.
I'm sure if you had thought about at a bit you wouldn't have worded it that
way.

The figure of 10,000,000 tons of shipping is what the Japanese had and used
during 1941 (including the 3.5 million tons of foriegn bottoms). I don't have
the resources at hand to say exactly how much of what they moved where
with it, just that that was how much they used to move whatever they were
moving. And as you pointed out, for much of the year they were under an
embargo of many strategic materials by the West. That tonnage of goods
wasn't available to be imported. But without it, they still used 10,000,000
tons of shipping to meet their needs in that year. Now if they needed that
tonnage in 1941, and the Army/Navy takes 4.1 million tons of it for the War,
and they lose the use of almost 2.5 million tons of foriegn shipping, then it
stands to reason that their economy is going to be "short" of shipping in 1942.
The economy only has 3.4 millions tons of shipping to meet the demands that
needed 10,000,000 tons in 1941.

Mike I said in my post that 6million tons of material in a year only require 500,000 tons per month (it could be the same 500,000 tons month after month)