victorhauser,
Well, the adjustment of the destruction percentages is the removal of a BUG that was tripling those percentages from what the intended baseline.
Keep the infantry strong vs tanks ...
Moderator: MOD_SPWaW
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CaptainBrian
- Posts: 59
- Joined: Wed Dec 27, 2000 10:00 am
- Location: California
There truly seems to be no constant in the ability of nation's infantry to deal with tanks... compare these widely different results of Japanese (in game terms, some of the most prolific antitank infantry) antitank efforts from approximately the same time frame:Originally posted by orc4hire:
I have to disagree with the sweeping grandeur of your statement that all infantry of all periods, nationalities, and services, should always be able to take out a tank if they have access to a fragmentation grenade or some gasoline. Some infantry, of some nationalities, particularly later in the period, specially trained and equipped, were very dangerous indeed. A lot of the infantry, particularly in the earlier part of the period were far, far more likely to flee in terror from the tanks than the tanks were to flee in terror from them.
vs U. S. Army, Okinawa April 1945. The 7th Infantry Division sent a battalion of tanks to make an unsupported attack against Japanese positions on Kakazu Ridge. 31 tanks were destroyed, with minimal losses to the Japanese.
vs. USSR, Pamientung Manchuria August 1945. "Each individual... armed himself with explosives and rushed the enemy tanks. Although minor damage was inflicted on a majority...the explosives were not of sufficient strength to halt the tanks." (August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945. COL David M. Glantz U.S. Army Retired)
One possibility is to incorporate an "Infantry vs. Tanks" toggle switch, much like the Artillery effectiveness buttons. No way will everyone ever be happy.
CaptainBrian
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CaptainBrian
- Posts: 59
- Joined: Wed Dec 27, 2000 10:00 am
- Location: California
In historical practice, the results could be very erratic. Compare these two Japanese (some of the best AT Infantry in the game) efforts in late 1945:Originally posted by orc4hire:
I have to disagree with the sweeping grandeur of your statement that all infantry of all periods, nationalities, and services, should always be able to take out a tank if they have access to a fragmentation grenade or some gasoline. Some infantry, of some nationalities, particularly later in the period, specially trained and equipped, were very dangerous indeed. A lot of the infantry, particularly in the earlier part of the period were far, far more likely to flee in terror from the tanks than the tanks were to flee in terror from them.
Okinawa April 1945 vs. U. S. Army. The U. S. 7th Infantry Division sent an unsupported tank battalion against Japanese positions on Kakazu ridge. Final result- 31 tanks destroyed by satchel charge armed infantry.
Pamientung Manchuria, August 1945 vs. USSR. "Each individual... armed himself with explosives and rushed the enemy tanks. Although minor damage was inflicted...the explosives were not (strong enough) to halt the tanks." (August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945. Colonel David M. Glantz U. S. Army Retired).
Going back to Okinawa...the First Marine Division was the only U. S. unit to not lose a single tank to enemy action, a definite validation of their tank/infantry trainingand coordination, in short combined arms warfare.
One possibility is to incorporate an "Infantry vs. Tanks" toggle switch (just like the artillery effectiveness toggles) in the preferences menu. Just like many other subjects/functions, one solution will not fit all.
CaptainBrian
Hi, unsupported armour against formed infantry is a mistake...this does not mean commanders don't keep trying.
The tank was designed to carry a cannon/machine through small arms fire to points close enough for it to achive fire superority and allow it's infantry to take the position. It was thought to be a "feared weapon" like the Carthagian elephant. The result of course was the advent of the anti-tank gun. Which again meant the tanks needed the support of infantry. Like the elephant of old it was also found that if the enemy did not panic they could in fact kill the tank which also spelled the need for close infantry support...this gave birth to the armoured infantry which road to battle with the tanks in armoured personal carriers and dismounted when needed but could fight from the vehicle (something they can not do in SPWAW).
Trained/formed infantry need not fear unsupported tanks. They require no speacial weapons other then the knowledge all they need do is board the tank (hence the grenade launcher on most modern/late WWII tanks)
Infantry equipped with tank killing weapons and cover/concealment have a great advantage over unsupported tanks.
Infantry with out tank support suffer greatly when opposed by combined arms as it should be.
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I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!
The tank was designed to carry a cannon/machine through small arms fire to points close enough for it to achive fire superority and allow it's infantry to take the position. It was thought to be a "feared weapon" like the Carthagian elephant. The result of course was the advent of the anti-tank gun. Which again meant the tanks needed the support of infantry. Like the elephant of old it was also found that if the enemy did not panic they could in fact kill the tank which also spelled the need for close infantry support...this gave birth to the armoured infantry which road to battle with the tanks in armoured personal carriers and dismounted when needed but could fight from the vehicle (something they can not do in SPWAW).
Trained/formed infantry need not fear unsupported tanks. They require no speacial weapons other then the knowledge all they need do is board the tank (hence the grenade launcher on most modern/late WWII tanks)
Infantry equipped with tank killing weapons and cover/concealment have a great advantage over unsupported tanks.
Infantry with out tank support suffer greatly when opposed by combined arms as it should be.
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I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
The German Army Handbook by Buchner has several pages dedicated to describing close combat with tanks. Here is a summary.
In 1939-1940 Infantry had One AT rifle per platoon and each man was equipped with 10 armor piercing rounds. This equipment was found to be unsatisfactory during the Russian campaign. (Not that it was not poor in France of Poland, just that in those campaigns AT guns and Stukas leveled the playing field).
OKH declared Close Anti Tank Combat as a knew form of combat. Training began in ernest. As the Russian campaign continued tanks were now being attacked with increasing effect by infantry. Attacking a tank was a simple decision. KILL or BE KILLED.
Early on primary means of destroying a tank
was with makeshift weapons. Creating smoke using Gasoline or damp hay or similar items ignited by flare pistols. Rags soaked in flammables, pouring gasoline into a tank, blinding optics with mud and paint. Covering ports and optics with canvas covers. Crowbars and similar items always kept ready by the infantry used to open hatches for pistol shots or hand grenades. Anything thrown down the main gun barrel. Throwing grenades down the barrel. (Author says he has disabled three tanks by sliding grenades down a barrel). Smoke grenades, flares. Cause smoke to get sucked into the tank through ventilation, many times crew will evacuate. Concentric handgrenades, 1kg explosive charges, Molotovs. 3kg concentric explosive charges, T-mines.
Guidlines were set on how to make and use makeshift weapons. In 1942 infantry began getting purpose built equipment.
Close combat teams consisted of four men.
1 leader equipped with MPi, two hand grenades, two smoke grenades and a spade.
1 tank blinder equipped with pistol, smoke bombs, two hand grenades, two twin smoke grenades and a spade.
1 tank destroyer equipped with pistol, smoke bombs, one magnetic charge, one T-mine with anchor hooks or a 3kg concentric charge. Several detinators, two handgrenades, and a spade.
1 securer equipped smae as destroyer.
A special decoration was was introduced in March 1942 for anyone who destroys a tank in close combat. Around 14,000 were eventually awarded.
So basically sometime in 1941 the German Infantry should get an improvement on close assault to simulate the use of improvised weapons along with training.
Of course as the was dragged on tanks became more immune (through better designing)to smoke inhalation, flame throwers, molotovs,poured flammables etc...
Somewhere in one of my books there is a table breaking down the number of tanks destroyed and by what means. Most are destroyed by Tank or Anti tank guns. Few by close assault and Panzerfaust.
Craig
In 1939-1940 Infantry had One AT rifle per platoon and each man was equipped with 10 armor piercing rounds. This equipment was found to be unsatisfactory during the Russian campaign. (Not that it was not poor in France of Poland, just that in those campaigns AT guns and Stukas leveled the playing field).
OKH declared Close Anti Tank Combat as a knew form of combat. Training began in ernest. As the Russian campaign continued tanks were now being attacked with increasing effect by infantry. Attacking a tank was a simple decision. KILL or BE KILLED.
Early on primary means of destroying a tank
was with makeshift weapons. Creating smoke using Gasoline or damp hay or similar items ignited by flare pistols. Rags soaked in flammables, pouring gasoline into a tank, blinding optics with mud and paint. Covering ports and optics with canvas covers. Crowbars and similar items always kept ready by the infantry used to open hatches for pistol shots or hand grenades. Anything thrown down the main gun barrel. Throwing grenades down the barrel. (Author says he has disabled three tanks by sliding grenades down a barrel). Smoke grenades, flares. Cause smoke to get sucked into the tank through ventilation, many times crew will evacuate. Concentric handgrenades, 1kg explosive charges, Molotovs. 3kg concentric explosive charges, T-mines.
Guidlines were set on how to make and use makeshift weapons. In 1942 infantry began getting purpose built equipment.
Close combat teams consisted of four men.
1 leader equipped with MPi, two hand grenades, two smoke grenades and a spade.
1 tank blinder equipped with pistol, smoke bombs, two hand grenades, two twin smoke grenades and a spade.
1 tank destroyer equipped with pistol, smoke bombs, one magnetic charge, one T-mine with anchor hooks or a 3kg concentric charge. Several detinators, two handgrenades, and a spade.
1 securer equipped smae as destroyer.
A special decoration was was introduced in March 1942 for anyone who destroys a tank in close combat. Around 14,000 were eventually awarded.
So basically sometime in 1941 the German Infantry should get an improvement on close assault to simulate the use of improvised weapons along with training.
Of course as the was dragged on tanks became more immune (through better designing)to smoke inhalation, flame throwers, molotovs,poured flammables etc...
Somewhere in one of my books there is a table breaking down the number of tanks destroyed and by what means. Most are destroyed by Tank or Anti tank guns. Few by close assault and Panzerfaust.
Craig
Every 3rd post here talks about how vulnerable 'unsupported' tanks are to infantry... the trouble is the definition of unsupported. Infantry following close behind a tank _will not_ protect it in SP. Only infantry _between_ the enemy infantry and the tank, or infantry actually stuck to the tank's exterior as auxiliary armor. If you have hostile infantry 1 hex (50 yards) in front of a tank, and friendly infantry 1 hex (50 yards) behind, the enemy infantry will close assault, and likely as not destroy the tank without the friendly supporting infantry being able to react. (Incidently creating a smoke hex from the wreck, blocking the friendly infantry's line of sight and assuring that they will take some casualties from op-fire if they try and get close enough to attack the enemy squad.)
So, how close to the tank does infantry have to be to be considered 'supporting'? In SP, they have to be in physical contact. Note, that doctrine generally held that the infantry _followed_ the tanks. In SP, of course, this is suicide; tanks are far too fragile to risk running into hostile forces.
Oh, and since we're quoting....
From EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN NIGHT FIGHTING ON THE EUROPEAN LAND MASS DURING WORLD WAR II:
"(2) Mark IV and Panther tanks of the 3d Panzer Regiment reached a roadblock protecting Bastogne and defended by an understrength tank battalion of CCR, 9th Armored Division after darkness on 17 December 1944. Sweeping the area with machine gun fire to clear any infantry who might be protecting the American tanks, the panzers overran and destroyed two tank platoons, set other vehicles ablaze with tracer bullets, and knocked out the roadblock. Pp. 295-296."
Heavens to betsy! Unsupported tanks overrunning a roadblock protected by a mixed force, at night and in close terrain no less. How could such a thing be possible? Why did the ferocious infantry not just whip out their trusty P-38 C-rat can openers, pop the tops on the panzers and beat the crewmen to death with a rolled up field manual?
From a 'Lessons Learned' document, from the field, 16 June, 1944:
"d, The combined use of armored and infantry units has been too cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire power of tankts during the period when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of armor has not been overcome and mobility has not been restored to its proper importance in the
employment of tanks. Too often a column of tanks has remained inactive on a road, held up by a single SP or AT gun. The time lost waiting for infantry to arrive, deploy and attack the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a wide envelopment which
would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun.
Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a road. Again, the time waited waiting for the arrival and action of tanks could have been materially reduced by early and wide deployment."
I am so staggered that I can barely type.... American doctrine suggesting that maybe tanks _shouldn't_ always wait for the infantry to show up (but what would tanks be doing wandering around without infantry stuck to them? Don't they know that that's suicide?), but rather take care of the situation themselves?
From the U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces"
(Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
"A typical attack formation of this type might be divided up among the Panzer division's units as follows: the first wave, on a frontage of about 2,000 to 3,000 yards, might consist of one tank battalion, two companies forward, supported on the flanks by elements of the assault gun battalion. Close to the rear of the first wave usually follow one or two Panzer Grenadier companies in armored half-tracks.
About 150 yards to the rear of the first wave moves the second wave, formed of the second tank battalion in the same formation, closely followed by the remainder of the armored Panzer Grenadiers, who are in turn followed at some distance by the motorized Panzer
Grenadiers. The flanks are protected by antitank guns which normally operate by platoons, moving by bounds. The artillery forward observer travels in his armored vehicles with the first wave, while the
artillery commander of the supporting artillery units usually travels with the tank commander. Assault guns normally also accompany the second wave."
Why, those wacky Germans; leading with their tanks like that. They can't possibly have ever won a battle that way.
So, how close to the tank does infantry have to be to be considered 'supporting'? In SP, they have to be in physical contact. Note, that doctrine generally held that the infantry _followed_ the tanks. In SP, of course, this is suicide; tanks are far too fragile to risk running into hostile forces.
Oh, and since we're quoting....
From EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN NIGHT FIGHTING ON THE EUROPEAN LAND MASS DURING WORLD WAR II:
"(2) Mark IV and Panther tanks of the 3d Panzer Regiment reached a roadblock protecting Bastogne and defended by an understrength tank battalion of CCR, 9th Armored Division after darkness on 17 December 1944. Sweeping the area with machine gun fire to clear any infantry who might be protecting the American tanks, the panzers overran and destroyed two tank platoons, set other vehicles ablaze with tracer bullets, and knocked out the roadblock. Pp. 295-296."
Heavens to betsy! Unsupported tanks overrunning a roadblock protected by a mixed force, at night and in close terrain no less. How could such a thing be possible? Why did the ferocious infantry not just whip out their trusty P-38 C-rat can openers, pop the tops on the panzers and beat the crewmen to death with a rolled up field manual?
From a 'Lessons Learned' document, from the field, 16 June, 1944:
"d, The combined use of armored and infantry units has been too cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire power of tankts during the period when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of armor has not been overcome and mobility has not been restored to its proper importance in the
employment of tanks. Too often a column of tanks has remained inactive on a road, held up by a single SP or AT gun. The time lost waiting for infantry to arrive, deploy and attack the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a wide envelopment which
would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun.
Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a road. Again, the time waited waiting for the arrival and action of tanks could have been materially reduced by early and wide deployment."
I am so staggered that I can barely type.... American doctrine suggesting that maybe tanks _shouldn't_ always wait for the infantry to show up (but what would tanks be doing wandering around without infantry stuck to them? Don't they know that that's suicide?), but rather take care of the situation themselves?
From the U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces"
(Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
"A typical attack formation of this type might be divided up among the Panzer division's units as follows: the first wave, on a frontage of about 2,000 to 3,000 yards, might consist of one tank battalion, two companies forward, supported on the flanks by elements of the assault gun battalion. Close to the rear of the first wave usually follow one or two Panzer Grenadier companies in armored half-tracks.
About 150 yards to the rear of the first wave moves the second wave, formed of the second tank battalion in the same formation, closely followed by the remainder of the armored Panzer Grenadiers, who are in turn followed at some distance by the motorized Panzer
Grenadiers. The flanks are protected by antitank guns which normally operate by platoons, moving by bounds. The artillery forward observer travels in his armored vehicles with the first wave, while the
artillery commander of the supporting artillery units usually travels with the tank commander. Assault guns normally also accompany the second wave."
Why, those wacky Germans; leading with their tanks like that. They can't possibly have ever won a battle that way.
orc4 thats the whole point isn't it the Germans did lose the war and most of the battles involved ..it worked a few times early on ..but after the first few times folks didn't get up and run away just because tanks were coming.. the example of the night fighting at Bastogne ..if that example was in any way indicative of how the Battle of the Bulge went or even the fighting around Bastogne proper then why did the Germans lose so badly at Bastogne and the Bulge in general ... Mad men thinking tanks were some superweapon that could replace tactics is why they lost and usually why the Germans lose in PBEM Human on Human ... If you think i am wrong you can always join Combat Command and show me
Hehehheeeeh said the spider to the fly heheheeehee
Hehehheeeeh said the spider to the fly heheheeehee
"For Americans war is almost all of the time a nuisance, and military skill is a luxury like Mah-jongg. But when the issue is brought home to them, war becomes as important, for the necessary periods, as business or sport. And it is hard to decide which
AmmoSGT, did you check out the date on that document? 1945. That was the tactics the Germans developed _after_ infantry got fairly comfortable with the idea of standing off tanks, and had the equipment to do so fairly well. Note also that the infantry were trailing by less than 150 yards -- 3 SP hexes. Probably more like 50-100 yards. In the real world, that's supporting distance. In SP, they might as well not be there.
The German tactics worked 'a few times'? Then everyone noticed that those tactics sucked, and the Germans lost the war? Good thing the Arabs never noticed that the Israeli's were using German tactics, or they would have lost too, huh? Or the US in Desert Storm... good thing Saddam never read his history....
Oh, wait; even in WWII a lot of the time American tanks led the way in assaults, with the infantry following in a supporting role, just like the Germans. I guess that's why we lost too, huh? Oh, wait... we didn't lose, did we?
The incident from the battle of the bulge wasn't supposed to indicate how the entire battle went, it was to indicate that tanks did on occasion successfully take out infantry positions, even late in the war. What would have been your argument if the example had happened to be American tanks taking out a German roadblock?
Here's one (same source):
"The 1st SS Panzer Division sent a column composed of infantry and assault guns toward Recht. About 0200, the advance guard hit the village defended by a tank battalion operating under the headquarters of CCR, 7th Armored Division. Unwilling to risk his tanks without infantry protection in a night fight through narrow streets and uncertain of the German strength, the American commander ordered a withdrawal after a sharp 450-minute engagement. P. 280."
Unsupported tanks in a village standing off a combined arms force for 7.5 hours, only withdrawing to avoid a night fight.
The point is that with the BUG currently in the close assault routines, SP does not model infantry/armor interaction properly. The point is that a sniper should not 'of course' be able to take out an AFV zipping down the road past him more often than not. The point is that not all infantry from '31 to '49 were equal and people who say, "Infantry could do this," and "Infantry could do that," as if a squad of Chinese peasant conscrips in 1931 were the same as a squad of US Army Rangers in 1945 are rather missing the point.
The German tactics worked 'a few times'? Then everyone noticed that those tactics sucked, and the Germans lost the war? Good thing the Arabs never noticed that the Israeli's were using German tactics, or they would have lost too, huh? Or the US in Desert Storm... good thing Saddam never read his history....
Oh, wait; even in WWII a lot of the time American tanks led the way in assaults, with the infantry following in a supporting role, just like the Germans. I guess that's why we lost too, huh? Oh, wait... we didn't lose, did we?
The incident from the battle of the bulge wasn't supposed to indicate how the entire battle went, it was to indicate that tanks did on occasion successfully take out infantry positions, even late in the war. What would have been your argument if the example had happened to be American tanks taking out a German roadblock?
Here's one (same source):
"The 1st SS Panzer Division sent a column composed of infantry and assault guns toward Recht. About 0200, the advance guard hit the village defended by a tank battalion operating under the headquarters of CCR, 7th Armored Division. Unwilling to risk his tanks without infantry protection in a night fight through narrow streets and uncertain of the German strength, the American commander ordered a withdrawal after a sharp 450-minute engagement. P. 280."
Unsupported tanks in a village standing off a combined arms force for 7.5 hours, only withdrawing to avoid a night fight.
The point is that with the BUG currently in the close assault routines, SP does not model infantry/armor interaction properly. The point is that a sniper should not 'of course' be able to take out an AFV zipping down the road past him more often than not. The point is that not all infantry from '31 to '49 were equal and people who say, "Infantry could do this," and "Infantry could do that," as if a squad of Chinese peasant conscrips in 1931 were the same as a squad of US Army Rangers in 1945 are rather missing the point.
nobody leads with tanks most armies have and will lead with recon of some sort desert storm the lead elements were recon and arty prep and air strikes ...i give up .. geeze ... doctrine is guidelines i am sure if you read just a little farther they are going to talk about terrain considerations differences for urban and forrest and open terrain and technical stuff like that ....If you want to run around with your supporting infantry in the rear in terrain where the tanks should be the support yeah hey you think everything is in support of tanks ok fine some countries do it the other way around they advance infantry with tanks in support for short visibility situtions ... but if you think even the U S Army went tearing around a wide open desert even with thermal imagry and there was no recon out in front well then we have identified the problem haven't we ....
"For Americans war is almost all of the time a nuisance, and military skill is a luxury like Mah-jongg. But when the issue is brought home to them, war becomes as important, for the necessary periods, as business or sport. And it is hard to decide which
HMmm bud I dont know which group in Desert storm ya talking about but the marine assaults where led by infantry in amtracs and hmmvs. The tanks couldnt keep up. And contray to some armored cav gys i know even that new m1a2 cant outrun a hmmv hahah thru it was a nice race 
Still Infantry back then rarely held there own vs tanks unless they had some cover. As most smart tank commanders werent or hopefully werent dum enough to attack infantry in cover as in towns or woods. Some did but nuthing every works out like the books say in real warfare simply because man is so adaptable and lady luck has a say so herself.
Still Infantry back then rarely held there own vs tanks unless they had some cover. As most smart tank commanders werent or hopefully werent dum enough to attack infantry in cover as in towns or woods. Some did but nuthing every works out like the books say in real warfare simply because man is so adaptable and lady luck has a say so herself. Krull
Hi, towards the end the germans were searching for a way to off set the numbers. Here is a very scary story....But pay attention even those wacky rocket scientist germans realized the need for infantry support....well some of them anyway, thank goodness there were a few dumb germans.
Little story: Panthers with Infrared in Combat.
Some reports tell of a late-war combat involving IR Panthers that were equipped, which encountered a British armoured division. A British unit equipped with Comet tanks was engaged in April 1945 (at night) by some solution B-type IR Panthers. In a short one-sided firefight, the entire platoon was annihilated.
Some farsighted officers of the Fallingbostel armour school formed basic tactics for equipped tank units. They planned to establish special night task forces. Panthers fitted with triple IR devices formed the core of these units. These tanks had three huge armour plates welded on the engine deck, thus offering protection on the sides and rear for three infantrymen. These troops had to protect "their" Panther with MP 44 assault rifles, which could be fitted with IR devices in its final version.[Vampir].
The IR Panther would be followed into combat by Sd.Kfz. 251/21 "Falke" vehicles carrying a number of infantrymen armed with MP 44s. The attack would have been backed, whenever possible, by Sd.Kfz. 251/20s fitted with 60 cm "Uhu" IR search lights. Units that were equipped in this manner would surely have had an enormous impact on enemy units that lacked IR devices.
In the Spring of 1944 about 1000 IR aiming devices were ready but army officials rejected their use. The ready and working devices were stored in a salt mine in the Harz mountains. A general was quoted as saying, "We don't need any stuff like this, our soldiers will win the war chivalrously".
Now of course you don't need as much infantry support if the path is being cleared by swarms of stukas but I still recommend taking some. When infantry is in support of tanks it means they engage units capable of killing tanks. If you are keeping them behind all the time you need to learn "overwatch" and "bounding overwatch" and what those little 2-4 man units called recon are for.
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I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!
[This message has been edited by Mogami (edited February 12, 2001).]
Little story: Panthers with Infrared in Combat.
Some reports tell of a late-war combat involving IR Panthers that were equipped, which encountered a British armoured division. A British unit equipped with Comet tanks was engaged in April 1945 (at night) by some solution B-type IR Panthers. In a short one-sided firefight, the entire platoon was annihilated.
Some farsighted officers of the Fallingbostel armour school formed basic tactics for equipped tank units. They planned to establish special night task forces. Panthers fitted with triple IR devices formed the core of these units. These tanks had three huge armour plates welded on the engine deck, thus offering protection on the sides and rear for three infantrymen. These troops had to protect "their" Panther with MP 44 assault rifles, which could be fitted with IR devices in its final version.[Vampir].
The IR Panther would be followed into combat by Sd.Kfz. 251/21 "Falke" vehicles carrying a number of infantrymen armed with MP 44s. The attack would have been backed, whenever possible, by Sd.Kfz. 251/20s fitted with 60 cm "Uhu" IR search lights. Units that were equipped in this manner would surely have had an enormous impact on enemy units that lacked IR devices.
In the Spring of 1944 about 1000 IR aiming devices were ready but army officials rejected their use. The ready and working devices were stored in a salt mine in the Harz mountains. A general was quoted as saying, "We don't need any stuff like this, our soldiers will win the war chivalrously".
Now of course you don't need as much infantry support if the path is being cleared by swarms of stukas but I still recommend taking some. When infantry is in support of tanks it means they engage units capable of killing tanks. If you are keeping them behind all the time you need to learn "overwatch" and "bounding overwatch" and what those little 2-4 man units called recon are for.
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I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!
[This message has been edited by Mogami (edited February 12, 2001).]
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Has anybody ever experienced this? I started a Russian campaign and the first battle was against a Finnish assault. It went very badly for my side. In any case I had one KV1 which the enemy could scarcely destroy (armor of 75, except for the rear which is 60). I don't know if the tank got immobilised or what, but it was surrounded at one point by like 12 infantry type units. For a turn or two, with me unable to rally it, the enemy for some reason decided to not attack it for like two straight turns. When I recovered the unit to be able to fire off a couple of the rounds, some of the units had moved on to well beyond the tank's rear. Before I fired, I looked around at how many units I could spot and there still were quite a few. Fired off my round, and in opfire the tank was assaulted a minimum of FIVE TIMES but more between 6-7 times before it was destroyed. What is this!!!??? Now you may say the superior Finn experience enabled more assaults, but I've been on the reverse side of that arrangement far more often than been the victim (with huge experience/morale against a foe with neither in good stead) and I have NEVER had more than two assaults to a unit's fire. I have a very sore spot from that rip-off engagement, though I knew my unit was doomed anyway. After that, I gave up entirely on playing against an enemy who could assault one of my units between 5-7 times (one per unit I imagine) for my one shot fired. The only thing I could do in a situation where I'm being mobbed like that, is to only fire in opfire, so that I'm basically fighting one-to-one. I don't think it's right that my one unit should've been assaulted only twice by all of those units (did I just say that?), but it's quite unfair for me not to be able to do it also.
OTOH, I can understand one unit assaulting every single unit that comes into a hex it's guarding, due to opfire, as I understand that entrenched units tend to get hyper, and I've certainly benefitted from that before, but what outrages me is that "I" was the one entrenched, not the Finns. If I had been on a level playing field, though the troops fought bravely, I would slaughtered the whole lot of the Finn army, but I was obligated to being only able to counter any Finn move with only two opfires. Thanks.
[This message has been edited by Charles22 (edited February 12, 2001).]
OTOH, I can understand one unit assaulting every single unit that comes into a hex it's guarding, due to opfire, as I understand that entrenched units tend to get hyper, and I've certainly benefitted from that before, but what outrages me is that "I" was the one entrenched, not the Finns. If I had been on a level playing field, though the troops fought bravely, I would slaughtered the whole lot of the Finn army, but I was obligated to being only able to counter any Finn move with only two opfires. Thanks.
[This message has been edited by Charles22 (edited February 12, 2001).]
Ammosgt,
Well geez, you think maybe it's possible that all German tactics (or anyone elses) can't be summed up in 1 extracted paragraph? You think maybe I've read more than that 1 paragraph? You think maybe I didn't feel like cutting and pasting several books worth of text into a message on a game forum just to try and convince people that maybe it was NOT standard docrtine OR PRACTICE for anyone to have infantry (that being guys ON FOOT) preceding the vehicles under any and all circumstances in which the enemy might be encountered. If you think not, well, I guess we've identified the problem, haven't we? But you apparantly think it's US practice to have guys walking the ground in front of every vehicle to make sure there isn't a sniper waiting with a grenade to blow it up when it drives by, so I guess there's no point trying to reason with you.
Krull,
Bud, I'm talking about, for example, "Getting It Right" by Dunnigan and Macedonia, who detail, among other things, the tactics the US Army adopted from German practice. And I remind you that as far as SP is concerned, Bradley's and HUMVEES AREN'T INFANTRY. They're vehicles, just like tanks, only they blow up a little easier. The technical term for the infantry on the HT you run down the road ahead of your tanks is 'casualties.'
Well geez, you think maybe it's possible that all German tactics (or anyone elses) can't be summed up in 1 extracted paragraph? You think maybe I've read more than that 1 paragraph? You think maybe I didn't feel like cutting and pasting several books worth of text into a message on a game forum just to try and convince people that maybe it was NOT standard docrtine OR PRACTICE for anyone to have infantry (that being guys ON FOOT) preceding the vehicles under any and all circumstances in which the enemy might be encountered. If you think not, well, I guess we've identified the problem, haven't we? But you apparantly think it's US practice to have guys walking the ground in front of every vehicle to make sure there isn't a sniper waiting with a grenade to blow it up when it drives by, so I guess there's no point trying to reason with you.
Krull,
Bud, I'm talking about, for example, "Getting It Right" by Dunnigan and Macedonia, who detail, among other things, the tactics the US Army adopted from German practice. And I remind you that as far as SP is concerned, Bradley's and HUMVEES AREN'T INFANTRY. They're vehicles, just like tanks, only they blow up a little easier. The technical term for the infantry on the HT you run down the road ahead of your tanks is 'casualties.'
sounds good to me orc4hire thru some officer told me to run infront of any tank. Id think Id have to say you first.Not to mention IF i had to and survived After it ws over id wup some tanker but soon as i found em
But alot this post here are right many specialy earlie rin war would run from tansk simply cause they had not seen warfare where big ugly vehicles with big guns came charging at ya. By the way to a infantry man even a 37mm looks big if its shooting in yer direction But tahst where game limits come in can't have everything real or it wouldnt be a game. Designers strill ahve to make it so french troops can fight vs big german tanks even if historicaly the ran simply because some player MIGHT liek to be the french.
But alot this post here are right many specialy earlie rin war would run from tansk simply cause they had not seen warfare where big ugly vehicles with big guns came charging at ya. By the way to a infantry man even a 37mm looks big if its shooting in yer direction
But tahst where game limits come in can't have everything real or it wouldnt be a game. Designers strill ahve to make it so french troops can fight vs big german tanks even if historicaly the ran simply because some player MIGHT liek to be the french.Krull
The whole discussion about support of tanks by infantry is quite interesting. But have you ever thought about the fact that any army had Spws and today almost every infantry unit in every modern army uses armored transorters?
The German word for those SPWs is "Schuetzenpanzer", which means a armored vehicle which transports infantry.
The early German tank tactics were only possible because of the fast transported infantry (on trucks, later on Spws). The artillery was transported by trucks, too, later SPA was used.
But there are examples for the tank only method, too:
The attack through the Maginot line by the 7.Pz Div for example. At first infantry and pioneers made a breach into the first fortification line, then the tanks broke through, unsupported by infantry, through 2 further fortification lines. It worked. The commanding general was Rommel.
What I want to say is that the supported tank attack was the standard method and every army of the world uses it today - BUT there are other situations where other methods may bring the same results.
The German word for those SPWs is "Schuetzenpanzer", which means a armored vehicle which transports infantry.
The early German tank tactics were only possible because of the fast transported infantry (on trucks, later on Spws). The artillery was transported by trucks, too, later SPA was used.
But there are examples for the tank only method, too:
The attack through the Maginot line by the 7.Pz Div for example. At first infantry and pioneers made a breach into the first fortification line, then the tanks broke through, unsupported by infantry, through 2 further fortification lines. It worked. The commanding general was Rommel.
What I want to say is that the supported tank attack was the standard method and every army of the world uses it today - BUT there are other situations where other methods may bring the same results.
If you like what I said love me,if you dislike what I say ignore me!
"Extra Bavaria non est vita! Et sic est vita non est ita!"
"Extra Bavaria non est vita! Et sic est vita non est ita!"