ASW depth charging successes in WitP (and UV) compared to historic results...

[mdiehl]

I think we passed each other there. I was responding to Nik. Japanese doctrine was not "shoot everything." It was to subordinate subs to fleet ops. They were intermittently given general shipping interdiction options but this was somewhat exceptional. Not saying that they should not be wlloed to do it, since they did sink some merchants. It just wasn't their primary mission.

The US started the war with a dual mission that heavily emphasized merchant and transport interdiction. Unfortunately however there were few boats available suitable for merchant interdiction owing to range restrictions on the older boats. That's why old rusties like the S-class were hanging around the Solomons once the PI and Indonesian bases became untenable.

Wolfpacking however was the specific tactic in discussion. It of necessity includes tagging on to convoys, sending signals as to position course and speed, and engaging the TF along with other boats at times of mximal confusion. In effect, concentrating (on time scales on the order of hours) forces to overload the escorts, if present. Contrary to what was posted earlier by someone else, the Germans were pretty effective at it as was the USN. It required, however, good communication among boats, decent timing, and doctrinal emphasis on the theories of how to do it properly.

So, if one is doing it "right" boats that can wolfpack should enjoy a success rate somewhat greater than boats that can not regardless of the number of boats in the hex.

That's why I asked about the surface combat thing. Not only were US DD skippers in fact explicitly trained in the torpedo first doctrine, but one could easily imagine that if the claim is that the player is in the shoes of Yamamoto or whatever and may thus declare a new doctrine, that DDs in close formation with CAs would be allowed to shoot torpedoes before the CA gun line engages. Or, better still, the US could simply produce oxy driven torpedoes rather than compressed air driven ones. We had one in the 1920s. It was thought dangerous to have that O2 on a ship's deck. To a certain degree that thinking was correct, since IIRC several Japanese CAs lit up like roman candles when shells struck their torpedo mounts.

So are the players stuck with historical doctrine or not? If not, why allow only one player to deviate from the historical doctrine?

[Nikademus]

No, it means exactly what i stated in the previous response regarding sub obs.

Making strategic decisions on how (merchant warfare vs picket lines in support of fleet ops) and where to employ one's assets is a totally different kettle of fish from where you are trying to take this conversation.

As i clearly stated, the tactical challenges that were present historically remain and are unalterable. However there is no reason why a player cant order his assets to preform a mission different from what was done orig (i.e. engage in dedicated merchant warfare from day 1 if desired) To reitterate and expand on what i mentioned, for the Japan player those challenges are:

a) Ever increasing Allied ASW proficiancy as time goes by, a double wammy of EXP levels + time period.
b) better and/or more proliferant ASW weapons
c) distance to prime merchant areas (if merchant strategy pursued)
d) increasing pool of assets that can be assigned to ASW work.

For the USA player

a) Mk-14 torpedo issue
b) exp issues at start + distance to prime areas. (AS ships will help here)


Having not played UV, you are not privy to just how dangerous it is to operate Iboats in environments where the Allied player ensures proper coverage of his merchants. This includes not only destruction of enemy subs but also thwarting of sub attacks via air and sea coverage. The only glaring flaw in the system was the abiltiy to mass stack subs in coastal/port hexes which was addressed a couple patches ago. Players now have to earn their kills the hard way, out on the trade lanes or else risk additional damage and casualties. Some will no doubt chose to go that route regardless. That too is a decision up to the player

The quickest way to lose Iboats as the Japan player is to operate them in dense ASW environments (air/sea) however away from that, which will be much easier to do in WitP given it's increased scale, the Iboats can flurish as can most other subs. It will be up to the Allied player to ensure proper ASW for his most important convoys. Neglect of this key facet will result in increased losses.

Same goes for USA player....careless use of subs in dangerous (i.e. shallow) waters will increase their loss rate despite Japan's fixed inferior status in ASW and reduce returns.

How successful the player is will depend on the other player's countermeasures and on how well the former plans his ops to take into account the strengths and weaknesses of his forces.

But there was no "doctornal thing" that would prevent a Japanese sub commander from attacking merchant targets if his command ordered him to do so. It was done in the war albeit on a limited basis and several successful campaigns were conducted off the Austrailian and Indian coastlines.

[mdiehl]

Making strategic decisions on how (merchant warfare vs picket lines in support of fleet ops) and where to employ one's assets is a totally different kettle of fish from where you are trying to take this conversation.

Not a completely different kettle of fish. If for example you were to suggest that 5 Japanese submarines operating within a given fixed area of ocean were equally as effective as 5 German or US submarines operating within that area I would disagree on the grounds that Japanese doctrine did not emphasize cooperative hunting and attack to the same degree as the Germans or the Allies (once the USN had enough long range boats available to make this kind of effort attemptable... that'd be mid 1943 or later).

And I'm talking "in theory" here, not as a criticism of UV (which I don't have yet). I'm also talking about marginal phenomena, I suppose. I have not seen lots of surprise engagements in any given individual UV game series of AARS.

Let me put the alternative DD question in a different way. USN DDs were definitely trained before the start of the war to begin night surface actions with torpedo attacks. If I make a strategic decision about how (an all DD TF of, say, 8 DDs) and where (near Tulagi at night) to deploy my assets, should that DD TF be equally as likely to launch a night surface torpedo-first attack as any IJN CA-DD battlegroup?

If not? Why not?

And as an aside, why do you keep mis-spelling "doctrinal" (ex: "doctornal" and "doctorinal") and putting it in quotes? In the context it makes it sound like you are quoting ME, which you are clearly not doing.

[Nikademus]

Not a completely different kettle of fish. If for example you were to suggest that 5 Japanese submarines operating within a given fixed area of ocean were equally as effective as 5 German or US submarines operating within that area I would disagree on the grounds that Japanese doctrine did not emphasize cooperative hunting and attack to the same degree as the Germans or the Allies (once the USN had enough long range boats available to make this kind of effort attemptable... that'd be mid 1943 or later).

Yes, a different kettle. Whether or not the IJN subs are as experienced (i.e. 'good') as the five German subs is irrelevent to the issue of the ability of a player to decide to send them to that area to attack the targets found. How well they do is a matter of the tactical factors i have listed twice now. its up to the player to judge whether its worth the effort or not. (Knowing the rules, i would not stack 5 IJN subs in one hex)

And I'm talking "in theory" here, not as a criticism of UV (which I don't have yet). I'm also talking about marginal phenomena, I suppose. I have not seen lots of surprise engagements in any given individual UV game series of AARS.

Didn't suggest you were. However you 'seem' to be concerned once more that the Japanese will be able to do something you feel that they should not be able to do. Hence I related the UV experience since WitP uses the same engine therefore we have actual game examples to go by vs pure theory. Japanese Iboats are no wonder weapon in UV...they wont be in WitP, unless the Allied player is neglectful of his quiet areas. The Japanese could have used their powerful sub force differently had they chosen. As with other facets, they did not.....to their cost. This is with the IJN "Doctrine" feature off btw. On the same token i've also made US subs pay dearly for ignoring the dangers of shallow water hexes and hanging around areas heavily patrolled by aircraft..thus increasing the Japanese kill ratio above historical. Once again, player has control over how he deploys his subs....but is at the mercy of static tactical realities. shallow-water hex = increased danger for sub. heavily patrolled area = more danger etc etc. sub might profit more....but sub also much more likely to die.

Let me put the alternative DD question in a different way. USN DDs were definitely trained before the start of the war to begin night surface actions with torpedo attacks. If I make a strategic decision about how (an all DD TF of, say, 8 DDs) and where (near Tulagi at night) to deploy my assets, should that DD TF be equally as likely to launch a night surface torpedo-first attack as any IJN CA-DD battlegroup?

If not? Why not?

See my last post.

And as an aside, why do you keep mis-spelling "doctrinal" (ex: "doctornal" and "doctorinal") and putting it in quotes? In the context it makes it sound like you are quoting ME, which you are clearly not doing.

I have a speesh impedimenth

[frank1970]

I do not really understand Mdiehl, what you mean with contact between the Uboats of the German Navy.

As far as I know the single subs weren´t able to contact each other.
There were several incidents of Uboats damaging each other while fighting convoys.